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Abstract
The Philosophical Foundations of PLEN: A Protocol-theoretic
Logic of Epistemic Norms
by
Ralph Jenkins
Advisor: Graham Priest
In this dissertation, I defend the protocol-theoretic account of epistemic norms. The protocoltheoretic account amounts to three theses: (i) There are norms of epistemic rationality that
are procedural; epistemic rationality is at least partially defined by rules that restrict the
possible ways in which epistemic actions and processes can be sequenced, combined, or
chosen among under varying conditions. (ii) Epistemic rationality is ineliminably defined by
procedural norms; procedural restrictions provide an irreducible unifying structure for even
apparently non-procedural prescriptions and normative expressions, and they are practically
indispensable in our cognitive lives. (iii) These procedural epistemic norms are best analyzed
in terms of the protocol (or program) constructions of dynamic logic.
I defend (i) and (ii) at length and in multi-faceted ways, and I argue that they entail
a set of criteria of adequacy for models of epistemic dynamics and abstract accounts of
epistemic norms. I then define PLEN, the protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms. PLEN
is a dynamic logic that analyzes epistemic rationality norms with protocol constructions
interpreted over multi-graph based models of epistemic dynamics. The kernel of the overall
argument of the dissertation is showing that PLEN uniquely satisfies the criteria defended;
none of the familiar, rival frameworks for modeling epistemic dynamics or normative concepts
are capable of satisfying these criteria to the same degree as PLEN. The overarching argument
of the dissertation is thus a theory-preference argument for PLEN.
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Procedural epistemic norms are essentially rules that conditionally instruct the execution of epistemic procedures formed out of epistemic actions. That these kinds of norms
characterize the requirements of epistemic rationality and do so ineliminably can be seen
by examining, first, a number of problems for existing models of epistemic dynamics and,
second, a set of important desiderata on formal frameworks for modeling epistemic dynamics
and epistemic norms. Chapter 1 considers the problems while outlining the rest of the dissertation, and Chapter 2 establishes the desiderata, which take the form of principles about
epistemic rationality and its norms that must be adequately formalized, as each desideratum
is grounded in best solutions to a number of important epistemological disputes. Together,
Chapters 1 and 2 argue that this set of problems and desiderata forms a sort of core or
minimal theory of epistemic rationality to which any formal account must be adequate.
Formally, PLEN is a version of propositional dynamic logic, a logic of programs that
encodes procedural operations on relatively basic computational steps with syntactic constructions and that interprets them over labeled transition systems or directed graphs in
which transition relations or edges represent the traversal of states of computation according
to programs. Protocols are, in PLEN, syntactic constructions that encode procedural operations on sets of basic epistemic actions. Epistemic actions are represented in the semantics
of PLEN by combining tools from dynamic logic, epistemic logic, and belief revision. Rather
than transition relations, sets of pairs of states, epistemic actions - and processes built by
sequencing or other procedural operations on actions - are represented in PLEN by paths
(sets of n-tuples) that build in information about distinct actions or processes that may link
the same states in a transition. This results in the models of PLEN resembling multi-graphs
rather than the directed graphs that underly traditional dynamic logics. This is a modest
innovation with deep philosophical benefits with respect to solving the problems raised in
Chapter 1 and capturing the desiderata of Chapter 2. The semantic rules of PLEN map
protocols to (structures that represent) processes that result in change of epistemic states
and states of the world, thereby mapping protocols to unique paths as well as preconditions
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and postconditions of execution. Protocols thus perspicuously represent certain features of
epistemic rationality norms such as their procedural complexity, their verdicts with respect
to various epistemic factors (e.g., whether a process, transition, or state is permissible or accords with a norm), their conditions of application, and the results of carrying out processes
that accord with them. This machinery provides the basis for powerful and flexible logics
with which to encode valid reasoning about these features of epistemic rationality and its
norms. Chapter 3 defines a simplified version of PLEN and makes note of several important
results. A separate technical document establishes these results as well as those deployed in
Chapter 4 as part of the theory preference argument.
The defense of PLEN’s theoretical preferability consists primarily of establishing (a) that
PLEN solves the problems delineated in Chapter 1 and satisfies the desiderata articulated
in Chapter 2, and (b) that none of the rival formalisms from belief revision, dynamic logic,
dynamic epistemic logic, or deontic logic solve all of these problems or satisfy all of these
desiderata equally well. Chapter 4 establishes the former of these claims by exploiting some
of PLEN’s technical features. It’s nearly mechanical to show that PLEN suffers from none of
the problems and satisfies all of the desiderata. Chapter 5 establishes the latter by examining
the various families of rival formalisms one by one and showing the various ways in which they
fail to either address the problems or formalize the desiderata. A final chapter summarizes
the results of the dissertation and scouts future extensions of the research programme.

Front Matter
Preface
This is not a thesis about how to change your mind. No, wait... maybe it is. This is a thesis
about devising and exploring a logical framework for thinking about the norms of epistemic
rationality and the requirements they impose on agents that would be rational. Given that
epistemic rationality norms define requirements not just on the synchronic relations among
the items of content in our minds but on the dynamic processes by which we change them,
this must be a thesis (at least partially) about how to change your mind.
The norms of epistemic rationality are best represented and reasoned about in terms
of protocols, as they are understood in dynamic logics. That is the main thought of this
dissertation. To put it a bit more precisely, protocols are formal devices that analyze procedural operations on spaces of basic actions and processes. Interpreted over structures that
represent epistemic action, protocols are formal devices that analyze procedural operations
on spaces of basic epistemic actions and epistemic processes. The models of dynamic logic with some simple upgrades - provide just the structures to represent epistemic action. The
requirements of epistemic rationality are defined by norms - rules, policies, or principles that
dictate, prohibit, permit, or recommend epistemic factors (over others) under various conditions. Procedural epistemic norms - rules, policies, or principles that apply to epistemic
actions and processes - are epistemologically important and unify many other kinds of epistemic norms as well as the epistemic normative propositions and prescriptions that articulate
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them. These procedural norms can essentially be captured by complex instructions formed
out of procedural operations on epistemic actions and processes. Hence, the main thought.
To develop and defend the main thought, I devise a formal framework based on dynamic logics that deploys protocols to analyze epistemic rationality norms. The core of the
framework is a “protocol-theoretic” logic of epistemic norms: PLEN. It’s worth noting that
there are several frameworks in dynamic and epistemic logic that take a general approach
to norms that is similar to PLEN in some respects or others. Some systems have nearly
identical formal languages to PLEN and/or domains of structures that are isomorphic to a
subset or superset of the models of PLEN’s languages.1 Some systems even provide technical
devices that are explicitly incorporated into PLEN’s final form [114, 184]. Really, almost all
of PLEN’s innovations are parts of some alternative system or another. So, what’s the point
of developing PLEN rather than deploying an existing system?
The answer, in short, is that no existing system puts all of the pieces together the way
that PLEN does. First, PLEN is a relatively simple logical framework that can:
• (i) provide devices for explicitly representing and reasoning about (protocols that encode procedural) norms of epistemic rationality,2
• (ii) capture the distinction between processes of epistemic change and the changes of
epistemic state they bring about when completed, and
• (iii) formalize features of epistemic rationality that are inadequately recognized in both
the formal and traditional epistemology literatures.
Properties (i) through (iii) capture, in an attenuated form, criteria of theoretical adequacy
on formal - or informal - accounts of epistemic rationality. This claim is argued for over the
1

See Chapters 5, 9, and 10 of [113] for something of an overview. See [174, 175] for some uses of a
complementation operator similar to the parallel execution operator used in PLEN and for the analysis of
normative - specifically deontic - expressions. See [30, 28] for discussion of the general form of the structures
that model the languages. See [114, 184] for systems with models that bear important similarities to those
of PLEN.
2
PLEN is an exogenous logic [113] (p. 157). The structures that determine the features of the dynamic
evolution of a system - programs, for instance - are explicit in the logical language.
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course of Chapters 1 and 2. That PLEN’s semantic structures and logic suffice for (i)-(iii) is
argued for at length through Chapters 3 and 4.
Second, PLEN uniquely contains logical resources for (i)-(iii); no rival formalism can
compete on all of these tasks. Frameworks for analyzing belief revision [5, 92, 67, 69, 84],
credence update [182, 153], and dynamic evolutions of knowledge (as in dynamic epistemic
logics and other frameworks [65, 86, 34, 233, 148, 131, 97, 74, 50, 158, 162, 245]) give
models of how reasoning unfolds within the constraints imposed by specific sets of epistemic
norms (deductive or probabilistic coherence, entrenchment, etc.) or normative assumptions
(e.g., time-slice epistemology, probabilism, etc.) underlain by specific assumptions about the
nature of epistemic dynamics. However, none of these frameworks provide general analyses
of epistemic norms, and they don’t provide explicit resources for reasoning about the logical
properties of epistemic norms. More, they nearly universally fail with respect to (ii) and
(iii). Deontic logics and normative systems do take on the project of analyzing norms and
their logical properties.3 However, even when they are tailored to the challenges of the
epistemic case, they fail to account for (ii) and (iii) despite having resources that can be
applied toward (i). The details of the foregoing claims and arguments for them are housed
primarily in Chapter 5, with some preliminary remarks in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
Defending a formal framework for philosophical purposes is a daunting task. This dissertation can really only be an opening move and one of limited scope, at that. Given that
this is primarily a philosophical thesis, the technical exploration of the formal framework
is neither comprehensive nor all that sophisticated. I’ve settled for merely developing the
properties of PLEN related to the soundness of its deductive system and its effectiveness
at treating the considerations in (i)-(iii). Beyond very basic observations, e.g., soundness
and some theorems relating the constructions in PLEN to other novel constructions, I neglect rigorous exploration of the mathematical properties of PLEN that are standardly of
interest in studying logical systems (e.g., completeness, complexity, compactness, decidabil3
For a handbook approach to the entire field, see [89]. See [4] for the seminal introduction and [3] for a
crossover with belief revision.
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ity, expressive power).4 This has been exchanged for extended philosophical examination
and defense of the basics of the system and application of the system to the main task of
analyzing epistemic rationality norms.
On the other hand, the amount of technical exploration required by the project entails that not all of the philosophical considerations that are germane to the project can be
discussed, let alone engaged with at appropriate levels of detail. Defenses of substantive principles of epistemic rationality, robust investigations of connections with established projects
in formal epistemology (e.g., learning theory) and the ethics of belief, and examination of
connections to the broader formal and informal study of normativity and practical rationality, (e.g., the usefulness of PLEN as a general model of norms) will, along with further
technical examination, have to be relegated to future work.
Where this project lies in the grand scheme of things is in the intersection of epistemology, applied logic, and philosophy of logic. The main interests and upshots of the project are
epistemological, much of the core work is in applied logic, and the project embodies certain
perspectives in the philosophy of logic. What binds these threads is a guiding interest in
finite, flawed epistemic agents, their goals, and the tools they use to achieve them. Some
epistemic agents, for instance, aim to achieve the goals of inquiry - things like truth, knowledge, and rationally justified belief. But every observable instance of such an agent is prone
to performance error, subject to bias, and limited in cognitive resources. In order to meet
their epistemic goals, such reasoners must find ways to recover from errors, to detect bias
and course correct, and to overcome their limitations. In other words, the question is: how
can beings like us overcome our frailties to meet the goals of inquiry? The answer, I think,
is epistemic methodology.
Epistemic methodology consists of (1) systems of norms that we endorse and deploy to
evaluate and regulate our epistemic behavior and (2) our reflection thereon and deliberation
thereover. We don’t (always) blindly endorse and deploy procedures and standards for
4

The technical exploration of PLEN is carried out primarily in a separate technical document. [135]
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carrying out our epistemic projects; we reflect on their properties (e.g., the effects of following
them, the restrictions they impose, the commitments they entail), and deliberate over which
of them to keep endorsing and deploying. We even devise and adopt new and better epistemic
norms from time to time. Imagine trying to think clearly about the effects of policy decisions
without statistics or working through a complex argument without using some of the formal
techniques of logic. Extensive, deliberate use of these things is hardly native endowment.5
This project is part of the analysis of epistemic methodology. As such, the approach is
that of procedural epistemology.6 The focus of the project is not the analysis of fundamental
elements of epistemic value. Rather, it focuses on the kinds of normative structures that
are needed in epistemic regulation or epistemic advice. These, it turns out, must focus on
the distinctive features of procedures and processes involved in changes of mind. Ultimately,
this thesis is designed to contribute something to the reflective and deliberative activities
involved in epistemic methodology; it’s an attempt to contribute to the general project of
helping us think carefully and to think of ways that we might do better.
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Part I
The Protocol-theoretic Account of
Epistemic Rationality Norms

1

Chapter 1
Epistemic Dynamics, Protocols, and
Epistemic Rationality
1.1

Introduction

Epistemic rationality imposes various kinds of requirements on the epistemic factors of reasoners. That is, where "epistemic factors" encompasses the belief or acceptance states and
ways of changing belief/acceptance states (inter alia) of reasoners, the thought is that reasoners must ensure that their epistemic factors meet certain conditions, fall within certain
parameters, or have certain properties; if a factor fails to meet those conditions, the agent
is not as she rationally should be, and the factor itself may be irrational.1
In general, there are distinct kinds of epistemic requirement that focus on the distinct
kinds of epistemic factors. One kind of epistemic requirement focuses on belief states. There
are, of course, irrational states of belief, as the ascendancy and weaponization of internet
1

In all of what follows, I focus on the rationality - broadly construed - of epistemic factors. It might
be thought that it is reasoners themselves that are the unique appropriate objects of epistemic appraisal particularly where rationality is concerned. This can’t be right. It’s a commonplace feature of the concept
of rationality that we distinguish the rationality of a view that agent i has or a move i has made in reasoning
from the rationality of i herself. While it is plausible that appraisals of rationality apply to agents themselves
in addition to their epistemic factors, I ignore this complication in all of what follows. There should be no
special difficulty extending the work here to agents.

2

CHAPTER 1. DYNAMICS, PROTOCOLS, AND RATIONALITY

3

conspiracy theorizing has made dramatically and depressingly clear. More formally, there are
probabilistically and logically incoherent states of belief as well as states of belief featuring
individual beliefs or sets of beliefs for which there is inadequate evidence or overwhelming
counterevidence. These are forms of irrational belief state, and epistemic rationality requires
that one avoid being in such belief states or that one find one’s way out of them. A second
kind of epistemic requirement focuses on ways of changing belief states; there are irrational
processes and moves in changing states of belief, such as wishful thinking and fallacious or
biased reasoning.2 Epistemic rationality requires that one avoid or halt these processes of
belief change and execute other - normative - processes of belief change instead.3
Call the rules, policies, or principles that define these requirements on reasoners the norms
of epistemic rationality or, interchangeably, epistemic rationality norms.4 This dissertation
is an extended defense of the protocol-theoretic account of epistemic rationality norms. The
core thought of the protocol-theoretic account is that epistemic rationality norms are best
represented, analyzed, and reasoned about in terms of protocols, as they are defined in
dynamic logics.5 There are two main reasons why I think that this account should be
2

At this point, I’m assuming that there are what Kolodny [147] calls “process requirements” of epistemic
rationality. This is sometimes thought to be controversial on the basis of commitment to what I will call
epistemic staticism, which is the view that there are really only requirements on the synchronic features of
epistemic states. Some threads of staticism include time-slice epistemology [179, 127] and some forms of
probabilism [53] and epistemic consequentialism [57, 83]. It has been impressed on me from workshopping
the idea in dissertation seminars that the idea that there are dynamic requirements is pre-theoretically clear
and plausible, so, for those inclined toward epistemic staticism, please bear with me. Epistemic staticism
receives due attention in Chapter 2.
3
Rationality may even require reversing or otherwise correcting the effects of prior processes or foreclosing
the possibility of alternative processes. The infamous recovery principle of AGM [214] is a prima facie
plausible example of the reversing or correction, but more complex belief change algorithms may require
such reversal, e.g., in cases where inferences were drawn from conclusions that themselves were drawn in
error or “learning by erasing” [99, 161].
4
Perhaps it would be better to define epistemic rationality norms as the regularities that characterize
the requirements in question (perhaps indirectly by characterizing an ideally rational model of epistemic
performance), so as not to create the impression that the rules are written and then deliberately implemented.
As I’ll argue in Chapter 2 and in the technical document [135], it is the case that epistemic rules are at least
sometimes explicitly written, adopted, and implemented, but it’s plausible that at least some epistemic norms
are more like evolved patterns of personal or sub-personal cognitive behavior than rules that are understood
and adopted. The idea is that, in order to be rational, sometimes we are required to instantiate some of
these patterns, which in turn imposes further requirements. In any case, the question of what I take norms
to be is briefly taken up in Chapter 3.
5
To be precise, the term “protocols” is prevalent in dynamic epistemic logic [74, 65]. Literature on
propositional and first-order dynamic logic, or dynamic logic in general, seems to favor the term “programs”,
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accepted. First, the protocol-theoretic account is developed with a formal framework - PLEN
- that models epistemic rationality norms with protocols, and PLEN can be shown to satisfy
theoretical desiderata relevant to understanding epistemic rationality. Second, PLEN does
so uniquely; no rival, predecessor, or otherwise alternative formalism captures the features
of epistemic dynamics and epistemic rationality norms that PLEN does. More precisely,
the PLEN framework models epistemic dynamics with a level of accuracy that no other
framework does, and it formalizes an epistemologically important set of features of epistemic
rationality and its norms that rival and predecessor frameworks fail to recognize. Hence,
rational theory preference dictates (ceteris paribus) adoption of the PLEN framework over
its rivals and predecessors, and this implies acceptance of the protocol-theoretic account.6
This opening chapter serves as both an introduction and as a piece of substantive argumentation aimed at laying the groundwork for the overarching arguments. The thrust of
the chapter is that there are a number of problems that models of epistemic dynamics must
solve in order to serve as an underlying model for theories of epistemic norms. Section 1.2
lays out some important features of the conceptual framework underlying the project. Much
of this section can be skipped by readers familiar with the basic concepts and models of
epistemic dynamics, the basic formal idea of protocols or programs, and the perspective of
procedural epistemology. The essential parts are sections 1.2.1 (including 1.2.1.1), 1.2.2 (but
not the subsections), and 1.2.3. The rest can be skipped with relative safety if the reader is
confident that they see what I’m up to.
Section 1.3 is the core of the chapter, as it develops several problems for the modeling
of epistemic dynamics that are basically damning to formalisms that are to be deployed
for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms. The upshot of 1.3 is that there is a
which is more consonant with the origins PDL as a logic of programs. I am primarily following [184] in
deploying the term “protocols”, though, formally, protocols and programs are equivalent constructions.
6
I mean acceptance, as understood by Cohen [55] (also Stalnaker [235] and perhaps Restall [210]). “[T]o
accept that p is to have or adopt a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that p — i.e. of including that
proposition or rule among one’s premisses for deciding what to do or think in a particular context, whether
or not one feels it to be true that p.” (p. 4) Equivalently, I think the two main arguments justify acceptance
of the account as a working hypothesis and deploying PLEN as a framework for developing the hypothesis.
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theoretically important distinction to be drawn between processes of epistemic state change
and the resulting changes to the contents of epistemic states. It is argued in 1.3 that models
of epistemic dynamics that do not draw this distinction (a) fail to accurately model epistemic
dynamics, and (b) this failure results in errors in thinking about the requirements of epistemic
normativity. Conversely, it is argued that failure to account for the requirements of epistemic
normativity also lead to inaccurate models of epistemic dynamics. This bleeds over into a
first stab at articulating the desiderata or criteria of adequacy that PLEN will be shown
to uniquely satisfy. Section 1.4 integrates the foregoing problems and the putative criteria
of adequacy into an articulation of the fundamental problem that the protocol-theoretic
account and PLEN are devised to address. Section 1.5 details the chapter plan for the rest
of the dissertation.

1.2

Preliminaries

There are three big ideas underneath the project, and these ideas will help to clarify the
protocol-theoretic account and lay the ground for the main arguments of the thesis. The
first big idea is the concept of epistemic dynamics [86, 91]: that there are numerous possible
epistemic states that a reasoning epistemic agent could be in at any time and numerous
possible paths or trajectories through the space of epistemic states that such a reasoner can
follow in transitioning from one state to another by execution of actions or processes. That
is, reasoning is a dynamic process; our epistemic states (belief states, acceptance states, etc.)
evolve over time along routes that are determined by the ways that we reason. The ways that
we reason can be restricted or enabled in various ways. Some of these restrictions are due to
cognitive or environmental limitations. Others are normative or methodological restrictions.
An important distinction in thinking about dynamics is that between transitions among
states or even paths of states and the actions, processes, or procedures that are used to
bring about those transitions and paths of states. That is, a process p might take an agent
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from one state, s, to another, s0 , that is distinct because it has distinct content, but so might
a process q. These processes are distinct despite their identical start points and end points.
The second idea is that dynamic logics are interpreted over plausible and useful models
of epistemic dynamics. Formally, the models are equivalently described as labeled directed
graphs [93], labeled transition systems [35], or multi-modal Kripke structures [33]. These
are abstract models of dynamic systems; systems comprising sets of states that change over
time by various sorts of events, actions, or processes. The nodes or worlds in these structures
abstractly represent states (without internal structure) of the system, the edges represent
changes of state, and the labels or modalities represent processes or actions that result in
change of state. These systems naturally represent such dynamic systems as computers
traversing various computational states as they execute programs, evolutions of knowledge
bases by learning processes, or the unfolding of information in the minds of groups of agents in
communicative situations [30, 34, 65, 113]. Given the first idea, these are transparently useful
models of epistemic dynamics: the states are epistemic states, the edges connecting states
are changes of epistemic state, and the labels are epistemic actions or epistemic processes.
The third idea is that there are procedural epistemic norms, and these are central to the
analysis of epistemic rationality. This claim goes beyond the idea that there are diachronic or,
more generally, dynamic norms that specify that some transitions or movements among states
are (e.g.) rational. As noted above, epistemic actions and processes are not interchangeable
with the changes of the content of epistemic states. Procedural norms carry information
that is distinct from and additional to that carried by “merely” dynamic norms.7 Epistemic
actions and processes can be broken down into sequences, combinations, choices, and other
procedural operations on more basic actions and processes. Some sequences, combinations,
choices, and other operations are rational, others not.8 There are epistemic rationality norms
7

Though, as I’ll argue in Chapter 4, the important normative information carried by dynamic norms and even static norms that assign normative statuses to epistemic states - can be “read off” from procedural
norms, universally.
8
This oversimplifies in two salient ways. First, the list of operations isn’t exhaustive. As we will see,
there are several other basic combinatorial instructions that are useful in specifying the procedural content of
norms. It’s important to note that these procedural operations are recursive, and so very complex procedural
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that define the rational procedural operations; they carry information or instructions about
what procedural operations on actions and processes to execute, modulo one’s epistemic
circumstances, in order to be rational. This is, perhaps, not the exclusive kind of epistemic
norm, but it is undeniably a kind, and it’s a kind that is indispensable for the function of
epistemic norms in cognitive life. More, every epistemic norm is logically associated with
this kind of procedural norm, so the procedural norms unify epistemic norms and normative
expressions.9
I discuss epistemic dynamics and the basic formal insights for thinking about epistemic
dynamics in the next two subsections, 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. These subsections introduce some
important ideas about the basic model of dynamics underlying this project as well as the
notion of protocols and its use for thinking about constraints on dynamics of various kinds,
especially constraints of capacity and feasibility. Section 1.2.3 addresses a philosophical
objection that has been with the project since its earliest days and clarifies the philosophical
perspective from which epistemic rationality norms are approached. The objection is targeted
to the emphasis on procedural epistemic norms, and I argue that it can be easily set aside by
taking the perspective of procedural epistemology as well as by noting an important technical
point raised later in the dissertation.

1.2.1

Epistemic Dynamics

Call any system that deliberately reasons, learns, or acquires and processes information an
epistemic agent, epistemic system, or, interchangeably, a reasoner or a cognizer.10 Epistemic
instructions can be encoded with protocols. Second, some operations on actions are more rational than others;
that is, rationality sometimes appears to be scalar and other times comparative rather than categorical. There
are also rational deontics: some operations are rationally obligatory, others are forbidden. The remarks in
the main text apply equally well to these more nuanced verdicts of epistemic rationality.
9
The third big idea is defended by means of both (a) the arguments in Chapter 2 concerning the features of
epistemic norms necessary to the cognitive function of epistemic norms and (b) the reduction thesis defended
in Chapter 4.
10
The term “deliberately” is not accidental, here. There are worries - e.g., Alston’s classic argument in
[7] - that discussions of epistemic normativity - at least deontic kinds of normativity - are moot because
epistemic actions are not voluntary. At this stage, I’m simply declaring commitment to the claim that this
worry is mistaken. In Chapter 2, I defend the claim that much epistemic action - and most epistemic action
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agents are usefully analyzed in terms of two factors: epistemic states and epistemic dynamics.
Epistemic states are reasoners’ representational states, the models of the world that the agent
constructs, manipulates, and transforms in order - among other things - to guide its actions.
These will be discussed a bit more in Chapters 2 and 3, but, at a minimum, epistemic states
are composed of epistemic judgments and their contents. Contents are usefully encoded with
sentences of a language, natural or formal. Standard taxonomies of epistemic judgments
include full and partial belief (credence), acceptance, and other cognates or alternatives. So,
for instance, one’s epistemic states can be partially described by a set of believed sentences
or by a credence function on a set of sentences. See Table 1.1 for a sample of several kinds
of partial epistemic state description with some common (and uncommon) bits of notation
for them.11
Epistemic states change over time as a result of various processes. Doxastic or beliefrelated states, for instance, can be changed by processes such as reasoning or observation.
Full beliefs are expanded, contracted, revised, or sustained over reasoning processes, credences are updated, and so on. Take a toy example:12
The Detective A detective is investigating the head, K, of a murderous criminal organization.
At time t1 , she believes, on the basis of the available forensic evidence, that K uses
of interest in this project - is voluntary. For the impatient, my response to the classic involuntarist arguments
is rather similar to that of [171].
11
The notation b(P ) is mine, and, though I use it here to denote belief, I use it in later sections in a
noncommittal fashion - belief or acceptance. In doxastic and epistemic logic, belief is often denoted with a
modal operator. In any case, I omit a full taxonomy of notations. However, do note that taking on different
categories of epistemic judgment as sort of a founding conceptual assumption is common in various fields.
Full or all-or-nothing belief is prominent in, e.g., Epistemic Logic [129], Doxastic Logic [162, 158, 224], Belief
Revision [118, 91, 92], and in epistemology, generally [121, 1, 7, 23, 54, 57, 83, 104, 164, 167, 173, 194, 195,
196, 217]. See, especially, Staffel’s [234] critical discussion of its prominence and Leitgeb’s work relating full
belief to credences [155]. Credences are prominent, of course, in Bayesian epistemology [182, 53, 155, 153]
and also in certain branches of belief revision [84, 149] and doxastic logic [20]. Acceptance and rejection are
discussed independently by Cohen [55] and Restall [210], with roots in philosophy of science, re: theoretical
commitments [204]. Supposition is a medieval logical notion [207] given an interesting analysis in an inductive
context by Levi [160]. Perhaps the list of epistemic judgments is even more expansive. Some potential addons: predicting P , suspecting P , guessing P , having the hunch that P , and so on. This is one of many points
that suggests future work in analyzing epistemic dynamics.
12
Any noticeable lack of realism is probably due in part to the distorting effects of simplification and
to my having augmented a scenario from a comic book: Deathnote by Tsugumi Ohba and Takeshi Obata.
Nonetheless, it serves as an example of complex epistemic dynamics with interactions among information
generating and inferential actions.
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Judgment
(Full) Belief
(Full) Disbelief

Credence (Partial
(Dis)Belief)
Acceptance
Rejection
Supposition

Table 1.1: Epistemic Judgments
Content
Notation
P, Q, R,...
b(P ), b(¬P ), P ∈ K
Informally: P (resp. ¬P ) is in
one’s belief set, P is fully believed
P, Q, R,...
d(P ), d(¬P ), P ∈
/ K, ¬P ∈ K
Informally: P (resp. ¬P ) is not in
one’s belief set, P is fully
disbelieved
P, Q, R,...
P r(P ), P r(¬P ), P r(P | Q)
Informally: P (resp. ¬Q) has
subjective probability P r (given Q)
P, Q, R,...
P ∈ X, ¬P ∈ X, P ∈
/X
Informally: P is accepted
P, Q, R,...
P ∈ Y , ¬P ∈ Y , P ∈
/Y
Informally: P is rejected
P, Q, R,...
P ∈ T (K, P )
- with T (K, P ) the suppositional
corpus supported by belief set K
Informally: P is a supposition
supported by one’s belief set, K
P >Q
- conditional belief on the basis of
supposition
Informally: Supposing P , Q
rationally follows (were one to fully
believe P , one would be committed
to fully believing Q)

9
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(exclusively and exhaustively) either City A or City B as a kind of home-base.
This is information she needs in order to improve her chances at apprehending
K. At t1 she also believes, on the basis of the best available psychological profile,
that if she leaks information that is insulting or embarrassing to K in a way
that can only be accessed in A, and K is based in A, then the frequency of
crimes matching the modus operandi of K will increase (as a form of response
to the insult, let’s say); else, no increase in A will be seen.13 Between t1 and
t2 , she acquires an independent stock, E, of inductive or defeasible evidence that
K is based in A, and she also knowingly leaks insulting information in a way
that renders it accessible only in A. Having not jettisoned any beliefs between
t1 and t2 , she ends up at time t2 with a new doxastic state containing all of the
foregoing beliefs. After t2 , she consults crime statistics, from sources S1 and S2,
concerning the period since her leak. S1 reports no increase in the frequency of
the relevant crimes, and S2 reports a dramatic increase. Not trusting S2, she
comes to believe that K-like crimes did not increase in frequency. This process,
as all do, takes time, so at t3 , some time after t2 , the detective has a new set of
beliefs that includes all of her prior beliefs and the belief that K-like crimes have
not increased in frequency. Suppose that she has several options going forward
from t3 : she might deduce that K is in B, she might infer inductively that K is in
A due to her evidence E (perhaps revising away the apparent inconsistency), or
she might conclude that K is in B on the basis of consulting a psychic.14 Doing
any of these would take her to a new state after some time. She deduces that K
is in B, ending up with a final belief state at t4 containing the prior beliefs and
her final conclusion about K’s base of operations.
13

Suppose that such increases provide no additional evidence about K’s home-base location.
To be exact about her deductive options: Assume classical logic. Since there was no increase, it follows
by modus tollens that either there was no leak of insulting information or that K is not based in A. Since
she knows that she leaked the insulting info, disjunctive syllogism entails that K is not based in A. From the
exclusive disjunction of "K is based in A" and "K is based in B", she deduces that K is based in B.
14
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The detective’s epistemic state at t1 is partially described by her beliefs (or at least the
propositions she accepts), her doxastic state. The content differences between the detective’s
doxastic states at some pair, ti and ti+1 , entail that the detective has distinct epistemic states
at ti and ti+1 in virtue of the nonidentical doxastic states. The additions of belief at t2 , t3 ,
and t4 are processes that thus result in changes from one epistemic state to another over
time. Call changes from one epistemic state to another epistemic transitions.
The actual and possible epistemic transitions, actual and possible processes of epistemic
transition resulting from sequences and choices among actions, and the properties of and
relations among the foregoing items constitute a system’s epistemic dynamics.15 A final
terminological note: epistemic factors will be my catch-all term for epistemic states and
the various parts that compose epistemic dynamics, e.g., changes of epistemic states, paths
of epistemic state evolution, epistemic actions and processes of epistemic state change, and
methods or procedures for structuring actions and building processes.
The Detective case illustrates a number of important features of epistemic dynamics.
First, it illustrates the way that complex processes can be constructed out of more basic
actions. The transition from her first belief state to her final belief state is effected by
sequencing multiple, smaller processes, often making choices among alternatives. Second,
it illustrates why it’s important for epistemological analyses to focus on the alternative,
unactualized trajectories as well as their relations with each other and with the actual one.
Presumably, the detective’s beliefs evolved from earlier states to those at t1 and will
unfold past t4 , but even if she was born with innate knowledge at t1 and she dies at t4 , the
actual sequence of doxastic changes is merely a part of her epistemic dynamics that matters
for epistemological purposes. Given the stipulation that she could have based her belief on
S2’s data or carried out those other processes at t3 , there are other possible trajectories for
15

The phrase “epistemic dynamics” can also denote the study or theory of these epistemic changes. I’ll let
context disambiguate. I won’t distinguish between epistemic kinematics (the “laws of motion” taking states
to other states given inputs or forces of change) and epistemic dynamics as some kind of more comprehensive
analysis of the epistemological features of inputs as well as the kinematics. Both [86, 91] discuss the distinction
usefully.
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her through the space of possible doxastic states. There are properties of and relations among
these other possible processes and trajectories worth noting. For instance, some processes
enable other processes. The deduction at t3 required the acquisition of the belief that the
crimes in A did not increase in frequency; the latter action enabled the former because no
comparable deduction could have been performed from any of the detective’s other beliefs.
This obviously matters for practical or cognitive control purposes, and it also matters if, for
instance, epistemic ought implies can; given an ought implies can principle, it can’t be the
case that the detective ought to deduce that K is in B if her prior actions did not enable the
deduction.
Further, there are some general relations among possible epistemic processes that stand
out. Some processes are more complex or more difficult to carry out than others. Some
distinct pairs of processes effect identical changes of state. Some processes are normatively
correct, and others are not. These properties might interact; the complexity or difficulty of
processes might, for instance, impact their normative statuses. Putting these observations
together, note that distinct processes can result in the same doxastic changes and yet still
be normatively distinct. The detective’s deduction gives the same conclusion as accepting
the outputs of the psychic consultation, despite their manifest epistemological differences.16
This observation carries some weight, as we will see below and in more detail in Chapter 2.
1.2.1.1

Labeled Transition Systems

It’s useful to think of epistemic dynamics in terms of labeled transition systems (LTSs)
or (polymodal) Kripke structures, though slightly more complicated structures will be introduced to model epistemic dynamics in future chapters due to problems for standard
16
I take it for granted that the deduction is rationally acceptable in ways that the acceptance of psychic
testimony isn’t - assuming a world like ours. There is much more to say about this toy example. One
question to raise: what are we to say about her evidence E? Is it uncontroversially more rational to conclude
that K is based in B on the basis of the deduction described than it is to conclude that K is based in A
given E? The stipulations of the case alone don’t answer this question, of course, but it does enough to raise
the issue of reasoning from bodies of beliefs that contain numerous and prima facie conflicting logical and
evidential relationships. These are important questions, and I won’t be answering them in this project.
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LTS-based models of epistemic dynamics.17 A labeled transition system, hS, →a∈A i, is a
non-empty set, S, with a set of relations, →a∈A , on S. Each element of →a∈A is a binary
relation on S, →a , that is indexed to a member of the set A. These are the transition relations. Each ordered pair of elements of S, hs, s0 i, is a transition, which represents a change
from the left element, s, to the right element, s0 . These bare transitions are distinct from
labeled transitions, which are triples, hs, a, s0 i. The distinction between labeled and “bare”
transitions is important to note. The labeled transitions hs, a, s0 i and hs, b, s0 i are clearly
distinct labeled transitions, but they connect a single pair of elements, and so are both related to the unique transition hs, s0 i. Labeled transition systems can be defined in terms
of both binary transition relations, →a∈A ⊆ S × S, or labeled (ternary) transition relations,
→a∈A ⊆ S × A × S. This choice is not of any importance at this stage of the exposition, but
will become a matter of significance in later sections and in Chapters 3 - 5.
Interpret S as a set of possible epistemic states, A as a set of basic actions that can
effect changes from one epistemic state to another, and the transition relations as showing
us what transitions among states result from what actions or, equivalently, what states can
be reached by what actions from any given state. Each transition can be thought of as a
change of state and each labeled transition as a token process or act that takes a system
from one state to the next. An LTS then displays a space of possible trajectories through the
space of epistemic states and the actions (and courses of action) that could take a system
through each one. Letting states be associated with sets of formulae of propositional logic
(say, via an interpretation function), the Detective’s epistemic dynamics can be represented
with the LTS in Figure 1.1.
Formal frameworks for analyzing epistemic dynamics tend to broadly resemble the basic
structure of transition systems. LTSs are a form of branching time model of dynamics [131]
which stand in prima facie contrast to input assimilating model s [118]. The former represent
dynamics with directed graphs or trees where the nodes are states and the edges are ways of
17

See section 1.3.
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Figure 1.1: The Detective’s LTS

The detective starts at the leftmost state and moves right over time. Let each column of
states from left to right represent the possible states for the detective at t1 − t4 , respectively.
First, she acquires evidence E (by action E+) that K is based in City A and recognizes that
she made the leak, transforming her state at t1 to the state at t2 . From there, she can deploy
S1’s data or S2’s data to update her beliefs concerning the crime rates matching K’s MO
to take her to either of two distinct states at t3 . From either of the resulting states, she
can deploy several processes to draw a conclusion about where K is based at t4 . She might
reason from the psychic consultation (action Sup), she might deduce (Ded) that K is in B
from her beliefs at t3 , or she might revise in accordance with evidence E (action Evi) to end
up believing that K is based in A. Note that she hasn’t yet figured out that the last move
results in inconsistency. This particular LTS might encode only a fragment of her epistemic
life, and so be a small subtree out of a vastly larger LTS. What actions are available at t4 or
t3 after trusting S1, for instance, are left unspecified.
moving from state to state. In these models, we can represent histories or sequences of states,
actions, or events through which a system unfolds or that an agent experiences or carries
out. We can talk about what histories converge to a certain point and what possible histories
unfold from that point. Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL) [74, 65, 131] is a standard-bearer
in thinking of epistemic dynamics in these terms.
Input-assimilating models take the form of functions from a pair comprising an input and
a state, to a new state. Typically, these models have more complex and useful structures for
representing epistemic states than mere nodes in a graph or LTS. That is, they typically have
formal objects that can represent distinct contents or parts of epistemic states. Dynamic
Epistemic Logic (DEL) [65] and AGM Theory (AGM) [4, 91] take this form.
Branching time models and input assimilating models can be merged, as van Benthem
et al [37] and Hoshi [131] show for DEL and Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL); every DEL
model generates an ETL model by means of their construction. Independent of the details of
this result, it’s not difficult to think about input assimilating models in terms of branching
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time models. As Gardenfors notes, it’s elementary that any function from input-state pairs
to states can be treated as a function from states to states indexed to inputs or, perhaps,
functions from inputs to pairs of states [91]. Such functions will be equivalent to transition
relations and so related to subsets of paths in a branching time model - those paths that
start at one element of the transition and end at the other. This point will be more carefully
articulated in Chapter 4.
There are numerous formal frameworks for analyzing epistemic dynamics in general and
for analyzing specific kinds of epistemic dynamics. Many of the most well-known and welldeveloped take the form of input assimilating models. To get a feel for models of epistemic
dynamics, I briefly explicate the most basic and important parts of a few of the most welldeveloped input assimilating frameworks for epistemic dynamics to acquaint the reader with
the general idea of thinking of epistemic dynamics formally and to pave the way in the next
section for highlighting where they fall short.18
1.2.1.2

Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL)

One of the best and most well-known general formal frameworks for epistemic dynamics is
Dynamic Epistemic Logic.19 DEL is based on Epistemic Logic (EL) which applies modal
logic to the analysis of knowledge and related concepts.20 Epistemic models are triples,
hS, R, V i, of a non-empty set, S, a set, R, of binary transition relations Ri ⊆ S × S such
that each transition relation is indexed to elements of a set, I, and a valuation function, V .
18

It’s useful in the next sections to try to visualize the models of dynamics as directed graphs. This is
a bit misleading, though. First, it’s hard to visualize anything but very simple graphs for the dynamics in
DEL, because product updates connect epistemic models, which are just graphs themselves. We get graphs
with nodes that are graphs! Second, the following systems are input assimilating models, and so don’t have
very complex dynamics - just functions from state to state. However, as Hoshi and van Benthem showed,
these kinds of systems can be connected to branching time models, and there, visualizing the states in these
systems developing as though in a graph is helpful.
19
DEL is one of the best in the sense that numerous other models of epistemic dynamics can be embedded
within DEL, and so subsume them. AGM, for instance, has been shown to be equivalent to a fragment of
DEL; one just goes through the possible worlds models of AGM [108] to arrive at epistemic models. This is
shown in Chapter 3 of deeply useful textbook [65]. If DEL is equivalent to a fragment of PLEN, then PLEN
will be, in this sense, be even better than DEL. This is a plausible conjecture, but one I leave unexamined
until future work.
20
See Hintikka [129], of course.
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The elements of S are interpreted as possible ways the world could be, and the relations,
Ri , are interpreted as indistinguishability for an agent i ∈ I. The valuation functions, V ,
map sets of expressions of the language of epistemic logic LEL to worlds in S. This gives
an interesting definition of knowledge: i knows A iff A is true in every world linked by
i’s indistinguishability relation. In other words, i’s knowledge is supposed to allow her to
distinguish possible ways the world could be. If A is false at some world, w0 , that i can’t
tell from w, then she doesn’t know A at w. This kind of model enables the definition of
knowledge for all of the agents in I, as well as notions of common knowledge, belief and
other doxastic states, and a basic logic of those concepts.
DEL captures the dynamic aspects of epistemic state change by encoding the epistemic
states of multiple agents with epistemic models and by modeling events and their informational effects on epistemic models. An event model is a triple hE, →i , prei where E is a set
of events e, →i is an indistinguishability relation among events for each agent, i, and pre is a
mapping of sets of expressions of the language of DEL, LDEL , to events in E. Event models
encode sets of possible events and whether or not agents can tell events apart. e1 →i e2 tells
us that i can’t tell whether e1 or e2 happened; when e1 happens, i thinks it’s possible that e2
happened. The precondition function, pre, tells us what the preconditions are of each event.
If pre(e) = A, then e can occur only if A is true.
DEL provides an input-assimilating model of epistemic dynamics with the addition of
product update functions. Product updates are functions from pairs of epistemic model and
event model, M = hS, R, V i and E = hE, →i , prei, to an epistemic model, M 0 = hS 0 , R0 , V 0 i
such that:
• S 0 = {(s, e) | s ∈ S, e ∈ E, pre(e) ⊆ V (s)},
• (s, e)R0 (s0 , e0 ) iff sRi s0 in M and e →i e0 in E, and
• V 0 (s, e) = V (s) for all atomic formulae of LDEL
The input of event e to a model, M , results in M 0 .
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Epistemic models represent epistemic states by encoding (e.g.) knowledge and belief
in the coupling of their indistinguishability relations and their valuations. What an agent
knows depends on where (at what world) in the epistemic model the agent is and what is
true at the indistinguishable worlds. Belief can be defined in similar ways. Event models
represent information-changing events. Product updates encode the effects of various kinds
of information-changing events on agents’ indistinguishability relations, and thus on what
agents can know (believe, etc.). That is, product updates represent the transitions among
epistemic models that result from informational events.21 DEL thus provides a model of
epistemic dynamics. All of the possible changes of epistemic model due to any possible
informational event are mapped out by the semantic structures of DEL.
Next, I consider two well-known frameworks for analyzing subtypes of epistemic dynamics: rational belief revision and rational partial belief update.
1.2.1.3

AGM Theory (AGM)

One subtype of epistemic dynamics is rational belief revision. An important core model
of this kind of epistemic dynamics is given AGM theory [5]. Like DEL, AGM is an inputassimilating model. The relevant epistemic states are belief sets, K, that are sets of sentences
of a propositional language, L, closed under entailment. That is, K ⊆ L such that K =
Cn(K) where Cn(K) is the set of logical consequences of K. AGM identifies a typology
of three kinds of epistemic change: expansion KA+ , contraction KA− , and revision KA∗ , and
defines epistemic commitment functions of the form BL × L −→ BL , such that BL is the
subset of the powerset of L that contains only belief sets. Each commitment function is
defined so that it satisfies philosophically defended rationality postulates based in epistemic
entrenchment.22
21

This is an elementary point, but I refer the reader to any of the useful diagrams in the relevant chapters
of any of [65, 34, 131] for help in visualizing this.
22
See the first half of [91] for an exploration of AGM, the commitment functions, and the rationality
postulates. In particular, Gardenfors explores entrenchment conditions and proves a couple of representation
theorems between the rationality postulates and a set of entrenchment postulates.
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The basic thought is that each belief set describes an agent’s doxastic state in equilibrium
under the forces of logical consistency and closure. These equilibrium states transition to
new equilibrium states according to the epistemic commitment functions when disturbed by
the external force of epistemic inputs from (e.g.) perception or reasoning. That is, starting
at K, observing that A when A ∈
/ K forces a disturbance of equilibrium; one must add
the belief that A to restore equilibrium. But this isn’t enough, as now we must also be
committed, on AGM, to adding the logical consequences of K ∪ {A}. So KA+ is a new belief
set equal to Cn(K ∪ {A}). If we end up finding out that our beliefs are contradicted by (e.g.)
empirical reality, then we must revise our beliefs and restore equilibrium (consistency and
closure). The AGM commitment functions define a mechanism for transitioning from any
belief set by means of an epistemic input to a new belief set that is restored to equilibrium
that satisfies conditions of rationality. Epistemic states are belief sets and the actual and
the possible rational changes of epistemic state are those transitions that are encoded by the
epistemic commitment functions.
1.2.1.4

Bayesian Rationality Theories (BRT)

The rational update of partial beliefs according to total evidence is another subtype of
epistemic dynamics. Subjective Bayesianism, providing a simple core model of this kind of
dynamics, represents epistemic states with probability functions over a set of sentences.23
Let L be a language and let P r : L −→ [0, 1] be a probability assignment to each sentence
of L. The probability P r(A) represents a reasoner’s degree of belief in A or the degree of
confidence that she has in A. These states of partial belief are assumed to obey systems of
axioms, one standard example of which is:
(A1)

For all A ∈ L, 0 ≤ P r(A) ≤ 1.

(A2)

If ` A, then P r(A) = 1, and if ` ¬A, then P r(A) = 0.

23

I’m not targeting any particular system, here, but rather to the basic thrust of Bayesian epistemology.
For greater detail, see, inter alia, [182, 53, 153, 155].
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For all A, B ∈ L, if A and B are mutually exclusive, P r(A∨B) = P r(A)+P r(B).

Dynamics involves transitioning from one probability function on L to another probability
function. Rules of conditionalization, of varying levels of simplicity, give update functions
from rational partial belief states to rational partial beliefs states:
(Simple Conditionalization) Where probability functions P ri and P rj represent a root and
terminal state of an epistemic transition, respectively, rational changes follow the
rule: If P ri (E) > 0 and P rj (E) = 1, then for all A, P rj (A) = P ri (A | E).
The basic thought is that each probability function or partial belief state describes an agent’s
doxastic state in equilibrium under the forces of probabilistic coherence given by the axioms
A1-A3. These equilibrium states transition to new equilibrium states according to the epistemic commitment function supplied by the conditionalization rule when disturbed by the
external force of epistemic inputs from (e.g.) perception or reasoning (which raise the partial belief in E to certainty). That is, starting at P ri , observing that E (a conjunction of
evidence statements) when P ri (E) > 0 forces a disturbance of equilibrium; one adds the
certain belief that E. But this isn’t enough, as now we must also be committed, on BRT, to
restoring probabilistic coherence. Conditionalization defines a mechanism for transitioning
from any partial belief state by means of acquired evidence to a new partial belief set that
is restored to equilibrium.

1.2.2

Protocols and Some Frameworks for Protocols

The frameworks for epistemic dynamics above are all important and informative, but what
they leave out or leave entirely implicit is essential to analyzing epistemic dynamics. Epistemic states change by the execution of some kinds of actions, procedures, or processes, and
these executions are subject to various constraints. The analysis of epistemic dynamics must
account for these constraints, or else be misleading or incomplete. This point will be familiar
from the development of dynamic epistemic logics, and will be expanded upon in 1.3 [65, 66].
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To model constraints, protocols are introduced. The basic, informal idea of a protocol is
a rule that determines what actions can be performed at what states of the world. There are,
of course, a number of formal tools that can be used to represent and think about protocols.
Protocols are deployed to analyze constraints on epistemic dynamics in formal frameworks
based on dynamic logics or, generally, in branching time models. There are several formal
frameworks for analyzing dynamics governed by protocols.24 Some are frameworks for general dynamics into which protocols are integrated. Others merge frameworks for epistemic
dynamics with frameworks for protocols. In any case, many of the most well-known and
well-developed take the form of branching time models. I briefly describe a few of the frameworks most directly related to the project in this dissertation, omitting most of the technical
detail. I focus on briefly explicating the framework’s conception of protocols and analyses of
constraints of possibility and feasibility. The purpose of these digressions is to indicate, in
a preliminary fashion, the location of PLEN in the space of formalisms, and to clarify the
basic concept of protocols by showing some ways in which the concept has been formalized.25
Remarks about the limitations of these formalisms are expanded in Chapter 5.
1.2.2.1

Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL)

Epistemic Temporal Logic [74, 65] is, in some ways, the basic model of epistemic dynamics
- or dynamics in general - under constraints. The structures of ETL are branching time
models; ETL represents epistemic dynamics in terms of sequences of events. Let E be a set
of events. A history, h, is a finite sequence of events in E. A history that leads up to the
event e is denoted he. The notion of a prefix can be defined: h is a prefix of h0 iff h0 = he
for some e. The set of all histories constructed from E is E∗. An ETL model is a triple,
hE, H,
24

i, V

i, where E is a set of events, H ⊆ E∗,

i⊆

H × H is an indistinguishability

See [65, 34, 30, 255, 231, 227, 175, 184, 74] for a smattering.
The four systems chosen for discussion here are idiosyncratic. A fuller repertoire of systems is discussed
in Chapter 5. The systems here are not meant to represent the best, most well-developed, or most influential
systems in their respective fields or even for this application. They were chosen to represent theories that
intuitively and simply convey the concept of protocols employed in this project.
25
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relation among histories for each agent i, and V is a valuation function mapping expressions
in the language of LET L to histories.
A set of histories, H, is a protocol in ETL. Thinking of events as possible actions, the
histories of each ETL, H, represent a constraint on the set, E∗, of possible histories (up to
the null constraint where H = E∗). According to H, histories can intersect and diverge.
Any given event, e, can be followed in H only by a subset of possible sequences of events
that follow it in E∗. The protocol, H, shows us what the constraints are on the overall space
of dynamics defined by E∗.
ETL models provide simple and intuitive models of epistemic dynamics under constraint.
Each node in an ETL is a temporal moment in the history of a reasoner’s epistemic state
development. At each node, there are multiple possible histories extending from it. That is,
there are multiple possible paths of epistemic change that can be carried out from any given
point in a history. But only a subset of possible sequences of events can begin at any given
point. For example, as the Detective case and Muddy Children [65] show us, some events
can only occur after some others and cannot occur after some others; there several possible
histories that extend from t1 in The Detective. In general, there are possible courses of
action or sequences of events that cannot occur given that others have occurred. This kind
of constraint isn’t present in E∗ itself, which is simply set of all possible finite sequences of
events. It takes protocols to introduce constraints.
ETL doesn’t have the machinery necessary to say much of interest about changes of
epistemic states, and also lacks machinery for distinguishing procedures from transitions,
and this is a serious limitation, as will be shown below. It does, however, shed light on
capacity and feasibility, and overcomes the limitations of DEL in modeling the development
of a particular state over time and the consequent enabling and disabling of processes. Additionally, the representation of states of a system with nodes of a graph is an abstract way
of representing any sort of epistemic dynamics, and some additional structure is desirable
for representing changes in the executability of actions from state to state.
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Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL)

PDL [113] is the central formal framework of the dynamic logic paradigm. Originally devised as a logic of programs, it provides an abstract model of general dynamics just as well.
Essentially a modal logic with an action algebra on top, PDL has two simultaneously defined
languages, L and P . L is a relatively standard propositional language plus a couple of operators defined with expressions from P : [π] and hπi. P is a program language. It begins with
a set of atomic actions Act, that are composed by the operations of sequential composition ;,
choice ∪, iteration ∗, and test (A)? which is formed from expressions of L. The idea is that,
if atomic actions are relations (linking states of a system), then the program control operators
are the regular operations on these relations in relational algebra. The semantics of PDL are
labeled transition systems or polymodal Kripke structures, hS, {Ra | a ∈ Act} , vi such that
S is a non-empty set, each Ra ⊆ S × S is a binary transition relation indexed to members of
Act, and v is a valuation function mapping subsets of L to each S. Each program is mapped
to complex graphs formed from S with edges in Ra by rules for successful execution of the
programs.
The original thought of PDL is that each structure displays a space of possible computations out of which a subgraph shows the possible computational processes that accord with
each (possibly indeterministic) program. The programs are instructions formed from basic
actions by various operations. The sequential composition of a; b is the instruction to do a
and then do b. Choice a ∪ b is the indeterministic choice operation; either a or b can be completed in order to execute this program construct. Iteration a∗ is the instruction to iterate a
some infinite number of times. And test is an atomic action that, if successful, always turns
up a true A. From these, more complex instructions can be composed. For instance, the
conditional program instruction of conditional choice “If A, do π1 ; else, do π2 ” is formalized
in PDL as ((A)?π; π1 ) ∪ ((¬ h(A)?πi >)?; π2 ). The instruction, guarded iteration “While A,
do π” becomes ((A)?π1 ; π)∗; (¬A)?π1 . Each protocol acts as a constraint on the possible
space of computations of the system. On this basis, a sound, complete, and decidable logic
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is defined. The well-known Segerberg axioms form the basis of the logic.
The models of PDL turn out to capture the exact thought that my earlier identification
of dynamics with transition systems captures; any dynamic system can be usefully thought
of in terms of states, transitions, and complex procedures for combining transitions. Programs capture what protocols are meant to capture; constraints on the possible ways that a
dynamic system can unfold. The execution conditions tell us what programs can be executed
at what states, and the program syntax tells us what the dynamics of the system must look
like if the program is to be executed. Programs define what states their constituent actions
can be executed at, how complex procedures are formed from basic actions (the computation
sequences of the programs), and which processes (of computation, of dynamics) are instantiations of the program. Consequently, PDL has the important feature that the execution
conditions of programs can encode the changes of possibility and feasibility by state or by
time. Think of the executions of a program as those sequences of actions of state change that
unfold under a constraint. From any state, programs tell us (via the execution conditions in
PDL) what actions can be executed at that state according to the program, hence, under the
constraint. These can be directly compared to the transition relations of each PDL structure.
Nevertheless, PDL fails to provide adequate models of epistemic dynamics. The representation of epistemic states in PDL, as states with valuations, is limited in some fairly
important ways. It doesn’t, for instance, allow the interpretation of epistemic or doxastic
operators in any principled or interesting way. The basic language of PDL also lacks some
interesting and intuitive control operators of PDL that are useful to analyzing epistemic
dynamics. It may, for instance, be highly important to the modeling of epistemic dynamics
that something like intersection of programs be added. More sophisticated variants of PDL
are desirable.
Worse, PDL cannot recognize the distinction between procedures and transitions because
it identifies actions with binary relations. However, by replacing binary relations with ternary
relations, S × Act × S, the distinction between labeled and unlabeled transitions can be used
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to distinguish procedures from transitions. The failure to do this raises some problems in
the analysis of reasoning about protocols, however, as we will see in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
The importance of this limitation will be argued below. Doing so, however, introduces some
complications worth considering. I hold this for the technical [135].
1.2.2.3

Epistemic Protocol Logic (EPL)

EPL [184] is a nearby variant on PDL explicitly devoted to the analysis of protocols and
reasoning about protocol information. EPL begins with basic protocols, which are finite
trees or finite, pointed, directed, acyclic graphs without converging edges where each edge
is labeled with an atomic action in the set Act. More precisely, each protocol is a finite
tree, T = hS, {Ra | a ∈ Act} , s0 i where S and each Ra are as in PDL, but each protocol is
a pointed model such that the transition relations are irreflexive, antisymmetric, and each
state has a unique predecessor. The state s0 is the root of the tree, and each sequence of
edges starting at the root is finite. Thus, there is a frontier or a set of leaves, the set of end
states of each path starting at s0 .
For each protocol, EPL defines a protocol expression hx, ai , tai i + ... + hx, an , tan i where
x is a node variable (a variable naming some node in some basic protocol), ai is an action
(labeled edge) taking x to the root of tai , which is a basic protocol. The atomic case is simply
a node variable. The next simplest case is a single action tree, hs0 , ai , s1 i where the frontier
is just s1 . More complex trees can be formed by connecting multiple states by action labeled
edges to single states. Protocol expressions can name complex trees whose root state is x
formed out of the subtrees tai , ..., tan and linked to x by actions ai , ..., an . These expressions
are then paired with a syntax similar to PDL’s. Protocol expressions are combined with
sequential composition ;, choice ∪, and iteration ∗. These are then interpreted by mapping
them to complex protocols that are generated by combining the protocols of the constituent
protocol expressions.
The protocols and protocol language are then paired with finite arenas with imperfect
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i, where S is a set of states, → is a set of sets of binary transitions

indexed to actions in Act, and

is an uncertainty relation linking states that are interpreted

as being indistinguishable from an epistemic point of view. The idea is that these structures
represent all of a system’s possible trajectories and an epistemic agent’s knowledge about
what trajectories are possible from any state. A protocol, complex or basic, can be embedded
in an arena, which is to say that it’s mapped injectively to a subtree of the arena. Such a
protocol is enabled at the state that is the root of this subtree. On this basis, a sound and
weakly complete epistemic logic encoding what agents can know about protocols as well as
facts about the enabling of protocols is defined and axiomatized.
EPL was explicitly designed to analyze dynamics that are constrained by such factors as
feasibility and possibility. The arenas of EPL represent a system’s dynamics. The protocols
identify subtrees of arenas as the dynamics of the system constrained by possibility and
feasibility. That is, the protocols identify what actions an agent can or cannot execute,
and the arenas with imperfect information identify what they know about what they can
accomplish given what actions they can or cannot execute.
EPL bears all of the strengths and some of the weaknesses of PDL in modeling constraints
on epistemic dynamics. EPL does well to distinguish procedure from epistemic change as
well as differences in possibility and feasibility over state, agent, and time. More, EPL
usefully recaptures important parts of PDL because there are protocol expressions in EPL
that correspond to every finitary program in PDL formed from sequential composition and
choice. However, the use of structureless nodes to represent epistemic states is troubled by
their simplicity, while the system is overall somewhat too indebted to PDL for it’s own good,
as Chapter 5 argues; even EPL fails to do everything that is required of a fully adequate
model of epistemic dynamics.
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Epistemic Logic for Rule-based Agents (ELRA)

Some formalisms focus on the ways in which epistemic states change. Jago’s Epistemic
Logic for Rule-based Agents (ELRA) [134] focuses on the execution of epistemic transitions
in accordance with formal rules. We begin with a denumerable language L. Let it be
standard in all other ways for now. Let Ai and B be metavariables ranging over atomic
propositions and their negations. Let rules be structures of the form A1 , ..., An . B. Let
A1 , ..., An be the condition of the rule. Consider transition graphs, hS, R, Labi, formed from
a non-empty set, S, a serial binary relation, R, relations among states, R ⊆ S × S, and a
labeling function, Lab : S −→ 2L . That is, the graphs display a space of transition relations
among states each of which is associated with a set of sentences of L. For a rule, r, say that
a state is r − matching iff for all Ai in the condition of the rule are in Lab(s). Then Jago
directs our attention to the class of models such that:
(M1)

For all s ∈ S and all rules r = A1 , ..., An . B, if s is r − matching, then there is
an s0 such that sRs0 and Lab(s0 ) = Lab(s) ∪ {B}.

(M2)

For any state s that matches no rules, there is a modally equivalent state s0 such
that sRs0 .

(M3)

For any s, s0 , sRs0 only if either there is some r such that s is r − matching and
(M1) is satisfied or there are no rules that s matches and (M2) holds of it.

(M4)

All states match the same rules.

These are the models of ELRA over which epistemic, doxastic, and modal language can be
interpreted. ELRA is, as might be easily noticed, a branching time model of dynamics.
ELRA has numerous interesting features. First, it represents epistemic states purely
sententially, thereby bypassing many of the unfortunate aspects of propositional or possible
worlds based models of epistemic states.26 Second, it builds in information about the natures
26

See [148] and [134]. More on this in Chapters 3 and 5.
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of various kinds of transitions; this information is about the preconditions and postconditions
of the transitions that can be carried out in a model. This allows the interpretation of claims
concerning what holds after the indeterministic “firing” of a rule. That is, we can formulate
statements about the informational effects of the execution of various rules. Seeing a set of
rules as a nondeterministic program (in which, at any state, one must execute some matching
rule out of the set, in no particular order), ELRA enables the formalization and analysis of
statements about (e.g.) the effects of carrying out the program from a given state.
The basic thought is that each state, coupled with a set of sentences, is an epistemic state.
The sentences that label each state can be interpreted, for instance, as those believed by an
agent. By firing various rules, an agent carries out changes of epistemic state, modifying
the set of beliefs at the state at which the rule is fired in a manner according with the rule.
ELRA explicitly attempts to model the dynamics of systems that unfold according to rule
sets. These provide models of constraints on dynamics insofar as the models of ELRA can
be compared to the developments of epistemic state that take place in a “wild” transition
graph that does not satisfy M1-M4, and so doesn’t “follow” the rules that its states match.
That is, rule sets define programs or protocols that determine constraints on the unfolding of
epistemic states. So, ELRA enables the distinction between rule-based procedures for state
change and the total set of transitions among states and it enables comparison among rule
sets. It also nicely analyzes preconditions of the application of (deductive) rules, and so gives
a very nice partial account of epistemic dynamics and, perhaps, certain kinds of norms.
ELRA isn’t, however, sufficient to model constraints on epistemic dynamics in general,
as it simply isn’t general; it’s an analysis of reasoners that change epistemic state by the
application of rules of a certain form. As such, it offers no analysis of procedures that do
not execute rules of that form.
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Procedural Epistemology

The third big idea introduced above is that the requirements of epistemic rationality are
defined by procedural norms that rule in and rule out processes formed out of more basic processes in certain ways. As I’ll argue in Chapters 2 and 4, these procedural norms
are integral to epistemic rationality. The attention paid to these procedural norms might
seem alien to some perspectives in epistemology. I frequently defend putative procedural
requirements by appeal to means-ends considerations rather than what might be thought
of as “fundamental” epistemological considerations. In the rest of Chapter 1, I appeal to
plausibility arguments (intuitions) concerning the hypothesis that epistemic rationality distinguishes between epistemic processes even where they have identical start and end states.
In Chapter 2, I argue that there are procedural norms of epistemic rationality - norms that
require or prefer some epistemic processes over others because the required/preferred process
is built out of more basic epistemic actions and processes by means of procedural operations
of sequencing and choice in some specified way. Some of these arguments are based on the
observation that procedural features (like the sequencing of subprocesses) of our epistemic
processes impact how well we can attain epistemic goals.
To this general approach, it might be objected that the “epistemic” norms that I focus
on at such length are merely practical rules for achieving properly epistemic ends or complying with properly epistemic norms; they are not fundamental nor properly epistemological.
Consider, for instance, the monistic view that truth is the sole, fundamental epistemic norm;
it’s the only standard against which epistemic factors can be evaluated. On this view, beliefs
can be indirectly evaluated with respect to evidential support and coherence in virtue of the
relations between these features of belief systems and truth, and reasoning processes can be
indirectly evaluated with respect to their reliability for producing true beliefs. On this view,
there might be rules that pick out some processes from others in virtue of having telltale features associated with reliability. But these rules will not be properly epistemological; they’ll
be strictly practical rules the normative force of which reduces to conditional imperatives of
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the form: “If you want to have true beliefs, then you ought to embody such-and-such mental
processes, since they are reliable for producing truths.” 27
My response to this objection is twofold. First, it’s not really an objection. My project is
compatible with the view above; I just think that the derivative and “not fundamental and
properly epistemological” procedural or pragmatic norms are extremely important for any
theorist that wants to understand epistemic dynamics and methodology, and I use the phrase
“epistemic norms” to talk about them. The basic epistemological perspective in this thesis
is that of procedural epistemology. [196] As Papineau [185] puts it, I think of epistemology
“...as a practical enterprise, concerned to ensure that the processes we embody are reliable for
truth, as opposed to a purely theoretical enterprise within the realm of belief.” (p.xviii) In
other words, I’m concerned with epistemic methodology - the kinds of rules, principles, and
concepts that limited epistemic agents can used to achieve the aims of inquiry. To that end,
I pay special attention to considerations about deliberate epistemic self-regulation, which
requires norms governing procedural construction - or so I argue in Chapters 2 and 4. If
these concerns are not properly epistemological, epistemology is poorer for ignoring them.
Second, as I argue in Chapter 4, if I’m right about the abstract form of epistemic norms
concerning belief states as well as the logical form of epistemic procedures, there is a clear
sense in which the “not properly epistemological norms” are indispensable to epistemology
for reasons that go beyond the analysis of self-regulation. I show that there is a sense in
which the important normative information that is carried by epistemic belief state norms
can be read off of procedural norms and that the converse fails. If that’s all correct, whether
we call procedural norms “properly epistemic” or not is of little relevance, as a model of
epistemic rationality that rigorously analyzes procedural norms will get a good analysis of
the “fundamental and properly epistemic” norms for free.
27

See [185] (p.xi) for this imperative. Papineau isn’t a proponent of the view described. On Papineau’s
view, one fundamental epistemic norm of truth is one too many: true belief is desirable because it’s a
prerequisite for successful action; there are no fundamental epistemic norms [185, 186].
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The Protocol-theoretic Account

With the three underlying ideas in hand, the protocol-theoretic account of epistemic rationality norms can be stated in a bit more detail.28 Epistemic rationality norms are, in
general, best analyzed by explicitly representing procedural epistemic norms with protocols
while representing epistemic dynamics with (upgraded versions of) the structures over which
dynamic logics are interpreted.29 In dynamic logics, protocols are objects that syntactically
encode complex instructions formed out of procedural operations on basic epistemic actions
and processes. This alone makes them natural representatives of procedural norms, as, per
the third idea, procedural norms function as instructions that dictate, permit, or forbid such
procedural operations. But there’s more!
The semantics of protocols associates the syntax of protocols to operations on dynamic
objects like transitions among states, extended processes of state change, and complex procedures built out of basic actions. These features of the structures of dynamic logics perspicuously represent corresponding features of epistemic dynamics - operations on transitions
of epistemic state, extended epistemic processes, and complex epistemic procedures. These
are exactly the features of epistemic dynamics that are associated with the requirements
specified by procedural norms.
On the basis of the foregoing structural similarities, important features of epistemic rationality norms can be formalized and reasoned about in protocol-theoretic logics of epistemic
norms. In particular, a formal framework that builds in the protocol-theoretic account of
epistemic norms can support logics that codify valid reasoning about (i) the preconditions
and postconditions of complying with them, (ii) equivalence relations among them, and (iii)
their normative verdicts with respect to states, transitions, and processes.
28

Given that procedural epistemic norms are the key to unifying epistemic norms generally, the thesis
scopes over epistemic norms in general.
29
The upgraded models are labeled directed multi-graphs [93], subsets of which are isomorphic to labeled
transition systems, or multi-modal Kripke structures (plus or minus sundry modifications) [33].
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Problems and Solutions

The closing observations of some of the prior sections reveal serious limitations on all of
the foregoing frameworks for epistemic dynamics and numerous others besides. Models of
epistemic dynamics must account for constraints of feasibility and capacity. As we will see,
there is a more serious problem: if a formal framework conflates actions, procedures, or
processes of epistemic change for the changes of epistemic state that might result from them,
the model cannot be complete and accurate. This point can be seen by considering an aspect
of the Detective case.

1.3.1

Representing Constraints on Dynamics

Epistemic states change by the execution of some kinds of actions, procedures, or processes,
and these executions are subject to various constraints. The analysis of epistemic dynamics
must account for these constraints, or else be misleading or incomplete.
Constraints on epistemic dynamics specify what an agent can do given any particular
state.30 There are multiple, distinct notions of what agents can do: call two of them capacity
and feasibility. Some actions or procedures are not executable by an agent under any condition.31 These actions are not within the agent’s capacity. Say alternatively that executing
those actions is not possible for the agent. If there are conditions under which an agent
can carry out an action, it is possible for her or within her capacity. Other actions are not
executable by an agent under some particular conditions, even if they are executable under
others. When an action can’t be executed under a specified condition, it’s not feasible for
the agent with respect to that condition. It’s feasible when it can be executed.
30

In Hoshi’s [131] terms, constraints on epistemic dynamics are encompassed by “protocol information”.
While this usage gels with the conventions of the DEL and dynamic logics terminology, it wouldn’t work
quite so well with some of my terminological choices. I will prefer “restrictions” when talking about protocol
information associated with norms, reserving “constraints” to talk about capacity and feasibility.
31
This can be multiply specified, of course. Among others, we might specify that some actions are not
executable by an agent under any logically possible condition, any nomologically possible condition, under
any psychologically possible conditions, etc..
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There are four important things to note at this stage about constraints of capacity and
feasibility:
• First, capacity and feasibility are distinct. An action a may be possible for an agent
or within her capacities, but not feasible under a specified set of conditions.
• Second, capacity and feasibility may differ for distinct agents. Some agents can do
under condition C what others cannot under C or at all.
• Third, the conditions that contribute to the feasibility of an action can be external
facts in the world or they can be facts about what epistemic states the agents are in.
That is, external and internal conditions can determine whether an action is feasible
for an agent at a time.
• Finally, there are changes in what actions can be carried out by what agents over time.
For example, given that epistemic states are a factor in determining what actions are
feasible, the basic idea of epistemic dynamics implies that the set of feasible actions
for an agent need not be constant from state to state. Learning and environmental
changes can enable new actions or disable actions normally within one’s repertoire.
Standard illustrations of these claims include, inter alia, the familiar Muddy Children puzzle:32
Muddy Children Several children are playing outside. After playing they come inside and
their father says, “At least one of you has mud on your forehead.” Each child
can see the other children’s forehead but not his/her own. Their father repeats
the following question, “Do you know whether or not you have mud on your
forehead?” The children are very intelligent and honest, so they answer father’s
question at the same time. Can the children come to know, over rounds of the
father’s question, whether they have mud on their foreheads? If they can, how
many question rounds are needed? (p. 6)
32

See [165] for the classical formulation. I explicitly quote Hoshi [131] for this formulation.
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Each of the children is capable of figuring out who has muddy foreheads, but cannot feasibly
do so without the father’s declaration, and one of them can’t figure it out without the
information provided by the other child’s answer. For a Muddy Children case where, of
two children, A and B, A is the muddy one, the first round of questioning produces “Yes”
and “No” answers from A and B, respectively. The second round produces uniform “Yes”
answers. It is possible for each child to figure out whether she is muddy, but at the first
round figuring it out is feasible for A and not for B. Thus, capacity and feasibility come apart
by condition and by agent. A’s ability to answer correctly was dependent on what A could
see (that B wasn’t muddy) and on the information gleaned from father’s announcement.
Not being able to observe the same facts, B couldn’t perform the same deduction. What
deductions were feasible depends on what information each child has as well as the actions
the child can perform to get information from the environment. That is, even idealizing
away differences in deductive ability, the children’s epistemic states and repertoires of action
impose constraints on feasibility. Finally, the announcements and inferences that the muddy
children can perform at early stages are not those that can be performed at later stages. A
could figure it out at round one while B couldn’t, but at round 2, everyone is caught up.
There are changes in what actions are feasible or possible for agents over time. Both learning
and changes of environment enable or disable actions.
Reconsider the detective example. Had the detective not had access to S1’s data, she
would not have formed the key belief that was the basis for the deductive inference at t3 .
This inference is possible for her but not feasible under the condition that she can’t get
S1’s data.33 The leak of insulting information was an action that enabled the deduction
by transitioning the detective to a new epistemic state where she possessed the requisite
premises. If an effective leak wasn’t in the detective’s repertoire, the deduction wouldn’t have
been available at t3 . The leak was, in essence, an information generating action that had
significant epistemological effects, including enabling her final deduction. Also, she couldn’t
33

Assuming there is no other method of forming the appropriate belief for the deduction.
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knowingly have generated whatever information was generated if she didn’t believe the info
she leaked to be insulting to K’s leadership. So, epistemic states make a difference not only
to feasibility, but to additional properties of action such as the possibility of deliberate or
knowing execution. That the deduction becomes executable only after acquiring the belief
that K’s crimes haven’t increased shows that the feasible actions are not constant from state
to state.
Given that these features are ubiquitous or even merely typical, representation of them
is clearly required of the analysis of epistemic dynamics. However, many frameworks for
epistemic dynamics don’t even attempt to represent the features of epistemic dynamics
illustrated above. Of the frameworks described above, only DEL was developed with an eye
to modeling the aspects of epistemic dynamics under consideration, and this it only does in
a limited fashion.34
AGM and BRT give little thought to dynamics under constraints.35 Neither AGM nor
BRT contain any rigorous concept of epistemic action as distinct from the epistemic commitment functions or update functions that define dynamics in these systems. Thus, any
possible permutation of the contents of epistemic state s that meets the formal conditions
in these theories is a perfectly possible change from any possible belief state or probability
function. There is no sense in which a permutation of the contents is ruled out by any considerations other than the rationality postulates or the laws of probability, and these are not,
in any sense, constraints of feasibility or capacity. Thus, due to the conflation of processes
of epistemic change with formally possible epistemic changes, no serious consideration of
constraint on action is an option in these theories.36
34

This point is more fully articulated and defended in Chapter 5. But a broad argument is drawn in the
main text to this effect.
35
This should be qualified. The models of dynamics in these systems can be interpreted as representing
constraints in the sense that the revision and update functions identify a proper subset of the set of all
possible transitions (ordered pairs) of epistemic states defined in the frameworks. This is what makes them
interesting and useful as theories of regulative ideals or norms for knowledge or rational belief. However,
this way of modeling epistemic norms, while an insight that motivates the project, is completely inadequate
given the principles that I argue must be captured by any theory of epistemic rationality and its norms.
This is a point to be expanded upon in Chapters 2 and 5.
36
Of course, modified versions of AGM and BRT that incorporate dynamic epistemic languages and de-
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At best, we can compare the class of transitions that satisfy the definitions of the commitment and update functions to the subsuming class of all possible pairs of epistemic states
in each system.37 This will define a broad notion of constraint insofar as the class of transitions that satisfies the relevant axioms, postulates, or rules are thought of as those satisfying
the requirements of rationality, but no other kinds of constraint on available actions (even
restricting attention to inferential actions) will be intelligible in these systems, and this notion of constraint will be a far cry from an adequate analysis of capacity and feasibility. For
instance, there is no representation of child A’s public answer to father’s question, nor of
the limitations on B’s ability or inability to acquire beliefs from which to deduce the correct
answer.
To be fair, the foregoing frameworks aim only to give a basic model of epistemic dynamics
in order to get at the logical conditions on knowledge, rational full belief, or partial belief
and changes thereon. All the same, they do give basic models of epistemic states and mechanisms for epistemic state change that are formally precise and not without great insight.
Nonetheless, the systems generally fail to account for constraints on dynamics, and they fail
especially with respect to dynamics in relation to epistemic rationality.38
DEL can go further on this note than either AGM or BRT; the Muddy Children puzzle
is a standard example in DEL textbooks, after all. In DEL, actions may be considered a
subset of events, and these are related to transitions of epistemic state by product updates.
This has two benefits. First, since the preconditions of events can come apart, there is a
modeling of constraints of capacity and feasibility. An agent, i, might be able to carry out
ductive closure under a DEL validity relation will provide models that perfectly well mirror the inferences
made in (e.g.) the muddy children case. The point, however, is not that the languages of standard AGM and
BRT systems are inadequate to mirroring some kinds of inference, but that they have very little, without
serious modifications (e.g., [6, 20, 99, 68]) to say about the cognitive abilities, opportunities, and limitations
of the agents in these kinds of cases. See the next paragraph as well as Chapter 5 for more detailed spelling
out of this argument.
37
That is, if we consider the full sets of transitions, BL × BL (where BL is the set of belief sets defined
over artificial language L), and P r(L) × P r(L) (where P r(L) is the set of probability functions defined over
language L), including transitions from and to incoherent or irrational states. The revision functions and
the conditionalization rule clearly define subsets of these transition relations. Thus, they define a restriction
of a sort on this more abstract transition relation.
38
Again, a promissory note: this will be argued for in much more detail in Chapter 5.
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some event, e, at a given state, while some other agent, j, can’t, separating the feasibilities of
agents. Some agents might be able to carry out some actions at some states but not at others
(those at which pre(e) hold), separating feasibility and capacity. Second, in DEL, there is
the possibility that two distinct event models, E1 and E2 , result in identical transitions given
an epistemic model M . This suggests that DEL does not commit the conflation that AGM
and BRT commit of identifying actions or processes with the changes they cause. However,
this is all too fast. DEL is still limited for analyses of epistemic dynamics and insufficient to
provide a framework for epistemic rationality norms, as we will see in detail in Chapter 5.
1.3.1.1

Protocols

Protocols are useful tools for modeling constraints. Cognate concepts include plans, policies,
and especially programs, but these carry connotations that are misleading when talking
about constraints of capacity and feasibility.
The basic, informal idea of a protocol is a rule that determines what actions can be
performed at what states of the world. Somewhat more formally, thinking in terms of
dynamic systems, protocols are rules that tell us what the options are - at any given state
of a dynamic system - for transitioning to a new state. To state it a little more formally, say
that epistemic processes are chains or sequences of epistemic actions.39 I assume the usual
type-token distinction holds for processes and actions [257]. Say that procedures are process
types; they are sets of processes defined by relations between process tokens like procedural
operations or construction out of a shared set of actions. For instance, a procedure might
be the set of processes such that actions of specified types are always sequenced or chosen
freely among under certain conditions.
Then, with that terminology in hand, protocols define procedures; they define what states
actions can be executed at (or, equivalently, what actions can be executed at each state),
what procedural operations can be used to combine basic actions or processes into more
39
Epistemic action is understood in a rather liberal fashion, as will be commented on in Chapters 2, 3,
and 4.
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complex actions or processes (which determine the relations among processes mentioned
above), what processes instantiate or adhere to a procedure, and what sequences of states
are traversed by executing or complying with a protocol.

1.3.2

The Processes and Constraints Problems

Recall the Detective Case from section 1.2.1. The process of deducing that K is in City B from
the available evidence and the process of simply believing the psychic’s testimony result in
identical changes of belief. For any theory that conflates (token) changes in epistemic states
with actions or processes of change, the differences between these two (token) processes are
invisible. They are, after all, merely expansions of the detective’s belief set with the belief
that “K is in B”.40 This is a barrier to modeling the epistemic dynamics of an individual
agent with a level of fidelity that is relevant to representing and reasoning about epistemic
rationality. The point will be expanded upon in the next section and in Chapter 2, but for
now, simply note that if believing psychic testimony and deduction from the best available
evidence are epistemically distinct (one way of reasoning being more rational than the other,
for instance), then, in order to see how an agent’s token reasoning processes are rational or
not, our model must be able to distinguish between them even if they result in the same
changes of epistemic state. From another angle, all LTSs provide are distinct labels, and we
need systematic recipes for encoding interesting things about the distinctness of those labels.
The prior point (in combination with the observations about constraints on epistemic
40

Strictly speaking, according to AGM, this final belief should have been added to the detective’s belief set
when she added “If I leak embarrassing information about K to media in A only, then the rate of K-like crimes
in A will increase”, “I leaked embarrassing information about K to media in A only”, and “There is no increase
of K-like crimes in A”. This is due to the fact that expansions are closed under deduction. Nonetheless, AGM
faces a dilemma: either we identify processes of epistemic change with commitment functions (hence, there
are only three kinds of process of epistemic change and no analysis of the process of deductive reasoning at
all), or we identify processes of epistemic change at a finer grain. The first option renders the main devices of
AGM implausible as a model of epistemic dynamics for precisely the reason that the two processes of change
in the main text are clearly psychologically, phenomenologically, and epistemologically distinct. AGM can’t
tell us anything about how they’re different. The inclusion of “K is in B” in a belief set must be either a
trivial consequence of the expansion above or the trivial consequence of expanding with “K is in B”. AGM
doesn’t tell us anything interesting about how the same belief could be added by the process of deduction as
distinct from the process of belief by psychic testimony. The second option requires machinery that is not
present in AGM. This point gets spelled out and expanded upon in a bit more detail in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 1. DYNAMICS, PROTOCOLS, AND RATIONALITY

38

action) implies that the following properties of formal systems are problems that any model
of epistemic dynamics must overcome or avoid:
(Processes) There are no structures for representing actions, procedures, or processes as
distinct from transitions between (models of) states.
(Constraints) There are no structures for representing constraints on actions, procedures,
or processes as opposed to constraints on transitions.
The Processes problem was pointed out in this section; a model of epistemic dynamics should
distinguish actions, procedures, or processes from transitions among states for the reason
that two (token) processes may, for a particular agent, time, or set of conditions, generate
identical transitions and yet be epistemically distinct. This point is expanded upon below
and defended at some length in Chapter 2. The Constraints problem notes the interaction
of the prior point with the observation of the constraints pointed out in subsection 1.3.1.
A model without the means of drawing the line between processes and transitions can’t
draw the line between constraints on processes and constraints on transitions. A model of
epistemic dynamics must do both if it’s to give a good analysis of epistemic dynamics. This
is also expanded upon below.
As we will see, there are further demands of a theory of epistemic dynamics and/or
epistemic rationality that, in concert with these problems, suggest the following related
problems:
(Constraint Unfolding) There are no structures representing how epistemic dynamics
unfolds under constraints as contrasted to how it would unfold without the constraints.
(Process Reasoning) There are no languages for encoding reasoning about the distinctions
in (Processes).
(Constraint Reasoning) There are no languages for encoding reasoning about the constraints in (Constraints).
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(Constraint Unfolding Reasoning) There are no languages for encoding reasoning about
how epistemic dynamics unfolds under constraints as contrasted to how it would unfold
without the constraints.
The Constraint Unfolding problem is a corollary of the Constraint problem. If a model cannot
represent constraints at all, it certainly won’t be able to distinguish how a system develops
under constraints from how it might have developed in the absence of those constraints.
Conversely, if the latter can be represented, then the former can be represented indirectly in
virtue of the representation of the latter.41
The Reasoning problems are corollaries of the other problems: models that don’t provide
structures for representing these distinct objects can’t provide explicit methods for reasoning
about those distinctions in their languages. At least, they can’t provide explicit formal
expressions that represent statements that would draw the distinctions while also giving those
expressions semantic values in the models. As I argue below, PDL (for instance) doesn’t seem
able to interpret statements that draw the distinction between accepting psychic testimony
and deducing the same information from one’s own premises. Suppose that we give these
token acts distinct labels in PDL. Then they must be embedded in the program expressions
or the propositional expressions in which program expressions are embedded. But now,
which expressions in PDL can plausibly represent the claim that accepting the testimony
is irrational and deducing the same information is rational? Nothing in the language of
PDL suffices. Nothing in the dynamic deontic expansions of PDL [174] works, either, since
they function by identifying subsets of states (i.e., “red states” or states that verify “violation
constants” will clearly be unable to draw the distinction). The general point here is expanded
upon below and in detail in Chapters 2, 4, and 5.
These problems result in a number of other serious theoretical failings; if a formal framework has the Processes, Constraints, Unfolding, or Reasoning properties, then it fails to be a
41

Suppose that a model of dynamics can tell us how a system would look if it executed action a at state
s and also that a cannot be executed at state s. Then whatever constraint determines that a can’t be done
at s is at least partially characterized by this fact.
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complete and accurate model of epistemic dynamics. Generally, the analysis of actions and
processes exclusively in terms of transitions among epistemic states results in the failure of
a model of epistemic dynamics to accurately characterize important features of dynamics,
including some that are relevant to the analysis of epistemic rationality norms. To illustrate
this, consider PDL as a test case.42 If the binary transition relations mapped to a and b in
all PDL structures are identical, then a and b are equivalent in all contexts in the language
of PDL; they are perfectly intersubstitutable. Formally, if the binary transition relation,
Ra , mapped to a is identical to that mapped to b (Rb ) for every structure of PDL, then
|=P DL A(a) ≡ A(b) where A(x) is any formula of PDL containing x. But this is wrong.
There are classes of assertions that may be true of action a that are false of b even if a and
b are mapped to equivalent transition relations.43
The main thought is that it’s possible for epistemic actions to be associated with identical
binary transition relations despite being distinct in many other ways. Consider the following
case.
(Honest Twin) Suppose that I know methods for discerning the validity of arguments in
first-order logic that are infallible if carried out correctly. Suppose that I have a twin
that knows all of the same methods I know but is infallibly honest and diligent when
asked about validity; so much so that he walks me through every proof construction
42

The problems articulated here generalize to many forms of DEL, belief revision theories, and, generally,
any theory that conflates epistemic actions and processes with epistemic transition relations or operations on
epistemic states. In any system in which A(π) and A(π 0 ) are interpreted exclusively over transition relations
or operations on states associated with π and π 0 , the problems in the main text will result. This is shown or at least sketched - in more detail in Chapter 5.
43
Note that some researchers define PDL in terms of ternary transition relations; see Ch. 4 of [30]. This
is not equivalent to the usual definition of PDL [113]. Define two program equivalence relations: Rp and Rr
such that: (1) πRpπ 0 is true at s iff all labeled transitions (sets of triples or ternary transition relations) or
π arrows starting at s are π 0 arrows and vice versa, and (2) πRrπ’ iff all binary transitions (sets of pairs,
binary transition relations) starting at s are π transitions and vice versa. Then πRpπ 0 can fail at states at
which πRrπ 0 holds. Consider a ternary or labeled transition system with only states s and s0 and labeled
transitions hsπs0 i and hsπ 0 s0 i. Note that hsπs0 i and hsπ 0 s0 i are distinct triples; hsπs0 i may be in the set of π
transitions but not in the set of π 0 transitions despite the fact that hsπ 0 s0 i is in the set of π 0 transitions. Thus,
in that case, πRpπ 0 fails at s. However, if the set of binary transitions mapped to π contains hs, s0 i and the
set of binary transitions contains hs, s0 i, then πRrπ 0 holds at s. So, shifting from binary transition relations
to ternary transition relations isn’t an insignificant move; though the language of PDL can’t distinguish
these structural nuances, the language of PLEN can. It’s not clear how best to extend execution conditions
defined in terms of ternary relations to complex protocols, as we will see in [135].
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if I but ask.44 In any situation, for any argument, if I were to successfully carry out
a method for discerning validity, the execution of the methods I know would tell me
exactly what my twin would tell me, were I to ask, and vice versa. In cases where there
are multiple proofs, my twin always carries out the one that I would have, had I carried
out the process. Let a represent the process of testing arguments using my deductive
and model-checking methods. Let b represent the process of asking my twin about
the validity of first order arguments and coming to believe what he says. These two
processes are certainly equivalent in a sense; given an argument, they return identical
verdicts if carried out correctly; they even give the same proofs. Thus, they terminate
with identical epistemic states from any initial state. Let Ra be the transition relations
associated with a; the set of all pairs of initial states and output states of carrying out
a. Let Rb be defined in a parallel fashion. Then Ra = Rb .
The Honest Twin case - and any like it - generates a number of kinds of error for any system
representing epistemic dynamics that analyzes actions and processes in terms of transitions.
First, conflating actions and/or processes with transitions will get claims about methodological inclusion wrong. Let a! and b! be instructions for carrying out a and b. Let Mi (a!)
say that the instruction encoded by a! is part of an explicit methodology that I’ve learned,
M . Now, in a model of epistemic dynamics in which actions and processes are analyzed
in terms of transitions only, the statements about actions and processes will be interpreted
with the same truth rule schema as any other formula in PDL: s

Mi (a!) iff (... Ra ...)

where the righthand side of the definition specifies some condition that Ra satisfies.45 Thus,
44

I, of course, I am the dishonest twin. An alternative case: Suppose that I have a power of clairvoyance
that enables me to directly query an omniscient database. For any A, I can add it truly to my belief set - if
it’s true - by consulting the database, and I can eject it from my belief set by consulting the database and
finding out it’s false. Still, I go about revising my beliefs in a piecemeal fashion. Suppose also that I’ve got
a hotline to God, and he always answers for me. I can revise my beliefs the same way, querying God one
belief at a time. Querying God and querying the database will always turn out the same answers, under any
conditions. The arguments in the main text concerning methodological inclusion and procedural features
apply as well to this case.
45
The alternative is to assign semantics to such formulae without reference to the parts of the models that
interpret action or program expressions. But any such route will fail to solve the embedding problem raised
in [135] with respect to epistemic normative terms.
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Mi (a!) iff s
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Mi (b!) for any s in any

model. Thus, for instance, |=P DL Mi (a!) ≡ Mi (b!). Of course, this equivalence fails in the
Honest Twin Case; b! may not be in my explicit methodology even if a! is. Additionally, let
hMi i > be a statement to the effect that some procedure in my methodology M has been
executed. This will be true if a! ∈ M and a has been executed. But if a and b are equivalent
just if they lead to the same transitions, then executing b suffices for executing a. So, even if
b is not in M (let {a} = M ), hMi i > will be true whenever b is executed. But the deductive
methodology I’ve learned may not include (and could perhaps explicitly prohibit or instruct
the avoidance of executing) the instruction to ask my twin, and so asking will not carry
out anything in my methodology (and may actually constitute a breach of the methods).
As shown, conflating processes with transitions will get this wrong. Thus, the analysis of
actions with transitions also gets facts about the feasibility of following our methodologies
wrong as well as the foregoing facts about methodological inclusion.
Second, procedural information about a and b is incorrectly equated by the identity of
binary transition relations. If any of the propositions of PDL encode procedural information, e.g., information about the number of steps a procedure requires, how those steps are
combined via procedural operations, what facts hold over the course of carrying a procedure
out, or information about particular substeps of carrying out a procedure, then the equivalence of binary relations implies false equivalences among these assertions.46 The action a
may require numerous substeps to complete while b is relatively basic. If Com(a) says, in
PDL, that a is complex, then the above fact that |=P DL A(a) ≡ A(b) has a false instance:
Com(a) ≡ Com(b). However, Com(b) may be false while Com(a) is true for all that identity
of transitions establishes. Asking my twin does not, of course, need to be as complex a process as figuring out a proof myself. More, there are senses in which a might require execution
of an action c while b does not. If a is actually a complex action, c; d, while b is atomic, then
46

That this is not visible in the usual form of PDL is an expressive limitation; its languages don’t have any
formulae that can distinguish transitions from procedures. The arguments here essentially examine what
happens when you add new expressions that do so.
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it’s true that a requires execution of c but b does not.47 More, the process of asking my twin
certainly contains sub-actions that doing the proof doesn’t, namely, asking my twin. If there
are expressions in PDL for encoding this, like Com(a = c; d) and Com(b = e; f ), the semantics of PDL will simply get them wrong because, as above, it must interpret them in terms of
Ra and Rb . Such an interpretation is already intuitively absurd; of course information about
transitions doesn’t reveal information about procedures. More directly, though, asking my
counterpart and constructing a proof do not involve the same procedural operations on the
same sets of basic actions; the equivalence is simply false. Thus, the conflation of processes
with transitions fails to accurately capture procedural information.
Third, and most important for the purposes of this project, the analysis of actions and
processes with transitions only will mischaracterize the verdicts of epistemic norms. The
point can be seen most readily by considering a case where a token action a and a token
action b would, if either is carried out, result in the same transition t = hs, s0 i. Let Ni,C (a)
say that norm N specifies that this particular token of a is rational for i to carry out under
condition C. These statements must, on the “transitions only” view that I’ve been criticizing,
be interpreted over the transitions associated with a and b. Thus, at s, Ni,C (a) ≡ Ni,C (b).
But this is is false. According to N , a may be rational and b may not be despite the fact
that these actions result in the same transition. There are plenty of examples to be had.
Consider inference by Modus Ponens from the set of statements {A, A ⊃ B, B ⊃ C, C} as
opposed to inference by Affirming the Consequent on the same set. It’s clear that one is a
rational inference, and the other not despite the fact that any statement about rationality
must be interpreted only over the transitions involved, which, for this initial state, will be
the same for both forms of inference.
If this argument just applied to token actions that result in the same token transition,
it would suffice to establish that transitions-only models mischaracterize normative verdicts.
However, as the Honest Twin Case shows, it’s possible that two actions (action types) are
47
I’m abusing notation a bit. Here, a and b are being used as variables for the perhaps complex procedures
deducing and asking my twin, respectively. They are not meant to be atomic actions.
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associated with identical transition relations, not just a shared transition. Explicitly, let
Ni,C (a) say that norm N specifies that a is a rational action (type) for i to carry out under
condition C. Then, as above, Ra = Rb implies that |=P DL Ni,C (a) ≡ Ni,C (b). This is a false
equivalence. In situations like that described in the Honest Twin Case, Ni,C (b) may be false
while Ni,C (a) is true for all that identity of transitions establishes. The transition-equivalent
actions, a and b - as opposed to the merely transition-convergent actions in the modus ponens
vs affirming the consequent case - are rationally distinct.
Under some circumstances, it may be rational to carry out a proof myself and not rational
to ask my counterpart. For instance, if I am unaware of my counterpart’s inexhaustible
honesty or even have strong but defeasible - and ultimately misleading - reason to distrust
him but I have extremely powerful reasons for trusting my own reasoning processes, it is
more rational to deploy my own proof methods. The converse case works just as well. If I
have good evidence my twin is better at proofs than I am and strong but defeasible - and
ultimately misleading - evidence for distrusting my own reasoning, I have a powerful reason to
ask my twin rather than rely on my own thinking. In the selection of epistemic actions, there
is something epistemically irresponsible from the agent-relative perspective with selecting the
action that is an unknown quantity or apparently the worse option [77, 78].
There are, additionally, differences between procedures in Honest Twin-like cases that
are of epistemic relevance. Among these are features of procedures like (e.g.) efficiency,
problem-solving power, speed, and likelihood of error. Consider likelihood of error. In a
noisy environment, asking my twin may be more likely to be erroneously executed than
deploying my own proof processes, however faster or more efficient asking might be. As
we try to guard against this likelihood of error in a noisy environment, we will encounter a
tradeoff with efficiency. More, different actions may have cognitive effects that are not part
of the representation of epistemic states. Suppose that total procedural knowledge is not
represented in a model’s representation of epistemic states. Then, it’s possible that a and
b have different effects on my procedural knowledge; being walked through a proof by my
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honest twin may not provide the same sort of procedural knowledge that working through
the proof on my own provides (or vice versa). This is epistemically relevant, as it affects
what future epistemic actions are available to me, as well as the likelihood of performance
errors, efficiency, problem solving power, and speed.
The foregoing arguments will find further articulation and defense in the next three subsubsections and in Chapter 2; explicitly, a number of examples of plausible epistemic norms
that declare some processes rational and others irrational despite defining identical transition relations are given. Thus, there are numerous ways in which conflating transitions for
processes gets epistemic dynamics and epistemic rationality wrong. More important, these
are all features of epistemic dynamics that we want to think about in analyzing epistemic
rationality and its norms for the transparent reason that these assertions all characterize
various aspects of epistemic norms and the relations of factors of epistemic dynamics to
norms. This should become clearer in future chapters.
Each of these failings is a result of the Processes problem. The central point is that,
if a formal framework contains assertions about the foregoing properties of processes but
interprets them in terms of sets of transition relations, it erroneously validates various classes
of invalid inferences and verifies classes of false equivalences. Of course, the defense of a
model of dynamics may simply rely on the fact that it is focused on some particular kind of
epistemic process or that it analyzes dynamics at a level of abstraction at which processes
drop out of the picture. In that case, the inferences and equivalences won’t be within the
scope of things the model aims to get right. That’s fine; theoretical interests can vary from
theorist to theorist, but it indisputably leaves the resulting model incomplete. Such a model,
constricted in its interests, leaves elements of epistemic dynamics unanalyzed. Thus, any one
of these problems is a black mark on the adequacy of a system as a general model of epistemic
dynamics; a model with these problems is simply incomplete or misleading. However, if a
model of epistemic dynamics is to be put to analyzing epistemic rationality, these problems
may be decisive.
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From Bad Models of Dynamics to Bad Models of Norms

I want to elaborate on the third problem in the foregoing section. This problem presupposed that there are epistemic norms that distinguish process tokens (and types) despite
those tokens (resp. types) corresponding to the same transition tokens (resp. types) among
epistemic states. I argue in Chapter 2 that this is indeed the case, but for now, let’s simply
take the following putative examples for granted:
(Bad Reasoning) IF: (i) a belief set at t is s = {B, A → B, C → A, C} where → is a validly
detachable conditional, and A is consistent with B and C, (ii) the belief set at
t + 1 is s0 = {B, A → B, C → A, C, A}, and (iii) transitioning from s to s0 can
be carried out by two process types:
(Process 1) Detach A from the conditional C → A by affirming the antecedent,
C, and
(Process 2) Detach A from the conditional A → B by affirming the consequent,
B, and *not* performing any sort of explanatory or confirmatory
inference to the same conclusion,
THEN: carrying out Process 2 in lieu of Process 1 is irrational, and carrying out
Process 1 is rational.48
(Wishful Thinking) IF: (i) a belief set at t is s = {B, A → B, C → A, C} where → is a
validly detachable conditional, and A is consistent with B and C, (ii) the belief
set at t + 1 is s0 = {B, A → B, C → A, C, A}, (iii) transitioning from s to s0 can
be carried out by two process types:
(Process 1) Detach A from the conditional C → A by affirming the antecedent
C, and
48

Perhaps more plausible, suppose that Process 1 involves explicitly, formally representing my belief set,
plugging my beliefs into the valid argument schema of conditional detachment, and thereby recognizing the
validity of such an argument, then updating my beliefs according to a rule like Defeasible Closure 1, thereby
expanding my beliefs with A. Suppose that Process 2 follows suit, but with affirming the consequent.
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(Process 2) Infer A without any regard to prior belief because it feels good to
believe A,
THEN: carrying out Process 2 in lieu of Process 1 is irrational, and carrying out
Process 1 is rational.
(Non Reasoning) IF: (i) a belief set at t is s = {B, A → B, C → A, C} where → is a validly
detachable conditional, and A is consistent with B and C, (ii) the belief set at
t + 1 is s0 = {B, A → B, C → A, C, A}, and (iii) transitioning from s to s0 can
be carried out by two process types:
(Process 1) Detach A from the conditional C → A by affirming the antecedent
C, and
(Process 2) Arrange medically unnecessary brain surgery that is known to cause
belief that A (assume the surgery succeeds),
THEN: carrying out Process 2 in lieu of Process 1 is irrational, and carrying
Process 1 is rational.
Note that (a) each of these norms conditions a verdict of irrationality on the availability of
alternative processes with certain features, and, more important for the point at hand, (b)
each example delivers the verdict that a process is irrational despite its delivering the same
epistemic transition as a rational process. Assume these are genuine or plausible epistemic
norms. This means that there are epistemic rationality requirements on processes of change
of epistemic state as well as on states and transitions. Explicitly, the foregoing problems
imply the following theses:
(D) Epistemic rationality is dynamic; there are epistemic requirements on transitions among
epistemic states, not just states or contents of states.
(P) Epistemic rationality is procedural; there are epistemic requirements on epistemic processes and procedures, not just states or transitions among states.
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If I’m right, a formal model of epistemic rationality norms must be adequate to (D) and (P).
How can a formal framework for epistemic rationality norms make sense of these features of
epistemic rationality?
To be adequate to (D), one’s model of epistemic rationality norms must have an underlying model of epistemic dynamics in addition to an underlying model of statics. To be
adequate to (P), the underlying model of epistemic dynamics must be able to carve transitions apart from processes. More precisely, if a model fails to distinguish transitions from
processes, it will have no machinery for drawing the distinction between transitional and
procedural requirements of epistemic rationality, and so no capacity to account for (P).
Generally, if a framework conflates the transitions associated with a and b with the actions
a and b themselves, then it must interpret assertions in its language about the actions a and
b on the basis of only transitions and features of transitions that omit procedural information
(i.e., relations of the transitions to edges or actions other than being in Rx ). But if that’s
the case, then the identity of the transitions associated with a and b will wrongly validate
or verify schemata like A(a) ≡ A(b). If the language of the framework contains expressions,
A(a) and A(b), that can be interpreted as statements about the rational permissibility of a
and b (with respect to norm N ), then the framework will validate falsehoods.49 Explicitly, in
Wishful Thinking, Non-Reasoning, and Bad Reasoning, there is only the transition from s to
s0 associated with each process. Thus, if A(a) and A(b) are interpreted in terms of transitions,
A(a) ≡ A(b) will hold at s. However, if A(a) says, intuitively, that a is rational (according to,
e.g., Wishful Thinking, Non-Reasoning, or Bad Reasoning), then A(a) ≡ A(b) is false; A(b)
may be false while A(a) is true for all that identity of transitions establishes. Thus, conflating
processes and actions with transitions will either get these kinds of procedural norms wrong
by misconstruing their verdicts or it will have to just not contain expressions encoding
verdicts like “a is rational (according to procedural norm N )”. Further, in Chapters 2-5, it is
49
This argument is phrased in general terms, but it applies more acutely to cases in which the a and b
transitions unfolding from a root state are identical. There, A(a) ≡ A(b) will be true in the framework while
the equivalence it represents will be false.
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shown that this argument extends to central features of epistemic rationality and its norms
including logical relations among epistemic norms, e.g., the failure to distinguish transitions
from processes results in failure to adequately analyze (e.g.) the equivalence conditions of
procedural norms. So, it’s generally worse for an account of epistemic rationality if its models
fail to distinguish transitions and procedures.50
The strongest form of this argument depends on the class of “transition-equivalent” pairs
of actions being non-empty. It might be objected that the basic premise of these arguments,
that there are any actions a and b such that Ra = Rb , is false.51 Specifically, it might be
argued that, in any case like the Honest Twin, a and b can’t be identified with identical
transitions because at the states that a reaches, one believes that one reached the state by
a, and at the states reachable by b, one believes that one reached it by b. This won’t work.
First, note that if a and b are analyzed strictly in terms of their transition relations then
the beliefs in question are identical or logically equivalent with each other. In the first case,
Ra = Rb . In the second case, if epistemic states are closed under equivalence, Ra = Rb .
If epistemic states aren’t so closed, then Ra and Rb may be nonidentical. But, second, in
that case or the case in which a and b aren’t strictly analyzed in terms of their transition
relations, one can simply construct a modification of the Honest Twin case in which a0 and
b0 either give mixed up beliefs about what process was carried out or they simply fail to give
beliefs about what processes were carried out.
50
Of course, this all depends on there really being plausible procedural norms. Chapter 2 attempts to
establish this.
51
In the main text, I only consider the objection from direct differences in the contents of the terminal
states of a and b. I won’t consider differences in, for instance, basing relations between the terminal states
for three reasons. First, I consider basing relations in Ch.2, and what I say there, if it works, undermines
the objection from basing relations here. Second, the Honest Twin case explicitly builds in the stipulation
that a and b provide exactly the same proofs, hence, exactly the same non-causal basing relations. Third, to
insist on a difference of causal basing relations will reinstate the very problem of normative verdicts above:
differences of process (defined in terms of causal structure) are operative in normative judgments about
beliefs. Such insistence is also either misguided or provides a direct reason to favor models that distinguish
processes from transitions. If the causal basing relation is defined in terms of the prior states, in which case
the causal basing relations just are identical between a and b because those processes apply in all of the same
situations, then Ra = Rb . If causal basing relations are defined in terms of something more fine-grained,
then Ra is not Rb but only because differences in the processes are operative in normative judgments about
belief, which returns us to the normative verdicts problem.

50
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There is no reason to think that all epistemic processes give such beliefs in addition to the
beliefs they directly add. Many beliefs about the processes that generate belief either fade
over time or are not scrutable in the first place.52 To see this, simply consider a modification
of the Honest Twin Case that extends the processes over long periods of time. Let a0 be the
process of carrying out the deduction or model-check and then going on with one’s life as
normal for ten years, and let b0 be the counterpart composed of asking my twin and then
going on with life for ten years. Assume that, as normal, I forget the details of how I came
to the conclusion about validity that I came to by doing a0 , but I remember the outcome. Or
assume that I form the correct belief about validity on the basis of misremembering which
process I used, but correctly recalling the outcome. In that case, Ra0 = Rb0 because in the
long term, the two processes converge on exactly the same states. Schematically let a0 = a; c
and let b0 = b; c where c is a process of forgetting what processes led to what beliefs, and the
original argument goes through.
Now, the argument formulated above needn’t be as generally formulated as it is - it’s a
matter of how serious a problem a model of epistemic dynamics faces. The Honest Twin case
is a limit case; Ra = Rb for a and b. However, the argument above can be modified to apply
to the more general class of transition-convergent cases - cases where two actions merely
overlap in associated transition relations despite being distinct in numerous, epistemologically relevant ways. Define S = {s | hs, s0 i ∈ Ra ∩ Rb } and then consider an equivalence,
A(a) ≡S A(b), such that s0

A(a) ≡S A(b) iff (s0

A(a) iff s0

A(b)) for all s0 ∈ S.

Then the S-variants of all of the equivalences above will be true at all states in S, and these
equivalences will still be false for the reasons articulated above. Thus, even if there are no
transition-equivalent pairs of actions, the analysis of actions with transitions will fail to get
the foregoing features of epistemic dynamics and epistemic normativity correct.
52

See, for instance, the general inscrutability of many heuristic and subpersonal processes [136, 238, 242,
105, 73], and Lam’s considerations [154].
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From Bad Models of Norms to Bad Models of Dynamics

The norms of epistemic rationality come in at least three types corresponding to the three distinct epistemic factors so far implicated. There are norms defining requirements on epistemic
state, norms defining requirements on epistemic transitions, and norms defining requirements
on epistemic action or process. Importantly, the norms described above define constraints
distinct from those of capacity and feasibility. This is all argued for explicitly in Chapter 2.
If this is right, then the evolution of an agent’s epistemic states must unfold along a subset
of the possible trajectories, and normative evolution is distinct from evolution by arbitrary
selection of feasible moves. Thus, any model of epistemic dynamics that aims at a reasonable
semblance of completeness and accuracy must analyze the constraints defined by epistemic
norms in addition to and in contrast with the constraints of capacity and feasibility. Call
the absence of resources for this the problem of First-Class Citizenship:53
(First-Class Citizenship) There are no structures that represent epistemic norms, no
structures that represent compliance with epistemic norms, and no languages encoding
reasoning about epistemic norms.
Two of the subclauses of the problem bear spelling out:
(Normative Unfolding) There are no structures representing how epistemic dynamics
unfolds under normative restriction as contrasted to how it would unfold (under constraints of capacity and feasibility) without the normative restriction.
(Normative Reasoning) There are no languages for encoding reasoning about the properties of epistemic rationality norms, e.g., how epistemic dynamics unfolds under normative restriction as contrasted to how it would unfold without the normative restriction,
53

As with the Processes and Constraints problems above, the reasoning problem is a simple corollary: if
a framework is to give a logic of dynamics, it needs to provide a system for reasoning about these things.
The terminology, here, is inspired by van Benthem [30, 34, 28], whose logical dynamics programme aims
to, among other things, make actions first class citizens in logic. I think that formal analyses of epistemic
rationality have to do the same for norms.
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what norms determine about specific courses of action, what norms can be derived
from others, what sets of norms are equivalent to each other, etc..
The Normative Unfolding problem is simply a matter of spelling out the clause in the FCC
about representing compliance with epistemic norms. Modeling how a system unfolds under
normative restriction is just a way of representing compliance with norms. The Normative
Reasoning problem is a simple corollary to FCC in that it’s explicitly claimed in FCC. The
absence of any languages for encoding reasoning about epistemic norms implies the absence
of languages for encoding reasoning about the specific properties of epistemic norms detailed.
The First-Class Citizenship problem undermines models of epistemic dynamics. Normative courses of action - those in compliance with a set of norms - are typically distinct from
those that an agent is capable of at any given state or time. Thus, if a formal framework
for modeling epistemic dynamics fails to solve FCC, then it is misleading or incomplete with
respect to epistemic dynamics. The thought is that normative constraints are genuine constraints that are distinct from constraints of capacity and feasibility. Normative courses of
action - those in compliance with a set of norms - are typically distinct from those that an
agent is capable of at any given state or time. Let a and b both be feasible processes or
epistemic actions that a reasoner could carry out from a given state. The explanation of why
a rational agent’s actual history contains execution of procedure a rather than b may be that
a complies with some normative canon and b complies with none. In order to adequately
capture this feature of epistemic dynamics, a model needs some devices to represent the
distinction between normative constraints and constraints of feasibility and capacity.
From another angle, the thought is that models of epistemic dynamics must distinguish
between normative constraints and the constraints of feasibility and capacity because epistemic agents are capable of violating the normative constraints, and normative constraints
typically identify proper subsets of feasible options. Thus, normative constraints are distinct
from constraints of feasibility and capacity and require distinct representations.
The Processes and Constraints problems exacerbate the FCC. If a model fails to analyze
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epistemic norms by failing to draw the distinctions between static and dynamic and between
transitional and procedural norms, it fails to adequately analyze epistemic dynamics because
it fails to represent the requirements of (e.g.) procedural norms. Consider any of the norms
in the last subsection. The explanation of why an epistemic agent’s history contains an
execution of procedure a rather than b may be that a complies with a deductive or inductive
canon and b is bad reasoning, wishful thinking, or non-reasoning. A model needs to be
able to represent the distinction between norms that constrain transitions and norms that
constrain processes or procedures in order to represent the difference between a and b. The
inability to do this is an inability to fully or accurately represent the epistemic dynamics of
rational agents.
So, any general or complete models of dynamics require some features for representing
and reasoning about epistemic norms and their requirements. In order to do this, epistemic
norms ought to be “first-class citizens” in a framework in the sense that there is something in
the structures that represents them - at least indirectly through representation of compliance
with them - and parts of the languages of the logic for reasoning about them.

1.4
1.4.1

The Framework Problem and PLEN
Introducing The Desiderata

Recall that the protocol-theoretic account is supported by a theory preference argument: the
formalism by which the protocol-theoretic account is developed (PLEN) satisfies theoretical
desiderata that no other formalism does. The argument begins with the thought that formalization in philosophy is theoretically valuable; all else being equal, a partially formalized
theory is to be preferred to a strictly informal theory. Formalization in philosophy forces
theorists to explicitly articulate hidden assumptions and empowers them to rigorously draw
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difficult or obscure conclusions.54 Both of these activities are useful for the evaluation and
improvement of theories. Formalization is consequently a sort of crucible through which good
philosophical theories would do well to pass, and so a desideratum on theoretical adequacy.55
Now, despite the virtues of formalization, formalization doesn’t suffice to transform bad
assumptions about a subject matter into a good theory. If an account of epistemic rationality
is fundamentally incomplete or mischaracterizes its target, formalization may only carry these
properties over despite its other virtues. This is the Garbage-in, Garbage-out principle.56
Thus, anchoring the formalization to the most defensible philosophical characterization of the
target domain available is paramount. Accordingly, the defense of PLEN and, consequently,
the defense of the protocol-theoretic account depend on the philosophical characterization
of epistemic rationality norms.
The foregoing problems partially characterize epistemic rationality norms by introducing
important features of epistemic dynamics. I’ll outline the rest of the core account of epistemic
rationality norms below and defend it in Chapter 2. Call the constraints on epistemic
dynamics defined by the requirements of epistemic rationality restrictions, for the sake of
setting them apart from capacity and feasibility. The main idea of the account is that
epistemic rationality restricts the space of possible epistemic factors that an ideally rational
reasoner can navigate.57 Requirements on epistemic states restrict the space of possible
states for an epistemically rational cognizer to be in. Requirements on epistemic transitions
restrict the space of possible transitions or trajectories of state change that an epistemically
rational agent can evolve along. Requirements on epistemic processes restrict the space of
possible epistemic actions and processes that a rational reasoner can deploy to evolve her
states.
Formal frameworks that get epistemic dynamics wrong by ignoring the difference between
54

See Hansson’s useful discussion [112] of the procedure and virtues of formalization, as well as its vices.
For additional insights about formalization, see [18].
55
To be clear, it’s a desideratum of non-zero weight. That, of course, doesn’t imply that formalization is
a minimal requirement of theoretical adequacy.
56
See [195] wherein Pollock devises very much the same kind of motivation for his project.
57
The notion of restriction will be more precisely characterized in Chapter 2.
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transitions and procedures get epistemic norms wrong, and frameworks that get epistemic
norms wrong get epistemic dynamics wrong. I have, hopefully, established that much. However, the examples in prior sections suggest specific conditions on modeling epistemic normativity. As argued above, given that the distinction between state, transition, and process
requirements carves epistemic rationality at real joints, formal frameworks that ignore the
difference between static and dynamic requirements - and that between transitional and procedural requirements - imposed by norms of rationality are either incomplete or else simply
misleading about epistemic rationality and epistemic dynamics (insofar as rationality requirements define ideally rational epistemic state change). The following observations thus
lie among the principles of epistemic rationality that any framework for analyzing epistemic
rationality must capture:
D1 Epistemic rationality is dynamic; there are epistemic restrictions on transitions among
epistemic states, not just states or contents of states, and there are characteristic
relations among restrictions on states and restrictions on transitions.
D2 Epistemic rationality is procedural; there are epistemic restrictions on epistemic actions,
processes, and procedures, not just states or transitions among states, and there are
characteristic relations among restrictions on transitions and restrictions on processes.
D1 and D2 primarily rehearse D and P above but specify some further requirements on
avoiding the First-Class Citizenship problem; there are relations among the different kinds of
restrictions. More on this in Chapter 2. But D1 and D2 are merely some of the principles that
the examination of epistemic rationality norms uncovers. The observations above concerning
capacity and feasibility partially suggest that:
D3 Epistemic rationality norms define restrictions on epistemic dynamics that model (a)
ideally rational evolution of epistemic state, (b) ideally rational changes of epistemic
state, (c) ideally rational procedures and processes of epistemic state change, and that
(d) can be distinguished from constraints of capacity and feasibility.
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As D1 and D2 imply, there must be epistemic rationality norms that carry some information
that defines rational dynamics, and this content distinguishes rational changes of state from
rational processes of change. All of this work can be done by explicitly defined restrictions
on epistemic dynamics, or so Chapters 2 and 4 will argue. These restrictions must be distinct
from the constraints of capacity and feasibility for the simple fact that neither the capacity
nor the feasibility of an action, process, or epistemic change imply its rationality.
It will be argued in chapter 2 that restrictions on epistemic procedure frequently, even
ubiquitously, involve restriction on the construction of procedures. Given the core array of
procedural operations, this implies the following corollary of D3:
Corollary Epistemic rationality norms restrict the construction of procedures; they determine how basic epistemic actions are to be sequenced, iterated, combined, chosen
among, conditioned on tests, avoided, reversed, and cautiously executed.
D3 and its corollary put further flesh on the account of epistemic rationality norms that must
anchor formal frameworks for epistemic rationality. I’ll forego developing the individual parts
of that account further, here.
In Chapter 2, each of D1-D3 is articulated in detail and defended as a condition on any
putative logic of epistemic norms. As will be seen there, these principles arise in connection
with central epistemological debates concerning the existence of dynamic epistemic norms
and the function of epistemic norms in cognition. If the arguments of Chapter 2 are right,
then D1-D3 are integral to the characterization of epistemic rationality and its norms. D1D3 thus specify conditions of adequacy on addressing the First-Class Citizenship problem
because they carve the nature of epistemic rationality and its norms at real joints. The
structures and logical resources of a framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic rationality norms are thus incomplete or plainly incorrect if there aren’t properties of
the structures or formal assertions that adequately represent D1-D3.
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The Framework Problem

If the foregoing arguments work, the analysis of epistemic rationality demands formalization
and the formalization must address the Processes, Constraints, and First-Class Citizenship
problems in a way that adequately captures D1-D3. Hence, the Framework Problem:
(Framework Problem) Any formal framework for reasoning about epistemic dynamics or
the norms of epistemic rationality, F , that either fails to adequately represent epistemic
dynamics or fails to adequately represent epistemic norms is either seriously incomplete
or inaccurate with respect to its target domain. If a framework for epistemic dynamics
fails to adequately formalize epistemic norms, it fails to be adequate with respect to
epistemic dynamics. If a framework for norms fails to adequately represent epistemic
dynamics, it fails to be adequate with respect to epistemic norms. Now, it is established
in Chapter 1 that any framework that suffers the Processes, Constraints, or First-Class
Citizenship problems (or related subproblems) fails to adequately formalize epistemic
dynamics. It is established in Chapter 2 that any framework that fails to formalize
desiderata/principles D1-D3 fails to adequately formalize epistemic norms. Thus, the
fundamental problem is to devise a formal framework for representing and reasoning
about epistemic dynamics, epistemic rationality, and epistemic rationality norms that
(I) solves the Processes, Constraints, and First-Class Citizenship problems and related
sub-problems, and (II) adequately formalizes principles D1-D3.
Now, the primary argument can be restated: we should understand epistemic rationality
norms in terms of protocols because the protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms, PLEN,
solves the Framework Problem.58 Showing that PLEN does so and is the only formalism in
58

The most useful method for defending a philosophical account of something is showing that it does better
than its rivals relative to a set of desiderata (ex. D1-D3) articulated within a theory preference procedure
(ex. Priest’s multi-factor model [199, 202]). Now, this way of doing things sometimes allows a great degree
of pluralism; the desiderata I want to satisfy may be anchored to goals like modeling a particular aspect of
a complex object of study. A model aimed at understanding a different aspect of the same object need not
answer to my desiderata. Rather than establishing a theory to be correct or objectively best in any general
sense, this way of arguing carves out a niche in the ecology of theories and shows how a theory fills it. The
argument of this thesis really is about niche-carving.
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its neighborhood that does so is the primary project of this dissertation.

1.5

The Shape of Things to Come

This dissertation has three parts. Part I articulates the protocol-theoretic account, outlines
the whole project, and provides a piecemeal defense of an informal, minimal theory of epistemic rationality that grounds the account. This minimal theory provides the philosophical
criteria of adequacy against which formal frameworks for epistemic norms will be evaluated.
In the course of spelling out the account and main lines of argument for it, Chapter 1 has
articulated a number of problems that mar formal models of epistemic dynamics. These
problems implicitly characterize epistemic rationality as a matter of dynamic processes constrained in various ways. Of the ways that epistemic processes are constrained, those related
to norms of epistemic rationality are of obvious epistemological importance. Chapter 2
examines the nature of epistemic rationality and its norms more closely, giving a detailed
defense of a minimal theory in the form of three principles: D1-D3. In Chapter 2, D1-D3 are
articulated and defended on the basis of arguments arising from disputes about the static
or dynamic nature of epistemic rationality and about the function of epistemic norms in
epistemic life.
Part II is the technical core of the project; it defines PLEN and shows how PLEN solves
the Framework Problem. Chapter 3 provides a detailed formulation of PLEN and discusses
some of its important properties. The syntax and semantics of PLEN are discussed in
some detail both formally and intuitively. The discussion focuses on getting a feel for the
system and for interpreting the formalism as an abstract theory of the nature, structure,
and content of epistemic rationality norms. To those ends, a sound axiomatization of PLEN
is given. Chapter 4 shows how PLEN solves the Framework Problem, and so completes the
first half of the theory preference argument for the protocol-theoretic account. Each of the
Processes, Constraints, and First-Class Citizenship problems are solved in turn, and D1-D3
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are formalized by relying on the technical properties of PLEN. The argument of Chapter 4
relies on a technical result that is more philosophically interesting if an analysis of deontic
operators can be devised in PLEN. To that end, there is a brief appendix that gives a
plausible - if preliminary - analysis of deontic operators in PLEN.
Part III completes the defense of PLEN and considers the road ahead. Chapter 5 locates
PLEN relative to the formalisms that PLEN draws on, showing that rival formalisms fail
to satisfy at least some of the foregoing desiderata. It is shown that PLEN occupies an
interesting place; it solves the problems articulated in Chapter 1, it formalizes D1-D3 with
great fidelity, and it’s a relatively basic framework that is easy to work with and modify. Rival
and predecessor formalisms, while fruitful for thinking about epistemic dynamics and about
norms and protocols, tend to fall short of PLEN on one or the other of these dimensions.
Chapter 6 recapitulates and suggests a number of ways in which PLEN can be complicated
or modified to improve its usefulness or to take on other philosophical projects.

Chapter 2
Desiderata: The Shape of Epistemic
Dynamics and the Structure of
Epistemic Norms
2.1

Introduction

The Framework Problem articulated in Chapter 1 was partially the problem of developing a formal framework for theories of epistemic rationality that adequately formalizes the
following set of principles:
D1 Epistemic rationality is dynamic; there are epistemic restrictions on transitions among
epistemic states, not just states or contents of states, and there are characteristic
relations among restrictions on states and restrictions on transitions.
D2 Epistemic rationality is procedural; there are epistemic restrictions on epistemic actions,
processes, and procedures, not just states or transitions among states, and there are
characteristic relations among restrictions on transitions and restrictions on processes.
D3 Epistemic rationality norms define restrictions on epistemic dynamics that model (a)
60
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ideally rational evolution of epistemic state, (b) ideally rational changes of epistemic
state, (c) ideally rational procedures and processes of epistemic state change, and that
(d) can be distinguished from constraints of capacity and feasibility.
Corollary Epistemic rationality norms restrict the construction of procedures; they
determine how basic epistemic actions are to be sequenced, iterated, combined,
chosen among, conditioned on tests, avoided, reversed, and cautiously executed.
These principles comprise a sort of core, pre-theoretic account of epistemic rationality. The
account doesn’t commit to any substantive norms or to any particular account of the structure of epistemic states (i.e., quantitative beliefs or full beliefs). Importantly, the account
of epistemic rationality comprising D1-D3 is entirely independent of the protocol-theoretic
account. It’s intended merely to enumerate features of epistemic rationality that PLEN - or
any other formal theory - must account for. In other words, D1-D3 articulate an intuitive
theory of the structure or form of epistemic norms that formal theories are to be measured
against.
Formalizing these features is a condition on the adequacy of formal frameworks for epistemic rationality. This was partially motivated in Chapter 1 regarding D1 and D2: if these
principles carve epistemic rationality at real joints, then formal frameworks that fail to capture them in some way will be either incomplete or misleading about epistemic dynamics,
epistemic rationality, or the nature and structure of epistemic norms. This chapter aims to
fully substantiate that conditional with regard to each of D1, D2, and D3 and its corollary.
The expository plan of the chapter is to articulate and defend these principles in turn,
thereby articulating the core account of epistemic rationality and its norms that formal
frameworks must capture. Doing so takes us through examination of a number of important
questions about epistemic rationality:
1. Is epistemic rationality strictly or fundamentally static or dynamic? What do norms
of epistemic rationality govern? What do their conditions of application concern?
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2. What kind of information is carried by epistemic norms? Propositions? Imperatives?
Programs?
3. What is the primary role of epistemic norms in cognition? Factual judgments? Post
hoc evaluations? Epistemic advice?
The sections of the chapter are organized straightforwardly around principles D1-D3, but
they overlap with respect to the questions above. First, a preliminary section outlines my
assumptions and terminological choices. From there, each section is composed of three
subsections: a subsection in which the principle is explicated, a subsection in which the
principle is argued for, and a subsection in which the principle is discussed. The articulation
and argumentation subsections are relatively self-contained. The discussion subsections do
the explicit work of explaining how the principles answer questions 1-3, and how the principles
hang together. This results in there being a bit of a complicated weave of interconnections
between these subsections.

2.1.1

Preliminaries

2.1.1.1

Epistemic Rationality and its Norms

The requirements of epistemic rationality are the conditions that one’s epistemic factors
must meet in order for them to be rational. The norms of epistemic rationality specify
these requirements; they are the cognitive or conceptual items that function in our cognitive
economies in order to allow us to think about and coordinate our actions with the requirements of epistemic rationality. Where the requirements of rationality are the things that we
need to do or the conditions we need to meet in order to be rational, epistemic rationality
norms are the rules, plans, or policies that spell out those requirements.
The fundamental target for analysis in this thesis is epistemic rationality norms. Epistemic rationality norms are broadly construed, here. The norms of rational belief revision
that distinguish acceptable forms of belief formation, retention, or change fall under the
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rubric of epistemic rationality norms, as do norms that distinguish rational from irrational
belief sets. Now, there are a great variety of proposed epistemic rationality norms across
the fields of epistemology and philosophy of logic. The debate about these often centers
on whether the norms are themselves rational - or, if one prefers, plausible - as norms for
controlling belief change. See, for instance, the debates about (e.g.) deductive closure, conditionalization, or even logical consistency [2, 53, 121, 199]. I will not be directly weighing
in on these debates. Rather, I’ll be pulling examples of epistemic norms liberally from the
literature as well as the aether in order to illustrate concepts or make arguments. While
it will sometimes matter whether these examples are cases of rational epistemic rationality
norms, it will be assumed that they are all norms of rationality as opposed to norms of some
other kind.1
Epistemic rationality norms are often encoded via “norm-kernels”:
(Norm Kernel) If C, then R(x).
These rule-like expressions are a focal point of analysis [261, 164, 167] because they plausibly
articulate the essential structure and properties of norms. It is this form of rule that enables
norm-kernels to define the requirements of rationality.
The condition C is commonly called the condition of application of the norm; it gives us
1
As for what distinguishes epistemic norms from non-epistemic norms, I wish to remain non-committal.
At a first glance, it seems that epistemic norms, as opposed to non-epistemic norms, condition their valence
(positive or negative, rational or irrational) on “epistemic” concepts including (inter alia) logical and probabilistic relations among the contents of epistemic states. Very roughly, say that, if the valence of an epistemic
factor x according to norm N is conditioned on logical or evidential properties of x or its relations to epistemic procedures, then N is an epistemic norm. If the valence that N assigns is conditioned on practical
or moral properties of epistemic factors, then, roughly speaking, it’s a non-epistemic norm. This rough and
ready rule will pick out the norms I focus on in this thesis. However, it may be possible to reduce such norms
to other moral, practical, or aesthetic norms. I won’t pursue this line of thought. Nothing hangs on the
impossibility or even contingent failure of reduction of epistemic to non-epistemic norms because my targets
are clear enough. Even if, as Papineau argues in [186], epistemic norms are really - at bottom - grounded
in practical, moral, or aesthetic considerations, there is a subset of norms concerning cognitive states and
activities that directly involve no practical, moral, or aesthetic concepts. The putative requirement that
one’s beliefs be probabilistically coherent, for instance, doesn’t directly appeal to any means, ends, morality,
or aesthetic values, though we might justify following a norm imposing such a requirement by appeal to the
desire not to get Dutch Booked or to some other practical considerations. Additionally, see the arguments
below distinguishing the project of analyzing strictly the non-reducible norms from the project of analyzing
the norms that are important for epistemic life.

CHAPTER 2. DESIDERATA: DYNAMICS AND NORMS

64

a condition under which the normative claim, R(x), holds. The variable x stands in for a
term denoting something in the domain of the norm, something to which the norm applies.
In other words, x is the object of the norm. The objects of norms are what they govern.
The consequent, R(x), is a normative claim of some kind, often a deontic proposition. R(x)
states the valence or verdict of the epistemic appraisal. The object of the norm may be
declared (by the norm), under condition C, to be rational or irrational, rationally obligatory
or permissible, more or less rational relative to a standard or an alternative object, and so
on.2 In other words, epistemic rationality delivers verdicts about what states, transitions,
and processes are rational (inter alia), and the norms of epistemic rationality are the rules
that structure the verdicts by giving conditions under which their objects possess some
valence or another.
There is room for norm-kernels of a converse form:
(Converse Norm Kernel) If R(x), then C.
These norm-kernels specify necessary conditions for a valence rather than sufficient conditions. The components of the anatomy are the same, though. Conditions of application and
objects are easy enough to identify, though the logical connection between them in converse
norm-kernels is different. Epistemic norms are often not merely statements of sufficient conditions but statements of exclusive conditions. Probabilistic coherence is sometimes thought
to be both necessary and sufficient for rational belief. These norms can be expressed in pairs
of converse norms or pairs giving conditions for dual valences: “If state s contains credences
that violate the axioms of probability, then s is irrational”, and “if s contains credences that
satisfy the axioms of probability, then s is rational”. Assuming that valences obey usual
duality rules like those that (e.g.) deontics and modals do, the standard norm-kernel form
indirectly specifies requirements (i.e., necessary conditions).
Norms involving deontic valences are of special importance because the requirements
of rationality frequently seem to require or permit actions or states. For example, “If the
2

The relations among these valences are discussed briefly in Chapter 4.
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conditional probability of H given E is above threshold t, then it is rationally permissible
to believe H given that you believe E.” For another, “If the inference (s, s0 ) leads to an
inconsistent belief state, then inference (s, s0 ) is forbidden.” And a third, “If you learn (only)
B between t1 and t2 , then it is rationally obligatory to update your credence in A at t2 ,
P r(A)2 , so that P r(A)2 = P r(A | B)1 . In general, norm-kernels like “if C, then O(x)”
tell us that rationality requires us to carry out the action x or be in state x. Permissive
norm-kernels, “If C, then P (x)” work in tandem to define requirements. Consider a set
of norm-kernels, N1 , ..., Nn , all of which condition on C and permit a1 , ..., an . If this set
exhausts the permission norms, executing some ai is required (or obligated) by N1 , ..., Nn ;
one is required to act permissibly, and a1 , ..., an exhausts the set of permissible actions.
Prohibitions negatively define the set of permissible actions, and thereby shape requirements
indirectly as well directly requiring that one avoid some actions.
Three remarks are in order. First, deontic and other valences are interdefinable. It’s
plausible that, if a norm N is a norm of epistemic rationality, then if N declares x impermissible under condition C, this is equivalent to declaring x irrational under C. It isn’t possible
to do x, according to N , while being rational. That is, if N declares x irrational under C,
in order for an agent to be rational under C, she can’t do x (should x be an action) or be
in x (should x be a state). But this is just to say that x impermissible according to the
norms of rationality. So, it seems to be possible to reduce the customary catalog of valences
- rational, irrational, more/less rational, and “there is a reason to” - to the deontic valences
- obligation, permission, and prohibition.3
Second, some valences of an object may preclude other valences of that object or they may
preclude other valence-object pairs. The obligatoriness of x may preclude the permissibility
of y where x and y are incompatible in certain ways, say, if x and y require use of the
same scarce resources, are time-sensitive, or cause the enabling conditions of one another to
3

This idea will be taken on at length in Chapter 4. One obvious hitch is that “more/less rational” and
“there is a reason to” seem difficult to reduce to deontic valences. Prima facie, it requires consideration
of degrees of obligation and permissibility or robustness of permissibility or consideration of how deontic
operators rank actions and how this works in contexts of choice.
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fail. The converse also holds. A norm obligating x under C functionally prohibits y under
C, because the execution of y implies the failure of the duty to x. From another angle, if
omissions can be counted as kinds of action, if x is an action and y is the omission of x, x’s
obligatoriness entails that y is impermissible.
Third, norm kernels may come in comparative form, as well:
Norms Kernel If C, then R(x, y).
Normses Kernel If C, then R(x) and R0 (y).
Norms of both forms can give us comparative information about the objects x and y. The
condition of application, C, may state comparative information like “the epistemic state
reached by x is more coherent than that reached by y”, or “x is a more coherent state than
y”. The valence R(x, y) tells us that there is a comparative valence between x and y. For
example, “If belief that-A is more probable given evidence E than belief that-B, then, given
belief in E, it is more rational to believe A than B.” The conjunction R(x) and R0 (y) is
straightforward. Such a norm just tells us that if these conditions hold of x and y, then x and
y have such and such differential normative properties. This is often the form of comparative
norms. Consider the following norms as instances:
(Evidence Over Consistency 1) If inference (s, s0 ) leads to a contradictory but properly evidenceapportioned belief state, and inference (s, s00 ) leads to a consistent but not properly evidence-apportioned belief state, then it’s more rational to carry out inference (s, s0 ) than to carry out (s, s00 ).
(Evidence Over Consistency 2) If inference (s, s0 ) leads to a contradictory but properly evidenceapportioned belief state, and inference (s, s00 ) leads to a consistent but not properly evidence-apportioned belief state, then it’s (rationally) permissible to carry
out inference (s, s0 ) and (rationally) impermissible to carry out (s, s00 ).
The plausibility of these norms depends on how proper evidence apportionment is spelled
out, of course, but they illustrate different forms of comparative assignment of epistemic
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verdicts. In all of what follows, I make no use of alternative forms of norm-kernel, but
it shouldn’t be difficult to see how what is considered applies to these different forms of
normative expression.
Epistemic rationality norms can be more or less informative. For instance, it’s commonly
thought that logical consistency or probabilistic coherence are requirements of rationality.
A consistency norm may be a rule or plan dictating the detection and revision of logically
or probabilistically inconsistent belief sets; a rule that tells us to identify inconsistency and
repair it. Such a rule needn’t be as informative as, for instance, an algorithm for detecting
and revising away inconsistency. That is, a consistency norm might be a rule that not only
tells us to identify and repair inconsistency but that tells us exactly how. A norm that carries
no information about exactly how to detect those conditions or how to revise belief upon
detection will be less precise and consequently less useful in guidance of epistemic action
than one that carries that information. Compare the rules:
R1 If A and ¬A are both in your belief set, revise by rejecting A or ¬A and everything that
entailed the belief you rejected.
R2 If your belief set is inconsistent, remove the inconsistency.
R2 is less precise in two ways. First, it carries no information about how to tell when one’s
belief set is inconsistent, in contrast to R1. R2 may, for all of the information it carries,
require revision away from some idiosyncratic notion of inconsistency (e.g., inconsistency
with the revealed truth of the scriptures) rather than logical inconsistency. Second, R2’s
recommendations are less precise. R1 dictates one of three possible revisions: revising A,
¬A, or both. For all that R2 tells us, there may be countlessly many ways to comply with R2,
including emptying one’s belief set entirely, deploying one of the above revisions alongside a
number of arbitrary other revisions (reject A and also B, C, and all beliefs about lizards),
or simply rejecting A, ignoring the possibility of reclosing one’s belief set. More precise,
informative norms are necessary for deliberate application of norms, or so I’ll argue below.
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I will say that rationality or its norms distinguish objects of epistemic appraisal x and y
when x and y differ in the valences assigned to them. I will also say, equivalently, that x and
y are rationally distinct or rationally distinguishable. I will say that rationality distinguishes
x and y on the basis of C when x and y are rationally distinct and C is what makes the
difference in valence. I will say that, thinking in terms of transitions among states in an
LTS, epistemic changes are transitions from one state to another. In a transition from state
s to state s0 , s is the root state and s0 is the terminal state. If two different transitions hs, s0 i
and hs, s00 i are discussed, it means that both transitions can be executed from state s or
both transitions are available at s. Take this to mean that some process resulting in these
transitions is feasible for a reasoner with state s.
For convenience, say that a normative property is dynamic if the objects that bear the
property are changes of states or processes of state change (or sets thereof). Say that a
normative property is static if the objects that bear the property are epistemic states (or
sets thereof). The synchronic properties of epistemic states are the properties that a state,
s, has at any particular time, t, or that relate s to other things (e.g., the parts of s, the
contents of s, other epistemic states, s0 ) only at t.
Epistemic norms frequently specify requirements on epistemic action. Epistemic action
is deployed as a capacious term. The set of epistemic actions is the set of actions that
generate, transform, reveal, or obscure information in any ways relevant to epistemic cognition. This includes actions as diverse as those overt actions involved in the construction
and manipulation of external representations (e.g., carrying out calculations or derivations
on a blackboard, crafting a physical model and manipulating it), methodical evidence acquisition or generation (i.e., experimentation or physical manipulations of the environment that
otherwise generate information), or in more internally oriented but still voluntary cognitive
behavior like consciously attempting to think of alternative explanations, directing attention to particular bodies of evidence, or the actions involved in deliberate self-stimulation of
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inference or supposition [144, 181, 171, 77].4
As a result of this conception of epistemic actions, I’ll be setting aside any worries about
doxastic involuntarism and related issues. One might argue, as Alston [7] does, that epistemic
norms cannot require or impose normative requirements on things like inference or belief
formation because normative requirements can only apply to things that agents have control
over, and inference and belief formation are not among these things. However, even if we
accept the claim that inference and belief formation are not actions over which agents wield
direct control, an indirect form of control over inference and belief change can be exerted by
performing actions that trigger these involuntary cognitive processes [171]. For instance, the
deliberate direction of attention to logical relations among believed propositions can trigger
expansion or contraction of beliefs. More generally, the deliberate direction of attention to
specific features of argument structure, evidence, environments, or our models can function as
self-stimulating actions that trigger inference and belief change. The deliberate construction,
modification, and manipulation of models can do the same - if only because deliberately
building, fiddling with, and using models can direct attention to logical relations, evidence,
etc..
By these means one can see to it that one infers or forms a belief, as long as there
are regular connections between actions that one can directly control and those cognitive
processes. That is, one can wield control over otherwise involuntary cognitive processes by
carrying out epistemic actions in the broad sense above. So, in place of a full engagement with
doxastic voluntarism and involuntarism, I’ll just stipulate that epistemic actions subsume
4

This usage is especially consilient with lines of empirical research on epistemic action, e.g., [144] and
[169], that show that manipulation of models can improve performance on cognitive tasks. For instance,
the manipulation of physical models of arrangements of blocks improves performance on later abstract block
arrangement tasks, specifically as exhibited in playing the game Tetris. There is also much philosophical
research on the construction and manipulation of models in philosophy of science [178, 87, 212]. This research
tends to focus on what epistemic gains are made by manipulating models despite their admitted distance
from the phenomena they model. However, that such gains are made coupled with the fact that model
manipulation is a volitional activity implies the point being made: that the sorts of non-inferential or noncognitive actions involved in manipulation of models are epistemically relevant and useful despite not being
(e.g.) inferences, perhaps because they trigger inferences or other cognitive processes. For instance, turning
over cards, looking under cups, reading letters, or any of the other standard actions in the DEL literature,
re: Ch. 5 of [65].
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both the kinds of actions described above as well as the kinds of action that reliably stimulate
inference or belief. So, where I assert that norms require inference or formation of belief under
some conditions, the doxastic involuntarist can re-phrase this as saying that norms really
require that one see to it that one infers or forms beliefs under those conditions by carrying
out the requisite self-stimulation actions.
Epistemic actions can be strung together to form epistemic processes. The epistemic
actions out of which a process is formed are basic, with respect to the processes they comprise. Complex processes can be strung together to form more complex processes. These
combinatorial assumptions - perhaps controversially - run together processes of epistemic
cognition and processes formed out of sequenced epistemic actions, as defined above. Such
epistemic processes might involve the interleaving of cognitive processes and actions on the
environment. One might wish to draw some sharp line between processes that affect the
outside world and those that don’t. However, I doubt that this boundary is much of one
for the reasons that, as argued above, (i) actions that affect the world generate, reveal, or
conceal information for cognitive processes to use and (ii) they also stimulate or trigger
such processes. A defense of this line of thought is in [171]. The boundary is thoroughly
questioned independent of my worries: [144, 181].
Finally, a reminder of the key background conceptual assumptions. First, much of the
argumentation in this chapter is dependent on thinking in terms of epistemic dynamics
and LTSs. Implicitly, epistemic rationality is thought of as telling theorists and reasoners
about which states, transitions, actions, processes, or procedures of change of state are
(epistemically) good or bad. The arguments are thus formulated in terms of classes of
possible epistemic states, transitions among these, and actions, processes, and procedures
that result in such transitions. Second, the requirements of epistemic rationality are the
conditions that one’s epistemic factors must meet in order for them to be rational. Finally,
the norms of epistemic rationality specify these requirements; they are the cognitive or
conceptual items that function in our cognitive economies in order to allow us to think
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about and coordinate our actions with the requirements of epistemic rationality. Where the
requirements of rationality are the things that we need to do or the conditions we need to
meet in order to be rational, norms are the rules, plans, or policies that spell out those
requirements.

2.2

D1: Epistemic Dynamicism I

2.2.1

Principle

D1 Epistemic rationality is dynamic; there are epistemic restrictions on transitions among
epistemic states, not just states or contents of states, and there are characteristic
relations among restrictions on states and restrictions on transitions.
This principle is straightforward. The thought is that epistemic rationality imposes requirements on what transitions between states reasoners carry out or, in other words, epistemic
rationality distinguishes some transitions from other transitions. Given an array of potential
transitions among epistemic states, epistemic rationality norms deliver (conditional) verdicts about them, carving them into distinct classes corresponding to normative valences rational, irrational, rationally obligatory, rationally permissible, rationally forbidden. This
partitioning into classes is what it means to restrict transitions. Suppose that, at some
particular state, s, there is a set of possible transitions, T = {t1 , ..., tn } from s to various
other states, {s1 , ..., sn }, that a reasoner can realize with her repertoire of epistemic actions,
abilities, skills, etc.. D1 tells us that, in at least some cases like this, there are at least
some epistemic rationality norms that restrict this set of transitions by dictating that some
of these transitions are (e.g.) rational and others are not. The norms restrict the set of
transitions in two senses: (i) the norm maps the state or the conditions of application to a
subset, T 0 , of T , and (ii) assuming that the reasoner wants to carry out rational transitions,
she’s got to stay within the “restricted area” of T 0 by carrying out only the transitions in T 0 .
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Now, if there are norms that restrict transitions by delivering verdicts about them, then,
given the conception of norm-kernels, it follows that:
(1) There are norms of epistemic rationality that take epistemic transitions as their objects.
This is trivial from the form of norm-kernels. The normative claim in the consequent of a
norm-kernel that delivers a verdict about transitions does so by attributing some valence to
transitions. More, there are norms that condition their verdicts with respect to transitions
and with respect to states on the properties of epistemic transitions. This entails more
than merely the synchronic properties of states, for instance, being the determiners of which
transitions are rational or irrational. Explicitly:
(2) There are norms of epistemic rationality that take properties of epistemic transitions as
their conditions.
This will be argued for below.
Now, as to the characteristic relations among restrictions, only some can be easily seen
with the material in hand. For instance, here are two characteristic relations between restrictions on states and restrictions on transitions:
(StoT) Norms that restrict epistemic states can generate norms that restrict epistemic
transitions.
(TtoS) Norms that restrict epistemic transitions can generate norms that restrict epistemic
states.
Now, “generation” is applied in a pretty murky way. What I mean is that, a norm that
restricts states generates a norm that restricts transitions iff there exists some norm-kernel
that takes a verdict on s with respect to a state-restricting norm as its condition of application
and, in the consequent, assigns the same verdict to a transition t. Replace the relevant terms
for the other generation claim. Take an arbitrary consistency norm, NC . One can “generate”
a restriction on transitions from NC by means of a norm-kernel rule of this form:
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(GenStoT) If s is rational according to NC and t = hx, si, then t is rational.
This kind of generation will be of note below with respect to “reduction strategies”. The idea
is intuitive; if one has rules telling rational from irrational states, the general policy of being
in rational states and avoiding irrational states carves transitions into rational and irrational
classes. One can generate a restriction on states as easily with the rule:
(GenTtoS) If t is rational according to NT and t = hx, si, then s is rational.
Now, StoT and TtoS were phrased imprecisely with “can” as the key modal. It is possible, in
general, to carve the class of transitions on the basis of restrictions on states and vice versa.
However, this is very different from the much stronger and more interesting claim that every
restriction on transitions can be derived from some Gen-like rule applying to states. This
fails in one direction:
TtoS Irreducibility: Some norms that restrict epistemic transitions cannot be generated
by norms that restrict epistemic states.
Counterexamples are given in the next section. It’s essentially a trivial consequence of the
fact that some rationally distinct transitions from a state s converge in their terminal states.
The other direction doesn’t fail, with some qualifications:
Qualified StoT Reducibility: Every norm that restricts epistemic states that excludes
states that cannot be reached by any transitions can be generated by a norm that
restricts epistemic transitions.
Almost every partitioning of states into rational and irrational classes can be generated by
GenStoT, assuming that every state can be reached by some transition. This is easy to see.
Assume there is some N that dictates that s is rational. If s is the terminal state of any
transition, t, then there is some arbitrary partitioning, NA , of transitions into rational and
irrational sets such that t is rational according to NA ; just plug NA into GenTtoS. However,
if there is no t with s as a terminal state, the reduction fails. The idea is that, if reasoners
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start off in some initial state, sI , and some norm N tells us that sI is rational (or irrational),
will there be no t with sI as the terminal state to plug into GenTtoS.
This principle and the claims spelling it out are strongly at odds with a cluster of commitments that I will net together under the title of Epistemic Staticism.

2.2.2

Arguments for D1

Epistemic Staticism is a general orientation to epistemic rationality that holds that the
requirements of epistemic rationality are strictly static.5 Defenders of epistemic dynamics
or, if you will, Epistemic Dynamicism, deny this, maintaining that the requirements of
epistemic rationality are dynamic6 . There are two independent dimensions of epistemic
statics to distinguish:
Objectual Epistemic Statics (OES) There are no epistemic rationality norms that take
anything other than epistemic states as objects.
Conditional Epistemic Statics (CES) There are no epistemic rationality norms in which
the conditions of application concern anything other than the properties of epistemic
states.
OES states that the objects of epistemic rationality are strictly static objects like doxastic
states or credences, as opposed to dynamic objects like transitions from state to state or
processes of state change. One can think of OES in terms of properties. OES states that
epistemic rationality is a strictly static property. CES states that it may be the case that
epistemic rationality is a dynamic property, but the conditions under which it holds of a
dynamic object factor in exclusively the properties of states. The strongest form of Epistemic
5

This is a widely held view. See, for a small set of examples, [179, 127], [83], [259], and [236].
See Lam’s Dissertation [154] as well as [146, 147], [217], Chapters 4-7 of [105], and [194, 196] for various forms of epistemic dynamicism. My case against staticism owes much to these sources, and Lam’s in
particular. Framing the argument in terms of reduction strategies is an insight I owe directly to Lam’s
discussion.
6
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Staticism is the conjunction of both OES and CES. OES and CES individually amount to
weaker forms of staticism.
Note that CES conditions valences on the properties of epistemic states in general, rather
than on merely synchronic properties. This means that CES is prima facie more permissive
than forms of Epistemic Staticism that condition valences only on synchronic and intrinsic
properties of epistemic states7 . By CES, the rationality of a state could be conditioned on
(e.g.) relations between the state and another state or on its diachronic properties. I will
not remark on these less permissive forms of staticism. The primary argument against the
permissive form of CES works, a fortiori, against any more restrictive form of CES that
focuses attention on subsets of static properties.
Epistemic Staticism is to be rejected along both axes. Let s, s0 , and s00 be epistemic
states, and let pairs of epistemic states, (s, s0 ) and (s, s00 ), be transitions from the state s to
s0 and from s to s00 , respectively. Then OES and CES are to be rejected on the basis of the
following schematic arguments:
(Against OES1) There are classes of pairs of transitions, hs, s0 i and hs, s00 i, that are rationally distinct. If rationality distinguishes x and y, then there is a norm that
takes x and y as objects. Thus, transitions are the objects of some epistemic
rationality norms.
(Against CES1) Some of the foregoing pairs of transitions, hs, s0 i and hs, s00 i, differ only in
the properties of the transitions themselves. Thus, hs, s0 i and hs, s00 i are distinguished on the basis of the properties of transitions. If rationality distinguishes
x and y on the basis of C, then there is a norm in which C is the condition of
application. Thus, the conditions of application of some epistemic rationality
norms concern properties of transitions.
The key premise in both arguments is the one that asserts that the rational distinguishability
of two objects implies the existence of certain kinds of norms. This is trivial if there are
7

Re: Time-slice Epistemology [179, 127]
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any regularities governing the rational distinguishability of the objects of epistemic norms.
Any such regularity can be stated as a rule taking the form of a norm-kernel. There is no
other form that a regularity of rational distinguishability could take than that of a rule that
connects some conditions to rational valences with some logical force. These rules are norms
of epistemic rationality as defined in the introduction; they specify the regularities in rational distinguishability (and its requirements) or, in other words, they are rules that specify
requirements of epistemic rationality. Thus, if the coming examples capture genuine regularities in rational distinguishability, then there must be some rule detailing the conditions
of application, the valence, and the object of such a regularity. No more robust existential
claim is being made than that.
The first premise is where controversy lies. To establish the first premise, I provide
a set of straightforward examples of dynamic norms. These norms rationally distinguish
transitions rather than states and that condition their valences, irrespective of object, on
the properties of transitions rather than merely the properties of states. The counterexamples
thus show that attributions of rationality distinguish dynamic objects sometimes on the basis
of dynamic properties. The assumption of OES or CES precludes the explanation of these
observations, and no means of explaining them away by reduction strategy works. As such,
there is no plausible account of epistemic rationality that explains them or explains them
away. So, dynamic norms of both kinds must be countenanced as parts of an account of
epistemic rationality.
There are classes of pairs of transitions that are rationally distinct. This is an undeniable
pattern in the attribution of rationality that supplies the first premise of Against OES.
Consider these schematic norms:8
Defeasible Closure 1 (DC1) Let a belief set, s, contain B1 , ..., Bn , the true belief that B1 , ..., Bn `
A, and let it contain no counterevidence for A. Let s0 be identical to s but that
8

All of these examples are presented in a simplified form; rationality and irrationality are presented as
mutually exclusive, binary properties of states, transitions, etc.. Each of these cases may be re-articulated
with “more rational” and “less rational” in place of “rational” and “irrational” respectively, to recognize a
perhaps more plausible comparative conception of the requirements of epistemic rationality.
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it contains A. Let s00 be identical to s except that it contains ¬A. If these conditions hold, it is rational for an agent to transition from s to s0 , and it is not
rational to transition from s to s00 .
Demand for Evidence 1 (DE1) Let a belief set, s, contain only B1 , ..., Bn , none of which
individually or collectively bears logical, probabilistic, explanatory, or any other
evidential relations to A. Let s0 be identical to s except that it contains A. Let s00
be identical to s but that it does not contain A (or, if your account of epistemic
states can handle it, it contains explicit suspension of judgment on A). If these
conditions hold, it is not rational for an agent to transition from s to s0 , and it
is rational to transition to s00 .
Minimal Mutilation (MM) Let a belief set, s, contain B1 , ..., Bn and be logically consistent.
Let s0 be some belief set with an empty intersection with s. Let s00 be any belief set
that satisfies every condition of minimal mutilation, conservatism, or preservation
of entrenchment relative to s defended in the epistemological literature. If these
conditions hold, it is not rational for an agent to transition from s to s0 , and it
is rational to transition to s00 .
These cases seem clearly to state norms that distinguish epistemic transitions. Given that
these rules are actually rules of epistemic rationality, it’s clear that OES is false; the requirements of epistemic rationality take more than epistemic states as their objects; they
apply equally well to changes of epistemic state. More, some of them condition the rational
distinction of transitions on the properties of the transitions such as whether they embody
valid inferences, minimally mutilate, or constitute complete non sequiturs. Thus, CES is
false, as well.
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The Failure of Reduction Strategies

Against OES could fail if there are successful strategies for reducing each example to some
more fundamental static norm. The thought would be that, if we accept the claim that the
only norms that are real are the fundamental norms, then a successful reduction strategy
straightforwardly shows that the dynamic norms above aren’t real, and so can’t plausibly
impose any conditions on the adequacy of formal reconstructions of epistemic rationality.9
Reduction strategies will fail to undermine Against OES and Against CES. First, there
is no reason at all to accept the claim above about the reality of derivative norms. This is a
point I will return to at the end of the next section. For now, just note that, after all, brains
are derivative entities; they reduce to their atoms. However, they seem perfectly real, and
it’s absurd to think that any worthwhile theory of the things in the world could exclude them
without loss. Just the same, dynamic epistemic norms seem perfectly real even if reducible
to static norms, and, as the next few sections will argue, it is their properties that a theory
of epistemic rationality must account for independent of whether they are fundamental.
Second, there are no plausible reduction strategies. Several philosophers have defended
the principle that:
Reduction 1 (i) Epistemic states are rational iff they satisfy the requirements of whatever
canon of synchronic rationality one prefers (e.g., probabilistic coherence). (ii) A
change of epistemic state from s to s0 is rational iff s0 is rational.10
The idea is that the rationality of the change from s to s0 depends only on the rationality
of s0 . Supposing that this is the sole requirement of epistemic rationality on changes of
epistemic state, this would offer a formula for determining whether any particular change
of states is rational. Despite the fact that Reduction 1 proposes that there is at least one
9

“Real” is used in a non-committal way to capture the idea that dynamic norms, if reduction strategies
are successful, are not worth modeling in a formal theory of epistemic rationality. Perhaps “legitimate” or
“acceptable” would be appropriate cognates.
10
Moss [179] takes this approach explicitly, as does Foley [83]. This is also essentially the strategy behind
the rationality postulates of the belief revision paradigm [92, 91] and probabilism [53].
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norm that takes transitions as objects, the formula could, prima facie, be defended even
by the staunchest epistemic staticist. The rationality of any transition ultimately or really
only depends on the rationality of its terminal state, and this is a strictly static notion. No
dynamic norm (other than Reduction 1 itself) is fundamental enough, then, for a staticist
to enter it into her ontology.
Unfortunately for such defenders of Epistemic Staticism, Reduction 1 is clearly mistaken.
Consider:
Non-Arbitrariness (NA) Let a belief set, s, contain B1 , ..., Bn and an inconsistency, A ∧ ¬A.
Let some subset, C, of s be counterevidence for A (not including its negation).
Let s0 be identical to s but that it does not contain A and it satisfies the canons
of synchronic rationality as fully as possible. Let s00 be a non-empty belief set
satisfying the synchronic canon of rationality as fully as possible that also has
an empty intersection with s. If these conditions hold, it is not rational for an
agent to transition from s to s00 , and it is rational to transition to s0 .
Even where s00 satisfies the conditions of synchronic rationality, it’s still clearly irrational to
move, willy nilly, to just any random statically rational state or another with no consideration
of the evidence one has already acquired. This is not a rational change of belief. Thus,
because these two transitions are indistinguishable in terms of the rational distinguishability
of the relevant states, it must be the properties of the transitions that makes the difference.
The strongest response to counterexamples like this is to deny that there are any cases
where the relevant states are indistinguishable. This takes the discussion down one of two
paths: one takes us into the territory of minimal mutilation or epistemic conservatism of
epistemic states and the other takes us into the territory of epistemic basing relations [248,
151, 150]. Let’s take these paths in turn.
A tempting response to the examples above is the replacement of Reduction 1 with
considerations of conservatism or minimal mutilation:
Reduction 2 (i) An epistemic state, s0 , is rational iff it satisfies the canons of synchronic
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rationality and it represents a minimal mutilation or a maximal conservation of
the state that precedes it in the course of the evolution of a reasoner’s epistemic
states. (ii) A change of epistemic state from s to s0 is rational iff s0 is rational.
Reduction 2 is schematic, and we can let minimality be cashed out in terms of some preferred
kind of comparison between the content of s and s0 with respect to, e.g., entrenchment, conservatism, etc.. There are competing accounts of minimality in the epistemological literature,
and nothing hangs on the details of these. The idea is that, as long as minimal mutilation
or conservatism rules out all states with an empty intersection with its predecessor, then the
distinctions that Non-Arbitrariness appears to make really just come down to Reduction 2
and the specification of mutilation.
This reduction strategy doesn’t work. First, if correct, it falsifies CES - it doesn’t reduce
MM above to static notions only. More on this in the next section. Second, note that
Reduction 2 fails to handle the following case:
Defeasible Consistency 1 (DC1) Let a belief set, s, contain B1 , ..., Bn , the true belief that
B1 , ..., Bn ` A, and counterevidence for A, C1 , ..., Cn . Let s0 be identical to s
but that it contains A and ¬A. Let a distinct belief set, s00 be identical to s but
that doesn’t contain A, it contains ¬A, does not contain some Bi , and contains
defeaters for Bi . If both of these transitions are feasible for a reasoner, then it is
rational to transition from s to s00 , and it is not rational to transition from s to
s0 . If the transition hs, s00 i is not feasible for a reasoner, it is rational to transition
to s0 .
This is a schema for non-paradoxical Preface-like cases. Let A be the conjunction of all
Bi . Let the counterevidence for A, C1 , ..., Cn , amount to all available evidence for fallibilism
about A - that any suitably large class of beliefs I have is overwhelmingly likely to contain
a false belief and that B1 , ..., Bn satisfies the size requirement. Standard Preface cases show
that, arguably, it is more rational to maintain the inconsistency that results from adding A
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despite the counterevidence for it (the evidence for fallibilism about A) than it is to randomly
reject some of the particular conjuncts for which I have strong evidence. It is crucial to these
cases that rejection of any Bi would be random. The reasoner in the Preface case cannot find
a way to rationally select any of her Bi for revision; else, there isn’t much of a problem at
all. If acquiring counterevidence to some Bi is feasible for an agent, then there is no serious
conflict. In any Preface case, if we could undermine the evidence for one or other of the belief
sets in tension, there would be no reason to accept the inconsistency. Now, despite the fact
that the terminal states differ across these transitions, it’s clear that the static properties are
not doing the work. Which transition is rational depends on which transitions are available
for execution, not merely the static states involved. Thus, CES fails: it is the properties of
transitions that matter for at least some norms.
Next, I consider basing relations. The usual thought [151] is that epistemic states inherently carry information about the evidential bases of beliefs. The epistemic basing relation is
the relation that holds between a set of beliefs B1 , ..., Bn and some other belief A just when
the belief A is based on B1 , ..., Bn . According to the basing theorist, it is only relative to the
beliefs on which a belief is based that it is rational or justified. Only states with appropriate
basing relations are rational, and basing relations track (inter alia) inferential relationships.
Consider a schematic reduction strategy in terms of basing:
Reduction 3 (i) An epistemic state is rational only if the epistemic basing relation of that
state satisfies (for my purposes, arbitrary) condition C. (ii) A change of epistemic
state from s to s0 is rational iff s0 is rational.
Deploying the basing concept, Reduction 3 appears to effectively reduce Non-Arbitrariness
1. Willy nilly changes to synchronically rational belief states are prohibited by Reduction 3 the willy nilliness of the transition would be recorded in inappropriate basing relations. The
resulting states would be irrational, so Reduction 3 would do the distinguishing work that
Non-Arbitrariness seemed to do despite taking only the properties of states as fundamental.
No need to appeal to any non-derivative dynamic notions.
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The thought of Reduction 3 depends on the idea that, in these cases, the terminal states
are not actually identical or even rationally indistinguishable. The terminal states that result
from the processes in these cases fail to have identical basing relations, and this results in
rational distinguishability between them. On the basis of this difference, the transitions are
rationally distinguishable.
This strategy fails. First, it defends neither OES nor CES. The clause (ii) in Reduction
3 states a dynamic restriction. More, the condition of application of the norm ineliminably
appeals to a property of transitions, namely the identity of the terminal states of transitions.
That a transition has an irrational terminal state is a property of the transition. Thus,
the reduction strategy fails to do the work it was needed for. This will be a problem as
long as the epistemic staticist even acknowledges restrictions on transitions; any strategy
for reducing the apparent restriction on transitions to properties of some class of states will
depend on such states playing a specific role in the transitions. Thus, the strategy will
generate a norm that conditions its verdicts on the properties of transitions. This objection
applies not just to Reduction 3, but to any reduction strategy that attempts to explain away
apparent restrictions on transitions in terms of properties of states. Second, the only form of
basing relation that will even appear not to appeal to properties of transitions or processes
will be doxastic basing relations. And these will fail to produce a viable reduction strategy.
There are three broad families of accounts of the epistemic basing relation, causal accounts, counterfactual causal accounts, and doxastic accounts. The details of these views are
irrelevant to the thrust of argument, here.11 The doxastic basing relation is the only version
of the epistemic basing relation that works for Reduction 3. Suppose epistemic basing is a
matter of the causal relations between states, actual or counterfactual, whatever preferred
account one gives along these lines. Reduction 3 would then tell us that a transition is
rational iff the terminal state is such that it is linked to the root state by an appropriate
causal process. It is transparent that this could not support CES; the rationality of epis11

For these irrelevant details, see: [150, 151, 248].
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temic states would be conditioned on whatever properties of the causal processes that result
in them constitute appropriateness. Thus, only the doxastic account of basing could possibly
be deployed in a successful reduction strategy for defending CES.
Unfortunately for CES, Reduction 3 can’t work. It fails to handle DC1. There, the norm
distinguished transitions on the basis of the availability of other transitions, not on anything
reducible to doxastic basing. The next section on D2 introduces more cases that undermine
Reduction 3. So, neither path of Reduction 3 handles the counterexamples to CES and OES
that I’ve provided.

2.2.3

Discussion

Epistemic staticism has an interesting and laudable pedigree.12 It is directly defended by
Williamson [259], Foley [83], Hedden [127], and Moss [179]. It is perhaps indirectly defended
- by means of reduction strategies - in any thread of epistemology that grounds epistemic
normativity strictly in the features of doxastic states. A proper taxonomy of such views
is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it’s important to note the prevalence of staticism. Epistemic Staticism subsumes arguably any form of epistemic consequentialism [236],
including forms of - oddly enough - process and method reliabilism [105], and Bayesian epistemology [53]. These might be surprising to treat as staticist views, but the thought is that
they support forms of Reduction 1 or something in the neighborhood of Reduction 1 that
analyzes the rationality of a process in terms of the output states of a process satisfying
static evaluative criteria.
Epistemic consequentialism is the clearest candidate for a reduction strategy, as it identifies the rationality of methods and processes straightforwardly in terms of their consequences
- which is to say, whether the states they produce tend to be true, coherent, etc.. Reliabilism, for instance, typically grounds the rationality (read: justification) of a belief in terms
of the reliability of the method or process the belief was produced by, and the reliability
12

Which is to say, I don’t think I’m swinging at ghosts.
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of a method/process is typically grounded in the properties of the states it outputs. That
is, even process reliabilists can endorse weakened versions of OES and CES that assert that
the only fundamental or irreducible norms are those that take states and properties thereof
as objects. After all, the reliability of a process reduces to the properties of the states it
produces in the limit (or across nearby possible worlds, etc..).
The rationality of a Bayesian update - by simple conditionalization, for instance - is
dependent on the rationality of its output state (i.e., probabilistic coherence and proper
relation to prior states). As Moss [179] and Hedden [127] argue, the apparently diachronic
conditionalization rules are actually just matters of proper basing. Failure of conditionalization is not irrational because the diachronic transition fails to have the right features; it’s
that the output state doesn’t contain the proper relations between credences.
Desideratum D1 is grounded in what I think is the best resolution of the dispute between
epistemic staticism and epistemic dynamicism: qualified - if polemical - rejection of staticism.
Exactly what the qualifications are will be apparent after examining D2. At this stage, it
suffices to note that establishing D1 effectively falsifies staticism as articulated above in CES
and OES. There are more subtle forms of staticism, however, and the relations among D1
and D2 and more subtle static views is not as clear cut a clash.13

2.3

D2: Epistemic Dynamicism II

2.3.1

Principle

D2 Epistemic rationality is procedural; there are epistemic restrictions on epistemic actions,
processes, and procedures, not just states or transitions among states, and there are
characteristic relations among restrictions on transitions and restrictions on processes.
This principle is as straightforward as the first. It claims the class of objects of epistemic
norms contains not only states - as per the Epistemic Staticist - and transitions - as per
13

See, for instance, the form of staticism used as a foil in the next section.
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the Epistemic Dynamicist - but also actions, processes, and even complex procedures. The
idea is that, given an array of potential actions, {a1 , ..., an }, (resp. processes{p1 , ..., pn0 },
or procedures {Pπ1 , ..., Pπn00 }) there are epistemic norms that deliver verdicts about them,
carving them into rational and irrational subsets, and thereby defining a restriction on actions
(resp. processes and procedures).14 An important part of that claim is that epistemic norms
deliver verdicts about procedures. Explicitly, some epistemic norms deliver verdicts about
procedural operations on basic actions. That is, if one wants to be rational, epistemic norms
show us that there is a restricted space of actions and potential procedural constructions
over those actions within the total space of possible actions and procedural constructions
that we must keep to. Explicitly:
(1) There are norms of epistemic rationality that take epistemic actions, processes, and
procedures as their objects.
That this is the case will be argued below. It will also be argued that:
(2) The norms of epistemic rationality take properties of epistemic actions, processes, and
procedures as their conditions of application.
Now, as to the characteristic relations among restrictions, only some can be easily seen with
the material in hand. For instance, here are three characteristic relations between restrictions
on actions, processes, and procedures and restrictions on transitions:
(TtoA) Norms that restrict epistemic transitions can generate norms that restrict epistemic
actions.
(TtoP) Norms that restrict epistemic transitions can generate norms that restrict epistemic
processes.
14

This general idea is shown below to apply as well to more subtle partitions, for instance, division of
epistemic factors by deontic status: obligatory, permissible, impermissible, and prima facie reason to carry
out or not to carry out.
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(TtoPr) Norms that restrict epistemic transitions can generate norms that restrict epistemic procedures.
Letting p be a process and Pπ be a procedure, the schemes for showing this are familiar:
(GenTtoA) If t is rational according to NT and performing a at s results in a transition
from s to s0 , t = hs, s0 i, then a is rational.
(GenTtoP) If t is rational according to NT and completing process p at s results in a
transition from s to s0 , then p is rational.
(GenTtoPr) If t is rational according to NT and implementing procedure Pπ at s results
in a transition from s to s0 , then Pπ is rational.
However a norm carves up the transition space, there is a rule that carves up the space of
actions, processes, or procedures in a way that matches in the sense that if t has valence R,
then any a, p, or Pπ meeting the conditions in the Gen rules has valence R.
Finally, the converses of all of the foregoing claims hold:
(APPrtoT) Norms that restrict epistemic actions, processes, or procedures can generate
norms that restrict epistemic transitions.
The scheme is, again, familiar:
(GenAPPRtoT) If a (resp. p, Pπ ) is rational according to N and performing a (resp.
completing p, implementing Pπ ) at s results in a transition from s to s0 , then t = hs, s0 i
is rational.
This section predictably mirrors the prior principle articulation section. More, the generation
facts of the prior section show that there’s a kind of transitivity; for norms that restrict
actions, processes, and procedures can generate norms that restrict states.
The prior claims are about what kinds of rules “can” generate what other kinds of rules.
However, this is very different from the much stronger claim that every restriction on actions,
processes, or procedures is equivalent to some Gen-like rule for states or transitions:
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(APPrtoS Irreducibility) Not all norms restricting epistemic actions, processes, or procedures can be generated from norms restricting epistemic states.
(APPrtoT Irreducibility) Not all norms restricting epistemic actions, processes, or procedures can be generated from norms restricting epistemic transitions.
Counterexamples are given in the next section.
As with D1, D2 suffices for the failure of epistemic staticism.

2.3.2

Arguments for D2

The basic argument schemata for D1 can be modified and applied to get D2:
(Against OES2) There are classes of pairs of processes, hs, a, s0 i and hs, b, s00 i, that are
rationally distinct. If rationality distinguishes x and y, then there is a norm
that takes x and y as objects. Thus, processes are the objects of some epistemic
rationality norms.
(Against CES2) Some of the foregoing pairs of processes, hs, a, s0 i and hs, b, s00 i, differ only
in the properties of the transitions they result in or the processes themselves.
Thus, (s, a, s0 ) and (s, b, s00 ) are distinguished on the basis of the properties of
transitions or processes. If rationality distinguishes x and y on the basis of C,
then there is a norm in which C is the condition of application. Thus, the
conditions of application of some epistemic rationality norms concern properties
of transitions or processes.
The key premise is given by examples:
Bad Reasoning (BR) Let some reasoner’s belief set at t be s = {B, A → B, C → A, C}
where → is a validly detachable conditional, and A is consistent with B and
C. Let the belief set at t + 1 be s0 = {B, A → B, C → A, C, A}. Consider two
possible process types for transitioning from s to s0 :
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(Process 1) Detach A from the conditional C → A by affirming the antecedent
C.
(Process 2) Detach A from the conditional A → B by deliberately affirming
the consequent, B, and *not* performing any sort of explanatory or
confirmatory inference to the same conclusion.
If these conditions hold, Process 2 is bad reasoning; an agent carrying out Process
2 in lieu of Process 1 is not executing a rational epistemic process.
Non Reasoning (NR) Let some reasoner’s belief set at t be s = {B, A → B, C → A, C}
where → is a validly detachable conditional, and A is consistent with B and
C. Let the belief set at t + 1 be s0 = {B, A → B, C → A, C, A}. Consider two
possible process types for transitioning from s to s0 :
(Process 1) Detach A from the conditional C → A by affirming the antecedent
C.
(Process 2) Hold an umbrella out during a lightning storm in the hope that it
causes belief that A and, by chance, get struck by lightning and end
up with the belief that A.
If these conditions hold, Process 2 is not even reasoning; an agent carrying out
Process 2 in lieu of Process 1 is not executing a rational epistemic process.
Non-Arbitrary Reasoning 1 (NAR1) Let a belief set, s, contain B1 , ..., Bn and be logically
consistent. Consider two possible processes:
(Process 1) Subtract every Bi such that i is a multiple of 3, and restore consistency by removing any element of s that implies any such Bi . Let
the resulting state be s0 .
(Process 2) Transition to s00 , which is an arbitrary, consistent expansion of s.
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Process 1 is an utterly arbitrary change of belief. If these conditions hold, then
an agent carrying out Process 1 in lieu of Process 2 is not executing a rational
epistemic process.
Non-Arbitrary Reasoning 2 (NAR2) Let a belief set, s, contain B1 , ..., Bn and be logically
consistent. Let s0 be a belief set with an empty intersection with s that satisfies
any static conditions of rationality one wishes. Let s00 be any belief set that
satisfies every condition of minimal mutilation, conservatism, or preservation of
entrenchment relative to s defended in the epistemological literature. Consider
two possible processes:
(Process 1) Subtract every Bi such that i is a multiple of 3, and restore consistency by removing any element of s that implies any such Bi until
arriving at s00 .
(Process 2) Expand s with an observation, Ci that contradicts some Bi , then
remove the Bi and anything implying it to restore consistency. Iterate
this process until reaching s0 .
Process 1 is a process of chaining utterly arbitrary changes of belief while every
step of Process 2 is a rational belief change. If these conditions hold, then an
agent carrying out Process 1 in lieu of Process 2 is not executing a rational
epistemic process.
Non-Arbitrary Reasoning 3 (NAR3) Let a belief set, s, contain B1 , ..., Bn and be logically
consistent. Let s0 be a belief set that satisfies any static conditions of rationality one wishes, as well as every condition of minimal mutilation, conservatism,
or preservation of entrenchment relative to s defended in the epistemological
literature. Consider two possible processes for reaching s0 :
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(Process 1) Subtract every Bi such that i is a multiple of 3, and restore consistency by removing any element of s that implies any such Bi until
arriving at s0 .
(Process 2) Expand s with an observation, Ci that contradicts some Bi , then
remove the Bi and anything implying it to restore consistency. Iterate
this process until reaching s0 .
Process 1 is a process of chaining utterly arbitrary changes of belief while every
step of Process 2 is a rational belief change. If these conditions hold, then an
agent carrying out Process 1 in lieu of Process 2 is not executing a rational
epistemic process.
2.3.2.1

Continued Failure of Reduction Strategies

It’s straightforward to translate the reduction strategies discussed above in terms of processes
rather than transitions. Note that each of the examples given directly undermines Reduction
1. There is no sense in which any of the terminal states above is irrational, unless one
adverts to talk of minimal mutilation or basing relations. We can consider both of these
options together. BR, NR, and NAR3 describe rationally distinct processes that terminate
with the same synchronically rational state. NAR3 explicitly stipulates that the terminal
state is reached with minimal mutilation, and, in each case, the identity of states can simply
be stipulated to preserve basing relations. Thus, neither Reduction 2, in terms of minimal
mutilation, nor Reduction 3, in terms of basing relations can possibly distinguish these
processes. But they are clearly rationally distinct. Hence, none of the reduction strategies
considered above will help the epistemic staticist.
There are still further reasons not to side with the staticist. I now want to return to
the dismissal of non-fundamental norms that the epistemic staticist must commit to, and
strengthen the case against it. The argument, Against OES, delivers the first parts of D1
and D2:
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There are norms of epistemic rationality that take processes as objects.
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That is, epistemic rationality is dynamic. There are epistemic rules that declare some transitions and processes rational and others not. Note the distinction between the conjunction
of D1.1 and D2.1 and something a bit like them:
D+

Epistemic rationality is fundamentally dynamic; there are irreducible norms of
epistemic rationality that take epistemic transitions or processes as objects or
that condition valences of states, transitions, or processes on the properties transitions or processes.

Against OES (1 and 2) establishes D1.1 and D2.1 but does not deliver D+. It is, for all D1.1
and D2.1 say, possible that all norms that distinguish transitions and processes from one
another can be derived from static norms by some Reduction, and so they are compatible
with the failure of D+. Now, even if D+ utterly failed, it might still be the case that D1.1
and D2.1 would be features of epistemic rationality that formal accounts must capture. After
all, if there are dynamic and procedural norms, they might play a role in epistemic cognition
that is distinct from that played by static norms or they might play a role that is important
to capture irrespective of their reducibility to static norms.
Even assuming a workable reduction of procedural norms to static norms, the derivative,
procedural norms would still be norms to be accounted for - if only by giving an account of
the fundamentals in which they are grounded. As the following few sections argue, dynamic
rules (including procedural rules) are indispensable for studying normative constraints on
epistemic dynamics, which, in turn, are indispensable for analyzing epistemic rationality in
any way that captures its primary role in epistemic life. As reasoners, we are frequently
more interested in dynamic norms than in static norms as components of epistemic advice.
These kinds of norms are simply more useful to reasoners. Telling me that I ought not be
in a contradictory belief state is not helpful. I need advice outlining strategies for resolving
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or coping with the tension. This advice may be grounded by static considerations of logical
relationships, but the actual, working advice that I can receive and deploy will have a
dynamic character; it will dictate or recommend procedures, actions, or processes for me to
carry out (or at least dictate reasons to select some procedures, etc., over others): thinking
of alternative explanations, confounders, countermodels, arguments and counterarguments,
seeking out new evidence, seeking out colleagues to ask about the matter, etc.. I need
direction for what I ought to do in the face of inconsistency, after all. So, insofar as logical
frameworks are useful for generating or validating epistemic advice, they will have to say
something, at least indirectly, about dynamic norms. However, they’ll be far more useful for
this cause if they can explicitly represent dynamic norms and their properties and provide
valid principles governing them.
The thought is that normative constraints on epistemic dynamics are worthy of study as
a matter of providing theoretically grounded epistemic advice or thinking about how we use
epistemic norms in cognition (more on this in the next full section, 2.4). That is, even if
staticists are successful in their reductive aims and the dynamic rules are entirely derivative
on some reduction strategy, D1.1 and D2.1 would stand as features of epistemic rationality
to be captured by a logical framework. Thus, a formal account of epistemic rationality
norms would still need to provide resources for representing and reasoning about dynamic
and procedural norms.
The prospects of procedural epistemic norms need not be so qualified, though, for the
staticist cannot be successful in their reductive aims. First, note that each reduction strategy
requires a dynamic norm in order to work. The second clause of each strategy is a normkernel that conditions the rationality of transitions, actions, processes, or procedures on the
rationality of their terminal states; it’s straightforwardly a rule that conditionally assigns a
verdict to a dynamic or procedural object. Thus, each reduction strategy deploys a dynamic
or procedural norm-kernel. A reduction of all other apparent rules for distinguishing (e.g.)
transitions to (e.g.) Reduction 1 coupled with an account of the rationality of states would
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not eliminate all fundamental dynamic norms. It would leave exactly one fundamental
dynamic norm: clause (ii) of Reduction 1. So, even an otherwise perfectly effective reduction
strategy using (e.g.) Reduction 1 would falsify OES as well as generate a fundamental
dynamic norm in Reduction 1. This would entail D+, and thereby entail D1.1 and D2.1. This
point generalizes; any rule that generates constraints on dynamics from static constraints
will just be equivalent to some dynamic constraint. All that is effected is a reduction to a
fundamental dynamic norm-kernel. The section on D3 will strengthen this point. Second,
the staticist cannot even go as far as reducing all dynamic and procedural norms to some
static norm by means of any reduction strategy. It is shown in Chapter 4 that there can be no
reduction of restrictions on actions, processes, and procedures to restrictions on transitions or
states. This is actually a relatively simple consequence of the distinction between transitions
and processes. Thus, D+ is correct in addition to D1 and D2, and there can be no escape
from the requirement of accounting for at least D1 and D2.

2.3.3

Discussion

This completes the qualified polemic against epistemic staticism. The main thought is that,
even if there are no fundamental dynamic norms in the sense that - with some ingenuity one can get all of the dynamic norms from a specification of what makes epistemic states
rational or not (which is itself extremely dubious), there are still strong reasons for any
formal framework for norms to provide an account of dynamic and procedural norms. There
manifestly are such norms, so, if they play an interestingly distinct or important role in
epistemic cognition, an account of epistemic rationality should provide means of capturing
their main features.
More, the arguments above connect to the problems for models of epistemic dynamics
noted in Ch.1. Explicitly, Bad Reasoning, Non-Reasoning, and Non-Arbitrary Reasoning
3 imply the Processes and Constraints problems. Each of those putative epistemic rules
rationally distinguishes token processes, p1 and p2 , despite those processes being bookended
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by the same transition t = hs, s0 i. Assuming those norms really carve epistemic rationality
at its joints (the plausibility of the examples suggests they do), a formal model of epistemic
dynamics without the means of distinguishing processes from transitions will be literally
incapable of representing the different verdicts that these norms give to p1 and p2 . They will
thus be incapable of representing the distinct constraints on epistemic dynamics that those
norms specify, and so any system that suffers Processes and Constraints will be less than
complete with respect to its representation of normative constraints.
Finally, this section is the first to emphasize procedural epistemic norms, norms that
explicitly specify requirements on what processes to carry out. The putative norms given
above to further bury OES show us that epistemic rationality distinguishes processes. Now,
it may not be clear in what sense these norms are “procedural” rather than merely conditions
on unanalyzed processes. The term perhaps suggests that epistemic norms specify something
more structured, like particular ways of ordering or composing actions. Merely delivering
verdicts on processes doesn’t transparently imply this. But it does imply this. I’ll argue
below (and in Ch.4) that restrictions on processes do imply restrictions on what epistemic
actions to perform and how to string them together with procedural operations. This should
be clearer after consideration of D3 (especially the D3 Corollary).

2.4

D3: Restrictions on Epistemic Dynamics

2.4.1

Principle

D3 Epistemic rationality norms define restrictions on epistemic dynamics that model (a)
ideally rational evolution of epistemic state, (b) ideally rational changes of epistemic
state, (c) ideally rational procedures and processes of epistemic state change, and that
(d) can be distinguished from constraints of capacity and feasibility.
Corollary Epistemic rationality norms restrict the construction of procedures; they
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determine how basic epistemic actions are to be sequenced, iterated, combined,
chosen among, conditioned on tests, avoided, reversed, and cautiously executed.
This principle identifies the functional content of epistemic rationality norms, the information
associated with such norms that enables them to play the roles in cognition, decision-making,
and evaluation that they play. In order to be epistemically rational, a cognizer’s epistemic
factors must satisfy certain conditions; else, the epistemic factors fall short of epistemic
rationality. That is, epistemic rationality rules in some states, transitions, processes, and
procedures and rules out others. Epistemic rationality norms define the conditions under
which epistemic factors fall short or don’t. They are the rules that do the ruling in and
ruling out. But this is just to say that epistemic rationality norms define restrictions on
epistemic dynamics, restrictions on which states, transitions, and processes can be a part
of an ideally rational epistemic history. This includes imposing restrictions on how basic
actions are conjoined by procedural operations.
What does it mean to define a restriction on epistemic dynamics? Here is a formal
mechanism for precisifying restrictions on epistemic dynamics.
(Restrictions on Epistemic Dynamics) Consider some set S of components of epistemic
dynamics; these could be states, transitions, processes, or some specified subset thereof.
Let P (S) be the powerset of S. Consider some partial order ≺ on the elements, Pi , of
P (S). Call some designated element of P (S), TI , the standard of irrationality. Now,
let RS and IS be subsets of S such that: ∀Pi ∈ P (S)∀s ∈ Pi (Pi  TI iff s ∈ IS ), and
∀Pi ∈ P (S)∀s ∈ Pi (Pi  TI iff s ∈ RS ) Then: every R≺ = (P (S), ≺, TI , RS , IS ) is a
restriction on epistemic dynamics.
The basic idea of restriction is a generalization of the notion of rational distinction or rational
valence. Technically, each restriction comprises a (not necessarily exhaustive or exclusive)
sorting of components of epistemic dynamics into RS and IS and an ordering over the powerset of a set of components of epistemic dynamics. The thought is that the subsets, RS and
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Figure 2.1: Restrictions on Epistemic Dynamics

If the restriction is on epistemic states, the boundary encircles the rational states, placing the
irrational states out of bounds, not to be trespassed upon. If the restriction is on transitions,
the boundary encircles the rational transitions, placing the irrational states out of bounds,
and cutting across any paths to their terminal states, blocking access. If the restriction is on
processes, the boundary encircles the rational processes; these are the processes that are to
be executed, even if a transition to a process’ terminal state is rational, the boundary may
place some ways of carrying out the transition out of bounds. With the subsets RS and IS ,
restrictions codify this kind of structure.
IS represent the way that categorical norms distinguish the objects to which they apply. RS
is the set of rational elements of S according to R≺ , and IS is the irrational set of elements
of S. Ignore the other parts of the structures for now; they’ll receive comment in due course.
The core part of restrictions on epistemic dynamics for the purposes of this project is the
division of components of dynamics to RS and IS .
Think of restrictions as boundaries separating different classes of epistemic factors. See
Figure 2.1 for diagrammatic help.
Norms are sometimes simple in that they categorically assign components of epistemic
dynamics exclusive statuses like "rational" and "irrational", “permissible” and “impermissible”. Restrictions codify the content of these kinds of norms. In the simplest case, there is a
partition of the set of elements into two disjoint subsets, one of which is the rational or legitimate subset, the other not. For example, the set of epistemic states can be partitioned into
those with inconsistent belief sets and those without. Formally, let P (S) partition the set of
epistemic states, S, into just PC and PIC , where PC is the set of consistent belief sets and
PIC is the set of inconsistent belief sets. Let PIC ≺ PC , PIC = TI = IS , and RS = PC . Then
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the following structure is a restriction on epistemic states: RC≺ = (P (S), ≺, PIC , PC , PIC ).
A restriction like the foregoing completely captures the content of a full-stop consistency
norms such as:
(Full-Stop Consistency) For any belief state, s, s is rational iff there is no sentence A
such that both A and ¬A are believed in s.15
It’s easy to see that this norm defines a class of restrictions exactly like RC≺ , though perhaps
varying in the properties of their ordering relations. More on this in a moment. FSC
quantifies over all belief states and partitions them into rational and irrational subsets on
the basis of inconsistency. The ordering, ≺, of a restriction need only satisfy the condition
that PIC ≺ PC . Full-Stop Consistency (FSC) tells us that the set of all and only the
consistent states is RS , and the set of inconsistent states is to be identified with both IS
and TI . Every other set of belief states may be incomparable in the ordering; the norm says
nothing about states on the basis of their other properties.
The ordering relation on the powerset provides a representation of more nuanced structures. Continuing with the boundaries metaphor, the ordering over the elements of the
powerset of components works like a concentric series of boundaries; this enables the representation of of comparative normative statuses (x is outside fewer boundaries than y) and
thresholds (some of the boundaries are fine to cross as long as one doesn’t go too far or
pass a cutoff point). That restrictions order powersets of elements of epistemic dynamics
also enables the construction to resemble norms in the way that they single out elements
of epistemic dynamics by their properties. Explicitly, the thought is that each Pi ∈ P (S)
represents the extension of a property of epistemic factors. The ranking may be so defined
that it equates the possession of some property with a normative verdict, e.g., consistency
or degree of entrenchment with greater rationality. After all, epistemic norms, expressed via
norm-kernels, typically tell us that entire classes of objects (e.g., states, transitions, or pro15
This norm is, for familiar reasons [167, 121], both implausibly permissive and implausibly strict. Still,
it serves as a suitable formal example.
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cesses) possess some normative valence if they satisfy C, the condition of application. Given
that the ordering is partial, there may be nothing else to say about the other elements of the
power set with respect to that restriction - the ordering may leave them all incomparable.
This is a virtue in terms of the representation of norms; a consistency norm like FSC may
tell us nothing about a mixed set of consistent and inconsistent belief states other than that
the consistent subset is a set of rational states.
More complex restrictions can be defined by more subtle norms. A strictly negative
consistency norm, for instance, might declare inconsistent belief states irrational but not
declare consistent belief states automatically rational. A more complex division of S and
ordering thereon might then be defined by the norm. Whatever the level of nuance, each
epistemic rationality norm defines some restriction on epistemic dynamics of some level of
complexity. For a first example, note that the threshold element, TI , can be fiddled with in
a number of ways. The definition of restrictions builds in the notion of a threshold element,
TI , that does intuitive work: epistemic rationality norms are frequently categorical, as FSC
is; the threshold element just matches the ordering to the categorical verdict that results
from dividing states into RS and IS . However, for more nuanced norms that issue no allor-nothing verdicts with respect to their objects, the threshold TI may be safely ignored
while the ordering is employed; for any restriction, there is always a restriction with an
identical rational subset and ranking but that TI = IS = ∅. These ranking relations then can
represent preference relations on epistemic factors. Thus, subtler epistemic norms than FSC
that merely recommend some epistemic factors over others can be captured by restrictions.
Of course, TI might also represent a threshold with respect to the ranking.
Norms that deliver deontic verdicts can also be modeled with restrictions on epistemic
dynamics. Deontics can be encoded with restrictions by taking IS to be the prohibited
components, RS to be the set of all permissible components, and some ≺ maximal subset of
RS to be the obligatory components. An alternative and simpler encoding of obligation is
this: any component, a, that is a part of every component in RS or otherwise accompanies
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every permissible component is obligatory. The prohibited actions are thus all of those
actions that preclude the execution of a. To illustrate: if one’s norms permit all and only
the courses of action p1 , p2 , and p3 , and there is a fourth course of action, q, that must
be carried out in order to carry out any of the foregoing pi , then q is obligated by those
norms. This will be the case if q is a subprocess of each pi , if q must be carried out prior
to carrying out any pi , or if one must do q concurrently with any permissible pi . In other
words, the obligatory actions are simply those actions such that either (i) they are the
uniquely permissible actions under some condition or (ii) they must be executed in addition
to any other permissible action. All one needs to analyze obligation in terms of restrictions
is machinery for thinking about these kinds of features of action. With obligation translated
into restrictions, permission and prohibition come along for free by the usual intertranslations
of deontics follows easily. More on this at the end of Chapter 4.
Now, D3 tells us that epistemic rationality restricts states, transitions, and processes,
and that these restrictions are distinct from the constraints of capacity and feasibility. In
other words, rationality requires not being in some of the states agents can end up in and not
doing some of the things agents can do. The thought is simply that rational agents are not
infallibly rational; their dynamics can diverge from the requirements of rationality. Agents
are typically capable of being in states that are not rational, making transitions that are not
rational, and carrying out actions and processes that aren’t rational. The requirements of
rationality typically pick out a proper subset of the states an agent can be in, a proper subset
of the transitions an agent can undergo from any particular state, and a proper subset of the
actions and processes that an agent can carry out under a particular circumstance. At any
given moment, there are plenty of things that are perfectly feasible for me that I rationally
ought not do. I am generally capable of thinking wishfully when making predictions about
the likely outcomes of my decisions, and, at a given time, such thinking may be feasible for
me. A model of my capacities and feasibilities will contain these factors, a model of my
ideally rational epistemic dynamics will not.
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The D3 Corollary amounts to the claim that, for a set of possible ways to construct
procedures out of a set of more basic actions, there is a restriction on that set - there is
a carving of that set of possible procedures into rational and irrational (et al) subsets. It
breaks down into separate subclaims for all of the possible ways to put actions together into
procedures. For instance, it entails at least these three claims:
(1) Epistemic rationality requires the execution of sequential and iterative procedures under
some conditions.
(2) Epistemic rationality requires parallel execution of procedures under some conditions.
(3) Epistemic rationality requires nondeterministic choice among procedures under some
conditions.
Sequential procedures are procedures formed from more basic actions such that one performs
one basic action and then another in sequence. Iteration is performing the same more basic
action some number of times. Parallel execution is exactly what it sounds like: it’s carrying
out two distinct actions at once. Nondeterministic choice is the most transparent of all; the
thought being that epistemic rationality constricts our choices but permits or delivers equal
verdicts to some sets of actions, among which one can choose freely. By “more basic”, I
mean simply that the basic actions out of which procedures are built are relatively simpler
than the procedures themselves. It may be the case that a procedure is itself formed out of
complex procedures. Consider laboratory protocols, data analysis techniques, or the proof
construction and model construction methods that compose the techniques that one aims to
inculcate in much logic instruction. The list of claims about specific procedural operations
entailed by D3 can be extended to exhaust the set of procedural operations.
The thought underneath the corollary and the subclaims fleshing it out is simply that it’s
epistemically rational or epistemically better to put together epistemic actions in some ways
and not others under certain conditions. With respect to sequencing and iteration, it’s helpful
to briefly consider some examples. For example, one can partially guard against p-hacking
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in data analysis - applying techniques of data gathering and analysis that make spurious
correlations appear statistically significant - by discretely separating the data acquisition
and data analysis steps of a study [126]. The analysis of ad hockery in formal learning
theory exposes other examples of rational vs irrational sequencing [85, 140, 142]. Systems
of multiple norms may require parallel execution if one is to abide by all of them at once.
If one is simultaneously to abide by norms of consistency and deductive closure, one might
have to carry out consistency detection and restoration tasks while ensuring that one’s belief
set is closed. For an example of epistemic rationality requiring choice, consistency norms are
useful examples. There are typically at least two different ways to restore consistency to any
inconsistent belief set; if A and B are inconsistent, one can contract A (and what implies
it) or B (and what implies it). Some closure norms do the same [22, 23]. More detailed and
just plain more examples are given in the next section.
Finally, note that the following “generation” facts hold. That is, as with D1 and D2, one
can easily find a rule to take a restriction on procedural construction to a restriction on, in
these cases, paths through epistemic state space:
(4) Sequential and iterative procedures determine sequentially composed paths through epistemic state space.
(5) Parallel execution procedures determine converging and corresponding paths through
epistemic state space.
(6) Procedures instructing nondeterministic choice determine branching paths through epistemic state space.
These facts follow easily from plausible assumptions. First, assume that each action corresponds to a path through epistemic state space. Then, if a procedure is formed from
sequentially executing one action, a, and then another action, b, the two paths through the
space of epistemic states corresponding to them, call them q and r, form a concatenated
path qr. If a and b must be executed in parallel, then a and b are to be started at the
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same state and concluded at the same state.16 Finally, if a and b are distinct procedures
corresponding to distinct paths, both of which are equally rational or the choice of which is
rational, the rational paths branch. But all of this is just to say that if epistemic rationality
requires procedures of these forms, then it requires that one follow the corresponding paths.
More precisely, we can give generation schemata as with the prior two desiderata:
(PrCtoP) If a procedure formed by sequentially composing two actions, a and b, is rational,
and p = qr where q corresponds to a and r corresponds to b, then p is rational.
(PrCtoP) If a procedure formed by parallel execution of two actions, a and b, is rational,
and p = q where q corresponds to a or p = r where r corresponds to b, and q and r
share root and terminal states, then p is rational.
(PrCtoP) If a procedure formed by choosing between two actions, a and b, is rational, and
p corresponds to a or p corresponds to b, then p is rational.
Each of these rules defines a restriction on paths through the space of epistemic states - the
paths that result from the rational procedures are distinguished from those that don’t.
Now, why should we take it that epistemic rationality norms define restrictions on epistemic dynamics at all, let alone with the properties described?

2.4.2

Arguments for D3

Three independent arguments converge to support D3. The first is a direct argument from
the robust conception of epistemic norms that emerges from many, independent lines of
epistemological work. The main thought is that many lines of thought in epistemology
converge on the idea that norms specify or define restrictions on epistemic dynamics. The
second is an argument from the cognitive function of epistemic rationality norms. Epistemic
norms play a role in deliberation about and guidance of epistemic action, and this can be done
16

It’s also quite plausible that doing a and b in parallel must take an agent through a unique sequence of
states, since it’s far from clear that one can be in more than one epistemic state at once.
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only if they provide information in the form of restrictions on epistemic factors. The third
argument appeals to the arguably standard (or at least highly influential) Dual Processes
Model (DPM) or Default Interventionist Model (DIM) [73, 238, 2] of reasoning to suggest
that if norms do define or specify restrictions on dynamics, they can play an important
explanatory role for the DPM (resp. DIM). Finally, I argue for the D3 corollary directly
from D3 and from several lines of thought that parallel the cognitive function arguments for
D3.
2.4.2.1

Norms Specify Restrictions on Epistemic Dynamics

First, norms define the requirements of epistemic rationality. I take it that this is simply built
into the concept of norms. Just as the norms of morality specify the moral requirements on
action, epistemic rationality norms specify the requirements of epistemic rationality. They
are, transparently, the rules or policies that specify what conditions an epistemic factor is to
meet in order to be rational, what conditions suffice for irrationality, and so on.
Second, the requirements of rationality divide states, changes of state, actions, and processes that effect changes of state into rational and irrational classes or perhaps into more
complex divisions involving rankings or preferences among these epistemic factors. I take it
that this is simply built into the concept of normative requirements; for any given requirement, the set of relevant objects is divided into those that meet it and those that don’t,
those that are assigned some particular verdict and those that aren’t. Sometimes requirements are looser or more nuanced; they might divide objects into a ranking according to how
many requirements are met or how heavily weighted the met requirements are. Nonetheless,
such requirements divide the objects of norms into various categories, though perhaps not
exclusively or exhaustively. Thus, the norms that specify requirements of rationality divide
the epistemic factors that they take as objects into rational and irrational subsets or they
effect some other more complex division.
Finally, any division of epistemic factors into rational and irrational classes or epistemic
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rationality ranking of epistemic factors (with or without a threshold that assigns the locations
in the ranking lower than it to the irrational class) defines restrictions on epistemic dynamics.
For any norm N , define an order on the powerset of N ’s domain, , such that for all
x, y ∈ Dom(N ), and all Pi and Pj in P (Dom(N )), x ∈ Pi , y ∈ Pj , and Pi  Pj iff either (i)
x is rational according to N , and y is irrational according to N , or (ii) x is more rational
according to N than y. Then define a restriction on N ’s domain, R = (P (S), , TI , RS , IS ),
where S is Dom(Ni ), and (iii) for all such Pi and Pj , Pi ⊆ RS and Pj ⊆ IS , or (iv) the
ordering over the powerset of the domain with respect to the norm is identical to the ordering
in the restriction. Thus, given the construction of restrictions in the prior section, epistemic
norms define restrictions on epistemic dynamics.
2.4.2.2

Robustness Analysis

That epistemic rationality divides epistemic factors into sets or rankings isn’t merely a matter
of pretheoretical judgment; it’s the result of a “robustness analysis” argument. The notion of
robustness analysis arises from consideration of what makes the sciences so distinctly reliable
in generating knowledge. One way of explaining the distinct reliability of science is that the
sciences frequently deploy multiple, independent methods of investigation, measurement,
or discovery to triangulate their way onto verdicts about the existence or character of a
phenomenon. As Wimsatt [260] puts it:
The family of criteria and procedures which I seek to describe in their various uses might be called robustness analysis. They all involve the following
procedures:
1. To analyze a variety of independent derivation, identification, or measurement processes.
2. To look for and analyze things which are invariant over or identical in the
conclusions or results of these processes.
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3. To determine the scope of the processes across which they are invariant and
the conditions on which their invariance depends.
4. To analyze and explain any relevant failures of invariance. (p.44)
It is the deployment of these procedures of robustness analysis that underly the reliability
and epistemic value of the sciences. There are varying accounts as to why this is the case,
but for the purposes of this argument, the key upshots are these:
• If multiple, independent lines of investigation, measurement, or discovery converge on
the same model, then the model is robust.
• Robust models are the best guides to the reality of the domain of inquiry.
One way to think of this is that by deploying multiple, independent methods or modes of
investigation and measurement to generate a model of something, one is maximizing chances
of discovering that certain features of a model are mere artifacts of particular methods. Convergence across methods rules out this possibility, given the independence of those methods
- at least for the set of methods employed. Thus, a robust model is the best guide to the
reality of the thing because it has the lowest chance of characterizing the thing inaccurately
by way of modeling artifacts.
Multiple, independent lines of investigation in formal and traditional epistemology converge on the idea that epistemic rationality sorts epistemic factors into rational and irrational
subsets. Thus, a model of epistemic rationality as a force that sorts epistemic factors emerges
as robust. In showing this, I’ll settle for only a small handful of examples.
Classical belief revision theories in the AGM mould explicitly articulate restrictions on
epistemic factors. The consistency and closure requirements on belief sets articulate a restriction on belief sets. Now, in the standard formulations of AGM, the deductive closure
condition defines belief sets; there are, technically, no belief sets in AGM that are not deductively closed. However, belief sets are explicitly deployed as models of ideally rational
doxastic state, and these are characterized in the machinery of AGM exclusively by means
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of sets of sentences of a propositional language, L. Thus, the powerset of L implicitly characterizes the space of all possible doxastic states; every K such that K ⊆ L is a doxastic
state. Deductive closure rules out a great swathe of these potential doxastic states as irrational. To the extent that the trivial belief set is also to be avoided, closure imposes a kind
of consistency requirement on doxastic states; no belief sets (rational doxastic states) that
aren’t trivial are inconsistent.
More, the epistemic commitment functions of expansion, contraction, and revision articulate restrictions on the set of possible transitions among belief sets. These functions
explicitly represent ideally rational change of doxastic state. Those transitions in the extension of the commitment functions are a small, proper subset of the possible transitions
among belief sets, which themselves are a small, proper subset of possible transitions among
doxastic states.
These comments apply, mutatis mutandis to every other belief revision theory based
even remotely on the same basic model of AGM. Spohn’s ordinal conditional functions [233],
Doyle’s truth maintenance systems [67], Ellis’ rational belief systems [69], Forrest’s belief
dynamics [84], and more [11, 18, 63, 74, 77, 99, 118, 134, 140, 149, 155, 160, 195, 211, 216,
20, 245] all essentially support these same claims. These models are not entirely independent
of the AGM framework. However, the following models are.
Bayesian credence update theories [53, 182] also do the same work of dividing epistemic
factors into rational and irrational sets. Rational epistemic states are modeled by probabilistically coherent credence functions. Rational epistemic transitions are a proper subset
of possible transitions from credence function to credence function. The rational transitions
are those that maintain probabilistic coherence according to some favored diachronic update
function.
Dynamic epistemic logic [65] characterizes the evolution of knowledge under logical closure. In responding to the standard arguments against the closure of knowledge, many
logicians and philosophers involved with DEL and epistemic logic more generally have ad-
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verted to a view of DEL as giving a model of ideal evolutions of knowledge states. That is,
actual knowledge may not be closed under deduction, but it ought to be! Thus, in DEL,
product updates give a model of ideal evolution of the knowledge states of epistemic agents.
That is, where the true propositions involving an individual knowledge operator Ki in one
epistemic model, M , represent an agent i’s epistemic state, the product update for some
event e identifies a transition to a new epistemic model, M 0 , and thus a new epistemic state
for i. These transitions from state to state are a proper subset of the possible pairs of such
states, and so a proper subset of the epistemic transitions possible for i. They are the correct
transitions with respect to the ideal evolution of knowledge.
Traditional epistemology follows suit. Basic norms of evidence apportionment do the
same sorting work. Strict, anti-dogmatic norms such as Clifford’s Rule divide belief states
into those that are rational (those for which all beliefs have sufficient evidence) and those that
aren’t on the basis of a demanding standard [54]. Belief states such that there is sufficient
evidence for each constituent belief are a proper subset of belief states. These kinds of static
rules can be lifted to dynamic contexts easily: adding a belief without sufficient evidence
is irrational. Such transitions are, of course, a proper subset of doxastic transitions. More
permissive or conservative norms provide different sortings but nonetheless divide states
into rational and irrational sets [160, 16, 173, 167]. Contractions of belief, according to
conservative theories, without discovery of a sufficiently serious problem with the prior belief
state, are irrational [121, 122, 160].
An independent line of inquiry that converges on this model is that analyzing the normative role of logic. Disputes about logic’s normative role often assume a model of epistemic
rationality as a force for dividing states and transitions into rational and irrational sets despite entirely different starting points. Consider such norms for rational inference as those
put forward by Beall, Field, and MacFarlane:
(Beall) In the context of multiple-conclusion logic, where X and Y are theories (set of
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propositions): If X ` Y , then it’s irrational to accept (all of) X and reject (all of) Y .17
(Field) Letting Cr(A) be the degree of credence in A: If A1 , ..., An ` B, then Cr(B) ≥
P
18
i Cr(Ai ) − n + 1.
(MacFarlane) wo- If A, B ` C, then you ought to see to it that if you believe A and you
believe B, you do not disbelieve C.
wr+ If A, B ` C, then you have reason to see to it that if you believe A and you
believe B, you believe C.19
These norms straightforwardly divide rational from irrational inferences. In general, inferences from one’s present information that accord with the relevant logical laws comprise a
proper subset of the possible transitions one can make among epistemic states. Interestingly,
each is indeterministic: according to these rules, there are multiple correct or rational ways
of inferring conclusions from one’s present theory or information that comply with logic.
Still, these represent only a few out of many possible moves.
In Beall’s rule, the only verboten path is accepting all of X and rejecting all of Y . Where
Y = {B1 , ..., Bn }, transitioning to an epistemic state where one accepts X ∪ Bi is, for each
Bi , a rational transition. So is rejecting all of Y and rejecting some part of X. That is, if
X = A1 , ..., Am , rejecting all Bi and some Aj is a rational transition. By Field’s rule, any
transition from a credence state is rational as long as one’s credence in the consequences of
A1 , ..., An is not lower than the sum of one’s credences in each Ai . This allows a number of
17

This is Beall’s “normative constraint role” of logic [23]. This rule is formulated in terms of Beall’s
preferred multiple-conclusion LP [22]. The rule generalizes the single conclusion variant: If X ` A, then it’s
irrational to accept all of X and reject A.
18
Field [77, 78, 79, 80] generalizes this rule in a number of ways. First, to the multiple conclusion
case
P involving both
P degrees of credence Cr(A) and disbelief Dis(A): If A1 , ..., An ` B1 , ..., Bm , then
Dis(A
)
+
i
i≤n
j≤m Cr(Bj ) ≥ 1. Second, to the case of conditional belief: Letting A | C/D denote the
conditional probabilityP
of A given full acceptance
P of C and full rejection of D, then: If A1 ..., An ` B1 , ..., Bm
then for all C and C, i≤n Dis(Ai |C/D) + j≤m Cr(Bj |C/D) ≥ 1.
19
MacFarlane, in one of the more useful and interesting unpublished papers [167] I’ve ever come across,
examines a wide array of inferential constraints constructed according to the schema: If A, B ` C, then
(Normative Claim). By varying a number of parameters like scope and valence in normative claim, he
generates an interesting array of possible bridge principles between logic and rationality. He ultimately
defends the two in the main text.
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options for compliance. One can, of course, raise one’s credences to meet the constraint or,
if one’s credence in B is quite low, one can lower one’s credence in some Ai s. MacFarlane’s
rules both provide multiple options for compliance. For wo-, if you believe A and B, you can
expand your beliefs to encompass C or come to disbelieve A or B. For wr+, if you believe A
and B, you have a defeasible or pro tanto reason to believe C. Exactly what options comply
with a pro tanto reason are unclear, but they include at least the following options: if one
has reason to believe C and no reason not to, then one ought to believe C, and if one has
reason not to believe C, then one is perfectly well permitted to continue not believing C.
I’ll let the enumeration of implicit and explicit models of epistemic rationality’s requirements that converge on divisions of epistemic factors rest with this small handful of samples.20
I take the foregoing to at least have made it prima facie plausible that restrictions on epistemic dynamics provide a robust model of the requirements of epistemic rationality. These
multiple investigatory lines converge on the division of epistemic factors by requirements of
epistemic rationality. Thus, given the construction of restrictions in the prior section and
the conceptual claim that epistemic norms define the requirements of epistemic rationality,
epistemic norms define or specify restrictions on epistemic dynamics. Thus, the model of
epistemic rationality norms as specifiers of restrictions on epistemic dynamics is a robust
model, and so a reliable guide to the nature of epistemic norms. This, I take it, establishes the core part of D3: that epistemic rationality norms define restrictions on epistemic
20
Really, this is a shallow sampling. My conjecture is that this is a conceptual feature of epistemic norms
generally, so it’s to be expected that every putative norm in the epistemology literature exhibits this feature.
Here, I want to gesture at even more work at analyzing epistemic norms that supports this conjecture. These
include the well-known rationality and entrenchment postulates of AGM theory [5, 91], Bayesian norms of
credence update [53, 153], the closure and updating constraints on dynamic epistemic logics [65], the upshots
for rationality of Tennant’s finite dependency networks [245], and more [23, 45, 67, 69, 74, 84, 108, 184, 233].
One might question their independence, given that they all attempt formal analyses of rational belief revision,
but (a) they are developed under sometimes very different conceptions and assumptions, and (b) that’s not
all! For accounts of epistemic rationality or norms thereof that converge on restriction outside of formal
rational belief revision theories, see: Field’s triple of articles, [77, 78, 79], Beall [22, 23], Restall [210], any
first-order account of norms of rationality that employs the deontic notion of permission (e.g., [164]), most
forms of evidentialism [57], specific accounts of rationality norms like the knowledge norm [1], Pollock’s
defense of internalism [194], Gibbard’s meta-ethics [98], Schafer’s doxastic planning account of at least some
rationality norms [217], or Kolodny’s explicit defense of process-requirements [146, 147]. Finally, Pettigrew’s
entire epistemic utility theory research programme construes various methodological, logical, and credence
norms as constraints on (e.g.) the formation and update of credences [189, 191, 190, 192].
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dynamics.
2.4.2.3

Epistemic Dynamicism

Now, the content of the restrictions on dynamics that epistemic norms define is a matter of
some controversy, as noted in defending D1 and D2. Epistemic norms perform sorting for
at least epistemic states. This almost needn’t be argued insofar as one thinks that there are
any epistemic rationality norms. Observations of norms that rule in epistemic states with
some features and rule out others are ubiquitous. One need only find a consistency or closure
norm of some kind or remind oneself that a “wise man apportions his belief to the evidence”
[132].
However, it is not the case that all of the models enumerated above converge on restrictions on all of these factors of epistemic dynamics. This may simply be a case of limited
scope. The models under consideration may never have been applied to the general analysis
of epistemic rationality. Rather, they have been guided by specific observations or problems
about dynamics and rationality. Nevertheless, D1 and D2 expand the epistemic factors over
which epistemic norms define restrictions to transitions and processes. In arguing for D1 and
D2, I really only argued for the claim that epistemic rationality divides the sets of possible
transitions and possible actions and processes into rational and irrational sets or imposes a
ranking on them. I called these “restrictions” without supplying a technical definition for the
term. Given the construction of restrictions on epistemic dynamics in this section, D1 and
D2, formulated in terms of divisions of transitions and processes into distinct sets, directly
imply that there are restrictions on transitions and processes in the more precise sense of
this section. This point is strengthened by the fact that most of the models above converge
on the restrictions on dynamics rather than merely on restrictions of states.
In sum, multiple, independent lines of epistemological and philosophical investigation
converge on restrictions on epistemic dynamics as models of the requirements of epistemic
rationality. These requirements are specified by epistemic norms. From the definition of re-
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strictions on dynamics and the observations defended as principles D1 and D2, it follows that
epistemic norms specify restrictions on epistemic states, transitions, actions, and processes.
Finally, that these restrictions are distinct from the constraints of capacity and feasibility is
trivial from the observation - made in the discussion section - that reasoners are capable of
doing irrational things.
2.4.2.4

The Cognitive Function of Epistemic Norms

Shifting gears to the second argument, a powerful rationale for restrictions as a formalization of the content of epistemic norms is that epistemic normativity is to play a role in the
dynamic control of epistemic state change. This is the cognitive role or function of epistemic norms, and for playing this role, it’s necessary for epistemic norms to be associated
with some kind of restriction (whether in the form of categorical verdicts or rankings) with
regard to possible states to be reached or transitions and processes of change to be applied.
Else, norms don’t really provide information with which to guide us in figuring out what
to do next, epistemically. The “what to do next” problem is, fundamentally, the challenge
of finding a function from arbitrary epistemic states with multiple successors reachable by
multiple feasible processes to some subset of those successors or to some subset of the feasible processes. This argument is consilient with the fact that, it is, after all, not rare or
controversial to conceive of epistemic norms doing exactly this kind of ranking or preference
defining work [117, 6, 133, 34].
Now, as to the guidance aspect of norms, if one sees two potential states ahead of one’s
current state one of which is consistent while the other is not or sees that one is in an
inconsistent state, both the ordering built into restrictions based on (e.g.) consistency norms
and the assignment of objects to rational and irrational sets can provide the requisite ranking.
The ordering and categorical assignments determine (or represent a regularity with respect
to) what transition one must make from one’s current state in those circumstances. The
thought is that such a norm ranks the set of consistent states more highly than the set
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of inconsistent states (or places it directly among the rational states as opposed to the
irrational states). If one is to be in more highly ranked or rational states, this settles choices
(at least along one axis of decision). A general function, “From any state, select the highest
items in the ordering” where the rational set is uniformly higher than the irrational set then
settles the “what to do next” problem, perhaps indeterministically (depending on the nature
of the ordering). Apply this to transitions, actions, and processes mutatis mutandis. Thus,
restrictions provide information capable of providing regulative guidance of epistemic actions;
they provide answers to the “what to do next” problem. I will argue below that epistemic
norms must define or otherwise be associated with restrictions if they are to provide regulative
guidance.
There are two obvious roles for epistemic norms to play in cognition:
(Descriptive) Epistemic norms could be regularities that show up in the best (idealized)
models of an agent’s cognition. They “govern” ideal epistemic dynamics the way the
laws of physics govern the evolution of physical systems.
(Normative) Epistemic norms could be objects that play a role in evaluating and guiding
cognition, not just in describing regularities. They govern evaluations of epistemic dynamics the way that laws govern legal evaluations of behavior, and they guide epistemic
dynamics the way that professional methodologies guide professional behavior.
The description of the normative role of epistemic norms suggests two kinds of normative
role for norms to play:
(Post Hoc Evaluation) Assessment epistemology: evaluating an epistemic state, change
of epistemic state, or process of epistemic state change after it’s occurred. Epistemic
norms can be used as standards or normative ideals that a system can realize, fail to
realize, or approximate to some greater or lesser degree. That is, norms can be used
to determine, post hoc, that a system is in the wrong state or that it got to its current
state by the wrong means.
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(Ante Hoc Regulation) Directive epistemology: deployment of norms to select epistemic
actions, procedures, or processes. Epistemic norms can be used as standards or normative ideals that a system’s current or future states and potential courses of action can
realize, fail to realize, or approximate to some greater or lesser degree. The relations
that current and future states and courses of action bear to these standards can be
used in selecting future courses of action.
To illustrate post hoc evaluation, we can consider the normal uses of various kinds of standards. For instance, we can use the dictionary to look up “comprise” and “compose” in order
to determine whether a sentence with one of these terms that has already been spoken was
grammatically correct. Additionally, we often want to tell whether someone has followed an
experimental protocol or proper methods of data analysis in presenting us with a new finding or whether someone’s already constructed proof actually works. Post hoc evaluation of
reasoning processes is also a standard practice. Knowing that I’m prone to wishful thinking
and recognizing that wishful thinking is a reasoning process that frequently guarantees error,
I can ask whether I got to my conclusion by merely being wishful.
Ante hoc regulation is about projecting what norms require of future actions, and trying
to ensure that our actions accord with those requirements. For instance, we can look up
“comprise” and “compose” in order to determine how to construct a sentence with one of
these terms (rather than the other). With some conception of how the sentence ought to
come out, use the dictionary to guide the process of constructing the sentence in a way
that matches grammatical usage. For further parallel examples, empirical scientists employ
experimental protocols to guide their information generating actions in the lab, statisticians
use established methods of data analysis to guide the way they draw conclusions from data
sets, and mathematicians use methods of structural and transfinite induction to guide their
construction of proofs. Again, ante hoc guidance of reasoning processes is also standard
practice. Knowing that I’m prone to wishful thinking and recognizing that wishful thinking
is a reasoning process that frequently guarantees error, I can suppress this process and
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substitute better ways of reasoning.
A useful framework for thinking about ante hoc regulation is epistemic planning in artificial intelligence research [115, 95]. Essentially, epistemic planning is just a special case of
planning. Planning is conceived of in terms of planning problems and solutions to planning
problems. The basic background is the by now familiar conception of dynamic systems.
There is a set of possible states of the relevant system - whether the system is a robot, set of
interacting agents, or single agent in an environment - and a set of actions that the system
can perform to transition from state to state. An action library is a subset of the set of all
possible actions. A goal state is a state of the system that has some specified set of properties
that encode a goal for the system. Planning problems are triples of initial state, goal state,
and action library.
The intuitive thought is that the planning problem is the problem of figuring out how
to get from the initial state, by some sequence of actions in the action library, to the goal
state. Solutions to planning problems are thus plans or instructions built out of procedural
operations on the action library that suffice to transition the system from the initial state
to the goal state. An epistemic planning problem is simply a planning problem that builds
epistemic normativity into the goal state by specifying that the state have certain normative
features. For instance, the goal state may be any state that satisfies some condition like
consistency, deductive closure, or proper basing relations. As D2 implies, a planning problem
might also impose restrictions on the kinds of plans that can be used to reach the goal state.
That is, the goal state might specify that only a certain kind of procedure was used to reach
it.
With that in mind, the following argument directly establishes D3:
1. If epistemic rationality norms can be deployed or applied in deliberate, ante hoc regulation or epistemic planning, then they must define restrictions on epistemic dynamics
that model (a) ideally rational evolution of epistemic state, (b) ideally rational changes
of epistemic state, (c) ideally rational procedures and processes of epistemic state
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change, and that (d) can be distinguished from constraints of capacity and feasibility.
2. Epistemic rationality norms can - and, if they are to have any role in cognition other
than description of regularities in practice, must - be used in deliberate, ante hoc
regulation/epistemic planning.
3. ∴ Epistemic rationality norms define restrictions on epistemic dynamics that model (a)
ideally rational evolution of epistemic state, (b) ideally rational changes of epistemic
state, (c) ideally rational procedures and processes of epistemic state change, and that
(d) can be distinguished from constraints of capacity and feasibility.
The basic model of deliberate ante hoc regulation can be thought of in terms of planning
problems. Suppose that an agent, α, endorses a set of norms, {N1 , ..., Nn }, and sets out to
follow them. At any initial state, s, that α can be in, there is a set of possible epistemic
states, {s1 , ..., sm }, that α can reach by applying some set of epistemic processes, {p1 , ..., pk },
formed out of the actions in α’s action library. According to {N1 , ..., Nn }, some of these
epistemic states are rational, others irrational, some transitions from s to si are rational,
others not, and some processes are rational, others not. The goal state can involve arriving
at a normative state, carrying out a normative state change, or carrying out a normative
action or process. Ante hoc regulation is deliberating about which of the pi will meet the
conditions imposed by {N1 , ..., Nn } on the goal state, and then selecting and carrying out
the right pi . To do this, α must answer certain arrays of questions about {N1 , ..., Nn }. These
questions are displayed in Table 2.1.
The necessity of these questions in deliberate ante hoc regulation is somewhat selfexplanatory. If one is trying to deliberately guide one’s belief formation toward a rational
state, one must figure out which rational states one can reach by chaining actions in the
action library. In order to deliberately select a normative action or process, one must be
able to figure out what feasible actions and processes are ruled in by the norms one endorses.
If one cannot distinguish the normative courses of action from those that are merely feasible,
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Table 2.1: Solutions to Epistemic Planning Problems
States
Transitions
Processes
Whether a possible
Whether a possible
Whether a possible
epistemic state, s, is
epistemic transition, t, is
epistemic process, p, is
rational or not with
rational or not with
rational or irrational with
respect to Ni .
respect to Ni .
respect to Ni .
• What the static
indicators of
rationality and
irrationality are with
respect to Ni .
• Whether the static
indicators of
rationality and
irrationality with
respect to Ni hold for
s

Whether the current state
is rational or not with
respect to Ni .
Which feasible (available
or executable) transitions
and processes lead to
rational states, and which
lead to irrational states.

• Whether the current
state is rational or
not with respect to
Ni .
• What the dynamic
indicators of
rationality and
irrationality are with
respect to Ni .
• Whether the
dynamic indicators of
rationality and
irrationality with
respect to Ni hold for
t.
Whether a transition that
is rational with respect to
Ni is feasible (available or
executable).
What the consequences of
executing a rational
transition with respect to
Ni will be (e.g., what state
one ends up at).

• What the procedural
indicators of
rationality and
irrationality are with
respect to Ni .
• Whether the
procedural indicators
of rationality and
irrationality with
respect to Ni hold for
p.

Whether a process that is
rational with respect to Ni
is feasible (available or
executable).
What the consequences of
executing a rational
process with respect to Ni
will be (e.g., what state
one ends up at, what
transition is effected).
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the use of norms in action guidance will be frustrated. One would figure out what one’s
norms required, confuse those with the merely feasible actions, and be no better equipped to
act normatively. Supposing that epistemic norms are useful in ante hoc regulation, the only
plausible use is in providing answers to questions like these. Thus, in addition to dividing
epistemic factors into sets by valence, norms useful for ante hoc regulation must provide
information that distinguishes the merely feasible actions from the rational ones.
From the definition of restrictions on epistemic dynamics, it follows that any norm that
provides answers to these questions specifies restrictions on epistemic dynamics. More precisely, if these questions, with respect to norm Ni , even have answers, then Ni divides epistemic factors into distinct subsets and identifies them as rational or irrational, more rational
or less, etc.. Thus, the definition of restrictions on dynamics trivially implies that there is
a restriction on epistemic dynamics that agrees with Ni . For any norm Ni , define an order
on the powerset of Ni ’s domain, , such that for all x, y ∈ Dom(Ni ), and all Pi and Pj in
P (Dom(Ni )), x ∈ Pi , y ∈ Pj , and Pi  Pj iff either (i) x is rational according to Ni , and y
is irrational according to Ni , or (ii) x is more rational according to Ni than y. Then define a
restriction on N ’s domain, R = (P (S), , TI , RS , IS ), where S is Dom(Ni ), and (iii) for all
such Pi and Pj , Pi ⊆ RS and Pj ⊆ IS , or (iv) the ordering over the powerset of the domain
is identical to the ordering in the restriction. This restriction will be exactly the one that
answers the questions in the deliberation table above. Finally, as epistemic norms deliver
verdicts about all of these epistemic factors (as argued above), an ideally rational agent will
thus find itself in the rational states, traversing the rational transitions, and employing the
rational processes; else, there is no sense in which it’s ideally rational.
In sum, to deploy a norm Ni in ante hoc regulation, one must answer the questions
above. Answering the questions above is straightforwardly limning a restriction on epistemic
dynamics that meets conditions (a)-(c) of D3. The restriction outlined by answering the
deliberation questions must be distinct from the constraints of capacity and feasibility if it’s
to be useful, so the restriction meets (a)-(d) of D3.
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The second premise is easy to see. Epistemic norms would be entirely inert in cognitive
life if they had no role in ante hoc regulation. Suppose that they didn’t. Then epistemic
norms might still be useful to post hoc evaluation; they could be the standards by which
we make post hoc evaluative judgments. But what could possibly be the point of post hoc
evaluations in the absence of ante hoc regulation? If post hoc evaluations could be used to
deliberately guide future epistemic behavior, it’s unclear how this wouldn’t just be deliberate
ante hoc regulation. Suppose that post hoc evaluation shows that state si−1 was irrational
according to norm Ni . An agent might bypass directly reasoning about the verdicts of Ni
by reasoning about future states by analogy with si−1 . Future state si+1 might have exactly
the features of si−1 that made it irrational according to Ni , and so a reasoner might seek to
avoid si+1 . But this is just a circuitous way of answering the questions in the table above,
and so just a circuitous form of ante hoc regulation. If post hoc evaluations couldn’t be
used in at least this way, epistemic norms can be nothing other than tools for pointless score
keeping.21
The pointlessness of such scorekeeping is worth contemplating. If there were only post hoc
evaluation according to norms, errors in reasoning would be entrenched and incorrigible. To
suppose that there are no means of ante hoc regulation is to suppose that there is no way to
drive the negative post hoc evaluations into future corrections. Any such correction requires
some way of guiding future action according to the verdicts of our epistemic norms. Suppose
that post hoc assessment of my prior reasoning reveals that I drew conclusions on insufficient
evidence. To assume that there is no way to employ norms in ante hoc regulation is just to
say that there is no way for me to then deliberately ensure that my future belief states accord
with norms of sufficient evidence. Deliberately doing so would require answering questions
in the table above with respect to such evidence norms and then, somehow, driving the
selection of future courses of inference in accordance with those answers. Thus, if there
21

More, even post hoc evaluation is a dynamic process that can be done correctly or incorrectly. I may,
after all, find out that I misapplied an evaluative norm. The norms of epistemic rationality must be used to
guide this process, or else all we can do is keep score about our score keeping behavior.
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were nothing that counts as ante hoc regulation, then there would simply be no way to
guide my future epistemic actions. In the absence of some way of suppressing my erroneous
dispositions to act and supplying a normative course of action, I would, at best, only be
able to recognize that I have made errors while being utterly powerless to do anything about
them. In particular, without the ability to guide my future evaluations, which would require
ante hoc regulation of evaluation processes, I would be hopelessly sentenced to a future of
commission of errors despite being capable of recognizing all of them. This is a little too
fast; there might be ways of normatively driving epistemic action without deliberate ante
hoc regulation. I consider this point below. For now, it suffices to note that this kind of
epistemic fatalism isn’t merely troubling, it’s demonstrably not our epistemic situation.
To see that epistemic norms can be deliberately applied, all that’s necessary is (a) noting
that empirically supported models of cognition and cognitive behavior presuppose deliberate
application of epistemic norms, and (b) direct observation of epistemic behavior reveals deliberate application of epistemic norms. First, note the vast empirical literature on cognitive
biases and de-biasing strategies [2, 136, 238]. The thought that runs through this research
is that our innate cognitive endowments are “fast and frugal” but lead us into error in complicated or novel situations. In order to override these error-prone strategies, cognizers must
halt their cognitive processes and enact a normative alternative. These normative alternatives can be supplied by explicit knowledge of logical and statistical methods. That many
epistemically damaging biases can be counteracted by training in various formal methods
establishes the prevalence and usefulness of effortful, reflective, and otherwise deliberate ante
hoc regulation [71, 72, 180].
Second, the sketch of deliberate application of epistemic norms above is, in many respects,
notably similar to the EMIL-A model of the cognitive dynamics of norm compliance [59].22
The EMIL-A model directly provides a place for restrictions on dynamics to fit; basically,
22

It may be interesting to note that the sketch of deliberate application was outlined independently of
EMIL-A, and that there are a number of other independent sketches of norm adoption that basically capture
the contours of the model. See, for instance, the synoptic power of EMIL-A in [59]. This might suggest that
there is something robust to the main ideas of the sketch.
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the array of features that need to be discovered in the procedure above correspond to beliefs
that must be developed in the EMIL-A model.
The EMIL-A model is broken into an epistemic and a pragmatic component. The epistemic component - comprising the norm recognition module - transforms information inputs
into normative beliefs. Normative beliefs come in three varieties: main normative beliefs,
norm pertinence beliefs, and norm enforcement beliefs. Main normative beliefs essentially
comprise the information contained in norm-kernels: beliefs about the verdicts of norms under their conditions of application, beliefs about whether the conditions of application hold,
about what specific actions in the agent’s repertoire are assigned what deontic operators under the present conditions, and other beliefs, including those about the authority or sources
of the norm. Norm pertinence beliefs are about whether the norm binds the agent. Norm
enforcement beliefs are about the sanctions underwriting the norm.
Normative beliefs are transformed by the norm-adoption module in EMIL-A into normative goals by the pragmatic component. Normative goals are then sent to a planning system
that solves planning problems in which the goal states are shaped by normative goals, which
generates normative intentions and, finally, actions. I overlook alternative models of norm
compliance here, for the reason that EMIL-A synthesizes the insights of available alternative
accounts of norm compliance.23
The parallels between the ante hoc regulation procedure and the EMIL-A model are
clear: both models require figuring out the features of norms outlined in the table above as
part of synthesizing a normative plan of action. The main normative beliefs generated by
the norm recognition module are explicit answers to the questions articulated in that table.
Restrictions on epistemic dynamics are exactly the kind of construction from which those
answers can be derived. The EMIL-A model thus requires the use of representations that
carry the information that can be derived from restrictions on epistemic dynamics.
Third, recall the examples above about ante hoc regulation. Empirical scientists employ
23

This is argued at some length in [59].
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experimental protocols to guide their information generating actions in the lab. Statisticians use established methods of data analysis to guide the way they draw conclusions from
data sets. Mathematicians use methods of structural and transfinite induction to guide their
construction of proofs. Philosophers deploy all of the above from time to time as well as
established argumentative methods to approach theses proposed by colleagues and forerunners. More homely examples abound. Knowing that I’m prone to wishful thinking and
recognizing that wishful thinking is a reasoning process that frequently guarantees error, I
can suppress this process and substitute better ways of reasoning. All of these examples
involve both pre-emptive commitment to certain courses of action as well as self-correction
or the halting of natural or intuitive processes and supplying normative courses of action.
These kinds of occurrence of ante hoc regulation have not only been empirically catalogued
but can be readily witnessed. The second premise of the argument is secure.
2.4.2.5

Cognition and Restrictions on Epistemic Dynamics

Finally, I want to consider a third way of arguing for the core of D3. The argument is this:
1. D3 can solve the problem of supplying alternative courses of action in Default Interventionist (DI) or Dual Processes (DPM) models of cognition.
2. Default Interventionism/DPM is a theoretically well-supported theory of rational cognition.
3. If a principle solves problems in theoretically well-supported theory, T , without worsening T , then there is a powerful reason to accept the principle.
4. ∴ There is a powerful reason to accept D3.
Default Interventionism is the main idea of the Dual Process Models of rational cognition.24
24

This argument is framed in terms of the Dual Processes Model and/or the Default Interventionist Model.
These, in many ways, come to exactly the same thing - heuristic processes can, upon reflection and with
effort, be halted and substituted for normative processes. See, for overview and defense: [73, 72] and the
relevant chapters of [2]. The DPM can be said to underly the DI model of rational cognition. A largely
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There are numerous particular theories of rational cognition that are grouped together as
Dual Process Models, but they share enough and are, collectively, prevalent enough that
it’s safe to call the standard model of rational cognition the Dual Processes Model (DPM).
The DPM divides epistemic processes into two types: Type 1 processes (also called The
Automated Set of Systems (TASS)) and Type 2 processes.
The defining feature of Type 1 processes is that they are autonomous under the stimulus
conditions that trigger them; they proceed in a mandatory fashion without input from higher
level cognition. These processes tend to be automatic, executable in parallel, and fast and
cheap, from a processing power standpoint. These processes or systems also tend to be
unreliable for solving abstract, complex, or novel cognitive problems, but we nonetheless
resort to them by default.
By contrast, the defining feature of Type 2 processes is that they are non automatic, serial,
and require a greater degree of processing power than those of Type 1. Type 2 processes
are also frequently called rule-based or rule-guided processes because (i) they adhere more
closely to normative rules (e.g., probability and logic) than Type 1 processes (though this
is contested [100, 101, 102, 152]), and (ii) are typically impacted by an agent’s explicit
knowledge of such rules [168, 239]. Type 2 processes tend to be far more reliable for solving
abstract, complex, and novel cognitive problems [136, 242, 2].
The DPM requires something like ante hoc regulation. The defining interaction between
the two types of processes is the suppression and substitution of Type 1 by Type 2 processes.
Type 2 processes are, in other words, the processes of reflective thought that override and
correct our instinctive or intuitive ways of thinking. This is Default Interventionism; the
default Type 1 processes are intervened upon by higher, normative processes.
Rationality in cognitive science is standardly thought of in terms of divergence from ideal
epistemic dynamics. In particular, cognitive scientists break rationality into two kinds, epistemic and instrumental. Epistemic rationality is standardly modeled with probabilistically
parallel argument could be framed in terms of theories of the cognitive dynamics of norm compliance like
EMIL-A.
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coherent degrees of belief, and instrumental rationality with expected utility optimization.
The rationality of particular cognizers is measured as divergence from these two ideal models.
The Dual Processes Model holds that Type 1 processes must be overridden and replaced by
Type 2 processes because the heuristic features of Type 1 processes cause irrationality (or
divergence from the ideals just noted). However, in order for it to be cognitively useful to
override Type 1 processes, there must be normatively superior processes to substitute for
them. This is where restrictions on dynamics come in.
An efficient solution to the problem of supplying superior alternative processes is for
agents to be able to use norms to model normatively correct processes and then drive them
into behavior. Let me unpack that. The proposal consists of two ideas. First is the idea that
a kind of Type 2 reasoning about epistemic norms is part of any efficient solution: explicit
representation or modeling of the norms and (logical) derivation of the elements of the set
of normatively correct processes given an initial state. The second idea is merely schematic:
there must be some way of driving the alternative processes derived from representation
of norms into epistemic behavior. I won’t say much about the second idea because (i) the
problem can be thought of in terms of well-developed theories of plan-synthesis and execution
(e.g., solving a planning problem and then acting on plans/complex intentions), and (ii) the
first idea is what does the work for this argument for D3.
In order for epistemic norms to provide solutions to the “supply problem” in the DPM,
epistemic norms must carry information that the agent can use about what epistemic factors
are normatively correct and under what conditions they are correct. But this just to say
that epistemic norms divide epistemic factors into rational and irrational subsets or otherwise
supply rankings of them, and this implies that they specify restrictions by the arguments
above. Thus, epistemic norms must specify restrictions on epistemic dynamics in order to
solve the supply problem. To illustrate the idea of supplying normative courses of action,
consider Figure 2.2.
To sum the key thought: epistemic norms map the normative actions, processes, and
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Figure 2.2: Supplying Normative Solutions

These graphs illustrate the relevance of restrictions on dynamics to ante hoc regulation. The
shaded ovals are epistemic states. Imagine the states on a plane, with the bottom closest to us
in time (our actual epistemic state at t), and the rest receding away from us (hence, appearing
smaller) in time. In the first and second pairs of illustrations, the arrows between the states
represent transitions among states. In the third, arrows represent distinct actions or processes
of state change that may lead to the same states. Dotted lines indicate irrationality with
respect to norms, N1 , N2 , and N3 . If a state has a dotted outline, it’s irrational according
to N1 . If an arrow is dotted in the second pair of graphs, then it’s irrational according
to N2 . In the third pair of graphs, dotted arrows  thin arrows  thick arrows according
to (the restriction defined by) N3 , where the latter is a norm restricting processes rather
than transitions. The idea is that, where a (relatively simple) norm N restricts epistemic
states (by attributing flat out rationality or irrationality), an agent, looking forward from
her state at t can use these restrictions to see what future states, transitions, and processes
are verboten or not with respect that norm (or to see what the ranking is). This is (a
visual representation of) the kind of information that enables the substitution of normative
courses of epistemic action in the Dual Processes/Default Interventionism Model. From a
given state, N1 tells us what future potential states are ruled in and which are ruled out. N2
tells us which potential future transitions are ruled in and which are ruled out. N3 tells us
which processes are to be preferred over the others at future states. Were an agent to halt
her heuristic processes at the bottom most state and search for a normative course of action,
each of these norms gives her an an array of potential solutions to the planning problem of
complying with Ni .
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successor states to each state, but they can only do this if they define restrictions. If there
were no restriction on (e.g.) states or actions correlated to each norm, they couldn’t do
this work. Suppose that there were no restrictions associated with any Ni . Then, from the
perspective of the bottom-most state, there is no structure that distinguishes the rational
or rationally preferable states from those that aren’t. The same holds for the transitions,
actions, and processes. If there is such a structure, it is equivalent in verdicts to some
restriction on dynamics. The availability of this information about an agent’s library of
available actions enables the substitution of normative courses of epistemic action.
Now, the argument could fail if there were some way to blindly guide epistemic practice
in response to post hoc evaluation. Consider a trial and error model of how post hoc evaluation could result in ante hoc regulation. Let a1 , ..., an be some set of epistemic changes expansions, contractions, and revisions of full belief, let’s say. Let A1 , ..., Am be a set of assertions. Suppose that a reasoner has a multi-track disposition in which conditions A1 , ..., Am
comprise the conditions of characteristic manifestation, a1 , ..., an comprise the characteristic
manifestations, and there is some way of mapping the Aj to the ai that captures the tracks
of the disposition.25 Suppose that there is an epistemic norm, N , that says if A5 holds, then
a4 is a rationally permissible belief change, but that if A5 and A9 , a4 is rationally impermissible. Suppose further that, upon carrying out an action, the reasoner can perform post hoc
evaluations, and these post hoc evaluations modify the disposition, weakening or strengthening connections between conditions of manifestation or even inhibiting or disinhibiting the
disposition. In particular, suppose that when the reasoner carries out a4 when A5 and A9
hold, and she reflects on this performance, she gets a negative post hoc evaluation that,
over time, inhibits the disposition to execute a4 when she recognizes that A5 and A9 hold.
Alternately, suppose that verdicts of rational permissibility strengthen dispositions to carry
out some Ai under the appropriate Aj .
Given this model, it might seem as though post hoc evaluations are all we need in order
25

See [249, 51] for the gist of the terminology deployed, here.
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to correct reasoning processes. After all, if one’s disposition initially dictates doing a4 under
A5 , but post hoc evaluation reveals that this is an error and inhibits the future disposition to
do a4 when A5 and A9 hold, one will come to do (or avoid) exactly what the norm requires.
While this would obviate the need for deliberate ante hoc regulation, it wouldn’t tell
against ante hoc regulation in general nor would it provide a role for epistemic norms such
that they would fail to specify restrictions on epistemic dynamics. First, this method just
is one of ante hoc regulation. Call the initial disposition d1 ; it is a disposition to act in
a way that violates norm N . After post hoc evaluation of reasoning that involves doing
a4 under condition A5 and A9 , the reasoner comes to deploy a new disposition, d2 . The
disposition d2 is characterized by the rule: If A5 and A9 , then don’t execute a4 ! The reasoner
has developed an internalized plan of epistemic action that adheres to norm N . The trial
and error mechanism for revision of dispositions just is a case of using epistemic norms to
control one’s future epistemic actions in a way that adheres with the norm in question. It
is of course, not a mechanism that enables knowing adherence with norms. Second, post
hoc evaluation itself requires that epistemic norms divide epistemic factors into rational and
irrational subsets or otherwise impose an ordering on them. From the definition of restrictions
on epistemic dynamics, it follows that even norms useful only for post hoc evaluation specify
restrictions on epistemic dynamics. Finally, the direct observation of deliberate ante hoc
regulation noted above suggests that this garden path is a dead end, for deliberate ante hoc
regulation is actual and ubiquitous.
2.4.2.6

Arguments for the D3 Corollary: Restrictions on Procedural Construction

Corollary Epistemic rationality norms restrict the construction of procedures; they determine how basic epistemic actions are to be sequenced, iterated, combined, chosen
among, conditioned on tests, avoided, reversed, and cautiously executed.
The arguments for the D3 corollary derive from a number of sources: (i) direct examina-
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tion of some classes of epistemic rationality norms, (ii) derivation from D3, (iii) derivation
from the requisite structure for epistemic regulation and knowing adherence/application, (iv)
derivation from the requisite structure for epistemic planning.
The fundamental assumption of the D3 Corollary is that epistemic processes can be
analyzed into actions (or executions of actions) and sequences thereof. Actions, including
epistemic actions, can be combined, sequenced, otherwise connected via procedural operations to generate processes. There is a basic set of procedural operations on basic actions.
Relational algebra is a formalism for the study of procedural operations on actions, represented as binary relations [28, 30]. The procedural operations of relational algebra include
sequential composition, iteration, parallel execution, choice, test, complement, reversal, and
fixed point. Perhaps the most familiar procedural operation is sequential composition, which
is an operation that orders actions in a linear sequence. In general, there are graph-theoretic
and set-theoretic structures associated to each procedural operation. We will see more on
this in later chapters. For now, procedural operations can be thought of as instructions.
Sequential composition instructs one to carry out an action a and then, come what may,
to carry out an action b. Other familiar procedural operations are associated with familiar
instructions: do a some finite number of times, do a while doing b, choose among a and b,
do a conditional on some condition C holding, avoid a, undo the effects of a, do a extra
carefully, etc.. These are associated in Table 2.2.
It’s tempting to think that the corollary follows trivially from the fact that epistemic
norms restrict epistemic processes. After all, epistemic processes are sequences of epistemic
actions, so if norms rule in sequence p and rule out sequence q, it’s plausible that they do
so on the basis of the ordering of the basic actions in p and q, respectively. But this is too
fast. It might be the case, for all that has been shown, that norms only rule out sequences
on the basis of distinguishing features of processes that are independent of the ordering of
epistemic actions that comprise them. For instance, norms might only rule out processes
because they result in prohibited transitions among states, because they require prohibited
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Table 2.2: Procedural Operations
Instruction
Procedural
Relational
Operation
Structure
Do a, then do b!
Sequential
Relational
composition “a; b”
Composition
Do a some finite n
Kleene Iteration “a∗”
Relational
times!
Composition
Comply with both the Parallel Execution
Intersection
instructions for a and
“a ∩ b”
b!
Select either a or b
Indeterministic Choice Union
(inclusive)!
“a ∪ b”
Avoid a, do anything
Complement “−a”
Complement
other than a!
Reverse the effects of
Reversal “x a”
Inverse of Relation
a!
Do a with minimal
Fixed Point “∇a”
Fixed Point
effects!
individual steps (irrespective of order), or because they lead to certain kinds of epistemic
states. So, there needs to be an argument for the claim that epistemic rationality norms
really do rule in some procedural operations on epistemic actions and rule out others on the
basis of the structure of the procedures. That some restriction on procedural construction
emerges can’t be merely incidental. Fortunately, several arguments are ready at hand.
Direct Examination of Procedural Norms First, one can simply point to both accepted and proposed normative and methodological standards that dictate or require particular procedural operations on epistemic actions. These are fairly numerous. Consider Table
2.3. To explicate just a handful of these examples, first, consider “argumentation methods”.
By this, I just mean the procedures that are explicated in logic and critical thinking texts
for analyzing and evaluating arguments. In standard textbook presentations, the following
processes typically have chapters or subchapters devoted to them: initial presentation of argument (excising it from its original spoken or written context; denote this with πp ), search
for enthymemes (πe ), mapping out putative evidential or support relations (πm ), formalizing
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the argument in some logical language (e.g., translating the argument into first-order logic;
πf ), testing putative support relations using formal and informal methods (e.g., deploying
semantic tableau methods to prove the arguments valid or invalid; πf t ), and evaluating
the truth of premises (πpr ). The chapters usually involve an array of algorithms, informal
procedures, or rules of thumb for structuring these processes.26
The norms that govern the overall process of analyzing and evaluating arguments dictate
particular sequences of these subprocesses. For instance, the requirement that one interpret
arguments charitably requires that one not rest one’s case on the evaluation of the strength
of the argument without having completed the search for enthymemes. That is, one can’t
complete the evaluation of argument well without searching for enthymemes. At the very
least, this suggests a ranking of possible procedures formed out of the foregoing subprocesses
that places the search for enthymemes prior to completion of testing support relations. That
is, the principle of charity requires that the process of analysis and evaluation of argument
take some procedural form that matches the sequence: ...; πe ; ...; πf t ; ....27 Thus, the norm
of charity divides these ways of constructing epistemic processes into relatively acceptable
and unacceptable subsets. Insofar as charity is a norm of epistemic rationality, the point is
made. But perhaps this is too capacious a sense of epistemic norms. More direct examples
are available.
The usual model-checking and proof construction procedures [82, 145, 200] involved in
the formal testing phase of argument evaluation themselves require fairly straightforward
sequential orderings of substeps. One must apply the non-branching rules to a tableaux
prior to applying the branching rules; else, in systems that countenance infinite trees, one’s
attempt at proving the validity of an argument will be vulnerable to erroneous failure to
close the tree [82]. Insofar as accurate verdicts on the validity of arguments shape require26

Among many others, see: [9, 109, 145, 159, 137, 203, 253]
Really, an algorithm for doing this would probably involve looping from formalization and testing procedures πf ; πf t back to πe ; a good test for whether or not one has charitably interpreted an argument is how
obvious it seems that the argument is invalid. If it’s trivially invalid, and your interlocutor is smart, you’re
probably being uncharitable!
27

CHAPTER 2. DESIDERATA: DYNAMICS AND NORMS

131

ments of rationality - either because accuracy is itself a norm of epistemic rationality or
because epistemic rationality conditions rationality of belief and inference on logical validity
- epistemic rationality divides ways of ordering steps of proof construction into relatively
acceptable and unacceptable subsets.
The main thought of both of these examples is that the results of an epistemic process can
depend on the ordering of epistemic actions and other procedural features of the construction
of a process. This is a familiar fact of epistemic life that is well-recognized in iterated
belief revision and DEL. It’s well-known that some ways of iterating belief revision functions
are utterly untenable.28 There are also dynamic paradoxes of belief revision, as Harman
[119, 121] points out. Given a limited set of available actions, it may be impossible to revise
one’s belief states out of an inconsistent state once one ends up at one. One of the sets of
driving observations for DEL is that some actions can obscure or reveal information. One
needn’t consider complex subterfuge to see this, as the revelation of information is readily
apparent in the basic PAL example of the muddy children in Chapter 1. Though those
cases were multi-agent cases, one can easily see the observation to single agent cases, as
in The Detective case. Performing some actions, for instance, makes information available
for inference. Obfuscation is also easy to see. One can perform actions that prevent later
epistemic actions from being feasible. If the detective, for instance, had made insulting
information about K available to both A and B, the deduction of K’s homebase location
wouldn’t have been possible. These cases show that getting to the right terminal state
can require the use of some subset of procedural sequences. Scientific practice reveals the
ubiquity of this. In order to identify a substance, one might need to destroy it by a chemical
identification process. This prevents other such processes from being carried out - at least
on the same sample. Finally, the explicit ordering of epistemic actions can be used as a
form of de-biasing strategy. There are cases in which, in order to suppress an unreliable
heuristic process from triggering, one simply has to prevent oneself from accessing some
28

Here, I have in mind Tennant’s Degeneracy results from [244].
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information. For instance, blind review of article submissions explicitly hides information
that can trigger biases. Additionally, there are cases in which one has to sequence the
ordering of tasks in order to avoid certain kinds of outcome. For instance, the sequencing of,
first, registration of hypotheses, and then the discrete separation of data gathering from data
analysis processes can be used to avoid some forms of p-hacking [126]. Insofar as epistemic
rationality norms divide outcomes into rational and irrational subsets (et al), these general
observations imply that epistemic rationality divides procedural constructions into rational
and irrational subsets.
The foregoing table of norms and methodological rules and the subsequent discussion
shows, if I’m right, that the procedural construction of epistemic processes is not a matter
of indifference from the epistemic perspective. First, some of these norms explicitly divide
processes into rational and irrational sets on the basis of the procedural operations out of
which they built. Thus, from the definition of restrictions on epistemic dynamics, there are
restrictions on procedural construction.29 Second, even if the static outcomes of processes are
the only features of normative relevance, the static outcomes often depend on the procedural
structure of processes. Thus, in such cases of dependence, the existence of restrictions on
static outcomes of processes implies the existence of restrictions on ways of constructing
processes out of actions. More, processes constructed in certain ways may be related to
normatively relevant outcomes in certain modal ways. As in the cases above, particular ways
of (e.g.) procedurally operating on actions may be reliable or even necessary for producing
(or avoiding) an outcome even if there are other processes that also generate that outcome.
Norms frequently dictate the execution of the reliable processes over unreliable processes that
converge, in some cases, on outcomes with the reliable process. Thus, even in the absence of
norms that directly specify restrictions on procedural construction, the norms that specify
restrictions on static outcomes indirectly specify restrictions on procedural construction,
and the structural restriction is not incidental. The restriction on procedural construction is
29

The next section spells this out.
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based on a dependence relation between the procedural structure and the epistemic outcomes
of the procedure.
Derivation from D3 In addition to what can be gleaned from the examples of procedural
norms in the foregoing sections, there is a straightforward derivation from D3:
1. Every restriction on processes is associated with a set of restrictions on procedural
construction.
2. Every epistemic rationality norm is associated with a set of restrictions on processes.
3. ∴ Every epistemic rationality norm is associated with a set of restrictions on procedural
construction.
The first premise is direct. Consider an arbitrary restriction on epistemic processes, R .
Note that epistemic processes generally break down into basic actions and sequences of basic
actions. At the very least, epistemic processes can be built from sequences of more basic
actions or processes, so all but indivisible processes break down this way. Sets of processes
may instantiate patterns of construction. All of the processes, p, in the set might contain
particular actions a or subprocesses q in a specific sequence, or they might be so formed
that, at a given point in a sequence, every process contains one element, pi , of a particular
set of subprocesses, {p1 , ..., pn }. Such sets of processes implicitly rule out any processes
not constructed according to these patterns, and these patterns can be described in terms
of procedural operations. In the first case, processes without a particular sequencing of
subprocesses are ruled out. In the latter, any processes without a choice among {p1 , ..., pn }
are ruled out. In the absence of any such procedural patterns, there is a general procedural
construction defined by any set of processes: choice over the set of token processes in the set.
Thus, for any set of rational processes in R , RP r , there is a corresponding division of ways
of building procedures out of actions and processes into rational and irrational sets. Thus,
by the definition of restrictions, if we can identify sets, S, of procedural constructions, then
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every restriction on processes defines a unique set of restrictions on procedural constructions
- the set of procedural constructions such that the processes in RP r match it.
Identify sets of procedural constructions with sequences of procedural operations on actions: sequencing, choices, iterations, etc.. A process, p, matches a procedural construction
iff there is a set of subprocesses, {p1 , ..., pn }, that, when interspersed with the sequence of
procedural operations, is identical to p. That is, a process matches a procedural construction
iff one can find a way of building p out of a set of subprocesses using the exact sequence
of procedural operations. This definition yields numerous sets of restrictions on procedural
constructions per restriction on processes.
The second premise is easier. Epistemic norms that take processes as objects straightforwardly define restrictions on processes. Moreover, the generation schemata from the D1
and D2 sections show how restrictions on processes can be generated from every restriction
on states or transitions. Thus, the schemata show how every norm that restricts any epistemic factor is associated with a set of restrictions on processes. This point is strengthened
in Chapter 4, where it is shown that for every restriction on states or transitions, there is
a restriction on processes from which the state and transition restriction can be read off.
From this fact, and the first premise, every norm can be seen to be associated with a set of
restrictions on procedural construction.
Epistemic Regulation and Planning Finally, the D3 corollary has independent support
from consideration of ante hoc regulation and epistemic planning in light of the examples
of norms that restrict procedural construction. First, restrictions on procedural construction are sometimes necessary for ante hoc regulation. In cases where epistemic outcomes
depend on procedures being constructed in certain ways (as in inductive rules, proof and
model construction procedures, numerous other formal methods involving algorithms for
the construction and manipulation of models, and de-biasing strategies), norms requiring
those epistemic outcomes derivatively require those procedural constructions. For instance,
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whether a semantic tableaux procedure gives a correct answer about the validity of an argument depends on how one orders one’s choice of rules to apply. The requirement that
one get right answers entails a requirement that one use procedures constructed with certain
sequential compositions of rule applications and not others. This point applies to nearly all
of the examples in the table of procedural requirements above.
Second, connecting the foregoing to epistemic planning further strengthens the inference
to the D3 corollary.
1. Ante hoc regulation requires epistemic planning.
2. Solutions to planning problems are restrictions on procedural construction.
3. ∴ Ante hoc regulation requires restrictions on procedural construction.
Ante hoc regulation is the process of solving epistemic planning problems. The solution to
an epistemic planning problem is a set of plans that each suffice to achieve the goal state
determined by some set of epistemic norms. A set of plans that achieve a goal state just is a
restriction on procedural construction because plans are themselves sets of instructions built
out of procedural operations of conditional choice, sequencing, etc. over a set of elements
of the action library. Thus, insofar as ante hoc regulation requires solutions to epistemic
planning problems, ante hoc regulation requires that there be restrictions on procedural
construction. These restrictions will be specified by the norms that define the goal state.
Typically, only a subset of possible plans constructible from the action library will reach
the goal state. As noted above, this is often due to the way the plans are constructed, the
ordering of the subtasks in the plan, the proper conditionalizing of choices in the plan, and
so on. So, the goal state, in concert with the features of the constructible plans, divides
the set of procedures into those that are effective for reaching the goal state and those not.
Insofar as the goal state is defined by the requirements of some set of norms, those norms
indirectly restrict procedural constructions.
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Discussion

In arguing for D3 and its corollary, two of the motivating questions of this chapter were given
tentative answers. First, one kind of information that epistemic rationality norms carry was
identified as restrictions on epistemic dynamics. Certain kinds of restrictions are equivalent,
in many respects, to programs. That is, these kinds of restrictions can, when put in the
proper framework (i.e., thinking of epistemic dynamics with LTSs), be seen to be equivalent
to rules or functions from conditions or states to instructions to perform an action. Given
the insights from action logic and deontic logic [261, 174, 175, 89] that link imperatives and
deontic operators to programs, it’s frankly unclear how to answer the motivating question
about what information norms carry. It seems quite clear, though, that norms carry some
program-like information, and that this information can be translated back and forth from
imperatives to procedural and imperatival claims.
Second, D3 found support in a certain conception of the cognitive role of epistemic
norms that requires more than mere post hoc evaluation. The view defended was essentially
a version of the idea that, whatever else epistemic norms do, they are to play a role in
regulating epistemic cognition (as it is shaped by voluntary epistemic actions). Else, they
are without any serious use or value..
Which is all to say that I side with the idea that epistemology is in the business of offering
epistemic advice, and not merely describing regularities about epistemic practice. Of course,
serious descriptions of epistemic practice are frequently exactly what is needed for devising
epistemic advice. See means-ends epistemology [220], its formal output in formal learning
theory [221, 183, 142, 140], or the “technological” side of naturalized epistemology [204]
for interesting insights on this note. The basic thought is that, given regularities among
(e.g.) the structure of the processes we use to generate our best models of the world and
the features of those models, guidelines that references those regularities can be written for
individual practice or performance improvement.
All of the foregoing is compatible with certain forms of normative anti-realism, like
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Gibbard’s plan [98] or norm [97] expressivism or Field’s epistemic relativist-expressivism
[77, 78, 79] as well as the forms of realism that act as a foil to either of these views. More
precisely, these forms of normative anti-realism commit to at least the two theses that: (i)
there is no uniquely best or uniquely correct set of epistemic norms, and (ii) epistemic norms,
whatever they are, are not objective and mind-independent. There is really no reason - implicit or explicit in the account of epistemic rationality and its norms thus far developed to rule out either (i) and (ii) or their negations.
There isn’t sufficient space to explore this suite of questions. It’s worth nothing, however,
that the answers to the two motivation questions are highly complementary. Restrictions
on epistemic dynamics are exactly the kind of information of information structure that is
useful from the first-person perspective of epistemic regulation and epistemic planning. Some
models of epistemic regulation require just the kind of information supplied by restrictions
on epistemic dynamics. So, there is a sort of mutual reinforcement. That restrictions on
epistemic dynamics are associated to epistemic norms makes it plausible that epistemic norms
are useful in ante hoc regulation and epistemic planning. That regulation and planning are
essential functions of epistemic norms makes it plausible that epistemic norms are associated
with restrictions on epistemic dynamics.
Finally, D1 and D2 supply some clarifying information for D3; epistemic norms must
specify restrictions on transitions and processes as well as on states. And this effects a bit of
a simplification on the explanation of the Processes and Constraints problems. The thought
is simply that, without tools to represent processes as distinct from transitions, the set of
restrictions on processes cannot be distinct from the set of restrictions on transitions.

2.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, the second half of a core or minimal account of epistemic rationality and its
norms was given; the first half was given in the form of the must-solve Processes and Con-
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straints problems (and the knock-on problems they raise) for models of epistemic dynamics.
The second half of the theory takes the form of principles D1-D3, a set of observations
about the objects of epistemic rationality, the kinds of information that its norms convey,
and the function of epistemic norms in epistemic cognition. As parts of a minimal theory,
these observations were argued to characterize desiderata or even criteria of adequacy on
accounts (esp. formal frameworks) of epistemic rationality. The following three chapters
will argue that the protocol-theoretic account of epistemic rationality norms (via PLEN)
uniquely satisfies these criteria.

Part II
PLEN: the Protocol-theoretic Logic of
Epistemic Norms
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Chapter 3
The Definition and Interpretation of
PLEN
Introduction: PLEN
This chapter introduces PLEN, the protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms. PLEN is a
formal framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic rationality norms based on
propositional dynamic logic. Its primary philosophical innovation is the deployment of protocols to analyze procedural epistemic rationality norms, and its primary technical innovation
is the deployment of paths and graphs to the interpretation of protocol expressions.
As a framework, PLEN isn’t a complete or final model of epistemic norms. Rather, PLEN
is a basic formalism that is defensible (re: solving the Framework Problem) and compatible
with a wide array of modifications. Diverse theories, tailored to specific theoretical interests
or commitments, can be built up from the basic formalism by adding restrictions or revisions
to its semantic structures, extending its languages, or modifying its logic. These extensions
of PLEN can then be studied and applied.1
1

The developmental approach of PLEN is modeled after Logical Dynamics, an interdisciplinary research
programme aimed at studying rational agency via logical tools and methods. The approach is focused on
building a general technical framework that accommodates many different formalisms for thinking about
the target systems rather than providing a specific theory to defend come what may. Dynamic logics are,
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The core of the PLEN framework consists of (i) a jointly defined pair of languages; a
syntactic system that represents procedural operations out of which protocols are composed
and a modal propositional language encoding assertions about protocols, (ii) a semantics that
simultaneous interprets both languages via abstract models of epistemic dynamics, and (iii)
derivation systems that codify valid rules for reasoning about various aspects of protocols,
including equivalence, execution, and the effects of execution. Informally, these things are,
respectively, taken to represent the procedural contents of epistemic rationality norms and
the fragment of natural language that embeds propositions about them, a model of epistemic
dynamics that interprets those contents in terms of restrictions on dynamics, and a logic of
epistemic rationality norms and propositions about them.
The plan for the chapter is straightforward. First, the languages and semantics of the
PLEN framework will be defined. They are then discussed in the order in which they were
introduced. Second, a derivation system for PLEN is defined, briefly explored, and shown
to be sound. Third, the interpretation of PLEN as a formalism for representing epistemic
rationality norms is explicitly outlined. The general theme of this part of the chapter is
laying the groundwork for showing that PLEN is a philosophically defensible answer to the
Framework Problem.
of course, central to the toolkit of Logical Dynamics, but they are just one kind of formalism deployed in
the field. The programme is organized around a core, abstract model of dynamics that is perhaps best
represented with labeled transition systems. Distinct formalisms, diverse in their expressive and logical
properties and tailored to specific theoretical interests or commitments, are built around these core models,
studied, and applied. One can, for instance, study classes of labeled transition systems with the languages
of PDL, modal logics, deontic logics, temporal logics, or with fragments of first-order logic. Such study has
unearthed interesting technical results such as, for instance, the fact that standard PDL can be translated
into the two-variable fragment of FOL [30]. See [28, 30, 34] for the core statement of the programme and
numerous important developments. See also [139, 114, 30, 74, 131] for seminal contributions, and [113] for
a comprehensive textbook presentation on dynamic logic.
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PLEN: The Formal Framework

PLEN has the structure of a logic.2 It’s fundamentally a triple of a syntax, semantics, and
proof or derivation system. The syntactic system contains a language of protocol expressions, PP LEN , and a language of propositional and modal, dynamic, and epistemic formulae,
LP LEN . PP LEN defines the compositional structure of protocols, which encodes instructions
for (inter alia) combining, iterating, sequencing, and choosing among basic epistemic actions
and procedures. That is, PP LEN codifies the procedural operations out of which complex
procedures are formed out of a repertoire of basic actions [30]. The protocol expressions
represent the procedural content of epistemic rationality norms - the instructions for correct
epistemic action that those norms dictate. LP LEN encodes a fragment of natural language the fragment that expresses a partial theory of epistemic norms or at least, a partial theory
of the procedural information that they carry. LP LEN deploys a range of dynamic epistemic
operators and protocol connectives to embed protocol expressions into propositional and
modal expressions. The resulting dynamic epistemic expressions encode statements about
the procedural content of norms, about the conditions of application or preconditions of
norms, and about the outcomes, effects, or postconditions of complying with norms on the
content of an agent’s epistemic states as well as on the world.
The semantics is defined over the set of epistemic directed graphs (EDGs). EDGs are
structures for modeling the possible epistemic trajectories or paths of particular epistemic
agents through a space of possible epistemic states. They are basically labeled directed multigraphs, allowing multiple, distinct edges between the same pair of states or nodes. EDGs
form the basis of interpretations for the syntax. Each protocol expression is associated with
execution conditions that determine sets of paths through epistemic state space for each
EDG, and, given that EDGs can be used as models of the dynamics of agents, each protocol
is associated with particular restrictions on the dynamics of agents. The expressions of
2

More precisely, PLEN has the structure that basically follows the blueprint of Propositional Dynamic
Logic (PDL) [113, 30] but with elaborations that resemble the path models of Process Logic (PL) [114] and
the basic protocols of Epistemic Protocol Logic (EPL) [184].
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LP LEN are given truth conditions that are jointly defined with the execution conditions for
protocols.
The plan for this section is to define the formalism first, with relatively minimal discussion, and then explore it informally. First, the syntax is defined and very briefly discussed.
Then, the semantics is defined and briefly discussed. These subsections are followed by
a more elaborate discussion of the formalism and the philosophical interpretation of the
formalism.

3.1.1

Syntax I: Simultaneously Defined Languages

3.1.1.1

Protocol Language

First, define the language of protocols, PP LEN .
Definition: Protocol Language PP LEN The expressions of PP LEN are protocols or protocol expressions. Let Π0 = {a1 , ..., an } be a finite set of basic/atomic procedures,
basic/atomic actions, or atomic protocol expressions. Let P rot = {; , ∩, ∪, ∗} and
P rot+ = {(−)?, −, x, ∇} be distinct sets of control operators. Let A be a metavariable for an expression of LP LEN , which is defined simultaneously with PP LEN . Let π
with subscripts be metavariables for protocols; I will omit subscripts when unnecessary.
Define PP LEN in Backus-Naur form:

Π0 | π1 ; π2 | π1 ∩ π2 | π1 ∪ π2 | πi ∗ | (A)? | −πi |x πi | ∇πi

Let ΠC be the set of all complex protocol expressions formed by the syntax above. Then
PP LEN = Π0 ∪ ΠC . Complex protocol expressions correspond to natural ways of building
complex procedures out of basic actions. P rot is the set of regular control operators. These
take protocol expressions and generate complex protocols. A protocol formed only with regular control operators is a regular protocol. P rot+ is the set of nonstandard control operators.
The nonstandard control operators generate complex protocols that, by the execution rules
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defined below, identify executions of their subprotocols (the elements of PP LEN that are
composed inside a protocol expression using control operators) or entirely distinct protocols
on the basis of graph-theoretic features of EDGs. This will become clearer in discussing the
execution rules.
The expression π1 ; π2 is the sequential composition of π1 and π2 ; the procedure that
requires doing π1 and then immediately doing π2 from the state reached by π1 . The expression
π1 ∩π2 is the parallel execution of π1 and π2 ; the procedure that requires doing π1 while doing
π2 . The expression π1 ∪ π2 is the indeterministic choice among π1 and π2 ; the procedure that
requires indeterministic selection from among π1 and π2 (including the execution of both).
The expression π∗ is the iteration of π any number of times; the procedure that requires
doing π any n times sequentially.
The expression (A)? is a test for A; a unique protocol that checks the current state for the
truth of A. The expression −π is the complement of π; the procedure comprising execution
of the set of protocols other than π incompatible with doing π. The expression x π is the
reversal of π; the procedure that reverses the effects that are brought about by doing π. The
expression ∇π is the fixed point of π; the version of π that makes no changes to the world
or to any epistemic states.
Sequential composition, parallel execution, and choice are binary, the rest are unary,
and PP LEN is recursively enumerable. Complex protocols can be composed to create more
complex protocols. Parentheses can be used to clarify structure. For example, the following
are well-formed protocols:
• (π1 ; π2 ); (π3 ; π4 )
• (π1 ; π2 ∗); (π3 ; π4 )∗
• π1 ; (π2 ; (π3 ; π4 ))
• ((π1 ; π2 ); (π3 ; π4 )) ∪ (π4 ∩ (π6 ∪ π1 ))
• −((π1 ; π2 ); (π3 ; π4 ))
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• (A)?; ((π1 ; π2 ); (π3 ; π4 ))
• x ((π1 ; π2 ); (π3 ; π4 ))
• −(π1 ; π2 ); (π3 ; π4 )
• ((A)?; (π1 ; π2 )); (π3 ; π4 )
• x (π1 ; π2 ); (π3 ; π4 )
The protocols, π1 ; π2 ; π3 ; π4 , π1 ∪ π2 ∪ π3 , and π1 ∩ π2 ∪ π3 are each ambiguous, but for
any complex regular protocol formed from multiple iterations of a single control operator,
this won’t matter. For example, (π1 ; π2 ); (π3 ; π4 ) and π1 ; (π2 ; (π3 ; π4 )), while syntactically
distinct protocols, are equivalent (in ways to be explicated), as are (π1 ∪ π2 ) ∪ (π3 ∪ π4 ) and
π1 ∪(π2 ∪(π3 ∪π4 )), and (π1 ∩π2 )∩(π3 ∩π4 ) and π1 ∩(π2 ∩(π3 ∩π4 )). In general, from a semantic
perspective, each of the binary control operators is associative, while parallel execution and
choice are commutative, as well. Permutations on the order of constituent protocols thus
make no semantic difference for choice and parallel execution, though, obviously, they do for
sequential composition.
As for intuitively reading off what each protocol expression says, protocols can be read
as programs, recipes, or instructions for carrying out complex procedures that are formed
out of basic actions. If an atomic protocol expression, π, is an instruction of the form “Do
π!”, then:
• π1 ; π2 reads “Do π1 , then do π2 !”
• π1 ∩ π2 reads “Do π1 concurrently with π2 !” or perhaps “Do π1 while doing π2 !”
• π1 ∪ π2 reads “Do π1 or do π2 !”
• π∗ reads “For some n ≥ 0, do π n times!”
• (A)? reads “Test for A!”
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• −π reads “Do anything but π, and don’t do π!”
• x π reads “Undo the changes wrought by π!”
• ∇π reads “Do π in a way that doesn’t change anything!”
Consequently, protocols formalize programs. In particular, the most important programming
and decision structures can be expressed in PLEN. Here is a small sampling:
• Conditional Choice If A, do π1 ; else, do π2 :: ((A)?; π1 ) ∪ ((¬A)?; π2 )
• Generalization of Conditional Choice If A, do π1 ; if B, do π2 :: ((A)?; π1 ) ∪ ((B)?; π2 )
• Guarded Iteration While A, do π :: ((A)?; π)∗; (¬A)?
• Guarded Repetition Repeat π until A :: (π; (¬A)?)∗; (A)?
This will be a point that I return to in arguing for PLEN’s theoretical adequacy with respect
to epistemic norms.
3.1.1.2

Propositional Language

Now, define the propositional language, LP LEN .
Definition: Propositional Language LP LEN Let AF orm = {Pi , Qi , ..., }, Conn = {∧, ∨, →, ≡, ¬},
Op = {[x], hxi , , b, d}, P op {↔, &, /, M }. Define LP LEN in Backus-Naur form:
• AF orm | π ↔ π 0 | π & π 0 | π / π 0 | M (π)
• [π] A | hπi A | A | b(A) | d(A)
• A ∧ B | A ∨ B | A → B | A ≡ B | ¬A
The set of propositional parameters or atomic formulae is AF orm. The connectives in Conn
connect formulae of LP LEN in a standard, propositional fashion. The operators in Op take
formulae of LP LEN as arguments. The operators [x] and hxi embed protocol expressions
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and operate on any formulae of LP LEN to form expressions about protocol executability and
postconditions. The expression [π]A says that A is a strong postcondition of π; A is true
after any way of doing π. The expression, hπi A, says that A is a weak postcondition of π;
A is true after some way of doing π. The special case, hπi >, encodes the executability of π.
That is, hπi > says that π is executable (at the current state); it can be carried out from the
current state.
The operators , b, d are pretty standard modal or epistemic operators, taking any formulae of LP LEN . A stands in for “Necessarily, A.” The epistemic operators b and d stand in for
belief and disbelief or acceptance and rejection; b(A) reading “A is fully believed/accepted”
and d(A) reading “A is fully disbelieved or rejected”.
The connectives in P op - ↔, &, /, and M - take only protocol expressions as arguments.

The first three connectives are binary and connect protocol expressions directly to form
statements about protocols. The expression, π ↔ π 0 , tells us that the protocols π and π 0
are procedurally equivalent at the current state, i.e., that, from the current state, π and π 0
instruct us to carry out exactly the same processes of epistemic state change. This will be a
notion more fully articulated below. The expression, π & π 0 , tells us that π and π 0 converge
in their dictates at the current state; there is some process that complies with both π and

π 0 , so one can comply with or execute both at once. The expression, π / π 0 , tells us that
the protocols diverge in their instructions at the current state; there is process that complies

with one and not the other. The formulae (π ↔ π 0 ) ∧ [π]A and (π & π 0 ) ∧ hπi A, respectively,

read as “π and π 0 result in equivalent changes, and A always results from π” and “π and π 0

result in equivalent changes, and there is a way of carrying out π that results in A being
true”.
Finally, M names a temporary methodology, the set of norms that an agent endorses
at a given point. M (π) expresses methodological inclusion; π is part of the methodology
endorsed at the current state. Formally, M (π) is unary, M names a subset of PP LEN ,
and the expression says that π is an element of M . Methodological expressions other than
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those of inclusion, expressions about the postconditions or preconditions of methodologies
in their entirety, can be encoded by explicitly replacing M with the nondeterministic choice
or parallel execution of each protocol in M , depending on the structure of the methodology
and the structure of the claim.
3.1.1.3

Remarks on PLEN’s Languages

PLEN’s languages encode fragments of natural language that can be used to talk about
epistemic dynamics and epistemic norms from both “internal” and “external” perspectives.3
This distinction between these perspectives isn’t quite rigorous, but, roughly speaking, the
internal perspective on epistemic dynamics (respectively, norms) is focused on the evolution
of the subjective part of epistemic dynamics. Internal languages exclusively represent what
is going on inside an agent’s epistemic states and how this content changes over time. AGM,
for instance, takes an internal perspective; it doesn’t describe what is going on in the world
represented by the content of an epistemic state, it describes how idealized models of epistemic states (ideally) evolve under specific kinds of change. There are no actions in AGM
that change the non-epistemic facts in the world. A model of epistemic dynamics takes an
external perspective if it represents the state of the world co-evolving with the content of
epistemic states. External perspectives can tell us about what’s going on outside an agent’s
head. Languages that contain statements about the truth or falsity of an agent’s beliefs or
about the actual effects on the world of the agent’s actions take external perspectives.
PP LEN encodes external information about epistemic norms and epistemic dynamics.
As remarked on above, the syntactic form of protocol expressions encodes the procedural
information of epistemic norms. This procedural information specifies (i) the procedural
commitments that an agent makes in employing a norm or complying with it, and (ii) the
processes and sequences of actions that count as complying with a norm.
3
This distinction is radically different from that between exogenous and endogenous logics of programs
or actions. The latter distinction is strictly defined: if programs are explicit in the language of a logic, then
it’s exogenous. If programs are not explicit in the language, then it’s endogenous.
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LP LEN encodes both internal and external information about norms and epistemic dynamics. On the internal side, the epistemic operators, b and d, describe the content of an
epistemic state, and these scope over any other formulae of LP LEN . Importantly, LP LEN
introduces no indices for epistemic operators - it’s a single-agent system. The formulae of
LP LEN can only describe the internal states of a single agent. On the external side lie formulae that are not embedded in the scope of a b or d. Some of these may describe changes
to the external world that are wrought by courses of epistemic action. Weak postconditions
- formulae of the form hπi A - state the effects of complying with epistemic norms on the
content of epistemic states and on the external world. Preconditions can be stated in the
form of conditionals, A → hπi >, hπi > → A, that state conditions under which norms can
be complied with. The various “protocol operators” that form complex expressions out of
protocol expressions are strictly external. They describe structural and procedural relations
between protocols. For instance, π1 ↔ π2 tells us that these two protocols can be carried
out in exactly the same ways, and formulae of the form [π1 ] hπ2 i > and [π1 ]¬ hπ2 i > tell us,
respectively that π1 enables or disables π2 .
LP LEN formulae can freely combine internal and external information. The expression
hπi (A ∧ b(B)) says that π can be carried out in such a way that A is true and B is believed.
Given that contents of epistemic states can be expressed in LP LEN , preconditions can also
state what kinds of things an agent must know about the world or about the norms themselves in order to carry them out. The contents of an agent’s beliefs about the preconditions,
postconditions, equivalence, convergence, and divergence relations among, and even execution conditions of her own norms can be encoded by embedding these formulae of LP LEN in
expressions over which b and d have scope.
Importantly, the internal and the external in LP LEN , as in life, can come apart. LP LEN
can describe the fact that an agent mistakenly thinks she can comply with a norm under
some conditions; b(hπi >) is not equivalent to hπi >. More, agents can, after executing protocols, also come to learn things about protocols: (π1 ↔ π2 ) ∧ hπ1 i (b(π1 ↔ π2 )). Intuitively,
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this reads “Protocols π1 and π2 are equivalent and doing π1 can result in believing this fact.”
Protocols can function as “hard information events”, revealing information to agents infallibly: [π]b(A). They can be softer, revealing less reliable information or less reliably revealing
information to agents: hπi b(A∨B ∨...) or hπi b(A). They can also be obfuscating events, obscuring ([π]¬b(A)) or preventing access to information (given a standardly defined dual to ,
♦, then [π]¬♦b(A)), or enabling or disabling possible informational actions: [π]¬ h(A)?i >,
[π1 ]b(A) → ([π2 ]¬ hπ1 i >), [π1 ] hπ2 i b(A). These well-known and important dynamic epistemic actions can thus be formalized in ways that mirror their familiar formalization (re:
DEL [65]).

3.1.2

Structures: Epistemic Directed Graphs

The semantics of PP LEN and LP LEN are defined by simultaneous definition of execution
rules for protocol expressions and truth conditions for propositional expressions. The key
objects are graph-like structures called epistemic directed graphs (EDGs). These function
in PLEN’s semantics as Kripke Frames do in modal logics, labeled transition systems do
in PDL, or path models do in Process Logic (PL). Epistemic directed graphs represent the
possible epistemic states of a reasoner at a time along with all of the possible changes and
trajectories of change of epistemic state that the reasoner’s repertoire of actions, procedures,
and processes could take her through. It is in relation to these that protocols, as objects
representing the procedural information given by epistemic norms, are interpreted.
The class of EDGs is a class of structures isomorphic to labeled directed multi-graphs.
EDGs are graphs, which is to say that they are sets of nodes connected by edges or n-ary
relations. In a directed graph, the relations are ordered. Letting s1 and s2 be nodes, if an
edge, e, links them, the idea is that you may be able to get from s1 to s2 but not from s2 to s1 .
The labeling tells you what action for moving from s1 to s2 the edge represents. Normally,
edges in graphs are defined by their endpoints, the nodes they connect. In a multigraph,
multiple edges may link the same pair of nodes. This is important for PLEN’s philosophical
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prospects, especially regarding D1 through D3.
The correlate of semantic conditions for protocol expressions will be execution conditions.
This chapter will introduce procedural execution conditions in order to interpret PP LEN and
LP LEN . Execution conditions will be defined in terms of edges and paths. Edges are sets
of ordered triples, hs, π, s0 i where the middle term is the label. Paths are sequences of
concatenated edges. For the purposes of PLEN, the middle terms of edges will be protocol
expressions. The semantics of PLEN will correlate edges with each atomic protocol and
n-ary relations or paths with each complex protocol.
Each EDG will act as a model or an interpretation for expressions of PP LEN , on the basis
of which truth conditions can be defined for expressions of LP LEN . Before defining these
conditions, I define the constituent parts of EDGs. As in all epistemological theories [91, 86],
PLEN analyzes epistemic states and epistemic dynamics. Structures representing these are
the essential components of EDGs.
3.1.2.1

Epistemic States

First, epistemic states. PLEN requires machinery to represent epistemic states, their content,
and their relations to the world, and, eventually to epistemic dynamics.
Definition: Epistemic States Let W be a finite, non-empty set, W = {w1 , ..., wn }. Each
element of W is an epistemic state.
The most important part of an epistemic state is its content: the epistemic judgments an
agent makes and the propositions or information toward which those attitudes are held.
Formally:
Content States Define a set of ordered triples, C ⊆ P (LP LEN ) × P (LP LEN ) × P (PP LEN ).
Each element of C is a content state.
Call the first term of a given such triple, X, the second term of the triple, Y , and call
the third term ΠM . The acceptance set, X, is a syntactic representation of the statements
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of LP LEN that an epistemic agent accepts or (fully) believes, these terms being used, for
now, interchangeably. The rejection set, Y , is a syntactic representation of the statements
of LP LEN that an agent rejects or (fully) disbelieves. The intent of ΠM is to encode a
methodology, the temporary epistemic rationality norms that an agent endorses or employs.
For each epistemic state, there is corresponding content. Define a function from W into
C to assign content to each epistemic state. Formally:
Content Function Let all functions, c : W −→ C, be content functions.
Call c(w) the content state of w. For brevity, epistemic states will be denoted with w where
it isn’t necessary to note c(w). In discussing the graph-theoretic properties of EDGs, for
instance, content states will frequently drop out of the picture.
To flesh out PLEN’s external approach to epistemic dynamics, add valuations for each
epistemic state:
Valuations Define valuations vw (P ) : W × AF orm −→ {0, 1} as functions from states and
propositional parameters (or atomic formulae) of LP LEN to the values 0 and 1, with
vw (>) = 1 for all w ∈ W .
Valuations are standard. Each pair of a valuation and an epistemic state combines, at a time,
a representation, c(w), of the key parts of an agent’s epistemic judgments and methodology
with a (basic) representation of the state of the world, vw . Valuations are clearly useful for
deploying EDGs as models of the languages of PLEN; we need some way to interpret the
atomic sentences of LP LEN . Moreover, they enable the representation of the co-evolution of
epistemic state and state of the world. An epistemic action at w may transition a system to
the epistemic state w0 in a way that changes one, both, or neither the content, c(w) = c(w0 ),
nor the non-epistemic state of the external world, vw = vw0 .
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Epistemic Dynamics

Second, epistemic dynamics. Actions, processes, and procedures can change epistemic states
and states of the world. PLEN requires machinery to represent this. We start with two basic
parts.
Transitions Each ordered pair of epistemic states, hw, w0 i, is a transition.
Edges Ordered triples, hw, π, w0 i, are labeled transitions or (directed) edges.
Sets of transitions are binary relations. Sets of edges are labeled binary relations or ternary
relations. Note that each edge, e, is a triple, hw, π, w0 i. There is thus a first state, f irst(e),
and a last state, last(e). Call f irst(e) the root state of e and last(e) the terminal state of e.
Just so for transitions.
Transitions are possible changes of epistemic state that can be effected by actions, procedures, or processes. Edges link transitions with basic protocols; they represent the possible
changes of both the world (the truths delivered by valuations) and epistemic states (content
states) by execution of particular actions, procedures, or processes. In particular, a procedure
or action π may take an agent from w to w0 . Actions or procedures may be indeterministic:
from w, π may take an epistemic agent to w0 or any number of other states, w00 .
These pieces all come together to form epistemic directed graphs:
Definition: Epistemic Directed Graphs (EDGs) Let W be a set of epistemic states.
Let C be a set of triples of the form hX, Y, ΠM i. Let c and v be a content function
and a valuation function, respectively. Let Πg ⊆ Π0 . For each π ∈ Πg , map a set of
edges, Rπ , to it: Rπ ⊆ W × {π} × W . Define the atomic edge set R0 as the union of
each set of edges mapped to each π in Πg : R = Rπ1 ∪ ... ∪ Rπn for each πi ∈ Πg . The
atomic action set in g is the set R = {Rπ | ∃π(π ∈ Π0 ∧ Rπ ⊆ W × {π} × W )}. Then:
g is an EDG iff g = hW, C, Πg , R, R0 , c, vi.
Occasionally, there will be the need to refer to graphs and parts of graphs by name. Subscripted names will pick out objects in relation to specific graphs, e.g., Rg , vg . When we are
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Figure 3.1: An Epistemic Directed Graph

dealing with two EDGs, g and g 0 , rather than subscripts, the graphs and their parts may be
“primed”, e.g., W and W 0 , R and R0 . Generally, conventions that pick apart different graphs
will be self-explanatory. Alternately, dealing with graphs g1 and g2 , the subscripts directly
transfer: W1 and W2 will be the obvious sets of epistemic states, for instance. Where there
is no need for such devices, objects are defined with respect to some arbitrary graph, g, and
the labels for g drops out of consideration. Figure 3.1 presents a simple EDG.
The languages PP LEN and LP LEN coupled with the set of EDGs form the basic formal
framework of PLEN. This formal framework can generate different logics by using EDGs
as the basis for semantic interpretations of LP LEN . But interpreting LP LEN requires interpreting protocols. Protocols are not standard semantic items; like imperatives, they require
execution conditions rather than truth conditions, formal definitions of conditions under
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which the protocols are executed, carried out, or, in normative terms, complied with. There
are different strategies for interpreting protocols. In defining the logic of PLEN, EDGs are
deployed as path models [114]. The next section defines execution rules for protocols and
the truth rules for propositions of LP LEN by joint recursion.

3.1.3

Semantics: Procedural Execution Rules for PP LEN

Execution of protocols will be the formal equivalent of following or complying with the dictates of epistemic norms. Execution conditions defined recursively for protocol expressions in
PP LEN function analogously to truth conditions for the expressions of LP LEN . EDGs function
as path models in PLEN. That is, they interpret protocol expressions and the operators of
LP LEN in terms of procedural paths - concatenated sequences of edges he1 , ..., en i or, equivalently, alternating sequences of state and protocol expressions, e.g., hs1 , π1 , ..., πn−1 , sn i.
These paths are those that follow or comply with the protocols to which they are assigned.4
EDGs can be deployed as path models after the definition of several useful preliminary
devices. These include procedural paths, state-sequences, correspondence of paths, and inverting functions. Say that two edges, e = hw, π, w0 i and e0 = hw00 , π, w000 i, are parts of the
same graph, g. Then e and e0 are concatenated iff w0 = w00 . That is, if w0 = w00 , then
there is a path in g, ee0 = hw, π, w0 , π, w000 i. In other words, e and e0 are concatenated iff
last(e) = f irst(e0 ). Of course, this entails that v(w0 ) = v(w00 ) and c(w0 ) = c(w00 ). Then
define two kinds of paths on the basis of concatenation of edges:
Procedural Paths Finite sequences of edges, he1 , ..., en i, such that, for all ei where i < n,
4

As noted in earlier chapters, spelled out below with respect to solving the Processes and Constraints
problems, this is merely one possible way to use EDGs to interpret protocol expressions. Alternatives can
be defined in terms of binary relations or ternary relations. The decision to use paths is not justified in
full detail in this dissertation. See [135] for details. The basic thought is that, in order to define execution
conditions that make good philosophical sense, paths must be defined and employed in the definition of
execution rules. Else, execution conditions for parallel execution are exceptionally hard to define without
introducing EDGs with odd features that clash with the goal of parsimoniously representing epistemic dynamics. More, introducing paths and deploying EDGs as path models [114] for PLEN enables definitions of
powerful equivalence relations among protocols, and this plays a role in PLEN’s theoretical adequacy with
respect to D1-D3.
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last(ei ) = f irst(ei+1 ) are procedural paths. Let Pg be the set of all procedural paths in
an EDG, g.
State-Sequences Finite sequences of transitions, ht1 , ..., tn i, such that, for all ti where
i < n, last(ti ) = f irst(ti+1 ) are state-sequences. Let Sg ∗ be the set of all state sequences
in and EDG, g.
Denote procedural paths (hereon, “paths”) with p, q, r, subscripted, as necessary. Equivalently, procedural paths are linearly ordered sets of edges s.t.: if i < n, last(ei ) = f irst(ei+1 ).
Thus, edges are simply the smallest paths in any graph. The length of a path p is the number
of edges it contains: length(p) = |{ei | ei ∈ p}|. Denote state-sequences with seq(p), seq(q),
etc., with p, q, ... subscripted as necessary. This notation is suggestive for a reason that will
be fleshed out below.
Paths are finite sequences of edges, and more complex paths can be formed by concatenations of paths. Each path, p, has, in virtue of being finite, a root state, f irst(p) and
a terminal state last(p). That is, f irst(p) is the first state of the first edge in any finite
sequence of edges, p, and last(p) is the last state of the last edge in p. Paths q and r are
concatenated iff last(q) = f irst(r). Thus, we can denote longer paths as concatenations of
shorter paths. Say that p = qr iff p is the concatenation of q and r. Letting the length of
a path be the number of edges in it, if the length of q is n and the length of r is m, then
the length of qr is n + m. A special case of finite path is a path that contains loops; p is a
looping path iff p is such that, for some wi , wi appears more than once in the sequence of
states - p = hw1 , π1 , ..., wn , ..., wn , ..., πm , wm i.
An integrally useful notion is that of subpaths. Simply put, p is a subpath of q, p ≤ q,
iff p = he1 , ..., en i and q = hej , ..., ek i where j ≥ 1 and k ≤ n. Naturally, if p = qr, then both
q ≤ p and r ≤ p. Each edge composing a procedural path is a subpath of it. The subpath
relation is just a special case of the subgraph relation discussed below. It’s easy enough to
see: each path, p, is a non-branching graph. Thus, each subpath, qi , is just a subgraph of
p because the set of nodes in qi is a subset of the nodes in p and the set of edges in qi is a
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Figure 3.2: Procedural Paths and State Sequences

subset of edges in p. Using subpaths, looping paths can be defined as those paths such that
some subpath has identical root and terminal states. Note that if there is even one looping
path in a graph, then there is a countably infinite sequence, hp1 , ...i, of looping paths such
that for each pi and pi+1 , pi is a subpath of pi+1 .
The edges of each procedural path can be mapped to any segment of the natural numbers.
The resulting linear order on the edges induces an order on the states: f irst(ei+1 ) = last(ei )
for each ei and ei+1 in any edge. Consider two paths of identical length that execute the
same protocols, p = he1 ...en i and q = he01 ...e0n i. There is an ordering of the states in each
path, as shown in Figure 3.2. The sequencing of the edges in each path induces a sequencing
of the states in each path. Thus, there is a state-sequence, hw1 , w2 , w3 , w2 i, in the procedural
path p = hw1 , π1 , w2 , π2 , w3 , π3 , w4 i. Call this sequence of states seq(p). Formally: seq(p) =
hw1 , ..., wn i iff (i) p = he1 ...en i, and for all wi , wi+1 in seq(p), (ii) if wi = f irst(ei ), then
wi+1 = last(ei ), (iii) if wi = last(ei ), then wi = f irst(ei+1 ) and wi+1 = last(ei+1 ). Statesequences will be useful tools for analyzing parallel execution. Note that paths may loop;
for instance, in p = hw1 , π1 , w2 , π2 , w3 , π3 , w4 i, it may be the case that w2 = w4 .
An important concept for defining executions for parallel execution protocols is the notion
of correspondence of paths.
Correspondence Let p = he1 , ..., en i and q = he01 , ..., e0m i. Path p corresponds with q,
(p

q), iff n = m, and ∀i ≤ n(f irst(ei ) = f irst(e0i ) ∧ last(ei ) = last(e0i )).

Let Corr(p) be the paths in g that correspond to p. Abuse notation a bit to let p

q

r
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Figure 3.3: Inverting Functions

stand for the conjunction of p

q and q

r. Transitions and state-sequences can also

correspond with procedural paths. A state-sequence, seq(p) corresponds to a procedural
path, p, iff seq(p) is what results from removing all of the protocol labels from the edges
that compose p. Which is just to say that the definition of correspondence applies just as
well to state-sequences. A transition corresponds with a procedural path p or state-sequence
seq(p) iff the transition is the pair consisting of the first and terminal states of p and seq(p),
respectively.
To define the reversal control operator in a philosophically useful way, we will need
inverting functions:
Inverting Functions Let p ∈ Pg . Let ei = hw, π, w0 i iff ei = hw0 , π, wi. Define an inverting
function fI : Pg −→ Pg such that fI (p) = he1 , ..., en i iff p = hen , ..., e1 i.
The inverting functions output the reverse sequence of edges of their input path. See Figure
3.3 for an illustration. With the foregoing machinery, procedural execution conditions can be
defined for each complex protocol for each EDG.
Definition: Procedural Execution Rules Assign procedural execution sets, Pπ , to each
complex protocol, π by the following rules:
(Atomics) Pπ = Rπ for any π in Π0 .
(;) Pπ1;π2 = {p | p = qr ∧ q ∈ Pπ1 ∧ r ∈ Pπ2 }
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Say that a protocol π can be procedurally executed in g iff Pπ is non-empty. Call Pπ the
procedural executions of π in g. Now, the truth conditions can be defined for LP LEN .

3.1.4

Semantics: Procedural Truth Rules

Truth rules for the expressions of LP LEN can now be defined on the basis of the execution
rules.
Definition: Procedural Truth Rules (Base) w

A iff vw (A) = 1.

(Con) The standard rules for the truth-functions, ∨, ∧, ¬, →.
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A iff ∀w0 ∈ W (w

() w

A).

(b) w

b(A) iff c(w) = hX, Y, ΠM i, and A ∈ X.

(d) w

d(A) iff c(w) = hX, Y, ΠM i, and A ∈ Y .

(hπi A) w

hπi A iff ∃p s.t.: w = f irst(p), p ∈ Pπ and w

([π]A) w

[π]A iff ∀p s.t.: w = f irst(p), if p ∈ Pπ , then w

A.
A.

(π ↔ π 0 ) w

π ↔ π 0 iff ∀p, if w = f irst(p), p ∈ Pπ iff p ∈ Pπ0 .

(π & π 0 ) w

π & π 0 iff ∃p s.t.: w = f irst(p), p ∈ Pπ and p ∈ Pπ0 .

(π / π 0 ) w

π / π 0 iff ∃p s.t.: w = f irst(p) and either p ∈ Pπ /Pπ0 or p ∈ Pπ0 /Pπ .

(M (π)) w

M (π) iff c(w) = hX, Y, ΠM i, and π ∈ ΠM .

3.1.5

Remarks on PLEN

3.1.5.1

Execution and EDG Structure

The execution conditions determine the gross structures of EDGs in which protocols can be
executed. Figure 3.4 provides simple diagrams of the executions of complex protocols and
also illustrates this correlation of graph-theoretic structure and the syntactic form of protocol
expressions. Think of the labeled arrows as paths that execute each πi : The execution
conditions for sequential composition identify paths that are formed by concatenation of
executions of the sequentially composed protocols. Iterations provide the reflexive, transitive
closure of Pπ . More precisely, the definition of the execution rules for π∗ imply that Pπ∗ is
the reflexive, transitive closure of Pπ . The definition implies that every execution of π is an
execution of Pπ∗ and also that every execution of a sequence of π executions is an execution
of π∗. The n = 1 case ensures that every root state of any execution of π is reached by a
looping execution of π∗.
Parallel execution requires convergence not merely of the terminal states of executions
of each subprotocol, but correspondence between procedural executions. See Figure 3.5. In
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Figure 3.4: Induced Graph-theoretic Structure

The graph-theoretic structure of EDGs - the depth and width of the graphs, the vertex
degree of each node, and other, standard features (connectedness, Eulerianness) - covary
with their execution properties. From the fact that a protocol is executable at a state, we
can, by means of the execution rules, infer the structure of the graph and vice versa.
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Figure 3.5: Executability of Parallel Executions

Call the left graph g1 and the right one g2 . In g1 , (π1 ; π3 ) ∩ (π2 ; π4 ) can not be executed at
w. In g2 , it can be executed at w, and this fact determines a specific state-sequence for the
agent to follow.
contrast, the conditions for indeterministic choice pick out executions of either subprotocol
or may indicate a graph in which both are executable.
The form of test in PLEN is rather different from the form of test in PDL. The test in
PLEN is procedural; such tests require invariance of A over paths rather than invariance
over edges. Since they are defined over paths, they may end up being equivalent in some
ways to complex protocols in particular EDGs. The remarks for fixed point are similar. The
executions of a fixed point of π are simply the executions of π that make no difference to
the world or to any epistemic contents. This is useful for avoiding conflicts, as a fixed point
execution of π can never take one to a state at which π 0 is no longer executable due failure
of its preconditions.
Complementation of a protocol, π, is seeking out any protocols the execution of which
does not also suffice for any execution of π. That is, complementation doesn’t generate
a single protocol. Rather, as above, complementation generates an indeterministic choice
among protocols the executions of which are incompatible with the execution of π.
Procedural executions complicate the semantics of reversal of π by adding the inversion
function. As above, reversal requires information about the executions of π. The reversal of
π is the indeterministic choice among protocols that invert the changes of truth and content
wrought by π and do so, not simply by taking whatever path one can from the terminal
state resulting from π to the root state, but by traversing the inversion of the path that π
dictated.
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Truth in LP LEN

For each epistemic state, PLEN pairs representations of the content of epistemic states c(w)
and the true description of the state of the world v(w). All of the formulae of LP LEN are
interpreted relative to these structures. The necessity operator is fairly standard. It says
that A is true at every state in the EDG; every description of the world at any time that
can be reached in any epistemic process is one in which A is true.
The operators b(A) and d(A) can be interpreted as belief or acceptance (b) and disbelief
or rejection (d) at w. Note that the b and d operators are syntactic epistemic operators.5
Their behavior is only determined by the properties of sets of formulae - X and Y - rather
than the transition relations of EDGs, as might be the case in dynamic epistemic logics.
This allows theorists to focus on subsets of EDGs in which assumptions or stipulations
about the behavior of these operators hold. No assumptions about the behavior of these
operators is built into the system at this stage, so, if, for instance, one distinguishes between
belief and acceptance, conditions can be added to PLEN to sync the operators up to the
(best philosophical accounts of the) epistemic judgments one wants to model. For instance,
one might argue that the exclusion condition on acceptance holds: for all A ∈ LP LEN ,
¬b(A) ≡ d(A), while it doesn’t hold for belief. Similarly for the exhaustion condition: for
all A ∈ LP LEN , (b(A) ∨ d(A)).
Note that the valuation at w may act as an external check on the epistemic content state.
It may very well be the case that b(A) at w but A is false. No factivity condition was built
into the valuation of b(A). This enables protocols to fold in reliability considerations. A
protocol can, for instance, dictate increases or decreases in true belief.6
5

As in Konolige and Jago [148, 134]. It has similar advantages and disadvantages, such as the absence of
logical omniscience.
6
Though such work is omitted from the main text, metrics for protocols that increase true belief and
decrease error over time are easy enough to construct. Consider the easy case where valuations assign
semantic values to finitely many formulae at states. Let states s1 and s2 be such that s1 is the root state
of a process executing π and s2 is the terminal state. Then consider the formulae of LP LEN accepted at s1
or s2 . Let n be the cardinality of the set of all true accepted formulae at s1 , and let m be the cardinality
of the set of all true accepted formulae at s2 . If m > n, π results in an absolute increase in true belief, if
n > m, then π results in an absolute decrease in true belief. Define comparative increases and decreases
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The first epistemic dynamic operator, hπi A, encodes weak postconditions of π. The
weak postconditions are the conditions that may hold after executing (or, more intuitively,
complying with) π or, perhaps more intuitively, the conditions that hold after complying
with π in some way. That is, one would say that A is a weak postcondition of π at w if
some way of executing π takes you to w0 and A holds at w0 . Call the special case of weak
postconditions, hπi >, the executability of π. The basic idea is simple; π is executable at a
state iff there is a path through an EDG that executes π - some series of epistemic actions
or procedures is such that it accords with π.
The second dynamic epistemic operator, [π]A, encodes strong postconditions. The strong
postconditions are the conditions that must hold after every execution of π. In other words,
the formula encodes the conditions that hold if one complies with π in any way. The special
case of strong postconditions is strong executability, [π]>. The truth conditions tell us that
π is strongly executable at a state iff every path that begins at that state is an execution of
π. Every epistemic process that begins at that state accords with π.
To sum: The weak postcondition operator, hπi A, tells us that some epistemic process
starting at the current state that accords with π results in a state where A is true. The
strong postcondition operator, [π]A, tells us that every epistemic process starting at the
current state that accords with π results in a state where A is true.
The procedural equivalence between formulae of LP LEN , ↔, is more informative about
protocols than any truth-functional or even intensional equivalence between propositional
formulae that embed protocol expressions. The expression π ↔ π 0 tells us that, from the
current state, any path executing π executes π 0 and vice versa. In other words, the idea is
that, where π and π 0 represent norms, N and N 0 , N and N 0 license exactly the same moves
(actions, processes, changes of epistemic state) from the current state.
Procedural equivalence is stronger than equivalence between postcondition expressions
in terms of proportions between true accepted formulae and false rejected formulae. From there, more
interesting properties can be defined by quantifying over all transitions associated with protocols within
EDGs and across EDGs, as well as interactions with postconditions and other expressions in which protocols
are embedded.
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because focusing on inclusion relations among sets of executions starting at a state is more
informative than focusing just on quantification over paths that execute protocols. Formulae
formed with ↔, for instance, say more about preservation of LP LEN formulae than even
combinations of modal and dynamic operators like ([π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A). For instance, suppose
that ([π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A) and hπi > are true at state w. From this, it does not follow that hπ 0 i >
or that hπ 0 i A are true at w. The countermodel is one in which π 0 is not executable at w.
If so [π 0 ]A is vacuously true.7 Thus, there is no execution of π 0 starting at w, nor one that
terminates with a state verifying A. Substituting π 0 for π in larger LP LEN expressions does
not preserve truth for these formulae. This point can be seen more easily from the fact that
π & π 0 follows from π ↔ π 0 and hπi > but not from ([π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A) and hπi >. However,
from π ↔ π 0 and hπi >, it does follow that hπ 0 i > because the relation holds only if the

sets of executions of π and π 0 starting at w are identical. Any procedural path executing
π also executes π 0 . Thus, if hπi A, then hπ 0 i > and hπ 0 i A must also hold. This equivalence
shows that the embedded protocols obey a kind of substitutivity. Additionally, π ↔ π 0
preserves strong postconditions; [π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A follows. In general, for formulae involving only
the dynamic operators, if π ↔ π 0 , then uniform substitution of protocols π and π 0 preserves
truth. Not so for ([π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A).
However, there are modal expressions that ([π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A) preserves truth for that
π ↔ π 0 doesn’t. Suppose that at w, hπi (hπi > ∧ [π]A) holds. Then hπi > ∧ [π]A holds at
some w0 that π can bring the system to. If ([π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A) also holds at w, [π 0 ]A must
hold at w0 , but hπ 0 i > and hπ 0 i A may fail at that state. If π ↔ π 0 holds at w, then all of
the foregoing formulae may fail at w0 . However, π ↔ π 0 ensures preservation of truth by
substitution of π with π 0 for each of these expressions as well as any that [π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A fails
to preserve at w. So π ↔ π 0 is strictly stronger than [π]A ≡ [π]A but not ([π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A),
but π ↔ π 0 is strictly stronger than ([π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A); in fact, it implies it, and the converse
fails.
7

Of course, this only follows if the truth condition is formulated with a material conditional.

CHAPTER 3. PLEN: DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION

166

The weaker π & π 0 does different work. It only guarantees (at w) that there is some path

starting at w that executes both π and π 0 . If [π]A holds at w, then, assuming convergence,

so do hπi >, hπ 0 i >, hπi A, and hπ 0 i A. It ensures that substituting π for π 0 in the context of
a dynamic operator preserves executability and weak postconditions, but not strong postconditions. It’s tempting to think that this expression makes parallel execution redundant,
but the notions are clearly distinct. That π & π 0 is true at w, it does follow that hπ ∩ π 0 i >

at w; given the former, there must be a p such that f irst(p) = w and p ∈ Pπ ∩ Pπ0 , but
then p ∈ Pπ and there is a q ∈ Pπ0 such that p

q because p ∈ Pπ0 and p

p. However,

the converse fails. Supposing that hπ ∩ π 0 i > at w, it follows that there is a p such that
f irst(p) = w, p ∈ Pπ , there is a q ∈ Pπ0 such that p

q. But that doesn’t entail that there

is any r such that f irst(r) = w and r ∈ Pπ ∩ Pπ0 . So π & π 0 may fail.

The expression π / π 0 merely ensures the falsity of some formulae of LP LEN ; it is es-

sentially the dual of π ↔ π 0 ; if there is some path from w that executes π but not π 0 , then
clearly π and π 0 are not executed by exactly the same paths from w.
The ΠM in every content state represents the current methodology of the epistemic agent
whose arena is g at w. The agent endorses or accepts the epistemic rationality norms in ΠM
at w. M (π) says that π is part of the methodology (of the agent whose arena is g) at w; that
is, that π ∈ ΠM .
On that note, LP LEN is a powerful language. Postconditions are represented by the
dynamic epistemic operators. Preconditions can be formalized by conditionals: A → hπi >,
for instance, says that if A is true at s, then π is executable at s. That is, A is a sufficient
precondition of π’s execution. The converse conditional, hπi > → A, encodes a necessary
precondition of π’s execution. Naturally, A ≡ hπi > encodes a necessary and sufficient
precondition of π’s execution.
Note that LP LEN contains expressions stating various kinds of interaction between methodologies, pre and postconditions, and execution conditions. A small sample:
• M (π) → [π]A says that if π is in the methodology, then A is a strong postcondition of
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π.
• M (π) ∧ hπi > says that some protocol in the methodology can be executed at the
current state.
• hπi A → M (π) says that if π can bring about A, then it’s in the methodology.
The truth of these expressions at a given state imposes structural requirements on the EDG,
including conditions on the edges and on the content functions. This can be easily seen; the
truth conditions of the operators pair with the execution conditions of protocols to dictate
graph-theoretic properties. Let w be a state at which any of the foregoing expressions is true.
If π is a sequential composition, for instance, this dictates a minimum length for any path of
which w is the root, and it dictates that the terminal state verifies A. If π is indeterministic
at w, that is, if there is more than one path executing π at w, then there is a tree of minimum
depth in which each leaf node verifies A. Each control operator induces other graph-theoretic
features: corresponding paths, branching paths, etc.. It’s trivial to see how conditions on
content functions in an EDG are constrained by the truth of these claims at a state.

3.2

Axiomatizing PLEN

The final part of PLEN is a logic of protocols; a derivation system that codifies the valid
rules governing protocol and process equivalence, execution of protocols, and the effects
of executing protocols. There are numerous ways to build a logic with the syntactic and
semantic resources of PLEN. In this section, valid reasoning in PLEN is partially axiomatized
with a simple Hilbert-style system.
The system has two features worthy of note at the outset. First, the system is sound.
There is, however, the caveat that some of the axiom schemata are syntactically restricted:
Let A(π) be any formula of LP LEN that embeds π in either the dynamic operators or the
connectives of LP LEN , except that the formula variable A(π) cannot embed π directly in
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A(π), M (π), or in a postcondition. Else, at least one schema fails. Second, the derivation
system is strictly stronger than the standard axioms of propositional dynamic logic (PDL),
with some qualifications. It validates the standard axioms of PDL [113] as well as novel
axioms. This is not just due to the larger language of PLEN over that of PDL; PLEN
validates axioms that, were they added to PDL in the natural ways, would fail in PDL. This
demonstrates one of the ways in which PLEN can account for features of epistemic norms
that is not recognized in other systems.

3.2.1

Syntax II: A Proof System for PLEN

Definition: (Rules) These are standard derivation rules for PDL or, indeed, for modal
logic. Note that detaching the conditional is valid in that it preserves truth and necessitation is valid in that it preserves theoremhood; explicitly, necessitation is restricted
to apply only to axioms and formulae derivable from axioms.8
#
"
`P LEN A
A → B, A
1.
(M P )
(N EC)
B
A
Definition: (Axiom Schemata) PLEN is partially, soundly axiomatized by the standard
propositional axiom schemata for the truth functions (assuming standard definitions of
conjunction and disjunction), standard axioms of a suitable modal logic (for concreteness, let it be S5 - but note that alternative modal logics can integrated into PLEN
easily), plus rules for the novel connectives and operators of PLEN.
8

This feature makes the system compatible with additional machinery for reasoning from premises without
the ugly - or at least perplexing - results that often accompany such an addition. In particular, this revision
makes room for a valid deduction theorem and so makes it possible to have rules for introducing conditionals
in the usual natural deduction style. See Hakli and Negri [116] for discussion of the matter and the machinery
for adding a valid deduction theorem to normal modal logics. The box “” of PLEN works like the box
of S5, and the modalities for each protocol work as in K. The machinery that Hakli and Negri construct
should make deduction for PLEN a simple matter.
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A → (B → A)





(A → (B → C)) → ((A → B) → (A → C)) 



(¬B → ¬A) → (¬B → A) → B))




(¬B → ¬A) → (A → B)



(A → B) → (A → B)



A → A


♦A → ♦A
[π1][π2]A ≡ [π1; π2]A

([π]A ∧ hπi >) → hπi A






hπ1; π2i A ≡ hπ1i hπ2i A
hπi A → hπi >



hπ1 ∩ π2i A → (hπ1i A ∧ hπ2i A)
[π](A ∧ B) ≡ ([π]A) ∧ [π]B)



([π1]A ∧ [π2]B) → [π1 ∩ π2](A ∧ B) ([π](A → B) ∧ [π]A) → [π]B 


[π1 ∪ π2]A ≡ ([π1]A ∧ [π2]A)
([π](A → B) ∧ hπi A) → hπi B 



hπ1 ∪ π2i A ≡ (hπ1i A ∨ hπ2i A)
(hπi (A → B) ∧ [π]A) → hπi B 



([π][π∗]A) ∧ A ≡ [π∗]A
A → [π]A


0
0

hπ∗i A ≡ (hπi hπ∗i A) ∨ A
((π ↔ π ) ∧ A(π)) → A(π )



(A ∧ [π∗](A → [π]A)) → [π∗]A
((π & π 0 ) ∧ [π]A) → hπ 0 i A



0
0

h(A)?i B → (A ∧ B)
(π / π ) ≡ ¬(π ↔ π )



h(A)?i > → A



A ≡ [∇π]A


(A ≡ hπi >) → [x π]A

Note two important properties and a qualification to note about the axiomatization of PLEN.
First, the deductive system of PLEN is sound. The usual definitions related to soundness
have counterparts in PLEN:
Derivation A derivation is any finite sequence of formulae of LP LEN , hA1 , ..., An i, such that
each Ai≤n-1 is either a premise, an axiom, or the conclusion of a derivation rule whose
premises appear earlier in the sequence, and An is the conclusion of a derivation rule
whose premises occur among hA1 , ..., An−1 i.
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Derivability Let A ∈ LP LEN , X ⊆ LP LEN , and {B1 , ..., Bn } = X. A is derivable from X,
X `P LEN A, iff there is a derivation hB1 , ..., Bn , Ai.
Theorem A is a theorem in PLEN, `P LEN A, iff A is an axiom or A can be derived from
the axioms of PLEN via the system in Chapter 3.
Verification An EDG, g = hW, C, c, v, Πg , Ri, verifies A at w, w |=P LEN A, iff w ∈ W and
w

A.

Tautology A is a tautology in PLEN iff A is verified by all states in all EDGs.
Logical Consequence A is a logical consequence in PLEN of X, X |=P LEN A, iff for every
g = hW, C, c, v, Πg , Ri and every w in W , if ∀Bi (Bi ⊆ X → w

Bi ), then w

A.

B1 , ..., Bn
is valid in PLEN iff A is a logical consequence in
A
PLEN of {B1 , ..., Bn }. A formula, A, of LP LEN is valid iff A is a tautology in PLEN.

Validity A derivation rule

Definition: Soundness Syntax II is sound iff if X `P LEN A, then X |=P LEN A, and if
`P LEN A, then |=P LEN A.
From these, it follows that the PLEN axiomatization is sound:
(Soundness Theorem) If X `P LEN A, then X |=P LEN A, and if `P LEN A, then |=P LEN
A.
Proof-Plan It suffices to show that all of the rules in the derivation system are valid,
and all of the axioms are tautologies. First, prove that the rules are valid they preserve the truth of all expressions of LP LEN at every state in every EDG.
Second, prove that each of the axiom schemata are tautologous - every instance
of each schema is a tautology. The details of the proof are entirely mechanical,
and shown in detail in [135]. 
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This axiomatization of PLEN is very likely not complete. But this is beside the main
theoretical point of PLEN’s deductive system. The primary functions of the axiomatization
of PDL are to: (a) show that formalizing reasoning can be easily carried out in the PLEN
framework by (b) provide a basic framework for analyzing valid reasoning about epistemic
rationality norms. This system is likely far from a final word on how best to model such
reasoning. This is intentional; PLEN is a formal framework rather than a final model. As
such, its full technical development is relegated to supplementary [135] and future work and
likely to require modifications to the logical apparatus.
Second, note that the deductive system of PLEN is strictly stronger than propositional
dynamic logic. The following list of axiom schemata, coupled with modus ponens and necessitation, forms the standard axiomatization of PDL:























(PDL)






[π1][π2]A ≡ [π1; π2]A


[π1 ∪ π2]A ≡ ([π1]A ∧ [π2]A) 



[(A)?]B ≡ (A → B)




([π][π∗]A) ∧ A ≡ [π∗]A


(A ∧ [π∗](A → [π]A)) → [π∗]A 



[π](A → B) → ([π]A) → [π]B) 

[π](A ∧ B) ≡ ([π]A) ∧ [π]B)

Then:
Proposition The axioms of PDL (without parallel execution) are all valid in PLEN, but
the converse fails.
Proof-Plan Each (instance of each) PDL axiom schema is a tautology of PLEN, which
is shown in the proof of soundness.

However,

the equivalence

((π1 ; π2 ) ∩ (π3 ; π4 ) ↔ (π1 ∩ π3 ); (π2 ∩ π4 )) is valid in PLEN but not in PDL, as-
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suming the natural execution conditions based on binary transition relations.
Thus, PLEN is strictly stronger. 
In some sense, this means that PLEN gives an alternative semantics to PDL. Or, more
precisely, the language of PDL is one of the logical languages that can be interpreted by the
basic model of epistemic dynamics in PLEN. This point can be strengthened further:
Proposition Every PDL model is isomorphic to an EDG.
Proof-Plan This is trivial. For every binary transition t = hw, w0 i that executes π in
the PDL model g, construct an EDG, g 0 , such that there is an edge e = hw, π, w0 i.
Then there will be a bijection f : W −→ W 0 such that f (w) = w0 iff hw, w0 i
executes π iff hw, π, w0 i executes π. 
That is, PDL can be applied as a model of epistemic dynamics, and its logic can be applied
as a logic of epistemic norms. PLEN is thus a proper extension of PDL; LP LEN contains
more expressions and the logic of PLEN can be used to reason about these expressions.
Note that, for purposes of modeling epistemic dynamics and epistemic rationality, many
of the constructions in LP LEN simply make no good philosophical sense if interpreted over
PDL. The key idea is simply that PDL interprets its complex protocols over binary transition
relations, where PLEN interprets them over procedural paths. This difference gives very
different properties to expressions like π ↔ π 0 . In the style of PDL, we could interpret
these expressions like so: π ↔ π 0 is true at any state w in any EDG iff every pair of states,
hw, w0 i is such that it executes π iff it executes π 0 . This condition is very different from the
truth conditions of the expression in PLEN, which requires sharing not just binary transition
relations but procedural paths. The latter cannot even be interpreted in PDL without adding
structure to the models of PDL that render those models essentially equivalent to EDGs. In
models that apply both the execution conditions of PDL and those of EDG, the procedural
equivalences imply syntactic properties of π and π 0 that the binary interpretation doesn’t.
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If π is a sequential composition, so must π 0 be, for instance. This is not so for the binary
transition based interpretation.
Finally, the soundness result comes with a caveat. The axiom schema ((π ↔ π 0 )∧A(π)) →
A(π 0 ) encodes a limited replacement property of π ↔ π 0 ; it is only valid under certain
syntactic restrictions. The schematic LP LEN formula A(π) can contain π up to any level
of syntactic depth, but A(π) cannot embed π in A(π), M (π), or in a postcondition of
a protocol. If we lift this syntactic restriction, some instances of the axiom schema fail.
Consider the instance of the foregoing schema: ((π ↔ π 0 ) ∧ [π]A) → [π 0 ]A. Let the
antecedent be true at w in EDG g. Then [π]A is true at all w0 in g. However, it doesn’t
follow that [π 0 ]A holds at all w0 in g, it only follows that [π 0 ]A at w. The same holds for
any M expressions. That execution of π always suffices for execution of π 0 and vice versa
simply doesn’t imply that π and π 0 are both in ΠM . For postconditions, the point is equally
simple. Suppose that A(π) embeds π in the postcondition of some protocol π 00 : hπ 00 i hπi A.
It may be the case that π and π 0 share all executions starting at w, but they may not share
executions at some w0 reachable by π 00 .
However, even with this syntactic restriction, the set of valid replacements of procedural
equivalents is fairly robust. If we let A(π) be any expression meeting the syntactic restriction
defined above, then replacement of π with any π 0 such that π ↔ π 0 preserves truth. From
this, various derivative rules governing the relation between procedural equivalence and the
other operators and with pre and postconditions can be gotten:
• (π ↔ π 0 ) → ((π 0 ↔ π 00 ) → (π ↔ π 00 ))
• (π ↔ π 0 ) → (hπi A ≡ hπ 0 i A)
• (π ↔ π 0 ) → ([π]A ≡ [π 0 ]A)
• (π ↔ π 0 ) → ([π]A → hπ 0 i A)
• (π ↔ π 0 ∧ hπi A) → (π & π 0 ∧ hπ 0 i A)
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• (π ↔ π 0 ) → ¬(π / π 0 )
• (π ↔ π 0 ) → (([π1][π2]A ≡ [π]A) ≡ ([π1][π2]A ≡ [π 0 ]A))
• And so on.
With the definition and exploration of the core system of PLEN out of the way, the next
step is examining it as an account of epistemic dynamics and epistemic rationality norms.
The final section of this chapter acts as a prolegomenon to Chapter 4 by outlining the
philosophical interpretation of PLEN.

3.3

PLEN and Epistemic Rationality Norms

The core thought of PLEN is that, in PLEN, epistemic rationality norms are protocols. This
requires a bit of clarification. Epistemic norms - really, norms in general - are simultaneously
mysterious and ubiquitous objects. They clearly play important roles in cognitive life, and
there is much that we can say about these roles and how norms function to perform them, but
what norms exactly are is uncertain. Different fields take different approaches. The approach
in epistemology [164] seems to follow in von Wright’s footsteps [261], identifying norms with
conditional propositions. Deontic logicians sometimes take them to be conditional rules,
perhaps best identified with imperatives [89, 250]. The social sciences [59] takes another
approach, identifying norms as regularities that emerge in models of populations or in the
cognitive architectures of individual agents. There is a great deal of unclarity.
The point of the protocol-theoretic account and its formalization in PLEN is to account
for what can be figured out about the functions and features of epistemic rationality norms
with a simple, coherent formalism, so as to provide a clear model of them. This is a modeling
task, with the metaphysics of norms set to the side. Chapter 2 went to great lengths to show
that epistemic rationality norms are dynamic and procedural, and Chapter 1 argued that
the underlying model of such norms must have certain features. PLEN is a formal theory in
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which protocols function with respect to the models of epistemic dynamics just as epistemic
rationality norms function with respect to the epistemic dynamics of reasoners. Protocols
represent procedural epistemic rationality norms by formalizing a kind of procedural or
program-like structure defined over epistemic actions and processes. Procedural or programlike structure is directly encoded by the syntax of protocols defined above, and modeled by
interpreting protocols over EDGs by means of the execution rules. This idea can be made
somewhat more precise, now that the formalism has been introduced.

3.3.1

Preliminaries, Procedural Operations, and Dynamics

The formal features of PLEN are designed to represent epistemic rationality norms and
epistemic dynamics. This can be seen by considering four ideas. The first idea is that
epistemic rationality norms are conceptualized as abstract objects like policies, programs,
or plans for restricting epistemic dynamics. This conceptualization was one of the main
upshots of Chapters 1 and 2, especially considering D3 and its corollary. On this informal
conceptualization, program-like structures are natural and useful for modeling procedural
epistemic rationality norms because they encode instructions for procedural operations over
actions, and this is the primary motivation for building the formalism around protocols,
which are established logical representations of programs or plans.9
The second idea is that the protocols of PP LEN are built with a subset of operations of
relational algebra.10 This syntactic feature reflects the idea that actions can be represented
with transition relations (binary, ternary, or n-ary), and, consequently, that processes and
9

The protocols of PLEN are basically just the programs of PDL, and, as PDL is the logic of programs,
the point should be obvious. However, do note that the core model of temporal action logics (e.g. [130]) is
also the core model of dynamic logics. If this point still evades one’s intuitions, one need only recognize that
protocols are constructions built out of some suite of basic actions with procedural operations that encode
programs or instructions for complex action and that plans are instructions for complex action built out of
some set of basic actions with procedural operations. More formally, see [195] for an explicit program-based
account of planning and practical reasoning, see [95] and [115] for a variety of formalisms for representing
plans, some of which bear obvious relations to the dynamic logics or program logics that provide the basic
tools of PLEN, and, finally, note the features of planning observed in [43] that have obvious analyses with
these tools.
10
See Chapter 3 of [30] or the earlier establishment of the idea in [28].
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procedures constructed out of procedural operations on actions can be represented by relational operations on representations of actions.11 This leads to a natural way of interpreting
protocols - assign relational algebraic operations on transitions (n-ary) to protocols in a way
that parallels the assignment of operations on binary transitions to the symbols of relational
algebra. That protocols encode instructions that specify procedures falls out of this idea.
This is spelled out a bit below.
The third idea is that graph-theoretic structures provide useful models of (epistemic)
dynamic processes, and they are built out of operations on relations. The first conjunct is the
core insight of dynamic logics [28, 30], dynamic epistemic logics [65, 193], and belief revision
theories [91, 92]. The second conjunct is a technical fact that has been well-established.12
The fourth idea is that a good formal framework should be general.13 PLEN should not
focus on any particular subset of epistemic actions (e.g., public announcements or any other
kind of transparent updating actions, opaque actions involving kinds of subterfuge, etc.) but
be entirely general concerning epistemic actions. Such generality allows a formal framework
to generate a unified theory of epistemic norms and not just the plurality of theories of the
epistemic norms that govern specific kinds of actions.
Putting these ideas together, the core thought of PLEN is that protocols encode the
procedural content of epistemic rationality norms in two ways:
(i)

Their syntax encodes procedural operations, abstract instructions for carrying
out, sequencing, combining, choosing among, conditioning on tests, avoiding or
complementing, reversing, and minimally executing arbitrary epistemic actions,
processes, and procedures or, in other words, constructing complex epistemic
procedures out of more basic epistemic actions.

(ii)
11

Their semantics - defined by their execution conditions - model the restrictions

See [261] for a classic source as well as [30, 28, 114].
See, again, Chapter 3 of [30] and couple this with the basic observation that transition systems are useful
for representing epistemic dynamics.
13
This is the core project and insight of [18].
12
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on epistemic dynamics that norms specify. The execution conditions of protocols
interact with these syntactically coded instructions to determine what epistemic
actions are to be executed at what states (according to the instructions of a
norm), what future courses of action must be carried out in order to comply
with these instructions (as well as derivative and partial instructions), and what
the resulting changes of epistemic state must be. In other words, the syntax
of protocols defines the structure of the graphs that model rational epistemic
dynamics.
The basic slogan of PLEN is that epistemic rationality norms are protocols. More literally,
protocols are the objects in the theory that stand-in for epistemic rationality norms, and
these two ways of encoding norms in PLEN spell out how. Basically, protocols function in
PLEN with respect to EDGs - the models of epistemic dynamics - the way that epistemic
rationality norms function with respect to epistemic dynamics. Let me elaborate on (i) and
(ii).
The syntax of complex protocols encodes instructions for sequencing or iterating basic
actions or more complex procedures, concurrently complying with multiple instructions or
complex procedures, indeterministically choosing among actions or procedures, avoiding actions or procedures, reversing their effects, or ensuring that they are carried out with minimal
effects. The control operators, in order of definition above, correspond to these instructions
in ways obvious from the natural translations in section 3.1, but reiterated in Table 3.1.
The control operators of PP LEN form the core of possible procedural instructions/operations;
there are no other obvious ways in which actions can be combined in plans, programs, or
instructions. That is, the control operators of PLEN represent the core possible procedural operations; the set of operations on actions that can be used to compose actions into
more complex procedures. The elements in Π0 encode basic actions. Epistemic actions are
understood in a capacious sense, including not only uncontroversially voluntary actions like
choosing which arguments to attend to, which cards to turn over, what transformations or

CHAPTER 3. PLEN: DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION

178

Table 3.1: Procedural Operations
Instruction
Procedural Operation
Relational Structure
Do a, then do b!
Sequential composition
Relational Composition
“a; b”
Do a some finite n times!
Kleene Iteration “a∗”
Iterated Relational
Composition
Comply with both the
Parallel Execution “a ∩ b”
Intersection,
instructions for a and b!
Correspondence
Select either a or b
Indeterministic Choice
Union
(inclusive)!
“a ∪ b”
Avoid a, do anything other Complement “−a”
Complement
than a!
Reverse the effects of a!
Reversal “x a”
Inverse of Relation
Do a with minimal effects! Fixed Point “∇a”
Fixed Point
manipulations of a formal or physical model to carry out, or which experiments to carry out,
but also arguably involuntary actions like inference. The complex protocols in ΠC encode
the possible combinations of basic actions that form any possible epistemic procedures.
Coupled with the semantics of PLEN based on EDGs, this procedural information determines the properties of models of the ideally rational evolution of epistemic systems. First,
distinguish acts and actions. Let acts be tokens of act-types, like a particular instance of my
pressing a particular button at a time t with particular effects. In contrast, let actions be
act-types, abstract particulars like pressing a button or even pressing *that* button, each
of which can be instantiated in different locations in space-time. With EDGs, think of a
particular epistemic act as the pair of a label for an action or act-type in Π0 and an epistemic
transition mapped to it by the execution rules. That is, an act, associated with a labeled
transition, is the concrete instance of an action, which is associated with the label in Π0 . In
PLEN, acts are edges. Actions are sets of acts - the execution sets of basic protocols. At
this stage, PLEN aims for robust generality. The set of epistemic actions is not exclusive;
epistemic actions are any actions that result in change of epistemic state or result in change
of factors relevant, via effects on cognition, to change of state. The class of epistemic actions
thus includes everything from direct expansions, contractions, and revisions of belief to the
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steps involved in the physical arrangement of representations of beliefs so as to make logical
connections more perspicuous.
Second, define epistemic histories and epistemic processes. This is simple: an epistemic
history is a state-sequence, and a token epistemic process is a procedural path.14 That is,
epistemic processes are chains of epistemic acts. Say that epistemic procedures are process
types; they are sets of processes defined by procedural relations among their constituent acts.
For instance, a procedure might be defined by sequences or choices of actions or the presence
of convergences or divergences between processes. Process types are, as should be clear,
mapped to complex protocols, and the defining relations correlate, via the execution rules,
to the syntactic forms of protocols. Processes are instantiations or realizations of procedures;
they’re elements of the process type.
Third, note that each EDG has a graph-theoretic structure that combines with the execution conditions to represent the feasibilities and capabilities of the particular agent, i,
whose dynamics are represented by g.15 The thought is that acts and processes are concrete,
particular parts of an epistemic agent’s life, while actions and procedures are abstract, and
execution rules link these concrete and abstract objects to each other. That is, the execution
rule maps a procedure to every protocol expression - the set Pπ is a procedure defined by
the syntax of π.
In sum: think of edges (triples of the form W × {π} × W ) in EDGs as instances or tokens
14

A needlessly complex version can be given as follows: Let a map, h, from a segment, h1, ..., ni of the
natural numbers to W pick out part of the epistemic history of an epistemic agent; the resulting sequence of
content states represents the evolution of the content of her epistemic states up to point n. Let Ah be a map
from a segment, h1, ..., mi of the natural numbers to Πg . This picks out another part of the epistemic history
of an epistemic agent; the sequence of actions that the agent actually carried out to evolve her epistemic
state up to point m. Say that w, w0 are connected by a in g iff hw, a, w0 i ∈ R. An epistemic process is the
pair of a sequence of epistemic actions and a sequence of transitions mapped to it by the execution rules:
hh, Ahi, such that for every ai , ai+1 mapped to i ≤ m − 1 by Ah, there is a triple of states, hwi , wi+1 , wi+2 i
mapped to j ≤ m − 2 such that ai connects wi to wi+1 and ai+1 connects wi+1 to wi+2 . Note that each basic
action is mapped by the execution rules to a set of acts in each EDG, and each complex protocol is mapped
by the execution rules to a set of processes in each EDG. The latter fact can be seen by considering the set
of processes, Ah, such that the first and last elements of Ah form a transition that is an execution of π.
15
All EDGs are labeled, directed multi-graphs. They may be deterministic (containing unique successors
for each state according to R) or indeterministic. They may be cyclic or acyclic. They may be connected,
Hamiltonian, Eulerian, and so on.
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of actions, processes as concatenated sequences of edges (paths) and instances of procedures,
histories as the results of processes, and protocols as the procedural instructions that define
procedures, the limit case of which is that of basic actions. Each protocol π ∈ PP LEN is
mapped to a procedure or process-type (set of processes) by the execution rules.16

3.3.2

Representation Rules: Interpreting Protocols as Epistemic
Rationality Norms

Let a protocol, π, codify the procedural content of an epistemic rationality norm, N , in the
sense that we interpret the executions of π to be those processes of evolution of i’s epistemic
state that are rational according to N . Explicitly, PLEN is to be deployed according to the
following interpretive rules:
Representation A protocol, π, represents a procedural epistemic rationality norm, N , and
g represents agent i’s epistemic dynamics iff
(1) π is executable at w in g iff i can comply with N at the state represented by w.
(2) transition hw, w0 i executes π iff the transition represented by hw, w0 i is a rational
change of epistemic state for i according to N .
(3) process hw0 , a0 , ...an−1 , wn i executes π iff the process represented by hw0 , a0 , ...an−1 , wn i
is a rational epistemic process for i according to N .
These rules are meant to partially characterize the representation of norms with protocols.
The idea is that these rules tell us that a protocol π represents a norm N , with respect to
a specific agent, i, whose dynamics are modeled by g, iff (i) the possibility of i’s compliance
with N correlates to executability of π in g and (ii) the verdicts of rationality delivered by
N with respect to i’s possible transitions and processes correlate to the execution sets of π
16

Under the rules for canonically representing epistemic rationality norms below, every protocol in PLEN
represents the procedural content of some norm; if there is nothing to an epistemic rationality norm other
than its procedural content, then PLEN identifies norms with procedures.
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in g. From these rules, it follows that the set of ideally rational evolutions of i’s epistemic
state according to N contains any state change that is mapped to π by the execution rules.
Let me flesh this out.
PLEN is a single agent system in contrast to the more familiar multi-agent systems
in the literature [65, 74]. Each EDG is thought of as a possible model of the epistemic
dynamics of an arbitrary, ideal-but-bounded epistemic agent; the class of EDGs is the class
of possible models of the ideal epistemic agent.17 Call the ideal epistemic agent, i. For EDG,
g, each element, w, of W represents a possible epistemic state for i. The content state, c(w)
represents the possible content of one of i’s epistemic states; a possible configuration of belief,
X, disbelief, Y , and explicitly endorsed methodology, ΠM , for i. Expressions built with the
acceptance and rejection operators like b(A) and d(A) represent i’s acceptance and rejection
of A. Each transition represents a possible change of epistemic state for i that would result
from some basic epistemic action, a (an element of Πg ). As above, each edge or labeled
transition represents a token execution of a basic epistemic action. Each sequence of states
represents a trajectory of epistemic state change for i that results from an epistemic process.
Each procedural path represents a token epistemic process composed of sequential or iterated
token executions of basic and complex actions. Each corresponding pair of procedural paths
represents a sequential composition of parallel token executions of actions and processes.
The execution rules map these sets of possible transitions and processes of epistemic state
change to each basic action and each complex protocol formed from the basic actions.
So, the idea is that if a protocol, π, represents a procedural epistemic norm, N , then the
processes that are mapped to π are interpreted as those that are rational according to N .
Every norm defines a process type, a rational procedure for controlling an agent’s trajectory
through epistemic state space. Those processes in the complement of π’s processes are
the irrational processes, the processes diverging from the rational procedure. So, PLEN
17

“Bounded” in generally the sense of [50]. The thought is that, an arbitrary ideal epistemic agent may
still be seriously limited in terms of capacity and feasibility. Here, I’m not assuming that all ideal bounded
agents are finite in particular respects (lifespan, possible epistemic states, possible actions). Accordingly, I’m
not assuming that EDGs are finite, though attention may be restricted to finite EDGs for many purposes.
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represents the ideally rational epistemic dynamics according to N with the processes that
are mapped to π by the execution rules. Equivalently, for any EDG, g, that represents the
dynamics of agent i, each protocol is mapped by the execution rules to a subgraph, g 0 , of g
if π can be executed in g. The subgraph, g 0 , captures some of the procedural structure of π
and so also of N . This is in virtue of the relations that any such g 0 has to the syntax of π.
So, if π represents N , then, given the interpretation of PLEN proposed in the form of the
representation rules above, g 0 marks out the possible rational epistemic actions, processes,
evolutions of i’s epistemic states according to N . This thought is the basic idea of applying
PLEN to the formalization of epistemic norms. One can visualize this thought by imagining
the rational procedure defined by a norm (i.e., its procedural execution set) as an overlay on
top of the paths of EDG, as in Figure 3.6.

3.3.3

Preliminary Theoretical Advantages Over Other Theories

There is room for debate about how best to use the objects in PLEN to represent procedural
epistemic rationality norms. The core representation rules form a plausible first stab that
is expanded upon in Chapter 4. As such, the rules above codify the application of PLEN
to the representation of epistemic rationality norms in the rest of this dissertation. Let me
illustrate two of the theoretical advantages of taking this approach.
First, consider a very basic question about epistemic rationality norms: What are they?
There are three plausible candidates. First, epistemic norms could be pieces of language
or the propositions that encode their meaning; the set of epistemic norms just contains
prescriptive expressions, normative statements, hypothetical imperatives, and norm-kernels.
Second, epistemic norms could be regularities or patterns of actual or idealized epistemic
behavior. Third, epistemic norms could be abstract objects like plans or programs. PLEN
is a rigorous spelling out of third option, and it shows why the third option is superior to
the other two.
Consider the first option. Thinking of epistemic norms as merely pieces of language
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Figure 3.6: Restrictions as Overlays

Think of all of the arrows - the solid and dashed - as being part of the EDG above. The solid
arrows execute the protocol (π2 ; π7 )∪(π5 ; π10 ∪π9 )∪(π3 ). Thus, the protocol defines a rational
procedure displayed by the solid paths in this graph; the solid processes are the permissible
processes. The rational procedure specified by a protocol under the interpretation rules is
thus a subgraph of the EDG. The dashed arrows represent those paths that don’t execute
the protocol, and so are not within its designated permissible paths.
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gives an impoverished and piecemeal account of them. It’s impoverished because conceiving
of epistemic norms merely as pieces of language overlooks their probative force. What is it
about these pieces of language that matters so much for the regulation of epistemic behavior?
It’s piecemeal because the set of pieces of epistemically normative language is diverse, and
lacks any obvious semantics that links them together. Thinking of norms as propositions
might address the piecemeal objection, though it’s hard to see how given the diversity of
normative expressions (re: exactly this discussion in [89]). In any case, the probative force
problem remains; it’s mysterious what relation normative propositions like norm-kernels
could have to rational epistemic behavior that wouldn’t implicate restrictions on epistemic
dynamics and so, in turn, implicate protocols. This point is more fully substantiated in the
arguments from Chapter 2 connecting the function of epistemic norms to restrictions, and
the arguments in Chapter 4 connecting restrictions to protocols.
Consider the second option. Thinking of epistemic norms as regularities in idealized epistemic behavior generates a vicious circle. In order to define an idealized model of epistemic
behavior that can illuminate normative regularities, we can’t just model actual behavior and
then remove computational or temporal limits, we have to remove errors in performance.
But epistemic norms are what define what counts as an error in performance. So, we need
to have a way of determining what behaviors are epistemically normative prior to idealizing.
The third option is superior. Thinking of epistemic norms as protocols provides a systematic recipe for relating the normative pieces of language to regularities in epistemic behavior.
This is one of the throughlines of Chapters 3 and 4. As argued in Chapter 2, epistemic
normative language is semantically linked to restrictions on epistemic dynamics. As will
be argued in Chapter 4, restrictions on dynamics are logically linked to protocols. Thus,
normative expressions and propositions describe or convey some of the information that is
associated with protocols. This can be shown in detail by crafting semantics for formal
expressions encoding the pieces of languages in question. This is explicitly done for some
normative expressions in Chapter 4, and hints as to how to do this are contained in the
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discussion above. This project is taken much further in the separate technical exploration
of PLEN in [135]. Protocols are, in turn, linked to regularities in epistemic behavior, as
described above. Every protocol, π, is associated with models of epistemic dynamics (Pπ
per EDG) that execute the protocol or otherwise carry out precisely the instructions contained in the protocol; errors are divergences from protocol. Thus, the idealization problem
is solved; thinking of epistemic norms as abstract objects (protocols) that are systematically
associated to some models of epistemic performance and not others gives us a way of defining
errors in performance. These models are then associated with the pieces of language via the
semantics gestured at above, giving a rich and unified account of epistemic norms in terms
of protocols. Chapter 4 more fully spells out the advantages of the approach, but before
moving on to PLEN’s soundness, I consider one other advantage of PLEN’s semantics.
Second, it’s of fundamental importance to the dissertation’s main arguments that, in
applying PLEN to the formalization of epistemic norms, transitions are not mistaken for
acts in PLEN, histories are not mistaken for processes, and feasibility is not mistaken for
normativity. Given the foregoing definitions, and letting g represent i’s epistemic dynamics,
we can show how PLEN formalizes certain features of epistemic dynamics, constraints of
feasibility and capacity:
• At any w in g, an action or procedure π is feasible for i iff it can be executed at w.
• An action or procedure π is within i’s capabilities iff it can be executed at any w in g.
Thus, g represents (a) all of the possible epistemic actions and procedures that i could carry
out (or undergo), (b) all of the possible changes of epistemic state that would result from
them, and, consequently, the set of possible histories that i could instantiate, and (c) all of
the acts and processes that comprise the agent’s possible epistemic dynamics. Then, the
protocols of PLEN carve these up in terms of the restrictions that they define. This enables
the distinction of transitions from processes, and feasibilities and capacities from normative
restrictions.
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In PLEN, two basic actions, a and b, can be mapped to the same transitions in a graph,
g, while being mapped to distinct sets of labeled transitions. The languages of PLEN can
distinguish these facts. From the fact that transition hw, w0 i executes a, it doesn’t follow
that a and b are equivalent in terms of executions, and there are thus classes of expressions
in LP LEN that distinguish them (e.g., a ↔ b is false, a & b is false, etc.). This point gets

stronger with complex protocols - a complex protocol π that is mapped to the same set of
transitions as π 0 in g may have procedural characteristics (requiring the execution of a basic
action c) that π 0 does not. Finally, with respect to any given protocol π, the feasibility

of some process hw0 , a0 , ...an−1 , wn i can be distinguished from its rationality. After all, the
feasibility of hw0 , a0 , ...an−1 , wn i at w0 does not imply that it executes π at w0 , and thus it
does not follow from mere feasibility that the process falls within the restriction defined by
π. Thus, PLEN handles the Processes and Constraints problems, as will be shown in more
detail in Ch.4.
In sum, PLEN’s technical structures provide a model of epistemic rationality norms that
analyzes their procedural content with protocols. These syntactical items are built using
operations that map naturally onto procedural operations on actions, and are correlated
to the graph-theoretic structure of EDGs which model epistemic dynamics, picking out
submodels that execute the protocol. Protocols thus provide submodels that represent the
rational dynamics with respect to a given norm. Finally, at this stage, we have some reason
to think that PLEN is theoretically advantageous.

3.4

Conclusion

In sum, PLEN is composed of a language for codifying procedural operations on epistemic
action, a language of modal, epistemic, and dynamic propositions about protocols, a semantics for both languages, and a sound deductive system for reasoning in the object language
about protocols. The architecture of PLEN is that of a propositional dynamic logic with
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some additional machinery. Given PLEN’s pedigree, it should be noted that PLEN provides
ample tools for supporting and investigating (i) the process equivalence relations that are so
frequently of note in the context of dynamic logics, i.e., graph isomorphism and bisimulation,
and (ii) methods of devising new graph equivalence relations to analyze protocol equivalence
relations. This work takes place in the forthcoming technical document [135].
The development of PLEN explicated in this chapter lays the groundwork for the solution
of the Framework Problem. PLEN contains an exogenous language of protocols, and, interpreted as I’ve suggested in this chapter, thus an exogenous language of epistemic rationality
norms. The semantics provide an array of set-theoretic constructions for modeling epistemic
dynamics, protocols stand in for epistemic rationality norms in these models, and there are
arrays of constructions for modeling the restrictions on epistemic dynamics that epistemic
norms define. In the next chapter, these pieces are put together to solve the Framework
Problem.

Chapter 4
PLEN as a Theory of Epistemic
Rationality Norms
4.1

The Theoretical Adequacy of PLEN

This chapter shows that PLEN adequately formalizes the core theory of epistemic dynamics,
epistemic rationality, and epistemic rationality norms defended in Part I, thereby solving
the Framework Problem. Chapter 1 argued that, in order to adequately represent epistemic
dynamics, a formal model must solve the Processes, Constraints, and First-Class Citizenship
problems. A model of epistemic dynamics that fails to do so is incomplete or incorrect.
Chapter 2 argued that principles D1 through D3 enumerate important features of epistemic
rationality and its norms. If the arguments there are right, these principles are grounded in
plausible considerations concerning the nature and structure of epistemic rationality norms,
and must thus be accounted for by any serious account of epistemic rationality. These two
lines of argument intertwine, thereby setting up the Framework Problem:
(Framework Problem) Any formal framework for reasoning about epistemic dynamics or
the norms of epistemic rationality, F , that either fails to adequately represent epistemic
dynamics or fails to adequately represent epistemic norms is either seriously incomplete
188
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or inaccurate with respect to its target domain. If a framework for epistemic dynamics
fails to adequately formalize epistemic norms, it fails to be adequate with respect to
epistemic dynamics. If a framework for norms fails to adequately represent epistemic
dynamics, it fails to be adequate with respect to epistemic norms. Now, it is established
in Chapter 1 that any framework that suffers the Processes, Constraints, or First-Class
Citizenship problems (or related subproblems) fails to adequately formalize epistemic
dynamics. It is established in Chapter 2 that any framework that fails to formalize
desiderata/principles D1-D3 fails to adequately formalize epistemic norms. Thus, the
fundamental problem is to devise a formal framework for representing and reasoning
about epistemic dynamics, epistemic rationality, and epistemic rationality norms that
(I) solves the Processes, Constraints, and First-Class Citizenship problems and related
sub-problems, and (II) adequately formalizes principles D1-D3.
The clauses (I) and (II) represent important theoretical desiderata. Other things being
equal, a theory that solves these problems and formalizes D1-D3 is preferable to a theory
that doesn’t. The main argument for accepting PLEN as a logic of epistemic rationality
norms is, accordingly, a theory preference argument. The first step, carried out in this
chapter, is arguing that PLEN is a solution to the Framework Problem.1 More precisely, I
attempt to prove the following proposition:
(The PLEN Proposition) (i) The semantics of PLEN contains structures that distinctly
represent epistemic states, transitions, processes, actions, procedures, and constraints thereon.
(ii) The syntax and semantics of PLEN provide structures that explicitly represent
epistemic rationality norms and their procedural content.
(iii) PLEN explicitly formalizes D1-D3; for each of D1-D3, there is a provable formal
assertion at the meta-level of PLEN where formal assertions include: propositions
1

Chapter 5 argues that PLEN is, among rival formalisms, the unique solution to the Framework Problem,
thereby completing the theory preference argument.
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about the semantic structures of PLEN, sets of valid meta-level rules or objectlevel laws, theorems at the object-level, and object-level theories.
The plan of the chapter reflects the proof plan of this set of propositions. First, Section
2 discusses the devices with which PLEN represents states, transitions, processes, actions,
procedures, and constraints; this is done with EDGs and their parts. This gives us clause (i)
of the PLEN Proposition. Section 3 explores the devices with which PLEN represents epistemic rationality norms, thereby establishing clause (ii) of the PLEN Proposition. Here, two
threads are pulled together. On the one hand, restrictions on epistemic dynamics are shown
to unify norm-kernels and other forms of normative expression. On the other, restrictions on
epistemic dynamics are shown to be reducible to protocols in that everything to know about
restrictions can be derived from the syntactic and semantic features of protocols. Together,
these threads bind protocols to epistemic rationality norms; these two lines of thought show
that protocols are the devices in PLEN with which to represent and, by means of tools
for reasoning about protocols, reason about epistemic norms. Section 4 walks through the
formalization of D1-D3 in PLEN. This establishes clause (iii).
These arguments all assume the conception of representation of epistemic rationality
norms by protocols defined in Chapter 3. That representation of the content of epistemic
norms can be extended with an analysis of deontic operators in PLEN. Such an analysis
strengthens the argument for clause (ii) of the PLEN Proposition, though the absence of
such an analysis is not fatal to it. Accordingly, I’ve relegated a plausible first stab at
formalizing deontic operators in PLEN to an appendix that follows the conclusion of the
chapter; it’s skippable but potentially interesting.
A final note of clarification: It is important to be explicit about exactly what the argument
has been and what the rest of the argument is going to be. The thrust of the main argument
for PLEN and the protocol-theoretic account of norms in this chapter is that the models
of epistemic dynamics and epistemic norms provided by PLEN accurately captures the real
features of epistemic rationality norms, which were adduced in Chapters 1 and 2. The
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thought is that Chapters 1 and 2 articulated at least some of the important features of
epistemic dynamics and epistemic norms “out there in the world”. This chapter shows that,
taking EDGs to represent epistemic dynamics, protocols do with respect to EDGs what
epistemic norms do with respect to actual epistemic dynamics.
I will often write directly or loosely, and say that “epistemic norms are protocols”. But this
is obviously false. Protocols are formal objects in dynamic logics. Whatever norms are, they
aren’t those! This is like saying, in talking about gravity, that physical objects are basins of
attraction in spacetime. That’s obviously false. Basins of attraction are just mathematical
objects in topology. Whatever physical objects are, they aren’t just topological entities!
Rather, basins of attraction *model* the gravitational properties of physical objects. The
formal object and the real thing bear important structural relations with each other such
that reasoning about the former can illuminate the properties of the latter. That is what I
intend to show in this chapter, with respect to protocols and epistemic rationality norms.

4.2

Formalizing Epistemic Dynamics: Processes and Constraints

In this section, I argue that the EDGs model epistemic dynamics in a way that solves
the Processes and Constraints problems by representing epistemic transitions in a manner
distinct from that in which epistemic actions and processes are represented. As a bit of
preliminary analysis, I want to explicitly lay out which parts of EDGs are intended to be
the formal counterparts of which epistemic factors. This is done in Table 4.1.
The first six rows of relations are mapped out in Chapter 3 explicitly or implicitly. The
essential thought being that EDGs are direct representations of the epistemic dynamics of
an individual agent. The states are epistemic states with a content state explicitly capturing
the epistemic judgments of acceptance and rejection. The transitions among epistemic states
represent changes of epistemic state by the application of some basic or complex action -
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Table 4.1: Representation of Epistemic Dynamics in PLEN
Epistemic States: Judgment
and Content
Epistemic State Transitions
Epistemic Action Tokens
Epistemic Action Types
Epistemic Process Tokens

⇐=
Represents
⇐=
Represents
⇐=
Represents
⇐=
Represents
⇐=
Represents

Epistemic Process Types
(Epistemic Procedures)

⇐=
Represents

Feasibility of a Transition
under C
Capability of a Transition

⇐=
Represents
⇐=
Represents

Feasibility of an Action under C

⇐=
Represents
⇐=
Represents
⇐=
Represents

Feasibility of a Process under C
Capability of an Action

Capability of a Process

⇐=
Represents

States: W = {w1 , ..., wn }, Content States:
hX : Y : ΠM i, Content functions: c(w)
Transitions: t = hw, w0 i
Edges: e = hw, a, w0 i
Execution Sets for Atomic Actions:
Ra = {e ∈ W × Π0 × W | e ∈ W × a × W }
Procedural Paths: p = he1 , ..., en i where for
each ei and ei+1 , last(ei ) = f irst(ei+1 ) and
there are πi and πi+1 such that ei ∈ Rπi and
ei+1 ∈ Rπi+1
Execution Sets for Complex Protocols: Pπ
such that p ∈ Pπ iff p satisfies the relevant
execution rules with respect to π
Let t be the transition. Then t is feasible
under C iff f irst(t) C.
Let t be the transition. Then t is within the
capacities of agent i iff g represents i’s
epistemic dynamics and there is some w such
that w = f irst(t).
Let e be the action token. Then e is feasible
under C iff f irst(e) C.
Let p be the process token. Then p is feasible
under C iff f irst(p) C.
Let e be the action token. Then e is within
the capacities of agent i iff g represents i’s
epistemic dynamics and there is some w such
that w = f irst(e) (iff e ∈ R).
Let p be the action token. Then p is within
the capacities of agent i iff g represents i’s
epistemic dynamics and there is some w such
that w = f irst(p) (iff e ∈ Pg ).
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as each procedural path is ultimately bookended by a transition. Each basic action is an
instruction to perform a basic epistemic action in the agent’s repertoire or action library.
Each complex protocol formed from these is a protocol, program, or plan of instructions
to perform some procedural operations on basic epistemic actions. These are each mapped
to parts of EDGs in ways that represent, respectively, action tokens and types and process
tokens and types.
Since every EDG in PLEN is meant to represent a possible model of epistemic dynamics for a rational agent, capacity and feasibility come cheap. Each state is mapped to a
propositional valuation. This valuation describes how the world is, so each node in an EDG
represents a pairing of epistemic state and world state. The epistemic actions connect these
in pairs. The feasibility of a state or condition relative property; a particular action is feasible
at a state s or under a condition C just when that action can be carried out at s or under C.
That is, given that EDGs are models of an agent’s epistemic dynamics, the feasible actions
for an agent at a state or under a condition are just those actions that can be carried out at
that state or at the states verifying that condition.
The capacities of agents are relative to the entire space of possibilities in an agent’s
epistemic dynamics. That is, i is capable of carrying out an action (instruction) a iff there
is some state that i could possibly get to at which a can be carried out.2 That is, given that
an EDG, g, is a model of an agent’s epistemic dynamics, the agent’s capacities are modeled
by the possible actions that can be carried out anywhere in that model of possible epistemic
actions.
Now, given this analysis, feasibility and capacity are equivalent to executability conditions. The action, e = hw, a, w0 i is feasible for an agent iff that edge is part of the EDG
2

Note that I exchange action symbols from the language of PP LEN with what I’m calling actions, here,
which are edges that execute action symbols. Really, symbols like a and π denote protocols and informally
represent procedural epistemic norms whose content is essentially a plan or program of epistemic action
formed out of procedural operations. The acceptability of these exchanges should be manifest; every action
symbol is correlated to an action type (a set of edges) in every EDG, so when talking about one graph,
the difference between a and Ra disappears. However, if talking more abstractly about action types that
transcend the dynamics of a single agent, actions may have many concrete instantiations or tokens and what
links these together is represented better by the instruction a than with a single action type in a graph.
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that accurately represents that agent’s epistemic dynamics. But this is equivalent to the
executability of a at s in the model of the agent’s epistemic dynamics. Similarly, the action
is within an agent’s capacities iff the action is executable somewhere in the model represents
the agent’s dynamics. Given that different EDGs may represent different agent’s epistemic
dynamics, these facts imply that the four distinctions between feasibility and capacity from
Chapter 1 are formalized trivially:
• First, capacity and feasibility are distinct. An action a may be possible for an agent
or within her capacities, but not feasible under a specified set of conditions.
• Second, capacity and feasibility may differ for distinct agents. Some agents can do
under condition C what others cannot under C or at all.
• Third, the conditions that contribute to the feasibility of an action can be external
facts in the world or they can be facts about what epistemic states the agents are in.
That is, external and internal conditions can determine whether an action is feasible
for an agent at a time.
• Finally, there are changes in what actions can be carried out by what agents over time.
For example, given that epistemic states are a factor in determining what actions are
feasible, the basic idea of epistemic dynamics implies that the set of feasible actions
for an agent need not be constant from state to state. Learning and environmental
changes can enable new actions or disable actions normally within one’s repertoire.
Aside from the multi-agent aspect of these observations, these are all trivial features of
EDGs!3 First, given g, what is feasible in g is not identical to what is in the capacities
3

One can treat EDGs as multi agent systems in several easy ways. First, one could treat each EDG as
an ideal model of a single agent’s epistemic dynamics. Then, each graph gives the constraints of capacity
and feasibility for an individual agent, and inter-graph differences encode inter-agent differences in capacity
and feasibility. Simply compare states with identical valuations for executability of the same, syntactically
defined procedures or actions. Second, index each action to a set of agents, Ag, relativize the content function
so that each state gets a set of content states each indexed to agents in Ag. Then simply generalize the
semantics of PLEN for each of these indexed actions and indexed program constructions. Then, for instance,
πi and πj will be the same action for different agents, and their executability may come apart. The impact
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defined by g; after all the set of protocols executable any particular s is not, in most EDGs,
identical to the set of protocols executable at any state in g. Second, given g and g 0 , what is
executable at states verifying C in g need not be identical to the set of executable protocols
at states verifying C in g 0 , nor need the set of executable protocols in g be identical to
that of g 0 . Third, because LP LEN has both propositional expressions, A, and epistemic
expressions, b(A), the conditions that define the feasibility of any particular action may
clearly be either internal facts about epistemic state or external facts in the world. Across
EDGs that potentially model an agent’s dynamics, we may even find (or stipulate, for the
sake of drawing conclusions) regularities connecting internal and external conditions and the
executability - at particular states or in general - of actions. Fourth and finally, it’s clear that
what is feasible need not be constant from state to state. If a is always feasible under c, it
may very well be the case that for some transition, t, a is feasible at f irst(t) and not feasible
at last(t) or vice versa. To be explicit, the observations about feasibility and capacity from
Ch.1 are trivially formalized in PLEN.
From the foregoing, it can be shown that the Processes and Constraints problems are
solved by PLEN. More precisely, it can be shown that none of the falsehoods that are
validated by systems that conflate processes with transitions hold in PLEN. First, note the
straightforward fact that edges in EDGs are distinct from transitions in EDGs. That is,
EDGs are isomorphic to directed multi-graphs rather than directed graphs, and this implies
that there may be more than one edge connecting any pair of states. Thus, the conflation is
avoided.
Recall the Honest Twin case. Let the action of asking my twin for an answer to a validity
problem be a, and let b be deploying my infallible validity detection method myself. Because
PLEN correlates a and b with sets of triples with the middle term identical to a and b,
more generally, it associates π and π 0 (where π and π 0 are any pair of complex procedural
instructions) to paths, none of the problems raised in Ch.1 arise.
of agent actions them may impact both their own epistemic states, the world, and the epistemic states of
others.
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First, it was shown in Ch.1 that the conflation results in confusions about methodological
inclusion. That is, b may be in my methodology at any particular content state while a is
not, despite the fact that Ra = Rb for all graphs, where Rx is the set of binary transition
relations assigned to x as in PDL. And this fact is encoded in the semantics of the M (π)
formulae in LP LEN . That is, LP LEN can distinguish between one set of instruction’s being
included in a methodology at a state and another set of instruction’s not being so included;
there is a systematic recipe for determining the truth of these kinds of propositions. This
is not so for systems with simpler languages or even for systems with the requisite language
but that interpret propositions about actions over transition relations. Explicitly, because
the expressions of LP LEN that explicitly embed protocols are not interpreted over transition
relations, the system can systematically distinguish M (π) from M (π 0 ) (one can be true at
a state while the other isn’t) even if the transition relations associated with π and π 0 are
identical.
PLEN actually embodies two solutions to this problem. First, M (a), which is the PLEN
expression for what was denoted with Mi (a) in Chapter 1, is interpreted in syntactic terms:
w

M (a) iff c(w) is such that a ∈ ΠM . The syntactic non-identity of a and b does the work,

though the methodological inclusion expression is interpreted over parts of the semantic
structures. This immediately solves the problem articulated in Chapter 1, and does so in a
way that is open to systems that do not distinguish edges from transitions, so long as those
systems have content states. This emphasizes the point that actions and processes cannot be
analyzed solely in terms of the transition relations associated with them. Second, if PLEN
were to interpret methodological inclusion expressions in terms of edges rather than binary
transition relations, the fact that Ra = Rb would not imply M (a) ≡ M (b). In fact, the
uniqueness of edge labels implies an important connection between the syntactic solution
and the ternary edge solution. In ad hoc notation, let Rae and Rbe be the ternary edge sets
for a and b, respectively. Then: Rae 6= Rbe iff a 6= b. This is due to the uniqueness of edge
labels. Thus, Rae 6= Rbe implies that the syntactic solution is available, and the syntactic
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solution implies that the ternary edge solution is available. Thus, whether M (a) and M (b)
are interpreted in terms of either syntax or edges, M (a) ≡ M (b) might fail even if Ra = Rb .
As a result, the validation of falsehoods about methodological feasibility no longer holds.
If a and b are mapped to the same transitions, then they are executable under equivalent
circumstances. But this doesn’t imply that the formula from Ch.1, hM i >, is true just
because b can be executed and a ∈ M . This transparently fails in PLEN; let w
some π such that w

hM i > iff

M (π) is executable at w. Then, the mere fact that Ra = Rb does not

imply that b ∈ M , and so it’s perfectly possible that w 1 hM i >. The difference maker is
that methodological inclusion is not interpreted in terms of Ra and Rb , but determined by
syntax.
Second, where A(π) and A(π 0 ) encode procedural information about π and π 0 , say convergence, divergence, dictation relations, or implementation relations among protocols, the
mere fact that π and π 0 are associated with identical transition relations does not lead to
confusion between A(π) and A(π 0 ). Again, this is simply because any such expressions will
be interpreted not with respect to the transition relations associated with them but in terms
of relations between syntactic features of π and π 0 themselves, the methodologies at states,
and the graph-theoretic features of EDGs. Explicitly, Com(π) and Rπ = Rπ0 do not imply
Com(π 0 ) for any of the procedural statements described above.
Finally, given the representation rules articulated in Chapter 3, the rationality and irrationality of actions and processes is determined not by transition relations associated with
protocols, but with edge and procedural path sets associated with them. This means that,
given the multi-graph structure of EDGs, even if π and π 0 are associated with the same transition relations, there may paths that execute π that do not execute π 0 and vice versa, thereby
distinguishing the verdicts that π and π 0 deliver with respect to any particular process p.
To sum, PLEN contains structures that explicitly represent epistemic processes as distinct
from epistemic transitions and contains structures that represent constraints on epistemic
processes (feasibility and capacity of processes) as distinct from constraints on epistemic
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transitions (feasibility and capacity of transitions).
Epistemic norms are represented with protocols in PLEN, and protocols are not interpreted with transition relations but with ternary or larger polyadic relations (procedural
paths). This enables PLEN to formalize several concepts of equivalence much stronger
than mere identity of transition relations. Conflation of processes with transitions resulted
in validation of propositional equivalences, A(π) ≡ A(π 0 ), between feasibility, procedural,
methodological, and normative statements about the instructions or norms that protocols
represent that were simply false. If the procedural content of protocols just comes down
to transition relations, and propositions about protocols are interpreted in terms of their
procedural content, then identity of transition relations yields about as strong an equivalence between π and π 0 as can be had. This protocol equivalence relation is what implied the
equivalences above; in fact it’s really a syntactic replacement result for a much simpler, more
confused system than PLEN. However, if the procedural content of protocols is analyzed in
the more complex terms of procedural paths, we get stronger protocol equivalence relations
that imply quite a lot. However, because propositions about protocols will no longer be
interpreted in terms of transition relations, the propositional equivalences noted above will
all fail.
Thus, the Processes and Constraints problems are solved. The Constraint Unfolding
problem can be solved simply by comparing EDGs, g and g 0 , such that g can be properly
embedded in g 0 (the states of g can be mapped to those in g 0 in such a way that all executability facts about g are preserved in g 0 and g 0 satisfies further executability facts). Between
these two graphs, one can determine what it would look like if some constraints modeled
in g did not hold. That is, at some state, s, in g, a might not be executable because its
preconditions are not met. But in g 0 , a might be executable at s’s counterpart.
Finally, the Reasoning problems are trivially solved by the metalogical reasoning about
epistemic dynamics and protocols possible in PLEN and also in the object level deductive
system of Syntax II. The latter provides an explicit encoding of valid forms of reasoning
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about protocols (hence, epistemic norms) and the features of epistemic dynamics that (e.g.)
compliance with norms determines. The differences between formulae like π1 ↔ π2 and
[π1 ]A ≡ [π2 ]A. The former provides explicit mathematical structures for reasoning rigorously
about processes as distinct from transitions as well as constraints on both of these and
different constraints across EDGs. I attack these problems in more detail in [135].

4.3

Formalizing Epistemic Norms: First-Class Citizenship

In this section, I argue that the syntax and semantics of PLEN provide structures that explicitly represent epistemic rationality norms and their procedural content, thereby solving
the First-Class Citizenship problem. To phrase it bluntly: epistemic rationality norms are
protocols in PLEN. To phrase it a bit more delicately, protocols are the formal structures
in PLEN that represent epistemic rationality norms. The thought is that norms straightforwardly instruct the selection and construction of courses of epistemic action the way that
programs instruct the selection and construction of courses of computational action. It takes
a bit of work to see this.
The argument that follows essentially shows that protocols can serve as constructions
from which the verdict information of epistemic norms can be read off. These structures are
restrictions on epistemic dynamics. Each protocol defines, for each EDG, a division of its
processes into rationally permissible and rationally impermissible sets, these restrictions in
turn specify restrictions on paths of states, transitions, and terminal states. More important,
for every such restriction on states, transitions, and paths, there is a protocol such that the
verdicts of these restrictions can be inferred, by means of the execution rules, from the syntax
of the protocol. Protocols are thus PLEN’s stand-ins for epistemic norms.
Additionally, the structures in PLEN with which protocols are associated represent indeterministic compliance with epistemic rationality norms. The contrast between these struc-
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tures and EDGs in which they can be embedded represents how epistemic dynamics unfolds
under normative restriction as contrasted to how it would unfold without the normative
restriction. This solves the Unfolding problems noted in Chapter 1.
Finally, the foregoing arguments, spelled out and defended in greater detail below, are
strengthened by certain formal results in PLEN. These results might be thought to lack
intuitive force or philosophical interest in the case that PLEN doesn’t offer a plausible
analysis of deontic notions, and, though far from decisive, this might weaken the overall
solution that PLEN offers to the First-Class Citizenship problem. To the end of resolving
this worry, there is a technical appendix giving a plausible - if preliminary - analysis of
epistemic deontics in PLEN.

4.3.1

How PLEN Solves the Problem

The basic thought of the solution is that protocols can be used to reduce a large class of
restrictions on procedural construction, which in turn reduces wide classes of other kinds
of restrictions on epistemic dynamics, which in turn reduce all of the important features
of a wide class of expressions that state the content of epistemic rationality norms. The
“important features” in this argument concern only the categorical and deontic verdicts of
the norms and the assignment of objects to rational and irrational sets by restrictions. The
following argument states the main moves of the solution more explicitly:
1. For all members of a large class of expressions that plausibly state the content of
epistemic norms, all of the most important things to derive about that content - the
categorical and deontic verdicts assigned to objects by epistemic rationality norms
under their conditions of application - can be derived from restrictions on dynamics of
the following kinds:
(a) Restrictions on states
(b) Restrictions on transitions
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(c) Restrictions on processes
2. Epistemic norms (also) restrict the construction of procedures; there are restrictions
on how epistemic actions can be sequenced, iterated, combined, chosen among, etc.,
and these are defined by some epistemic norms.
3. For each member of the class of restrictions on dynamics that account for the content of the norm expressions considered, there is a class of restrictions on procedural
construction such that the verdicts of each such restriction can be used to derive the
categorical and deontic verdicts of the other forms of restriction on dynamics. More
precisely:
(a) For every restriction on processes, there is a (class of) corresponding restriction(s)
on procedural constructions. The converse also holds.
(b) For every restriction on transitions, there is a (class of) corresponding restriction(s) on procedural constructions.
(c) For every restriction on states, there is a corresponding (class of) restriction(s)
on procedural constructions.
4. For each member of the foregoing class of restrictions on procedural construction,
there is a protocol in PLEN from which the verdicts of that restriction on procedural
construction can be read off syntactically.
5. ∴ For each member of the class of restrictions on dynamics that account for the content
of the norm expressions considered, there is a protocol from which the categorical and
deontic verdicts of that restriction on dynamics can be derived (even if only by means
of reading off the procedural restriction).
6. ∴ For all members of a large class of expressions that plausibly state the content of
epistemic norms, there is a protocol from which the categorical and deontic verdicts
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of that normative content can be derived (even if only by means of reading off the
procedural restriction).
In simpler terms, protocols unify many sorts of normative expression by doing exactly what
we would expect epistemic rationality norms to do with respect to epistemic dynamics;
specify restrictions on them, thereby dividing the good from the bad (the permissible from
the prohibited, the rational from the irrational).

4.3.2

Details of the Solution: Premise 1

The thought behind the first premise is that the central kinds of epistemic norms (categorical and deontic norms) and the different pieces of natural language that encode them
(including norm-kernels) are all unified - in a conceptual, informational, or pragmatic sense
- by restrictions on dynamics. Where I talk about the “content” of epistemic norms, I am
speaking loosely. I want to make no claims about what the contents of thoughts expressed
by normative claims are or what the best semantics of those expressions is. Accounting for
the contents of thoughts or best semantics is, at this stage of the project, simply too big a
task to take on. Rather, in speaking of the “content” of norms, I intend to denote the information that is associated with or conveyed by epistemic norms that is useful for complying
with, applying, or responding appropriately to them. This is a point I raised in Chapter
2, in discussing restrictions on dynamics and the cognitive role of epistemic norms. There,
I pointed out that in order to comply with norms, we need to be able to figure out what
verdicts they assign to their objects under their conditions of application. This information
is the “content” at which I am aiming.
There are several grammatically and/or semantically distinct types of expressions that
are called epistemic norms. Perhaps the standard account of norms, following von Wright,
identifies norms with norm kernels: conditionals that link normative expressions (assignments of valences to objects) to conditions of application, as described in Chapters 1 and 2.
But it’s far from clear that these kinds of conditional deontic expressions are actually the
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only or the best candidates for representing the content of epistemic norms. There are, after
all, numerous types of norms and numerous kinds of natural language construction that are
plausible candidates for encoding each of these types of norms.4 While von Wright argues
that norm-kernels are the core form of norms, this is disputed by imperativalists [250, 251],
who argue that norms are, at their core, imperatives or commands. The spiraling apart
and occasional reconvergence of deontic and imperative logic [89] is driven by the plausibility of both of these thoughts. More, natural language is straightforwardly noncommittal
about how norms are represented. We state norms with constructions including imperatives,
straightforward declaratives, and other kinds of rules or requirements, and it’s not clear that
any has any privileged claim to truly representing norms.
All of these types of normative expression (for the epistemic case) can be understood as
stating properties of restrictions on epistemic dynamics; they state what kinds of epistemic
factors go into what parts of the restriction. A restriction on dynamics is, informally, a
sorting of the possible changes in the world into different normative categories like rational or
irrational, legitimate or illegitimate, moral or immoral. The thought, then, is that epistemic
norms - however they are expressed - define restrictions on epistemic dynamics; they tell
us about the properties and contours of restrictions. Restrictions on epistemic dynamics
thereby unify all of these types of normative expression (for the epistemic case). Explicitly,
all epistemic normative expressions are associated with a restriction on epistemic dynamics
that, from the arguments of Ch.2, serve the normative expression’s essential cognitive roles.
This is what I mean when I say that restrictions on dynamics unify these expressions. There
are a few direct arguments for this premise.
First, recall restrictions on epistemic dynamics:
(Restrictions on Epistemic Dynamics) Consider some set S of components of epistemic
dynamics; these could be states, transitions, processes, or some specified subset thereof.
Let P (S) be the powerset of S. Consider some partial order relation ≺ on the elements,
4

See Chapter 1 of von Wright [261] for a much finer typology than I’ll be giving, here.
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Figure 4.1: Restrictions on Epistemic Dynamics

Pi , of P (S). Call some designated element of P (S), TI , the standard of irrationality.
Now, let RS and IS be subsets of S such that: ∀Pi ∈ P (S)∀s ∈ Pi (Pi  TI iff s ∈ IS ),
and ∀Pi ∈ P (S)∀s ∈ SPi (Pi  TI iff s ∈ RS ) Then: every R≺ = (P (S), ≺, TI , RS , IS )
is a restriction on epistemic dynamics.
Formally, the basic idea of restrictions is that restrictions involve rankings over the powerset
of a set of elements of epistemic dynamics, and these can be thought of, diagrammatically,
as boundaries separating different classes of epistemic factors into rational or irrational,
permissible or impermissible sets. Recall the information conveyed in Figure 4.1.
Restrictions on dynamics are complex tools for capturing the content of norms. The core
thought is that every epistemic rationality norm, in order to function in ante hoc regulation
or epistemic planning (re: Chapter 2), is associated with a set of restrictions on epistemic
dynamics that encode its verdicts. The powerset over the components of dynamics, S, breaks
up the set of components by property. Each Pi in P (S) can be thought of as the extension
of some property of these components, e.g., consistency of states or reliability of processes.
The subset RS is the set of rational components, and IS is the set of irrational components.
The ranking may often do no work, but it defines something like a relation of “more rational
than”, where this is relevant to the verdict assignments of norms.
Generally speaking, every expression that employs a normative term or a deontic expression obviously defines a set of restrictions: the objects of the normative expressions are
directly or conditionally assigned either to (e.g.) rational or irrational sets (RS or IS ), or
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placed somewhere in the ordering of subsets of the domain. In the central case of deontics,
the objects of norms are assigned to deontic categories, and this can be captured by restrictions. All of those actions that are rationally permissible compose the rational set, those
that are prohibited are in the irrational set. The obligatory actions are simply those actions
such that either (i) they are the uniquely permissible actions under some condition or (ii)
they must be executed in addition to any other permissible action. All one needs to analyze
obligation in terms of restrictions is machinery for thinking about these kinds of features of
action. All restrictions whose orderings match these assignments to rational and irrational
sets are models of such deontic norms.
Taking the analysis of normative expressions in terms of restrictions further, normative
terms like “right” and “wrong”, “legitimate” and “illegitimate”, “rational” and “irrational”
obviously define simple sets of restrictions. Conditional rules straightforwardly define restrictions, placing those contents that satisfy C into whatever category is employed in their
consequents. Normative declarations identify elements as members of the rational or irrational sets in a restriction. The deployment of evaluative terms rather than categorical
normative terms or deontics is also analyzable in terms of restrictions; positive evaluative
terms imply that, under conditions of parity, categorical and deontic restrictions apply. To
say that x is correct or that one has reason to a is just to say that if x or a is just like
everything else among one’s available options but that it satisfies the evaluative property in
question, one is rationally obligated to attain x or do a (one is irrational not to). Normative claims that employ comparative terms are similarly analyzable in terms of restrictions;
where x is more F than y, one is ceteris paribus rationally obligated to choose x over y (it’s
irrational not to). Thus, given that deontics are appropriately represented by restrictions on
dynamics, even these kinds of normative claims are unified by restrictions.
The case for premise 1, then, is that sets of restrictions on dynamics can be given that
capture the content of any familiar class of epistemic norm expressions. See the Table 4.2
for a loose typology of normative expressions and the categories that correspond to RS and
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IS in any restriction associated with each.
All of the natural language constructions that look like norms in the typology given in
Table 4.2 can be understood - at least insofar as the information necessary to comply with
them or respond appropriately to them is concerned - entirely in terms of restrictions on
epistemic dynamics. All of the foregoing, I think, makes the first premise highly plausible.
But a stronger argument can be given.
4.3.2.1

Norm-kernels, Norm Functions, and Protocol Functions

The argument focuses on norm-kernels. It will show that, insofar as the most ubiquitous
classes of epistemic rationality norms have their most important features - what factors they
assign to the rational and irrational sets under what conditions - captured by norm-kernels,
these features of these classes of norms are captured by restrictions on processes, transitions,
and states. That gives us premise 1. From there, the rest of the argument in section 4.3.1
tells us that the most important properties of these restrictions can be read off of restrictions
of procedural construction, and that the most important features of procedural restrictions
can ultimately be read off of protocols themselves.
So as to properly recognize its scope, I want to note explicitly that the argument for
premise 1 quantifies over only those restrictions on epistemic dynamics that capture the
content of norms that are (i) straightforwardly categorical (i.e., those norms that explicitly
divide epistemic factors into rational or irrational subsets) or (ii) deontic. The partial ordering on subsets of epistemic factors cannot be captured by the properties of the constructions
in PLEN, as it stands. However, as suggested in Chapter 6, a modification of PLEN with
weighted paths will plausibly do the trick. With that caveat out of the way, let’s move onto
the argument itself.
First, suppose, along with [261] and many others [164], that norm-kernels express the core
content of normative expressions. Every norm-kernel (hereafter, this term is interchangeable
with “norm”) maps conditions of application and objects (inter alia) to a valence. Thus, norms
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Table 4.2: Preliminary Typology of Epistemic Norms and Correlated Restrictions on Dynamics
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relate objects of epistemic appraisal to conditions and normative properties or valences.
Because of their conditional form, they can be thought of as functions from pairs of conditions
and objects to valences or normative properties of objects.
Let n be a norm. Let V al be a set of valences of epistemic rational appraisal, the normative properties attributed to the objects of epistemic appraisal. In other words, valences
encode the verdicts of norms, and so indirectly encode their requirements. For concreteness,
consider only the norms that apply deontic operators like rational obligation, rational forbiddance, and rational permissibility to their objects. Again, it’s a very plausible conjecture
that all of the remaining argument can be extended to more complicated norm-kernels, but
this is left to future work.
Let Dom(R) be the domain of rationality, the objects that can be appraised for the valences in V al. The domain of norms of rationality contains actions, conditions, and epistemic
states. Let Con be the set of conditions expressible in PLEN. That is, assume Con is a subset of LP LEN . Let nDom(R) ⊆ Dom(R) be the objects that n applies to. Let nCon ⊆ Con
be the conditions of application of n. Then:
Norm Functions Norm-kernels have the functional form: fn : (nCon, nDom(R)) −→ V al
The general reason to think that norm functions are suitable tools for approximating normkernels is the basic form of norm-kernels. They associate conditions of application with
assignments of deontic valences to their objects. There must thus be some norm function
that agrees with each norm-kernel. For instance, consider the norm-kernel:
Indiscriminate Consistency If your beliefs are inconsistent, then, if possible, it’s rationally obligatory to revise them in a way that removes the inconsistency by any procedure, plan, or program that effectively does so.
This rule can be formalized by means of protocol functions. First, define the following
constructions:
• Let nCon = {s | (b(A) ∧ b(¬A))}
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• nDom(R) = {π ∈ PP LEN | ([π]¬b(A)) ∨ ([π]¬b(¬A))}
• V al = {OM , PM , FM }

Read the elements of V al as deontic operators with the flavor of epistemic rationality, but
relativized to a methodology. For instance, “rationally obligatory”, OM , is read as obligatory
with respect to the union of all norms in the agent i’s methodology. Then our toy norm inadequate as it may be - can be formalized with the following norm function:
Indiscriminate Consistency Function fn : (nCon, nDom(R)) −→ V al such that:
fn (s, π) = PM iff s ∈ nCon, π ∈ nDom(R), and s
or ¬∃π 0 (π 0 ∈ nDom(R) ∧ s

hπi >, or s ∈
/ nCon and s

hπ 0 i >)

fn (s, π) = OM iff s ∈ nCon, for all π 0 ∈ nDom(R), it holds that s
s

hπi >,

π & π 0 , and

hπi >

fn (s, π) = FM iff s ∈ nCon, s
∃π 0 (π 0 ∈ nDom(R) ∧ s

hπi >, and ¬∃π 0 (π 0 ∈ nDom(R) ∧ π & π 0 ), and

hπ 0 i >),

At states at which inconsistencies are believed, this function maps executable protocols that
result in the elimination of the inconsistency to rational obligation (with respect to methodology M ). It maps executable protocols that don’t remove the inconsistency to rational
permissibility where there are no ways to remove the inconsistency. It maps executable
protocols to rational prohibition or forbiddance where they do not remove the inconsistency
and there are available methods to do so. Note that the function is entirely indiscriminate
with respect to what protocol one uses to eliminate the inconsistency if there are many. It
arbitrarily selects some executable inconsistency-removing procedure. It’s a mechanical task
to extend this kind of analysis to norms that states, transitions, actions, or processes - under
arbitrary conditions - to other valences.
Now, the crux of the argument is the following thought:
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Norm-Kernel Analysis For any norm-kernel, N , if all conditions of application relevant to
N are expressible in LP LEN and all of N ’s objects are actions, expressible conditions, or
states in PLEN, and all valences with respect to N are expressible in PLEN, then there
is a norm-function, fN , that represents that norm-kernel by mapping N ’s conditions
of application and objects to its valences. For every norm-function, fN , there is a
protocol, π, whose universal protocol function, fπ∀ , agrees with fN for every pair of
condition of application and object.
The idea behind Norm-Kernel Analysis is that protocols do the same thing that normkernels do; they map permutations of pairs of (i) conditions of application expressible in
LP LEN and (ii) objects (elements of epistemic dynamics) to valences, which are analyzed in
terms of execution-theoretic properties of protocols. This thought actually goes further than
we need it to; it goes all the way to the fundamental argument for the solution of First-Class
Citizenship by showing that the verdicts of norm-kernels can all be read off of some protocol.
I take this up in subsection 4.3.6. Here, however, I want to focus on a part of this thought
to establish the first premise above.
The protocol functions of π, as I define protocol functions below, are explicitly defined in
terms of the restrictions on dynamics that π is mapped to by the execution rules of PLEN:
the execution set of π. Thus, because the universal protocol function of π completely agrees
with the norm function of norm-kernel N , the restrictions on dynamics that are associated
with π by the semantics of PLEN are themselves constructions from which all of the verdicts
of N can be inferred. I now want to try to prove Norm-Kernel Analysis.
To prove Norm-Kernel Analysis, first define protocol functions. For each graph g in
which a protocol, π, is executable, π defines a set of conditions, πCon(g), a set of objects,
πDom(R)(g), and a set of valences πV al(g). The idea is that πCon(g) ⊆ LP LEN and
πCon(g) = {A |`g (A ≡ hπi >)}. It’s the union of the preconditions of π in g. These are the
conditions of application of π, a subset of all definable conditions in LP LEN .
Now, let πDom(R)(g) = πDom(R)Act(g) ∪ πDom(R)Con(g) ∪ πDom(R)Stat(g) be the
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domain of π. The general idea is that protocols, in virtue of the mechanisms of PLEN,
bear all sorts of relations to protocols, states, formulae of LP LEN , and so on. For instance,
let πDom(R)Act(g) ⊆ PP LEN , let π ≡gp π 0 mean that π and π 0 have identical sets of pro
cedural paths in graph g, and πDom(R)Act(g) = π 0 | ∃π 00 ∈ Sub(π)(π 0 ≡gp π 00 ) . Explicitly, πDom(R)Act(g) is the set of protocols that are procedurally equivalent with some
subprotocol of π; it’s the set of actions or procedures implicated in executions of π. Every execution of π in g executes some subset of πDom(R)Act(g). These actions are all
in the purview of the restriction of π. πDom(R)Con ⊆ LP LEN and πDom(R)Con(g) =
{B |`g ([π]B)}. That is, πDom(R)Con(g) is the set of strong postconditions of π in g; they’re
the conditions that are brought about at the states reachable by π. πDom(R)Stat(g) =
{s ∈ S | ∃p ∈ Pπ (s = last(p))}. This is the set of states that π can bring a system to via its
executions. In other words, these are the states reachable by π. In sum, πDom(R)(g) is the
set of objects of π in g; the things that the protocol can “assign” deontic valences to.
The deontic properties that an action, postcondition, or state can have relative to π are
contained in πV al = {Ob, P er, F orb}.5 These are the valences of the objects of π. The idea
is that actions, conditions, and states can have various relations to the restrictions defined by
π that encode deontic operators. The analysis of deontic operators in terms of protocols and
restrictions on dynamics will occupy a brief appendix to this chapter. The key, however, is
that the analysis of the deontic operators in terms of protocols and restrictions on dynamics
is plausible, and so each protocol function maps the conditions of application and the objects
in the domain of a protocol to the protocol-theoretic analysis of deontic operators. Please
grant me that for the moment.
Given the foregoing definitions, every protocol π generates a function, fπg , for every EDG
g in which π is executable:
Protocol Functions fπg : (πCon, πDom(R)) −→ πV al.
5

Again, only focusing on the basic deontic operators. With weighted graphs, any comparative property
relative to π, might be added to πV al, but this is a conjecture to be spelled out in future work.
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I omit the details of the specification of such functions; they are spelled out in the appendix
to this chapter and in the technical document [135]. Given this fact, for each set of g1 , ..., gn
in which π is executable, a universal protocol function for that set can be defined that agrees
with each fπgi for each gi :
Universal Protocol Functions fπ∀ : (πU Con, πU Dom(R)) −→ πV al where πU Con =
πCon(g1 ) ∪ ... ∪ πCon(gn ) and πU Dom(R) = πDom(R)(g1 ) ∪ ... ∪ πDom(R)(gn ) for
all gi in which π is executable at any state.
Define fV al : V al −→ πV al as a bijection from the objects in V al to the objects in πV al.
Then, the following proposition holds:
(PFT) For any fn , with any C ∈ nCon and any x ∈ nDom(R), if C ∈ LP LEN and x
is an action or procedure in PLEN, a condition expressible in LP LEN , or a state or
class of states in the semantics of PLEN, then there is a protocol π such that the
universal protocol function fπ∀ for arbitrary g1 , ..., gn in which π is executable is such
that fπ∀ (C, x) = fV al (fn (C, x)).
The proof of PFT is not difficult, and it’s left to the technical document [135]. This can easily
be seen to suffice for Norm-Kernel Analysis. Given that, as argued above, Norm-Kernel
Analysis suffices to show that restrictions on dynamics can be used to infer everything
we need to know about norm-kernels (i.e., their assignments of valences to objects under
conditions of application), we have the first premise.

4.3.3

Details of the Solution: Premise 2

The various forms of restriction on epistemic dynamics in Premise 1 are established by
D1 and D2. What’s interesting is the possibility of a further category of restriction on
epistemic dynamics. The observation of plausible sets of methodological norms from various
fields of logic and epistemology suggest a further category of restriction: restrictions on the
construction of epistemic procedures. More precisely, as the second premise states, there are
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numerous plausible methodological norms that define restrictions on procedural operations
on epistemic actions.
Informally, a restriction on procedural constructions is simply a restriction on the possible
ways that epistemic actions can be sequenced, iterated, chosen among, executed, conditioned
on tests, etc.. Formally:
(Restrictions on Procedural Construction) Let S be the set of all possible procedures
constructible out of any set of basic actions and any set of procedural operations.
Then every restriction on S, R≺ = (P (S), ≺, TI , RS , IS ), is a restriction on procedural
constructions.
Any rule that specifies that some ways of building a procedure out of constituent actions are
rational and others are irrational defines such a restriction. Every such rule defines a set of
procedures that “match” the rule and a set of procedures that fails to match it. Let RS be
the set of matching procedures, IS be the non-matching procedures, and ≺ be some suitable
similarity relation on the structure of the procedures or on the holding of the conditions of
application of the rule. The result is transparently a restriction on procedural constructions.
There are multiple ways of working out the details of this argument. For now, consider
this simple way of working it out. Suppose that a rule has the form of a norm-kernel,
and simply takes as its objects the sequential compositions of a set of actions, {a, b, c, d}.
Suppose a rule says that, if a sequential composition, π; ...; π 0 , doesn’t place a prior to c, then
that sequential composition is irrational. The procedures that match the rule are those that
sequentially compose a and c in the specified way. Generally, rules like this can be mapped
to a restriction such that if S1 is the set of procedures such that C holds of them, and S2
is the set of procedures that fails C, then RS = S1  TS = S2 = IS . Any binary partition
of a set can be matched with an ordering relation, as pointed out above with respect to
categorical norms. That norm-kernel thus defines a restriction on procedural constructions.
The norms in Table 4.3 define restrictions on ways in which epistemic actions can be
sequenced, iterated, concurrently executed, chosen among, combined with tests, comple-
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mented, reversed, or executed with minimal changes.
That each of these norms imposes a restriction on how rational procedures are built out
of more basic actions implies the second premise. This is straightforward. Some actions
make it impossible to execute other actions. In chemistry lab procedures, for instance, some
tests that detect properties of a substance destroy that substance, so other tests must be
performed first (assuming that tests must be performed on the same sample). In the more
purely epistemic case, the Detective example from the first chapter is one in which the ordering of the epistemic actions matters. If the detective had drawn conclusions earlier in the
process or failed to make some information available or failed to utilize certain sources of
information in inference, she’d have been unable to perform the deduction at the end. Very
many algorithms for manipulating technical constructions require some sequential orderings
of tasks and not others, semantic tableaux being a familiar philosophical example. Iterated
belief revision provides other examples. Proof construction provides yet more; in tableaux
methods, one ought to apply all applicable non-branching rules prior to applying branching rules in order to manage complexity of proofs. Proof systems also require iteration of
the same step, as do belief revision systems, and projection rule testing systems in FLT.
Systems incorporating multiple norms require concurrent compliance. Procedures for proof
construction give indeterministic choice among applicable steps. Norms like “If belief set K
is inconsistent, then revise it to consistency” require the performance of a test for consistency
sequentially followed by a revision action that may involve reversing the effects of a prior
process. All prohibitionary norms require performing actions other than those prohibited.
The controversial recovery rule of AGM requires reversal, as do all backtracking algorithms.
Finally, FLT procedures require finding projection rules that reach a fixed point. These
examples will be familiar from Chapter 2.
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Details of the Solution: Premise 3

The third premise asserts that restrictions on procedural construction effectively reduce all
other restrictions on epistemic dynamics. The details of this reduction are relegated to
the technical document [135], but the reduction can be verified relatively easily. First, the
idea of restrictions on procedural construction comes to the thought that, if we identify a
set or space of possible ways of building procedures out of a repertoire of basic actions, a
restriction is simply a division of that set/space into subsets into the correct or legitimate
ways of building procedures and the incorrect or illegitimate ways of building procedures.
We can define restrictions on procedural constructions more formally by defining syntactic
schemata:
Def.: Syntactic Schemata Let a syntactic schema be a sequence of symbols satisfying the
rules of PP LEN but defined over a set of variables (ΠV ) for elements of Π0 . Formally:

ΠV | π1 ; π2 | π1 ∩ π2 | π1 ∪ π2 | πi ∗ | (A)? | −πi |x πi | ∇πi
- where ΠV is a set of subscripted variables, hx1 , ..., xn i.
Call the set of syntactic schemata ΠSch . Explicitly define restrictions on procedural construction like so:
(Restrictions on Procedural Construction) Let S = ΠSch . Then every restriction on
S, R≺ = (P (S), ≺, TI , RS , IS ), is a restriction on procedural constructions or a syntactic
restriction.
By replacing the subprotocols in a protocol with variables that themselves can be replaced
with complex schemata, we identify ways of building procedures. Take x1 ; x2 . This schema
identifies the way of building procedures by sequential composition of atomic actions. The
more complex schema (x1 ; x2 ) ∩ (x3 ; (x1 ∪ x4 )) identifies the way of building procedures by
parallel execution on a sequential composition of atomics and a sequential composition of an
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atomic and a choice formed out of the first component of the first sequential composition and
a new component. Given finitely many atomic protocols, there are finitely many protocols
built according to this pattern, among them: (a; b) ∩ (c; (a ∪ d)) and (a; a) ∩ (a; (a ∪ a)).
Given the set of all syntactic schemata, a restriction on procedural constructions is just
a way of partitioning the possible ways to build protocols into rational and irrational sets.
A restriction on procedural constructions might, for instance, single out all sequential compositions as the rational ways of building procedures and the rest as irrational. The rational
sets of such a restriction would contain x1 ; x2 , x1 ; (x2 ; x3 ), (x1 ; x2 ); x3 , (x1 ∪ x2 ); x3 , and so
on for all of the possible ways of building a protocol such that sequential composition is the
main control operator.
Second, define correspondence among restrictions:
Def.: Correspondence Let RΠ be the rational set of syntactic schemata in a restriction
where S = ΠSch . Let RP X be the rational set of processes in a restriction where S = Pg
for some g. Let RT X be the rational set of transitions in a restriction where S = Tg .
0
, correspond iff:
Restrictions on different sets of elements, R≺ and R≺

1. For any πv , π that matches πv , and p such that p ∈ Pπ , πv is in RΠSch iff p is in
RP X .
2. For any p and any t such that t = hf irst(p), last(p)i, p is in RP X iff t is in RT X .
3. For any t and any s such that s = last(t), t is in RT X iff s is in RSX .
4. Same for IΠ , IP X , IT X .
Now, the Reduction Lemma, proven in [135], is as follows:
Reduction Lemma For every connected EDG:
(1) For every restriction on the construction of procedures, there is a corresponding
restriction on processes.
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(2) For every restriction on processes, there is a corresponding restriction on procedural constructions.
(3) For every restriction on transitions, there is a corresponding restriction on processes.
(4) For every restriction on states, there is a corresponding restriction on transitions.
(5) It is not the case that, for every restriction on processes, there is a corresponding
restriction on transitions nor a corresponding restriction on states.
(6) It is not the case that, for every restriction on transitions, there is a corresponding
restriction on states.
From the Reduction Lemma, premise 3 follows; for every restriction on epistemic dynamics,
R≺E , there is some restriction on procedural constructions, R≺C , from which all categorical and deontic verdicts of R≺E can be derived via the relevant correspondence rule. From
another angle, for any restriction on epistemic dynamics, R≺E , there is a restriction on procedural constructions, R≺C , that provides sufficient information for inferring the verdicts of
R≺E for any object in its domain. Whether or not a process, transition, or state is rational
according to a restriction of the relevant kind can be determined by examining the corresponding restriction on procedural constructions. The converses of these fail; there aren’t
restrictions on transitions or states that can be used to derive the verdicts of restrictions on
processes or procedural constructions. Thus, restrictions on procedural construction provide
structures for representing and reasoning about all other restrictions on epistemic dynamics.

4.3.5

Details of the Solution: Premise 4

Premise 4, which asserts that protocols can be used to read off the verdicts of restrictions
on procedural constructions, can be gotten rather simply from the notion of restrictions on
procedural construction. It turns out that every protocol can be associated with a restriction
on procedural constructions by means of the following notion of a matching syntactic schema:
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1M) Every protocol contains a sequence of atomic subprotocols, π1 , ..., πn . Consider an arbitrary function, f : hπ1 , ..., πn i −→ ΠV . A protocol schema, πV , matches a protocol, π,
iff there is a sequence of variables hx1 , ..., xn i, such that hx1 , ..., xn i = hf (π1 ), ..., f (πn )i.
By 1M, every protocol, π, can straightforwardly be mapped to a set of syntactic schemata
such that uniformly substituting the sequence of atomic protocols in π for the variables in the
schema yields π. For instance, by 1M, (a ∩ b); (c ∪ d) is matched by schema (x1 ∩ x2 ); (x3 ∪ x4 )
but is not matched by schema x1 ; x2 . Thus, it’s easy to see that each protocol is mapped to
a restriction on procedural constructions by 1M. The restriction on procedural constructions
such that RΠSch is the set of matching schemata and IΠSch is the set of non-matching schemata
suffices to show that there is a set of restrictions on procedural constructions (i.e., syntactic
schemata) that can be read off of the syntax of π. The elements of the set of matching and
non-matching schemata can be straightforwardly enumerated by checking to see whether
replacing the atomics in π with the variables in πv generates πv . Thus, the elements of RΠSch
(resp. IΠSch ) can be enumerated by checking to see whether replacing the atomics in π with
the variables in πv generates πv . If so, then it goes into RΠSch . If not, then it goes into IΠSch .
With the notion of matching schemata, the following theorem and its proof give premise
4:
Reading Off Theorem For every restriction, RSch , on procedural constructions, there
are sets of protocols, {π1 , ..., πn }, and individual protocols, π, such that a set, R, of
restrictions containing RSch can be read off of the set (resp. protocol), and every
restriction that R contains is identical to RSch with respect to its rational, irrational,
and threshold sets.
Proof-plan Define procedures for reading off restrictions on construction from protocols:
R1 Take the set of protocols, {π1 , ..., πn }, such that each πi is matched by at least
one πv in RSch by 1M. Eliminate redundancies. From this set of protocols,
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RSch can be read off by simply adding a matching πv to the rational set for
each πi . Do the same for each other component of the restriction.
R2 Let π = π1 ∪ (...(... ∪ πn )) where each πi is in {π1 , ..., πn } from R1. Then read
off the set of schemata such that they match the πi by 1M. Do the same for
each other component of the restriction.
For any such restriction, each element of the rational set is matched by a set of
protocols that differ only in the sequence of atomics that they contain. The set of
protocols thus only requires one of these protocols for each schema in order to read
off exactly the rational set of schemata. Just so for each of the other components.
From this set of protocols we can thus read off the set of restrictions containing
exactly that restriction. Every other restriction in that set that can be so read off
will be identical to RSch with respect to its categorical and deontic verdicts; they
will contain all and only schemata that match each πi . Thus, these restrictions
can differ by only their ordering relations. Thus, everything to be derived about
the verdicts of the restriction can be derived from the set of restrictions that can
be read off of {π1 , ..., πn } (resp. π). 
This theorem, coupled with the Reduction Lemma, implies that all restrictions on epistemic
dynamics can be read off of the syntax of protocols in verdict-equivalent sets, and this enables
us to derive everything about the verdicts of the norms represented by restrictions.

4.3.6

Details of the Solution: Putting it All Together

Premise 2 worked to motivate the examination of restrictions on procedural construction.
From there, the rest of the argument falls into place. From premises 1, 3, and 4, it follows
that protocols are the proper devices in PLEN with which to represent epistemic rationality
norms. To summarize: Protocols are devices from which the most important information
about restrictions on epistemic dynamics can be inferred, and restrictions on epistemic dy-
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namics unify the information necessary to comply with or respond appropriately to epistemic
rationality norms.
To recapitulate detail: For each restriction on processes that determines the properties of
the corresponding restrictions on transitions and states, there is a corresponding restriction
on procedural constructions. Correspondence between two restrictions on dynamics ensures
that we can derive information about the assignment of objects to rational and irrational sets
of one restriction from the assignment of the other. This verdict information about restrictions on procedural constructions can be read off of the syntax of some protocol, π, or set
of protocols, {π1 , ..., πn }. Given that restrictions on processes unify the classes of normative
expressions adumbrated above (whether by means of defining protocol functions that agree
with the norm functions of the underlying norm-kernels or simply by codifying the verdicts
of those expressions), procedural constructions unify these classes just as well due to the
Reduction Lemma; anything inferable about the verdicts of the normative expressions from
the restriction on processes can be inferred from the restrictions on procedural constructions.
Thus, by the Reading Off Theorem, these restrictions can all be read off of the syntax of
protocols; protocols themselves are constructions from which anything inferable about the
verdicts of the normative expressions can be inferred. Hence, protocols are the best possible
candidate out of the formal devices available in PLEN for analyzing epistemic rationality
norms themselves, insofar as epistemic rationality norms are objects that underly the different
kinds of epistemic norm expression.6

4.3.7

PFT Solves the First-Class Citizenship Problem

Now, as I hinted above, the solution can actually just be derived from PFT itself. The basic
idea is that for every norm under consideration, there is a formal object - a norm function
- that corresponds to it that mirrors its mapping of objects to valences under conditions
6

It’s also possible to run nearly same argument while bypassing the restrictions on procedural construction.
Simply note that each protocol is directly associated with a restriction on processes by the execution rules.
From the relevant clauses of the reduction lemma, the restrictions that capture the content of norm-kernels
can all be read off of protocols anyway.
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of application. Norm functions can all be mirrored in the same way by protocol functions.
Thus, for every norm, n, with content fully analyzed by a norm function, there is a protocol
that represents n by defining an agreeing function from the conditions of application and
objects of n to the protocol-theoretic analysans of n’s valences. More precisely, assuming
that each valence has a formal counterpart in PLEN, there is a protocol that maps every
pair of condition C and object x of any norm n to the formal counterpart of the valence
of x under C according to n. Thus, for instance, the Indiscriminate Consistency Function
has protocol-theoretic partner - the protocol π such that fπ∀ agrees with the Indiscriminate
Consistency Function for every condition of application and object.
If the foregoing arguments are right, and, for every norm-kernel that can be captured
by the norm functions considered, there is a protocol that can be used to read off all of
the verdicts (assignments of valence to object under condition of application) of the normkernel, then it follows that that protocols perform a theoretical unification of the normative
expressions in our taxonomy above. To see the foregoing claim, recall that protocol functions
are defined in terms of the execution sets of protocols, which are defined in terms of the
syntactic forms of protocols. Execution sets of protocols are basic forms of restrictions on
epistemic dynamics and define derivative restrictions. Let S = Pg , let the execution set be
RS , and let TI = IS = Pg /RS . Each execution set defines restrictions on states: let S = W ,
and let the set of terminal states be RS . For transitions: let S be the set of transitions
possible in a graph, let RS be the set of all pairs of first and last states of any execution of
π. Thus, from PFT, every norm-kernel can be represented, via its norm function, by a set
of restrictions on epistemic dynamics defined by the syntactic form of some protocol, π, in
that the restrictions on dynamics can be “read off” of the syntax by means of the execution
rules and the relations between execution sets and restrictions on dynamics.
Thus, from PFT, it follows that if norm-kernels unify or underly the informational content
of all of the other forms of expression commonly called “epistemic norms”, then the restrictions on epistemic dynamics defined by protocols provide a unifying formal construction for
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all of these expressions7 . Protocols thus provide a formal analysans of the unifying content
of norm expressions. From properties of the syntax or semantics of protocols, properties of
norm kernels can be inferred, and thus properties about the unifying content of epistemic
norm expressions can be inferred. More explicitly, let N be a norm-kernel such that there is
a norm-function, fn , expressible in PLEN that captures the assignment of valences in V al
to its objects under any of its conditions of application. The PFT results show that there
is a universal protocol function, fπ∀ , from which all such assignments of N ’s norm function
can be inferred. The foregoing results also show that there is a protocol, π, such that the
assignments of fπ∀ can be inferred from the syntax of π by means of first figuring out π’s execution sets, and then deriving the restrictions on processes, transitions, states, and formulae
of LP LEN from that. Thus, protocols are constructions that represent the unifying content
of epistemic rationality norms.

4.4

Formalizing D1-D3

Section 4.2 showed how PLEN solved the Processes and Constraints problems. This section
puts all of the foregoing pieces together to complete the formalization of the core theory
defended in Part I. The formalization of D1-D3 is central to this project. In particular, I
show that for each of D1-D3, there is a provable formal assertion at the meta-level of PLEN,
a derivable (and thus valid) formula at the object-level of PLEN, a set of valid rules, or an
object-level theory that corresponds to it.
Prior to getting on with the formalizations, I want to lay groundwork concerning the
theoretical adequacy of the formalization of D1-D3. The basic conception of adequacy for
formalizations is adapted from the formal adequacy theses of [18]:
7

Again, I wish not to wade into the battles concerning content, but merely to argue that (a) norms can be
complied with or applied, and (b) normative expressions can be appropriately or inappropriately responded
to. The idea of this argument is merely that, if we suppose that the information necessary to comply with
or apply norms and respond appropriately to normative expressions can be read off of norm-kernels, then,
because we can read off all of the features of norm-kernels from restrictions on dynamics and the features of
restrictions can, in turn, be read off of protocols, then we can read all of this information off of protocols.
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THESIS I. Let s be a social situation involving the intuitive concepts of knowledge, justifiable beliefs and common knowledge among a group of agents. Assume
that s is presented in such a way that all the relevant features of s pertaining to
knowledge, beliefs and common knowledge are completely determined. Then we
may associate to s a mathematical model S. (S is a multi-agent Kripke model;
we call these epistemic state models.) The point of the association is that all
intuitive judgements concerning s correspond to formal assertions concerning S,
and vice-versa.
THESIS II. Let σ be a social “action” involving and affecting the knowledge
(beliefs, common knowledge) of agents. This naturally induces a change of situation; i.e., an operation o taking situations s into situations o(s). Assume that o
is presented by assertions concerning knowledge, beliefs and common knowledge
facts about s and o(s), and that o is completely determined by these assertions.
Then
(a) We may associate to the action σ a mathematical model Σ
which we call an epistemic action model. (Σ is also a multi-agent
Kripke model.) The point again is that all the intuitive features of,
and judgments about, σ correspond to formal properties of Σ.
(b) There is an operation ⊗ taking a state model S and an action
model and returning a new state model S ⊗ Σ. So each induces an
update operation O on state models: O(S) = S ⊗ Σ.
(c) The update O is a faithful model of the situation change o, in
the sense that for all s: if s corresponds to S as in Thesis I, then again
o(s) corresponds to O(S) in the same way; i.e. all intuitive judgements
concerning o(s) correspond to formal assertions concerning O(S), and
vice-versa. (pp. 166-167)
For this project: A formalism, F , is theoretically adequate to the analysis of epistemic
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dynamics, epistemic rationality, and epistemic rationality norms iff it contains elements
satisfying the following theses:
THESIS I. Let s be an epistemic state. Assume that s is presented in such a way that
all the relevant features of s pertaining to the content of s are completely determined.
Then we may associate to s a mathematical model S. The point of the association is
that all intuitive judgements concerning s correspond to formal assertions concerning
S, and vice-versa.
THESIS II. Let σ be an epistemic “action” involving and affecting the epistemic states of
agents. This naturally induces a change of epistemic state; i.e., an operation o taking
situations s into states, o(s). Assume that o is presented by assertions concerning the
content of s, the postconditions, preconditions, and alternatives of o(s) (including the
content of the new state), and about the procedural properties of σ and their relation
to s and o(s), and that o is completely determined by these assertions. Then
(a) We may associate to the action σ a mathematical model g which we call an epistemic directed graph. The point again is that all the intuitive features of, and
judgments about, σ correspond to formal properties of g.
(b) There is an operation ⊗ taking a state model S and an action σ and returning
an EDG, S ⊗ σ. So each induces an executability assignment O on state models:
O(S) = S ⊗ σ.
(c) The assignment O is a faithful model of the state change o, in the sense that for
all s: if s corresponds to S as in Thesis I, then again o(s) corresponds to O(S) in
the same way; i.e. all intuitive judgements concerning o(s) correspond to formal
assertions concerning O(S), and vice-versa.
THESIS III. Let N be an epistemic norm concerning the rationality of states, transitions, and actions, processes, or procedures of epistemic state change. This naturally
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induces a restriction on states, transitions, and actions/processes/procedures of epistemic state change; i.e., an operation r taking norms N into sets of states, transitions,
and actions/processes/procedures, r(N ). Assume that r is presented by assertions
concerning procedural operations that construct complex actions and procedures, the
procedural content of N , the postconditions, preconditions, and alternatives of complying with N or controlling one’s dynamics in accordance with r(N ), and about the
procedural properties of N and their relation to s and o(s), and that r is completely
determined by these assertions. Then
(a) We may associate to the norm N a mathematical model π which we call an epistemic protocol. The point again is that all the intuitive features of, and judgments
about, N correspond to formal properties of π.
(b) There is an operation ⊗ taking an EDG, g, and a norm N and returning an EDG
g ⊗ N . So each induces a restriction operation R on EDGs: R (π) = g ⊗ N .
(c) The restriction operation R is a faithful model of the restriction r, in the sense
that for all N : if N corresponds to π as in Thesis I, then again r(N ) corresponds to
R (π) in the same way; i.e. all intuitive judgements concerning r(N ) correspond
to formal assertions concerning R (π), and vice-versa.
This defines the fundamental argumentative goals of the section. Note that the desiderata,
D1-D3, defended in Chapter 2 are or imply “intuitive” or, rather, semi-formal but philosophically defensible judgments concerning epistemic dynamics and epistemic rationality norms.
Thus, adequacy of PLEN as a formal framework requires providing formal assertions to correspond to the objects of these judgments. Now, if section 3 is right, then protocols are the
best devices in PLEN for representing epistemic rationality norms. It is the properties of
protocols, then, that we must search for assertions that correlate to D1-D3. More precisely,
adequacy requires that for every principle about epistemic rationality and its norms, D1-D3,
there is a provable formal assertion at the meta-level of PLEN about protocols, a derivable
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(and thus valid) formula at the object-level of PLEN, a set of valid rules governing the properties of protocols, or an object-level theory that corresponds to it. I argue in this section
that this is the case by spelling out the formal assertions that correspond to each of D1-D3.

Before presenting those results, I must emphasize that none of the analyses below is
taken to be final; each of them is merely a demonstration that PLEN contains the resources
to provide formal assertions corresponding to each of D1-D3. This is not to say that the
analyses don’t still need work. The goal is to make it plausible that good work can be done
with the tools of PLEN.

4.4.1

D1

D1 Epistemic rationality is dynamic; there are epistemic restrictions on transitions among
epistemic states, not just states or contents of states, and there are characteristic
relations among restrictions on states and restrictions on transitions.
This principle contains the core assertion of epistemic dynamicism: there are epistemic
restrictions on transitions among epistemic states. This principle was defended in Chapter
2. However, in arguing against epistemic dynamicism, Chapter 2 defended more than just
this core assertion; the following were also defended, spelling out D1’s hint of “characteristic
relations” among types of restrictions:
(D1.1) There are norms of epistemic rationality that take epistemic transitions as their
objects.
(D1.2) There are norms of epistemic rationality that take properties of epistemic transitions
as their conditions.
(D1.3) Norms that restrict epistemic states can generate norms that restrict epistemic transitions.
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(D1.4) Norms that restrict epistemic transitions can generate norms that restrict epistemic
states.
Now, how are all of these claims formalized in PLEN? Much of the work was done above in
section 3. First, the execution rules of PLEN map sets of transitions to each protocol - the
set, Tπ , of all transitions composed of the first and last states of some path in Pπ . Defining
a restriction on transitions that is mapped to each protocol is thus trivial; Tπ = RT X and
TI = IT X = Tg /Tπ . Since epistemic rationality norms are represented in PLEN by protocols,
it’s transparent that there are epistemic restrictions on transitions: the formal counterparts
of epistemic restrictions on transitions are the Tπ mapped to each protocol. That is, a formal
assertion corresponding to the first clause of D1 is this:
(RET) For every protocol, π, for every EDG, g, there is a set of transitions,
Tπ = {hw, w0 i | ∃p(p ∈ Pπ , w = f irst(p), w0 = last(p)}, in g. There is thus, trivially,
a restriction on transitions corresponding to π such that RT X = Tπ , and TI is the
complement of Tπ .
In other words, that w0 can be reached from w by execution of π implies that the transition
is in the restriction defined by the norm that π represents. Switching to intuitive epistemological language, every execution of π is a rational or correct epistemic process according to
π, so the rational transitions according to π are those that bookend the rational processes.
Another way of putting this is that the rational transitions are those that can be achieved
by implementing π. So, there are epistemic restrictions on transitions.
Now, it might be objected that the presence of restrictions on transitions does not imply
that there are restrictions that are not just restrictions among states or contents of states.
Of course, an epistemic staticist would argue that restrictions on transitions are, in principle,
reducible to restrictions on states. However, EDGs contain restrictions on transitions that
cannot be reduced to restrictions on contents of states.8 First, there is a technical reason:
8

Staticists would have to defend restrictions on states irrespective of content in order to reduce these
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states are represented with nodes that are then associated with contents via the content
function, there are restrictions on states that rule in hw, w0 i and rule out hw, w00 i even if
w0 has identical content with w00 . Identity of content does not imply identity of state in
PLEN. Second, there is a philosophical reason: even if we focus on restrictions on content
states alone, there are restrictions that rule in hc(w), c(w0 )i and rule out hc(w00 ), c(w0 )i while
also ruling in hc(w), c(w0 )i and ruling out hc(w), c(w00 )i that, if the arguments of Chapter 2
are correct, capture the content of plausible epistemic norms. These restrictions cannot be
reduced to restrictions on states by any function defined by a rule that considers only the
properties of content states nor, for the reasons in Chapter 2, by any function that meets
the staticist’s aims.
Second, PFT implies all of D1.1-D1.4.
(PFT) For any fn , with any C ∈ nCon and any x ∈ nDom(R), if C ∈ LP LEN and x
is an action or procedure in PLEN, a condition expressible in LP LEN , or a state or
class of states in the semantics of PLEN, then there is a protocol π such that the
universal protocol function fπ∀ for arbitrary g1 , ..., gn in which π is executable is such
that fπ∀ (C, x) = fV al (fn (C, x)).
Simply put, PFT shows that, for any epistemic norm with conditions of application expressible in LP LEN , domain contained somewhere in the set of structures of PLEN, and valences
encoded in execution-theoretic facts, there is a universal protocol function for some protocol
that agrees with that norm. It follows trivially from PFT that:
PFTC1 If there is an epistemic norm, N , such that (i) its condition of application C is expressible in LP LEN (e.g., any postcondition statements, any precondition statements),
(ii) its objects are represented by objects in the structures of PLEN (e.g., states,
kinds of restrictions on transitions, and for them, this is unintelligible. Only the static features of states are
normatively salient, and individuating properties other than content (e.g., time index, relations to processes,
relations to predecessor and successor states) are dynamic. However, the protocol-theoretic account via
PLEN makes perfectly good sense of transitions among content-identical states being rationally distinct;
there might be a rational process that takes you from w to w0 but not rational process that takes you from
s to s00 .
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transitions, paths, syntactic schemata), and (iii) its valences are encoded in executiontheoretic properties of PLEN, then there is a protocol πN such that the domain of the
universal protocol function of π takes the expression that corresponds to C and any
object, x, of N to the valence that N attributes to x.
PFTC2 If a transition, t, is in nDom(R), then there is a π such that t is in πDom(R).
PFTC3 If a condition, C, is in nDom(R), then there is a π such that C is in πDom(R).
Thus, if there are epistemic norms that take transitions (that are, in principle, representable
in PLEN) as their objects, then there are protocols that take transitions as their objects
- there are protocols the protocol functions of which take transitions. PFT also implies
that if there are epistemic norms that take properties of transitions expressible in LP LEN
as their conditions of application, then there are protocols that take those expressions as
conditions of application. Again, for any such norm, there is a protocol whose protocol
function takes those expressions as inputs. Taking an object or condition as an input, the
protocol function maps condition and object pairs to valences, thus delivering valences about
those objects. Valences are encoded in the execution sets and derivative constructions. Thus,
protocol functions place objects of norms into restrictions on dynamics that correspond to the
protocols. Thus, PLEN has a systematic way of saying that there are epistemic restrictions
on transitions and that these are conditioned on properties of transitions. This, I think,
suffices to show that PFTC2 and PFTC3 correspond to D1.1 and D1.2
Now, for D1.3 and D1.4, much simpler features of PLEN correspond:
(RST) For every connected EDG, g, and every restriction on states, R≺S , defined on the
states of g, there is a restriction on transitions, R≺T , defined on the set of transitions
in g such that a transition, t, is in RT X iff last(t) ∈ RSX .
(RTS) For every connected EDG, g, (i) there is some restriction on transitions, R≺T , defined
on the transitions of g, such that there is a restriction on states, R≺S , defined on the
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set of states in g such that a transition, t, is in RT X iff last(t) ∈ RSX , and (ii) there is
some restriction on transitions such that there is no restriction on states meeting the
foregoing condition.
These are mechanically derivable from the definition of restrictions, as shown in the proof of
the Reduction Lemma in [135]. Thus, PLEN has systematic means for thinking about how
transition restrictions can generate state restrictions and vice versa. Note that this coheres
with the objections to staticism in Chapter 2. It cannot be the case that all restrictions
on transitions are reducible to restrictions on states in virtue of their terminal states, as
there may be transitions t and t0 such that last(t) = last(t0 ). These cases are, of course,
exemplified by the cases discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.

4.4.2

D2

D2 Epistemic rationality is procedural; there are epistemic restrictions on epistemic actions,
processes, and procedures, not just states or transitions among states, and there are
characteristic relations among restrictions on transitions and restrictions on processes.
D2 expands on D1. Not only is epistemic rationality dynamic, it’s procedural. In particular,
Chapter 2 argues that:
(D2.1) There are norms of epistemic rationality that take epistemic processes as their objects.
(D2.2) There are norms of epistemic rationality that take epistemic procedures as their
objects.
(D2.3) The norms of epistemic rationality take properties of epistemic processes and procedures as their conditions.
(D2.4) Norms that restrict epistemic transitions can generate norms that restrict epistemic
processes.
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(D2.5) Norms that restrict epistemic transitions can generate norms that restrict epistemic
procedures.
(D2.6) Norms that restrict epistemic processes and procedures can both generate norms
that restrict epistemic transitions.
Again, formalization is largely carried out by the machinery already introduced. First, the
execution rules of PLEN map restrictions on processes to each protocol. The execution rules
map sets of processes to each protocol:Pπ . Defining a restriction on processes that is mapped
to each protocol is trivial: the formal counterparts of epistemic restrictions on processes are
the executions mapped to each protocol: RP X = Pπ and TI = IP X = Pg /Pπ . That is, a
formal assertion corresponding to the first clause of D2 is this:
(REP) For every protocol, π, for every EDG, g, there is a set of processes, Pπ , in g that is
mapped to π by the execution rules. There is thus, trivially, a restriction on processes
corresponding to π such that RP X = Pπ and TI is the complement of Pπ .
In other words, the processes that execute π are the rational processes according to π.
Switching to intuitive epistemological language, every execution of π is a rational or correct
epistemic process according to π. Another way of putting this is that the rational processes
are those that can be achieved by implementing π.
Second, each of D2.1-D2.3 correspond to the following trivial corollaries of PFT:
PFTC4 If a process, p, is in nDom(R), then there is a π such that p is in πDom(R).
PFTC5 If a procedure, Pπ , is in nDom(R), then there is a π 0 such that any π 00 s.t. that
Pπ00 = Pπ is in π 0 Dom(R)
PFTC6 If a condition, C, is in nDom(R), then there is a π such that C is in πDom(R).
Thus, if there are epistemic norms that take processes (that are, in principle, representable in
PLEN) as their objects, then there are protocols that take processes as their objects - there
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are protocols the protocol functions of which take processes as inputs. PFT also implies that
if there are epistemic norms that take procedures or sets of processes (that are, in principle,
representable in PLEN) as their objects, then there are protocols such that their protocol
functions take protocols for which those procedures are execution sets as inputs. Simply put,
protocols can deliver rationality verdicts about procedures by mapping them conditionally
to valences. Finally, PFT implies that if there are epistemic norms that take properties of
processes expressible in LP LEN as their conditions of application, then there are protocols
that take those expressions as conditions of application. Again, for any such norm, there is
a protocol whose protocol function takes those expressions as inputs. Taking an object or
condition as an input, the protocol function maps condition and object pairs to valences,
thus delivering valences about those objects. Valences are encoded in the execution sets and
derivative constructions. Thus, protocol functions place objects of norms into restrictions on
dynamics that correspond to the protocols. Thus, PFTC4, PFTC5, and PFTC6 correspond,
respectively, to D2.1, D2.2, and D2.3.
Finally, D2.4-D2.6 correspond to the simple propositions:
(RTP) For every EDG, g, and every restriction on transitions, R≺T , defined on the transitions of g, there is a restriction on processes, R≺P , defined on the set of processes in g
such that a transition, t, is in RT X iff p ∈ RP X .
(RTPr) For every EDG, g, and every restriction on transitions, R≺T , defined on the transitions of g, there is a restriction on procedures, R≺P r , defined on the set of procedures
(the set of sets of processes, the powerset of Pg ) in g such that a transition, t, is in
RT X iff p ∈ RP rX .
(RPT) For every EDG, g, (i) there is some restriction on processes, R≺P , defined on g,
such that there is a restriction on transitions, R≺T , defined on g such that for all
transitions, t, such that t = hf irst(p), last(p)i, p ∈ RP X iff t ∈ RT X , (ii) there is some
restriction on processes such that there is no restriction on transitions meeting the
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foregoing condition.
(RPrT) For every EDG, g, (i) there is a restriction on procedures, R≺P r defined on the
set of procedures (the set of sets of processes, the powerset of Pg ) in g, such that
there is a restriction on transitions, R≺T , defined on g such that a transition, t, t =
hf irst(p), last(p)i, for some p ∈ Pπ for some π that matches a πV , π ∈ RSch iff t ∈ RT X ,
and (ii) there is some restriction on procedures such that there is no restriction on
transitions meeting the foregoing condition.
These propositions - trivial consequences of the Reduction Lemma - each show simple ways
of constructing restrictions on elements of epistemic dynamics from restrictions on other
elements of epistemic dynamics. The latter two formalizations note the limited reducibility
of restrictions on processes and procedures to other restrictions. There can’t be, as shown
in [135], for all arbitrary restrictions on processes or procedures, restrictions on transitions
from which the restrictions on processes (resp. procedures) can be derived. Suffice it to say
that these assertions show how to formalize claims about the generation of restrictions from
other kinds of restrictions in PLEN.

4.4.3

D3

D3 Epistemic rationality norms define restrictions on epistemic dynamics that model (a)
ideally rational evolution of epistemic state, (b) ideally rational changes of epistemic
state, (c) ideally rational procedures and processes of epistemic state change, and that
(d) can be distinguished from constraints of capacity and feasibility.
Corollary Epistemic rationality norms restrict the construction of procedures; they
determine how basic epistemic actions are (rationally) to be sequenced, iterated,
combined, chosen among, conditioned on tests, avoided, reversed, and cautiously
executed.
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As argued in Chapter 2 and earlier in Chapter 4, D3 characterizes the unifying model of
the content of epistemic rationality norms. Epistemic rationality norms define restrictions
on epistemic dynamics in the sense that the norms determine what elements of epistemic
dynamics occupy what parts of the restriction. The extension of the restriction then characterizes ideally rational epistemic dynamics. If a norm determines that a class of epistemic
states is rational (or at least maximal in the ordering of the restriction), then ideally rational
(with respect to the norm in question) agents will end up in those states. If a norm determines that a transition is rational (or higher in the ordering than other available transitions),
then an ideal agent, when in the root state, will transition accordingly given the option. If a
norm determines that a process or procedure is rational (or higher in the ordering than other
available processes), then, at a state at which that process (or a process in the procedure)
can be carried out, an ideally rational agent will carry it out. These are trivial consequences
of the notion of ideal rationality - an ideally rational agent complies with epistemic norms.
But compliance with a norm, in PLEN, is cashed out in terms of membership in the rational
subset of the restriction mapped to the norm or comparative superiority in the ranking in
the restriction. Thus, an ideal agent’s epistemic dynamics are in the rational subsets or are
comparatively superior in the ranking of the restrictions defined by epistemic norms.
The corollary of D3 extends this basic idea to the construction of procedures out of basic
actions. As argued in Chapter 2, epistemic norms frequently tell us that certain sequences,
combinations, choices, iterations, conditioning on tests, reversals, and other procedural operations on epistemic actions are rational, irrational, or more or less rational. A procedure’s
compliance with an epistemic norm, in PLEN, is characterized by restrictions. Restrictions
divide and order ways of building procedures. A way of building a procedure is rational
according to a norm if that way of building the procedure is in the right place with respect
to the restriction. An ideally rational agent will structure procedures accordingly.
As in Chapter 2, some details of D3(d) are spelled out by these further assertions:
(D3.1) Normative restrictions are distinct from constraints of capacity and feasibility.
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(D3.2) Particular models of the actual evolution of a reasoner’s epistemic states can be
compared with the correct evolution as defined by the norms of rationality.
As argued, capacity and feasibility impose bounds on epistemic dynamics; there are formally,
physically, or logically possible states, transitions, and processes that are ruled out by various
factors. These bounds are distinct from those imposed by epistemic normativity. There are
perfectly feasible (e.g.) processes that are not rationally permissible. A model of the feasible
courses of epistemic development is thus very different from a model of the normative courses
of epistemic development.
The D3 corollary was spelled out in Chapter 2 with the following assertions:
(D3c.1) Epistemic rationality requires the execution of sequential and iterative procedures.
(D3c.2) Epistemic rationality requires parallel execution of procedures.
(D3c.3) Epistemic rationality requires nondeterministic choice among procedures.
(D3c.4) Sequential and iterative procedures determine sequentially composed paths through
epistemic state space.
(D3c.5) Parallel execution procedures determine converging and corresponding paths through
epistemic state space.
(D3c.6) Procedures instructing nondeterministic choice determine branching paths through
epistemic state space.
D3c.1-D3c.3 simply outline some of the procedural operations that epistemic norms rule
in. The rest correlate features of epistemic dynamics to the procedural operations that
are ruled in by various norms thereon. For instance, if a norm rules in - as rational a sequential composition of actions, then, given that processes sequences of actions that
transform epistemic states, there is a corresponding rational process.

CHAPTER 4. PLEN AS A THEORY

237

The formal assertion corresponding to D3 and its corollary has not been introduced
above, but has been implicated by it. Naturally, all of D3 can be gotten in PLEN by means
of restrictions. The proper assertion to which D3 (and its corollary) corresponds is this:
((RRT) Restriction Representation Theorem) Protocols define restrictions on every
aspect of epistemic dynamics. More precisely:
(RRT.1) Protocols define restrictions on the construction of epistemic procedures:
π
for every protocol, π, there is a restriction on procedural construction, R≤
(ΠSch ),

that can be read off of the syntax of π in the sense that there are simple rules
relating the syntax of π to a determination of whether a given protocol schema is
π
(ΠSch ).
in the rational or irrational set in R≤

(RRT.2) Protocols define restrictions on epistemic processes: for every protocol, π,
π
(Pg ), that can be read
there is a set of restrictions on processes per EDG, g, R≤

off of the syntax of π in the sense that there are simple rules relating the syntax
of π to a determination of whether a given process is in the rational or irrational
π
set in R≤
(Pg ).

(RRT.3) Protocols define restrictions on epistemic transitions: for every protocol, π,
π
there is a set of restrictions on transitions per EDG, g, R≤
(Tg ), that can be read

off of the syntax of π in the sense that there are simple rules relating the syntax of
π to a determination of whether a given transition is in the rational or irrational
π
set in R≤
(Tg ).

(RRT.4) Protocols define restrictions on epistemic states: for every protocol, π, there
π
is a set of restrictions on states per EDG, g, R≤
(Wg ), that can be read off of the

syntax of π in the sense that there are simple rules relating the syntax of π to
a determination of whether a given state is in the rational or irrational set in
π
R≤
(Wg ).

This theorem is a short step from the syntactic schemata, matching criteria, restrictions on
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procedural construction, and Reduction Lemma of section 4.3.4. A proof is available in the
separate technical document [135].
Given the canonical interpretation of PLEN such that protocols are the formal objects
representing epistemic rationality norms, this theorem straightforwardly encodes D3. Every protocol is mapped by the execution rules to restrictions on procedural construction,
processes, transitions, and states by means of its syntax. The syntax of the protocols determines - via the rules - the extension of the rational subsets in these restrictions. The
D3 corollary corresponds to RRT.1 and the theorem itself suffices to capture D3. Every
protocol (hence, norm) is mapped to a restriction on dynamics such that the syntax (hence,
procedural instructions) of the protocol determines what elements of epistemic dynamics
or what procedural constructions are in what parts of the restriction mapped to it. It is
straightforward to see how this works, and the Reduction Lemma and Reading Off Theorem
above essentially provide the details.
As for assertions D3.1, D3.2, and D3(a) through D3(d), now that we have seen RRT,
it’s easy to see how sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 above essentially took care of these. The formal
assertions that correspond are trivial corollaries of RRT and graph-theoretic properties of
EDGs. RRT.2-RRT.3 correspond to D3(a)-D3(c). D3(d), fleshed out with D3.1 and D3.2,
corresponds to the trivial assertion that, for each protocol, π, there is a state, w in some g,
such that the feasible states, transitions, and processes at e may not identical to the rational
elements per the restrictions of π. These sets can be directly compared for basic set theoretic
relations.
D3c.1-D3c.3 follow simply from the fact that epistemic protocols represent epistemic
norms and are built out of control operators that represent procedural operations of sequential composition, parallel execution, and indeterministic choice. D3c.4-D3c.6 correspond to
GTP1 and GTP2:
GTP1 For all protocols, π, and EDGs, g, if g ∈ Gπ , where g ∈ Gπ iff all subprotocols of π
and all computation sequences [113] of π are executable in g, and g is the smallest graph
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that does so while also meeting other structural conditions [135], then the syntactic
properties of π correspond to the graph-theoretic properties of g.
GTP2 For all protocols, π, and EDGs, g, if π is executable in g, then the syntactic properties
of π correspond to the graph-theoretic properties of subgraphs of g.
These are proven in [135]. To spell these claims out, I simply note some features that are
shown there. For example, if there is a π ∈ PP LEN such that g ∈ Gπ , then the number
of nested sequential compositions in π is proportional to the depth of g where depth of g
is determined by the length of maximal paths in g (the finite paths that are not subpaths
of any other paths) if g is non-looping. That is, for a regular protocol π, every sequential
composition that is not nested in a parallel execution or choice corresponds to a pair of
concatenated paths. This property extends to any graphs that execute protocols. For any
g, p ∈ Pg , for any protocol, π, if p executes π, appending an atomic to π via ; adds 1
to the depth, n, of p. In general, the executability of a protocol at a given state imposes
structural requirements on the EDG, including conditions on the edges and on the content
functions. This can be easily seen; the truth conditions of the operators pair with the
execution conditions of protocols to dictate graph-theoretic properties. Let w be a state at
which π is executable and [π]A is true. If π is a sequential composition, for instance, this
dictates a minimum length for any path of which w is the root, and it dictates that the
terminal state of that path verifies A. If π is indeterministic at w, that is, if there is more
than one path executing π at w, then there is a tree of minimum width (and, depending on
π’s structure, depth) in which each leaf node verifies A.
Each control operator induces other graph-theoretic features: corresponding paths, branching paths, etc.. It’s trivial to see how conditions on content functions in an EDG are constrained by the truth of these claims at a state.9 In general, recall how the simple diagram
of the executions of complex protocols illustrates this in Figure 4.2. Properties of EDGs like
depth and width, as well other features. For some examples: The length of the executions of
9

However, some these claims are nonetheless fleshed out in [135].
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π are proportional to the number of Xi in the immediate subprotocol hierarchies of implementations of π with main operator ;. It follows that the subgraphs, g 0 , of any g in which π
is executable such that the maximal paths of g 0 are executions of implementations of π are
such that the depth of g 0 is proportional to the number of sequential compositions in π. If
the main operator of π is ∗, then any execution of π is in the reflexive, transitive closure of
the edge relation of π. If the main operator of π is ∩, then, for any EDG, g, in which π is
executable, there is an (s, g 0 ) ≤ g that is a lattice. I’ll let the illustration of this point rest
with these facts.

4.5

Conclusion

This chapter is an extended argument for the PLEN Proposition. The first section argued
that PLEN’s semantics contain structures that adequately represent epistemic dynamics and
its various parts. Epistemic states were modeled with content states that encode attitudes
of acceptance, rejection, and endorsement of methodologies while imposing no substantive
restrictions on how these sub-states interact. Epistemic dynamics were modeled by transitions, edges representing actions, and procedural paths representing processes. It was then
shown that PLEN’s representation of all of these elements of epistemic dynamics was theoretically adequate insofar as it solves or evades the Processes and Constraints problems (and
the knock-on problems that followed them).
I then spelled out the slogan of PLEN: epistemic rationality norms are protocols. I
showed that for a large and representative class of epistemic rationality norms, all of the
most important things to derive about norms can be captured by restrictions on dynamics,
and all of the important things to derive from restrictions on epistemic dynamics can be
captured by restrictions on procedural construction. I then showed in outline that these
could be read off of the syntax of protocols. This shows that PLEN solves or evades the
First-Class Citizenship problem.
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Finally, on the basis of the representation of epistemic norms with protocols, each of
D1-D3 were shown to be correlated with formal assertions in the object language of PLEN
or features of the PLEN formalism itself. In particular, each of D1-D3 were shown to
correlate to the properties of protocols. D3, in particular, was shown to be analyzed in
terms of restrictions on epistemic dynamics which, by the theorem called RRT, was reduced
to properties of protocols.
The PLEN Proposition fits into a theory preference argument for PLEN. Given that
solving the Processes, Constraints, and First-Class Citizenship problems and formalization
of each of D1-D3 are criteria or desiderata of theoretical adequacy, the PLEN Proposition
shows - in a qualitative fashion - that PLEN is a theoretically adequate formal framework
for analyzing epistemic rationality and its norms. This takes us some way to completion of
the central part of the dissertation: defining PLEN and displaying its virtues. The results
of the argument, thus far, are summarized in the following, partially empty table:
(Key) Systems in this family are generally:
• + :: Adequate
• - :: Somewhat Adequate, Some Systems Adequate, or Unclear
• X :: Inadequate
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Belief Revision
Systems
Dynamic Logics
Dynamic
Epistemic Logics
Deontic Logics
PLEN

Norm Exogeny:
Broad or Narrow

Modeling
Epistemic
Dynamics:
Constraints
Problem, ProcessTransition
Distinction,
Restrictions

Desiderata:
D1-D3

Paradoxes and
Other Tradeoffs:
Paradox,
Generality,
Simplicity, ...

+

+

+

-

D1

D2

D3

+

+

+

Belief Revision Systems
Dynamic Logics
Dynamic Epistemic Logics
Deontic Logics
PLEN

The rest of this table is filled out in Chapter 5. For now, it’s enough to note that the table
records the following facts. PLEN is “narrowly norm exogenous”.10 Where an action logic
is exogenous for having program expressions that are interpreted as names for actions in its
logic, PLEN’s protocols are interpreted as norm expressions. Each protocol is an expression
that encodes the instruction of an epistemic norm. So much for First-Class Citizenship. As
argued in Section 2, PLEN’s underlying model of epistemic dynamics handles the Processes
and Constraints problems readily. Section 3 shows how PLEN represents restrictions on
epistemic dynamics, and associates each protocol (i.e., norm expression) with restrictions
on epistemic dynamics. Section 4 provides formalizations of D1-D3 by showing how formal
assertions in PLEN’s object languages or about PLEN’s constructions correspond to the
10

See section 5.1 of Chapter 5 for explication of this term and its importance.
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features of epistemic rationality and its norms asserted in each. The Paradoxes and Tradeoffs
column is set to “-” by default, as I’ve yet to stumble on any paradoxes or other serious
theoretical tradeoffs for PLEN’s positive features.11 PLEN is extremely general; it imposes
no constraints on what action names are admissible in its protocol languages or representable
by its models. It’s also a simple formalism with relatively few moving parts and a great deal
of flexibility and room for modification.
Chapter 4 has filled in the PLEN row on these evaluative matrices. The second step of the
theory preference argument is moving from PLEN’s virtues to PLEN’s overall preferability
among its rivals. That is the project of Part III. Chapter fills in the remaining rows; I argue
that, among the alternative formal frameworks for epistemic norms, PLEN comes out best.

Appendix: Analyzing Deontics in PLEN
This section merely closes lacunae in the main argument of section 4.3. As such, it can be
skipped by those already convinced or looking for a better flowing transition into Part III.
The goal is to deepen the connection between protocols and epistemic rationality norms, by
showing how deontic operators can be re-conceptualized in PLEN. This gives an interpretation of the valences, Ob, P er, and F orb deployed in the argument for Norm-Kernel Analysis.
More explicitly, the idea, here, is that the mapping from V al to πV al in the definition of
the Protocol Function Theorem (PFT) is actually principled; each intuitive deontic operator
in V al is mapped to a plausible formal analysis of the operator in PLEN. Now, strictly
speaking, the mapping alone gives us the ability to read off verdicts from protocols, but the
following material makes the notion of agreement in the PFT more substantive and provides
a bit of justification for the mapping used in the technical result.
To analyze deontics in PLEN, it’s useful to first have the technical notion of dictation.
Def.) Dictation Norms dictate actions, conditions, or states; this is the most basic notion
11

There isn’t, for instance, any obvious disunity in the ways that PLEN solves the Constraints, Processes,
or First-Class Citizenship problems.
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of restriction or requirement. Norms tell us that we must execute some action, bring
about some condition, or be in some state. Protocols do the same work. Protocols even
dictate other protocols, whether these specify basic actions or complex procedures.
(1) π dictates π 0 , π ⇒ π 0 , iff for all g, every execution of π contains an execution of
π 0 or corresponds to an execution of π 0 .
(2) π dictates π 0 in g, π ⇒g π 0 , iff every execution of π in g contains an execution of
π 0 or corresponds to an execution of π 0 .
(3) π dictates π 0 in g, π ⇒gw π 0 , iff for all g, every execution starting at w of π contains
an execution of π 0 or corresponds to an execution of π 0 .
(4) π dictates π1 , ..., πn exclusively at w in g, π ⇒gwx π1 , ..., πn , iff every execution
of π starting at w in g contains or corresponds to executions of π1 , ..., πn and no
other protocols.
(5) π dictates π1 , ..., πn exclusively in g, π ⇒gx π1 , ..., πn , iff every execution of π in g
contains or corresponds to executions of π1 , ..., πn and no other protocols.
(6) π dictates π1 , ..., πn exclusively, π ⇒x π1 , ..., πn , iff every execution of π in any g
contains or corresponds to executions of π1 , ..., πn and no other protocols.
If π dictates π 0 at w in g, this tells us that executing π at w in g implies that π 0 is carried
out at some point reachable from s in the restriction of π. The dictation of π 0 by π in g
tells us that every execution of π implies the execution, at some point, of π 0 . The general
dictation of π 0 by π tells us that π dictates π 0 for every g. These distinctions are useful for
thinking about various levels of particularity in the requirements of norms; general dictation
encodes a protocol’s imposing uniform requirements on all agents. Dictation in g encodes a
protocols requirements on the agent whose arena is g. A protocol’s dictating π 0 at w in g
encodes the protocol’s imposition of requirements unfolding from a particular state.
Now, the basic plan for formalizing deontic notions in PLEN is the following set of rules,
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where we let p be a subpath of q, p  q, iff p = he1 , ..., en i and q = hei , ..., ej i where i ≥ 1
and j ≤ n:
Requirement/Obligation π requires/obligates π 0 , πRπ 0 , iff ∀p∃q(p ∈ Pπ → (q ∈ Pπ0 ∧ q 
p)) (iff π dictates π 0 )
Permission π permits π 0 , πP π 0 , iff ∃p∃q(p ∈ Pπ ∧ q ∈ Pπ0 ∧ q  p) (iff π doesn’t dictate π 0 )
Prohibition/Forbiddance π prohibits/forbids π 0 , πF π 0 , iff ∀p∀q((p ∈ Pπ ∧ q ∈ Pπ0 ) →
q  p)) (iff π dictates −π 0 )
We can punch these formalizations into the object language of PLEN by defining variants
that are true over states rather than paths per graph:
State Requirement π requires π 0 , πRπ 0 , at w iff ∀p∃q(w = f irst(p) ∧ p ∈ Pπ → (q ∈
Pπ0 ∧ q  p))
State Permission π permits π 0 , πP π 0 , at w iff ∃p∃q(w = f irst(p)∧p ∈ Pπ ∧q ∈ Pπ0 ∧q  p)
State Prohibition π prohibits π 0 , πF π 0 , at w iff ∀p∀q((w = f irst(p) ∧ p ∈ Pπ ∧ q  p) →
q ∈ P−π0 )
Finally, here is the full-on definition of the deontic operators in PLEN:
(Rational Obligation wrt π) w

ROπ (π 0 ) iff πRπ 0 at w

(Rational Permission wrt π) w

RPπ (π 0 ) iff πP π 0 at w

(Rational Forbiddance wrt π) w

RFπ (π 0 ) iff πF π 0 at w

These are defined for application to protocols, but the extension to formulae of LP LEN is
straightforward.
These basic translations of deontics are encoded in the definition of protocol functions for
the proof of PFT. Protocol functions basically just map Ob, P er, and F orb to the foregoing
translations of deontic notions.
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Individual Protocol Functions Let g be an EDG. Let πV al = {Ob, P er, F orb, } and
define the duals as usual. Define the domains and conditions of application of protocol
functions as in the main text. Then: fπg : (πCon(g), πDom(R)(g)) −→ πV al is such
that:
(i) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)Π(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to Ob iff for all w, if
w

A, then π ⇒gw x.

(ii) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)Π(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to P er iff for some
w, w

A, and π ⇒gw x.

(iii) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)Π(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to F orb iff for all
w, if w

A, then π ⇒gwx −x.

(iv) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)Con(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to Ob iff for all
w, if w

A, then w

[π]x.

(v) If A ∈ πCon(g) andx ∈ πDom(R)Con(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to P er iff for some
w, w

A, and w

hπi x.

(vi) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)Con(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to F orb iff for
all w, if w

A, then w

([π] − x.

(vii) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)Stat(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to Ob iff for all
p ∈ Pπ such that w = f irst(p), if w

A, then x = last(p).

(viii) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)Stat(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to P er iff for
some p ∈ Pπ such that w = f irst(p), w

A, and x = last(p).

(ix) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)Stat(g), then π maps (A, x) to F orb iff for all
p ∈ Pπ such that w = f irst(p), if w

A, then −x = last(p).

(x) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)T ran(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to Ob iff for all
p ∈ Pπ such that w = f irst(p), if w

A, then x = hw, last(p)i.
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(xi) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)T ran(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to P er iff for
some p ∈ Pπ such that w = f irst(p), w

A, and x = hw, last(p)i.

(xii) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)T ran(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to F orb iff for
all p ∈ Pπ such that w = f irst(p), if w

A, then x = hw, last(p)i.

(xiii) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)P roc(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to Ob iff for
all p ∈ Pπ such that w = f irst(p), if w

A, then x is a subpath of p.

(xiv) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)P roc(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to P er iff for
some p ∈ Pπ such that w = f irst(p), w

A, and x is a subpath of p.

(xv) If A ∈ πCon(g) and x ∈ πDom(R)P roc(g), then fπg maps (A, x) to F orb iff for
all p ∈ Pπ such that w = f irst(p), if w

A, then x is a subpath of p.

All of the foregoing analyzes deontics with respect to specific protocols/norms. To encode
what is generally rationally obligatory (etc.), replace π in ROπ (π 0 ) with an entire methodology: ROM (π 0 ). This isn’t strictly speaking well-formed in PLEN. So, strictly speaking, add
formulae to LP LEN by the following rules:
(Methodological Deontics) (O) If π ∈ PP LEN , then ROM (π) ∈ LP LEN , and if A ∈
LP LEN , then ROM (A) ∈ LP LEN .
(P) If π ∈ PP LEN , then RPM (π) ∈ LP LEN , and if A ∈ LP LEN , then RPM (A) ∈
LP LEN .
(F) If π ∈ PP LEN , then RFM (π) ∈ LP LEN , and if A ∈ LP LEN , then RFM (A) ∈ LP LEN .
Then, define truth rules for them:
(Rational Obligation wrt M) w
all πi such that w
that q  p.

ROM (π 0 ) iff for every p in the intersection of Pπi for

M (πi ) is such that if w = f irst(p), then there is a q ∈ Pπ0 such
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(Rational Permission wrt M) w
all πi such that w

RPM (π 0 ) iff for some p in the intersection of Pπi for

M (πi ) is such that if w = f irst(p), then there is a q ∈ Pπ0 such

that q  p.
(Rational Forbiddance wrt M) w
all πi such that w

RFM (π 0 ) iff for no p in the intersection of Pπi for

M (πi ) is such that if w = f irst(p), then there is a q ∈ Pπ0 such

that q  p.
Again, extension to objects other than protocols in the language of LP LEN is straightforward.
To the foregoing deontic operators, we can add the analysis of defeasible reasons. One has
a defeasible reason to believe A if one has a reason to believe it, but that reason is inconclusive
because it may be outweighed or undermined on some general balance of reasons. There are
two key conditions to consider in formalizing some defeasible reason R for belief in A: (a) If
R makes no difference to the permissibility or obligation of belief in A under any norms of
rationality under any conditions, then R isn’t a reason for belief in A at all. (b) If R cannot
fail to obligate belief in A (under norms of rationality under any conditions), then R can’t
be defeasible. There is machinery for formalizing defeasible reasons in PLEN. I’ll introduce
one apparatus.
We want to make sense of how R can make a difference to the permissibility or obligation
of belief in A. The translations above provide a general framework. The reader can fill in
the obvious duals. The key idea for formalizing defeasible reasons is that R must encode the
difference between conditions under which a methodology, M , permits or obligates belief in
A. Let R be a putative reason for A. Let R∗ be some set of propositions excluding R but
compatible with R. Let R ∗ ∗ be some set of propositions including R. Then:
Defeasible Reason Say that RDπ (A) iff one has a defeasible reason, R, for accepting A A
proposition, R ∈ LP LEN (just a propositional variable with a suggestive name, not to
be confused with other uses of capital “R” in the notation), is a defeasible reason for
accepting A (relative to π) iff there are R∗ and R ∗ ∗ (also propositional variables of
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LP LEN ) such that:
(O) (i) RPπ (b(R∗) ∧ d(A)), (ii) ROπ (b(R ∗ ∧R) → b(A)), and (iii) RPπ (b(R ∗ ∗) ∧ d(A)).
OR:
(P) (iv) ROπ (b(R∗) → d(A)), (v) RPπ (b(R ∗ ∧R) ∧ b(A)), and (vi) ROπ (b(R ∗ ∗) → d(A)).
Extend the definitions in the natural way to methodologies M, then add RDπ (A) and
RDM (A) to the language as in Chapter 4. The first set of conditions tells us that, according
to π, any state at which R∗ is believed is one in which one can adhere to π and end up
rejecting A, but if one adds belief in R, then adhering to π requires accepting A. However,
the final condition tells us that belief in R alone does not guarantee that adhering to π
requires acceptance of A because there is a full set of reasons (possibly including R via,
monotonicity of → in classical logic, which, for the moment, we use in PLEN) that doesn’t
require belief in A. The second set of conditions tells us that, according to π, any state at
which R∗ is believed is one in which one cannot adhere to π and end up accepting A, but if
one adds belief in R, then adhering to π permits accepting A. However, the final condition
tells us that belief in R alone does not guarantee that adhering to π permits acceptance of
A because there is a full set of reasons including R (possibly including R via, monotonicity
of →) that doesn’t permit acceptance of A.
Given the usual dual definitions of obligation and permission, the intuitive thought of
the definition comes to the idea that defeasible reasons for A make a difference to the
permissibility and impermissibility of accepting or rejection A, but not a difference that
can’t be neutralized by other reasons. Defeasible reasons to reject A can be formalized in
the obvious, complementary way. Encode the righthand side of the definition of defeasible
reasons in PLEN with respect to π, acceptance, and A with the expression: Dπ (b(A)).
Encode the complementary defeasible reasons with respect to π, rejection, and A: Dπ (d(A)).
From here, the analysis of defeasible reasons is ignored because it is reducible to the analysis
of the deontic operators.
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Finally, we can extend the suite of deontic operators to contain optionality and omissibility which are, arguably, not analyzable in terms of the others [89]. They can be formalized
in PLEN semantically like so:
Optionality π 0 is optional under π, ¬(πP π 0 ) ∧ ¬(πRπ 0 ), iff ∃p∃q(p ∈ Pπ ∧ q ∈ Pπ0 ∧ q  p)
and ∃p∀q(p ∈ Pπ ∧ q  p → q ∈
/ Pπ 0 )
State ¬(πP π 0 ) ∧ ¬(πRπ 0 ) at w iff ∃p∃q(w = f irst(p) ∧ p ∈ Pπ ∧ q ∈ Pπ0 ∧ q  p) and
∃p∀q(w = f irst(p) ∧ p ∈ Pπ ∧ q  p → q ∈
/ Pπ 0 )
Omissibility π permits omission of π 0 , ¬(πRπ 0 ), iff ∃p∀q(p ∈ Pπ ∧ q  p → q ∈
/ Pπ 0 )
State ¬(πRπ 0 ) at w iff ∃p∀q(w = f irst(p) ∧ p ∈ Pπ ∧ q  p → q ∈
/ Pπ 0 )
These notions can be added to the object language of PLEN easily enough, and from there,
added to the definition of protocol functions. With this machinery, we can extend the
arguments in Chapter 4 beyond the limited range of deontic norm-kernels that were targeted
in Chapter 4.

Part III
Defending PLEN
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Chapter 5
PLEN vs. Rival Formalisms
5.1

Recapitulation: Modeling Epistemic Dynamics and
Formalizing Norms

The protocol theoretic account of epistemic rationality norms is defended by means of a
theory preference argument. The account, formalized by PLEN, satisfies a set of critically
important theoretical desiderata on formal accounts of epistemic rationality norms. As shown
in Chapter 4, PLEN achieves all of the following goals:
• (i) provision of devices for explicitly representing and reasoning about (protocols that
encode) norms of epistemic rationality,
• (ii) capturing of the distinction between processes of epistemic change and the changes
they bring about when completed, and
• (iii) formalization of the features of epistemic rationality articulated in D1-D3 that are
inadequately recognized in both the formal and traditional epistemology literatures.
These goals characterize what I take to be necessary conditions - or at least important
desiderata - for the project of giving an adequate account of epistemic norms with an adequate underlying model of epistemic dynamics.
253
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The first goal requires what I’ll call “norm exogeny”. Normally, a logic of action is
exogenous if the logic’s languages contain expressions that explicitly name or describe actions.
As a result of the success of program logics in the logic of action, this is often cashed out in
terms of containing a language of program expressions [113, 230]. Norm exogeny analogously
requires that a logic’s languages contain norm expressions: formal expressions that explicitly
name or describe the structure or content of norms. This is what I mean by devices for
“explicitly” representing and reasoning about norms.
A broader condition of exogeny could be satisfied by there just being some features of
the formalism that correspond in a perspicuous way to actions. If there are some explicit
statements, theorems, or objects stipulated to represent actions or that satisfy (formal assertions that correspond to) the intuitive features of actions, say that the formalism has the
feature of broad action exogeny. Hence, broad norm exogeny requires that there be some
features of the formalism that perspicuously correspond to norms. If there are some explicit
meta-language statements, theorems, or objects stipulated to represent norms or that satisfy
(formal assertions that correspond to) the intuitive features of norms, the formalism has the
feature of broad norm exogeny.
Now, a formalism can very well be deeply theoretically interesting and useful with only
broad norm exogeny, but it’s preferable for a formalism to be narrowly norm exogenous, as
this enables the possibility of a proof system for encoding explicit reasoning about norms.
The soundness of such a system shows the soundness of the formalized reasoning. More,
there are philosophically important forms of argument concerning equivalence, dependence,
and independence relationships among epistemic norms that only an exogenous logic can
formalize [135]. Exogenous logics are thus preferable to non-exogenous logics, and narrow
exogeny is preferable to broad exogeny. Or so I’ll assume going forward. It’s shown that
PLEN formalizes the aforementioned forms of reasoning about epistemic norms in the technical document [135] in a far more robust way than is shown in this thesis. For the purposes
of the thesis, simply recall that the axiomatization of PLEN, Syntax II, is sound, and that it
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provides machinery for deriving and proving expressions encoding statements about various
properties of epistemic methodologies M , procedural features of protocols (i.e., epistemic
norms), and verdict relations among objects in LP LEN .
The protocols of PP LEN account for the norm exogeny of PLEN; they explicitly represent
epistemic rationality norms and are embedded in formulae of LP LEN . The semantics of
PLEN provide models that formally distinguish between processes of epistemic state change
and mere transitions among epistemic states via the difference between procedural paths and
transitions. The laws governing protocols thus provide theories governing various properties
of epistemic rationality norms. The derivation systems of PLEN thus formalize explicit,
valid reasoning about these properties, including valid reasoning about equivalence relations
among epistemic rationality norms. This enables PLEN to formalize D1-D3. Formally, this
is all captured by the following proposition, proven over the course of Chapter 4:
(The PLEN Proposition) (i) The semantics of PLEN contains structures that distinctly
represent epistemic states, transitions, processes, actions, procedures, and constraints thereon.
(ii) The syntax and semantics of PLEN provide structures that explicitly represent
epistemic rationality norms and their procedural content.
(iii) PLEN explicitly formalizes D1-D3; for each of D1-D3, there is a provable formal
assertion at the meta-level of PLEN where formal assertions include: propositions
about the semantic structures of PLEN, sets of valid meta-level rules or objectlevel laws, theorems at the object-level, and object-level theories.
Now, of course, alternative accounts of epistemic rationality norms might also achieve the
same goals, and so furnish no preferential argument for the protocol theoretic account. This
chapter aims to show that no rival formalism, and so no rival precise accounts of epistemic
rationality, does as well as PLEN without either significant theoretical costs or without
simply being equivalent to a fragment of PLEN. This is done by considering a set of families
of systems as formal frameworks for epistemic rationality and its norms.
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Now, the field of formalisms is too vast to survey. As such, I want to focus on what I
take to be rivals of PLEN with respect to the twin goals of adequately modeling epistemic
dynamics and giving an account of epistemic norms. What I mean by a rival formalism is
this: a formalism F rivals PLEN with respect to the project of this thesis iff:
(i)

F has structures (in its syntax or model-theory) that: (a) are explicitly taken to
characterize the elements of epistemic dynamics epistemic (e.g., epistemic states,
transitions among epistemic states, epistemic actions and processes), (b) could
easily be modified to do so, (c) are explicitly taken to encode epistemic norms,
or (d) can be easily modified to encode epistemic norms, and

(ii)

F isn’t identical to any fragment of PLEN, F can’t be embedded in PLEN, or F
isn’t identical to an easy extension of PLEN.

This definition carries an element of relativity: ease of technical modification is hardly a
rigorously understood concept. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this thesis, there is a reliable
indicator of ease: if I can come up with ways in which a formalism can be modified for certain
ends, and it really can be, then it can be easily modified for those ends.
A key feature of this notion of rivalry is, even where a system was not expressly designed
to be used to think about epistemic rationality, there may be interesting machinery in the
theory for doing just that, so, in what follows, I make extremely modest modifications to the
systems (or I suppose them without much detail because they can be safely ignored while
seeing the problems to be raised) or to their informal interpretations to see how they fare
as accounts of epistemic norms with underlying models of epistemic dynamics. To be clear,
the following systems are not all designed to model epistemic dynamics and provide a formal
account of epistemic norms. They all do, however, contain machinery that might be useful
to this project, and I interpret them as such in the examinations that follow.
For the sake of efficiency, many groups of rival systems will be taken on together in the
examination on the basis of their shared features. For instance, offshoots of dynamic logics
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often build in basically the same action theory - actions are represented with binary relations
and programs are encoded with operations on those relations. If this underlying program
theory is shown to suffer (e.g.) the Processes problem, then, barring some special additional
features, all of the systems with the same basic program theory will suffer the Processes
problem. As such, I omit detailed examination of these systems beyond what suffices to
show the conditions or desiderata under consideration.1
The groups of systems examined with respect to the desiderata above include belief
revision theories, dynamic logics, dynamic epistemic logics, and deontic logics.2 The chapter
follows this listing of groups. First, I consider belief revision frameworks, including Bayesian
frameworks, and show how they fall short with respect to the desiderata above. Next up for
the same treatment are dynamic logics, including PDL, Process Logic (PL), and EPL. The
next family are dynamic epistemic logics including epistemic action logics (EALs) and logics
of epistemic planning (LEPs). Following these two sections, deontic logics - including von
Wright’s logic of norms and actions (VWNA), STIT theory (STIT), and dynamic deontic
logics (PDeL) are considered and subjected to the same sort of criticisms. Finally, I close
by considering PLEN’s modularity - one can add, subtract, and restrict elements of PLEN
to generate formalisms that go beyond the expressive and representational power of PLEN.
I omit detailed explication and/or definition of systems for which I provided explication or
definition in prior chapters (e.g., AGM, PDL, EPL, DEL, ...).
1

Which is to say that it may seem that I am ignoring the technical and philosophical merits of the systems.
I certainly don’t want to downplay any of the technical or philosophical merits of these systems outside of
the project of modeling epistemic dynamics and accounting for epistemic norms; rather, I merely want to
show how these systems fall short with respect to precisely that problem. Their value for other projects is
unquestioned, here.
2
The focus on these systems is not meant to ignore the enormous amount of work in the intersection of
AI, deontic and imperative logic, epistemic logic, and non-monotonic logic. See, e.g., [89]. Much of this work
focuses on finding new formal devices for representing normative discourse from dynamic perspectives and
resolving the old problems of deontic logic. This work often formalizes important conceptual distinctions
that are relevant to this project, such as that between norms (themselves) and normative propositions, and
the distinctions remarked on above. Rather, the focus of this project is meant to throw a spotlight on the
formalisms that are PLEN’s nearest philosophical neighbors.
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Schematic Problems

There are just too many formalisms to evaluate in any depth in a single chapter; there are
dozens upon dozens of variants and modifications of modifications of doxastic dynamic logic
built out of PDL [228, 229, 227, 34] or action-specific variants of DEL [65, 193, 99] or twists
on AGM [224, 211, 256]. As such, I break the project into general evaluations of each of four
groups that are based on their general features. For instance, I articulate general arguments
for the theoretical inadequacy of PDL and PDL-based theories. Rather than assessing the
technical details of each particular formalism that has spun out of PDL and might plausibly
be used to think about epistemic dynamics, I identify a feature of PDL-based theories that
supports a general strategy of objection. This results in identifying a number of schematic
arguments that can be applied against the groups of formalism in virtue of their shared
features.
Some groups simply fail to have machinery that represents epistemic norms. Other
systems fail to achieve a high enough degree of “model validity” by failing to provide models
of epistemic dynamics that capture important truths about dynamics.3 Some groups fail to
formalize some of D1-D3. Still others are plagued by paradoxes or general theoretical costs
that are too steep to pay. Some groups suffer more than one of these problems. Accordingly,
the rest of the chapter unfolds by applying the following schematic problems alone or in
groups to rival formalisms:
1. Failure of Epistemic Norm Exogeny: System S doesn’t have any (syntactic or semantic)
constructions that encode the structure or anatomy of epistemic norms.
(a) Special Case 1: System S is a logic and doesn’t have anything in its languages to
encode directives, instructions, plans, or programs/protocols.
3

I mean this in the senses implicit in [178, 12]. Roughly, models are valid to the extent that the mathematical structures that make up the model suitably resemble and/or correlate with the parts of the systems
one is trying to give an account of, and the relations among the structures suitably resemble and/or correlate
with the relations among those parts.
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(b) Special Case 2: System S is a logic and doesn’t have anything in its languages to
encode norm-kernels, i.e., conditions, deontics, or formulae that encode suitable
conditions of application.
(c) Special Case 3: System S is a logic and doesn’t have an action language; i.e.,
there’s nothing to encode epistemic actions that change the world, epistemic actions that are not uniform across all epistemic states, epistemic actions that are
not uniform across preconditions, or epistemic programs that are formed from
mixed world-changing and information changing actions. Without encodings of
actions, plausible expressions that encode norms like instructions, plans, or programs will not be encoded in the language.
2. Failure in the Model Epistemic Dynamics: System S doesn’t have (syntactic or semantic) constructions that represent feature F of epistemic dynamics.
(a) Special Case 1: The Constraints Problem
(b) Special Case 2: The Processes Problem
(c) Special Case 3: System S doesn’t have anything in its constructions to represent:
epistemic actions that change the world, epistemic actions that are not uniform
across all epistemic states, epistemic actions that are not uniform across preconditions, or epistemic programs that are formed from mixed world-changing and
information changing actions. Without representations of these actions, epistemic
dynamics is inaccurately modeled and epistemic norms that restrict such actions
are unanalyzable.
3. Failure of Desideratum in D1-D3: For some of D1-D3, there is no corresponding formal
assertion of S, where formal assertions include: propositions about the (semantic where S is a logic) structures of S, sets of valid meta-level rules or object-level laws of
S, theorems at the object-level of S, and object-level theories in S.
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4. Paradox or Other Theoretical Tradeoff: System S suffers from paradoxes or other
theoretical tradeoffs (explicated where applied):
(a) Paradox
(b) Lack of Generality
(c) Lack of Uniformity of Problem Solutions
The idea is that every rival formal framework below will be shown to suffer at least one of
these schematic problems. The simplest case will be when every member of the family of
formalisms in the framework simply lacks the machinery for norm exogeny, adequate modeling of epistemic dynamics, the desiderata, or suffers some unresolved paradoxes or tradeoffs.
A more interesting case that sometimes arises is when the formalisms are incompatible with
adding machinery that would represent or formalize the relevant notions; some formalisms
can’t be amended to handle the correct representation of epistemic dynamics or epistemic
norms without paradox or breakdown of some kinds. These will, of course, be spelled out in
some detail below. Of course, if the arguments of Chapter 4 worked, PLEN survives all of
these schematic problems. And that’s the thrust of the defense of PLEN.

5.2

Belief Revision

There are multiple paradigms for models of dynamic belief revision. The most well-known
and developed are AGM [5, 91] and Bayesian theories [182]. Both of these paradigms encompass multiple exact formalisms built around the same basic notions. AGM is built around
belief sets, deductively closed sets of sentences of a formal language. There are, for instance,
non-classical versions of AGM [216, 118] that close belief sets under non-classical consequence relations, variants of AGM that reject some or other rationality postulates (rules
characterizing rational belief set changes) [211, 52, 256], and extensions of AGM to iterated
belief revision [237, 118], in addition to variants based on possible worlds representations of
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belief sets [108] and predecessor [4] formalisms.
Bayesian theories are centered on probability functions into sets of sentences of a formal
language. These are taken to encode credences or partial beliefs. Alternative Bayesian
theories arise under distinct probability theories as well as alternative rules for characterizing
rational updates of credence/partial belief or theories that build in both partial beliefs and
partial disbeliefs as separate functions [75, 80].
A number of alternative belief revision formalisms have been developed in response to
the perceived theoretical inadequacies of these frameworks, including Spohn’s Ordinal Conditional Functions [233], Tennant’s Finite Dependency Networks [245], and Pollock’s Defeasible
Reasoning Semantics [197, 195].
The foregoing are the rival systems I will focus on in this section.

5.2.1

AGM Theories

In many ways, AGM is the most natural model of epistemic dynamics. Epistemic states
are represented simply and intuitively with sets of sentences of a propositional language.
The core constructions of AGM are belief sets, deductively closed sets of sentences K (i.e.,
K = Cn(K)). This gives them rather transparent appeal as models of the content of beliefs.
This modeling decision also makes it easy to apply classical logic to the analysis.
There are numerous belief revision theories based on the AGM framework or, if you will,
versions of AGM that can be built by modifying the basic formalism [256, 118, 90]. These
belief revision formalisms can be taken out in swathes. Every version of AGM - in virtue
of being based on the same basic formalism - suffers the same problems. The core problem
among AGM theories is that epistemic dynamics reduces to transitions among epistemic
states. Thus, AGM theories suffer at least the Processes problems, and this spreads to the
failure to formalize several of D2-D3.
Explicitly, dynamics in AGM theories is defined by a set of epistemic commitment functions that take belief sets and inputs (particular sentences in the base formalism) to belief
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sets. As Gardenfors shows [91], these functions are equivalent to relations on belief sets.
Hence, the basic actions of belief change in AGM theories are analyzed with transition relations among belief sets. This is as natural a model of epistemic dynamics as the model of
epistemic dynamics; changes of epistemic state consist of transitions among representations
of the contents of belief. Unfortunately, this generates a couple serious problems with respect
to the goal of providing an underlying model of dynamics for an account of epistemic norms.
Before considering these problems, however, there is the indirectly related failure of norm
exogeny in AGM theories.
First, AGM theories or AGM-based theories all fail the narrow condition of norm exogeny.
Strictly speaking, AGM is a logic-based analysis of epistemic dynamics and doesn’t itself
provide a logic of epistemic dynamics. As such, it doesn’t have an object language into
which to embed norm expressions. Thus, AGM theories fail to provide a logical analysis of
valid reasoning about epistemic rationality norms.
There are, however, constructions in AGM theories that arguably represent or encode
epistemic rationality norms: the rationality and entrenchment postulates.4
Rationality Postulates for Contraction For propositional formula A, a belief set K, an
an independently defined expansion function K+A , a rational contraction function
satisfies the following postulates:
(-1) K−A = Cn(K−A )
(-2) K−A ⊆ K
(-3) If A ∈
/ K, then K−A = K.
(-4) If A ∈ K−A , then ` A.
(-5) K ⊆ (K−A )+A
(-6) If A is equivalent to B, then K−A = K−B .
(-7) (K −A ∩K−B ) ⊆ K−A∧B
4

See, for instance, [5] and [118]. I follow the presentation in [91] pretty closely.
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(-8) If A ∈
/ K−A∧B , then K−A∧B ⊆ K−A .
These are motivated independently in AGM, but can also be shown to be equivalent to the
entrenchment postulates.5 Let A ≤ B say that either both A and B are logical truths, that
A is not believed, or that the need to discard one of A or B leads to discarding A. The
intuitive though is that ≤ encodes entrenchment; it says that B is at least as entrenched as
A. Then entrenchment is thought to satisfy these conditions:
Entrenchment Postulates (EE1) If A ≤ B and B ≤ C, then A ≤ C.
(EE2) If A ` B, then A ≤ B.
(EE3) A ≤ A ∧ B or B ≤ A ∧ B.
(EE4) If K is consistent, then A ∈
/ K iff A ≤ B for all B.
(EE5) If A ≤ B for all A, then ` B.
Given a rational contraction function, the following rule defines epistemic entrenchment:
(CtoE) A ≤ B iff A ∈
/ K−A∧B or ` A ∧ B.
Given entrenchment, the following rule defines a rational contraction function:
(EtoC) K−A = K ∩ {B | A < A ∨ B} if 0 A, and K−A = K otherwise.
The rationality and entrenchment postulates are the rules in AGM that specify what the
requirements of rational belief revision are. This suffices for broad norm exogeny: entrenchment and rationality do perspicuously correspond to norms of epistemic rationality. Those
are the features of AGM that characterize rational belief dynamics. As a result, there is
a simple model of compliance with epistemic rationality norms: the epistemic commitment
functions. Dynamics in AGM theories just are models of ideally rational belief change with
respect to these norms. The entrenchment and rationality norms are not, however, really
theoretically adequate.
5

An epistemic commitment function is a partial meet contraction function iff it satisfies (-1) - (-6).
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The entrenchment and rationality postulates fail to encode crucial properties of epistemic
rationality norms. For one, AGM theories say absolutely nothing about epistemic actions
that change the world or epistemic programs that are formed from mixed world-changing
and information changing actions. As such, AGM theories cannot escape Special Case 3
of the failure of broad norm exogeny; there are no ways in AGM to represent these kinds
of norms. More generally, AGM theories don’t say anything about actions or processes
as distinct from transitions, and this leaves AGM theories entirely powerless to represent
normative restrictions on action or processes where they come apart from restrictions on
transitions. This takes us to the second major problem for AGM theories, which, after a bit
of discussion, connects back up to this first problem.
AGM theories or AGM-based theories all suffer from the Processes and Constraints problems. Epistemic dynamics, even if we translate into the iterated case, entirely reduces to
transitions among belief sets, however those are defined.6 In other words, no AGM theory can represent the basic distinction between processes and transitions; every process of
epistemic change in AGM theories just is a sequence of transitions. Additionally, no AGM
theory can represent the constraints on epistemic processes due to feasibility and capacity;
there aren’t even preconditions in AGM. AGM theories simply provide a model of the space
of all formally possible transitions among belief sets and the subset that are defined by the
epistemic commitment functions. Thus, there is no distinction between processes and epistemic transitions in AGM theories, and this leaves AGM theories powerless to represent the
numerous distinctions and properties of epistemic dynamics articulated in Chapters 1 and
2.
As a result of these problems, no AGM theory can accurately represent properties like
methodological inclusion, procedural information, or epistemic distinctions between processes. The methodological inclusion point can be seen as a result of the failure of broad
norm exogeny. While AGM theories do have rationality postulates or entrenchment rules
6

This needn’t be stepped through for each case; just look at the explicit definitions of the formalisms, re:
[91, 92, 256, 216, 211, 52].
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that, via representation theorems, explicitly characterize rational epistemic dynamics, there
is nothing in them that represents the endorsement or commitment to epistemic norms.7
Procedural information is entirely invisible in AGM theories except where it corresponds
to differences in belief set transitions. In AGM theories, if two processes (think of the
Honest Twin case) define identical transition relations (epistemic commitment functions),
they are identical in AGM. Expanding with A by inference is entirely indistinguishable from
expanding by observation. Revising as a result of applying some inconsistency or consequence
detecting algorithm is indistinguishable from revising as a result of paying undue credence
to psychic testimony. And so on. This straightforwardly implies that AGM theories can say
nothing of the procedural differences in cases like the Honest Twin.
Normative information is also obscured or neglected. Despite the features of AGM theories that represent epistemic norms (the rationality postulates, entrenchment conditions,
etc.) and compliance with them (epistemic commitment functions), nothing in them represents all or even any of the same features of procedural epistemic norms that the arguments
of Chapters 1 and 2 suggest are important. The rational distinctions between epistemic processes in the Detective case (the deduction vs the psychic testimony), Bad Reasoning case,
or the Honest Twin case are invisible in AGM. Thus, AGM theories cannot adequately represent epistemic dynamics nor can they adequately represent procedural epistemic rationality
norms.
As a result of all of this, AGM theories uniformly straightforwardly fail to formalize D2
and D3. AGM theories don’t recognize procedural norms at all, let alone the restrictions
that procedural norms specify. They thus also incompletely characterize the restrictions
on epistemic dynamics associated with epistemic normativity in general as a result of their
failure to represent processes at all. Thus, D3 is mischaracterized.
Now, to its credit, AGM is broadly norm exogenous. Some of the primary results of
AGM are equivalence results among the features of AGM [91] (pp. 211-241). Further, one
7
This is somewhat ironic as one of AGM’s founders, Carlos Alchourron, was explicitly concerned with
modeling the revision of norms in the work he did that lead to his contributions to AGM. See [3, 4].
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Table 5.1: Belief Revision Theories
AGM
[5, 91]
Multiple Language or Relevance Sensitive
[52, 216]
AGM
Non-Classical AGM
[211, 256]
Neighborhoods AGM
[108]
Iterated AGM
[237, 118]
Special Operator AGM
[92, 118]
Offshoots and Hybrids
[67, 69, 84, 91]
can reason about how epistemic dynamics looks under compliance with epistemic norms and
about the verdicts of various norms; again, this is illustrated by the fundamental results of
AGM (pp. 217-226). However, there is no machinery for reasoning about the features of
epistemic dynamics and epistemic rationality that AGM ignores, e.g., procedural requirements, process requirements, procedural structure, and knowing execution. And, of course,
none of the available reasoning can be done internally in some logical object language. As
Segerberg [226] remarks, “AGM is not really logic; it’s a theory about theories.” (p. 136)
All of these problems apply equally to all or most of the many versions of AGM in Table
5.1. The application of the central problems generalize to the variants of AGM because the
underlying model of dynamics in all of these theories reduces to content-changing transitions
among states.
Additionally, for many versions of AGM, there are theoretical problems and tradeoffs
that are independent of the desiderata above. The absence of expressions for higher order
belief [118], Tennant’s Degeneracy Theorem [244], the amnesiac revision function [141], and
the controversiality of the Recovery postulate in basic AGM [118] also mar AGM theories at least the basic theories for which these results were initially proven and any systems to
which the results can be extended. More, AGM theories are committed only to the analysis
of a specific typology of epistemic commitment functions even in variants modified with
operators additional to expansion, contraction, and revision. Thus, AGM theories fail to be
general theories of epistemic dynamics, let alone theories with any claim to general analyses
of epistemic rationality. The addition of new operators still limits AGM in its generality
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- there is no general analysis of epistemic action or process in AGM, and so no analysis
of epistemic norms in general given that some norms are procedural. Thus, AGM theories
suffer with respect to general theoretical tradeoffs in addition to the failure of the desiderata
above.
Finally, AGM theories can be embedded in PLEN satisfactorily.8 One need only let
there be a set of atomic actions eA , cA , and rA that represent the expansion, contraction,
and revision functions with respect to the formula A for each propositional formula (i.e.,
not formulae that embed protocol expressions) of LP LEN (barring application of each of
these actions to formulae embedding themselves). Then, one can define subsets of EDGs
such that the binary execution sets of these actions satisfy the rationality postulates and/or
entrenchment conditions. The easiest way to do this would be to first identify the subset
of EDGs in which all acceptance sets in all content states are belief sets (for now, ignoring
rejection and methodology sets) or closed sets of formulae of LP LEN . Then, from there,
one can identify the transition relations that respect the rationality postulates. From there,
Gardenfors’ representation theorems [91] (pp. 217-226) equate these actions to commitment
functions that satisfy the entrenchment postulates. If this all works out, PLEN satisfies
the desiderata that AGM theories don’t without the theoretical tradeoffs, and PLEN can
subsume AGM.

5.2.2

Bayesian Theories

My comments on Bayesian theories will be brief - perhaps moreso than Bayesianism deserves.
Extremely basic explication of the core parts of Bayesian theories of epistemic dynamics
[182] is contained in Chapter 1. The reason for the brevity of this treatment is primarily
that Bayesian theories seem susceptible to being taken out in general by some of the same
arguments that applied to AGM theories. First, an emphasis on the positive. It’s clear
8

I won’t delve into this in detail, but dynamic logics for belief revision are well-known and well-developed.
See, for instance, Dynamic Doxastic Logic [224, 228], which has actions that satisfy the AGM postulates.
There are also results showing that the AGM postulates are satisfied by actions in certain dynamic epistemic
logics [65]. These cash out earlier conjectures made by van Benthem [28, 30].
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that Bayesian theories of rationality, insofar as they are concerned with credence update
rules like conditionalization are fundamentally dynamic. Conditionalization is, at the very
least, a diachronic norm of rational credence change such that only some transitions count as
rational credence updates: those transitions from credal state w to credal state w0 such that, if
P rw0 (E) = 1, then P rw0 (H) = P rw (H | E). More, it’s quite plausible that conditionalization
is a procedural norm - so long as the grain at which we individuate procedures is coarser
than, for instance, causal processes.9 This can all be granted, and it can nonetheless be
shown that Bayesian models of epistemic rationality fail to solve the Constraints problem
and fail to formalize D3.
Now, the criticisms are straightforward. First, Bayesian models of dynamics just don’t
say anything about constraints of feasibility and capacity. Like AGM, they concern only
an idealized model of rational processes and are unconcerned with idealized models of agent
capabilities with which to contrast the normative processes. If one can conceive of probabilistic versions of the Muddy Children or hidden envelope cases [65, 131], for instance, there is
nothing - in general - in Bayesian models to tell us anything about them. Thus, for instance,
whether or not one can carry out an update that complies with the rule of conditionalization at all - is not something that a Bayesian model is interested in. This straightforwardly results
in a failure of completeness with respect to modeling epistemic dynamics. Second, a key part
of the representation of restrictions on epistemic dynamics is providing machinery that can
distinguish the normative processes from those that are merely feasible processes. Without
machinery to represent constraints of feasibility and capacity, Bayesian models provide no
account of epistemic dynamics into which to embed the normative paths and thereby carry
out important cognitive work, such as determining whether, as Chapter 2 argues is essential,
conditionalization can even be complied with by an agent, let alone what specific processes
or actions to carry out in order to conditionalize.10 In other words, one has to augment the
9

If this is not the case, then D2 cannot be formalized with Bayesian models. This would be frosting on
the cake that I am baking.
10
Aside, of course, from the action of conditionalizing on one’s prior credences. But this is a particularly
capacious action type that one can realize by numerous different action subtypes. It’s not at all clear how,
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Bayesian model of normative credence update with a model of epistemic dynamics in order
to formalize D3. Without such machinery, there is just nothing in Bayesian models to tell
us about D3(d).
This all results in parallel problems to those suffered by other belief revision theories.
Let P r1 (H | E) = k be one’s conditional credence at t1 . Let πL be the process of subjecting
oneself to a series of electric shocks that cause one randomly to take on the credences:
P r2 (E) = 1 and P r2 (H) = k. Let πR be the process of coming, by hard won argument and
observation to have credences such that P r2 (E) = 1 and P r2 (H) = k. There is no difference
between πL and πR in Bayesian theories from either the perspective of modeling dynamics or
from the perspective of rationality.11 Nonetheless, there is something distinctly epistemically
troubling about any causal process that achieves conditionalization by chance, and Bayesian
theories, at their core, are powerless to capture it.

5.2.3

Ordinal Conditional Rankings

As with Bayesian theories, my commentary will be minimal - in fact, much more minimal!
The arguments applied to AGM theories apply nearly as well to Spohn’s Ordinal Conditional
Ranking theories. I omit detailed exposition of the system for the sake of brevity. See [233]
for the full explication. Spohn’s theory reduces epistemic dynamics to transitions among
ranking functions. That is, only content changes of epistemic states are represented in the
theory - just like AGM theories. As such, they are powerless to represent, with any real
granularity, epistemic actions or processes. Thus, at least the Processes problem follows, as
does failure of D2 and D3 for parallel reasons as those above.
at any given state, one is actually supposed to bring these credal changes about.
11
Even if we assume that the update of belief in E is rational in both processes and restrict our attention to
the update of the unconditional probability of H, the randomness with which one updates one’s unconditional
probability in H is objectionable. Here, as elsewhere, I’m channeling Goldman [105].
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Finite Dependency Networks

The arguments applied to AGM and Bayesian theories apply nearly as well to Tennant’s
Finite Dependency Networks [245]. I omit detailed exposition of the system for the sake of
brevity. See chapter 2 of [245] for the basics of it, and the rest of the book for exploration,
defense, and application of it. Tennant’s theory reduces epistemic dynamics to transitions
among models of epistemic states that, insightfully, contain structures that track reasons for
belief via color-coded graph-theoretic structures representing acceptance and non-acceptance
and support and defeat relations. However, only content changes of epistemic states are
represented in the theory. As such, they are powerless to represent, wth any real granularity,
epistemic actions or processes. Thus, at least the Processes problem follows, as does failure
of D2 and D3 for parallel reasons as those above.

5.2.5

Defeasible Reasoning Semantics

The arguments applied to the foregoing families of theories apply nearly as well to Pollock’s
Defeasible Reasoning Semantics [197, 195]. I omit detailed exposition of the system for the
sake of brevity. Pollock’s theory reduces epistemic dynamics to transitions among models
of epistemic states that, insightfully, contain structures that track reasons for belief via
graph-like structures representing support and defeat relations. However, content changes of
epistemic states are represented in the theory. As such, they are powerless to represent, wth
any real granularity, epistemic actions or processes. Thus, at least the Processes problem
follows, as does failure of D2 and D3 for parallel reasons as those above.12
12

However, Pollock’s complete theory of rational agency, articulated in [195], builds upon this semantics
and places it in a dual epistemic-practical model of a rational agent. The practical reasoning module of
the model is built around a plan synthesis system that is, broadly speaking, basically a program logic.
The practical reasoning module is fed beliefs from the epistemic module (the defeasible reasoning semantics
system), and it feeds information back into it. Interestingly, Pollock defends the view that epistemic norms
are internalized plans of cognitive behavior [194]. If these internalized plans can be called up deliberately
under some conditions, and the planning module can be used to construct plans with epistemic actions,
then Pollock’s theory might have something much more robust to say about D2 and D3. I leave these
considerations to future work.
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Dynamic Logics

Dynamic logics come in a wide variety [113, 65, 247, 28, 31, 34, 35, 175], as well as “dynamified” versions of static logics [30] (Ch. 2). The core constructions of dynamic logic
are program expressions that encode sequences of actions, indeterministic choices among
actions, and iterations of actions [113]. Attaching the language of program expressions to
an underlying model of dynamics has become conventional [30], and the most common form
for the underlying model of dynamics is that of a labeled transition system or multi-modal
Kripke frame.
Propositional Dynamic Logic or PDL is the central formalism in dynamic logic. It is the
modification or extension of PDL to myriad applications that comprises much of the field of
logical dynamics [34], though the field also relies quite heavily on epistemic logics and game
theory [34]. PDL supports useful combinations of both of these latter frameworks [34].
There are a number of different ways of adding additional procedural constructions to
dynamic logic such as concurrency operators and things like negated action or complement
and reversals of actions [247, 113], but I’ll omit discussion of these. More interesting variants
arise by modifying the underlying model of dynamics by interpreting program expressions
over different structures. Interpreting program expressions over processes generates Process
Logic (PL) [114]. Interpreting program expressions over protocols (indeterministic trees
that model sequences of decision problems) and then embedding these in a model of agent
uncertainty about actions generates Epistemic Protocol Logics (EPL) [184]. Treating the
nodes of an LTS as belief sets and zeroing in on the subset of basic actions that represents
rule-based revisions of belief set generates Epistemic Logics for Rule-based Agents (ELRA)
[134]. Extending the language of PDL with operators about knowledge, ability, opportunity,
belief, and more and suitably upgrading the model of dynamics to provide semantics for
these additional notions generates KARO logics [128, 124].
The foregoing are the rival systems I will focus on in this section.
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PDL

The promise of PDL as a model of epistemic dynamics and epistemic norms is one of the
primary motivators of this entire project. In examining PDL, treat it the way PLEN was
interpreted as a theory of epistemic norms: interpret the states in PDL’s model theory
as epistemic states, the propositional language as one that contains epistemic or doxastic
expressions, and the program expressions as encoding the content of procedural norms. Keep
this adaptation of PDL in mind in what follows.
PDL does well with respect to recognizing constraints on dynamics if programs are taken
to encode capacity and feasibility. However, as has already been argued, PDL suffers the
Processes problem and, as a result, cannot handle methodological inclusion, procedural information, or epistemic distinctions in cases like the Honest Twin. Thus, PDL fails to formalize
D2. Because PDL can’t represent processes as distinct from transitions, it cannot accurately
represent normative restrictions on processes. PDL mischaracterizes D3 as a result - the
restrictions on processes cannot be analyzed in PDL.
PDL does provide machinery for exogeny. There are explicit protocol expressions in
PDL and operators encoding the dynamic properties of protocols. Taking protocols to be
the analysans of epistemic norms, PDL is narrowly exogenous and its deductive systems
encode valid reasoning about the dynamic properties of epistemic norms. Given the general
strategy of interpreting deontics and verdicts in terms of dynamic properties (as in Chapter
4), these features of norms can be explicitly reasoned about in PDL. However, the exogeny
of PDL pales in comparison to that of PLEN.
There are specific kinds of arguments concerning the equivalence and dependence relations among norms (as spelled out in terms of relations between restrictions on epistemic
dynamics and normative verdicts). These are articulated in [135], as are their formalizations
in PLEN. PDL, however, cannot adequately formalize these forms of argument for the simple
reason that PDL suffers the Processes problem and, as a result, fails D2 and partially fails
D3. PDL cannot analyze restrictions on processes and actions in a way that distinguishes
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them from transitions, and so the forms of reasoning that PDL can formalize are limited
to arguments about properties that can be analyzed in terms of transitions only. PDL cannot, for instance, formalize an argument establishing that a norm that dictates constructing
proofs myself is inequivalent in an important way to a norm that dictates either asking my
honest twin or doing the proofs myself.13 More, PDL cannot analyze any useful equivalence
relations among epistemic norms stricter than transitional equivalence without simply adding
machinery from PLEN.14 Thus, it follows that if PDL’s languages are extended to contain
expressions that encode statements about (e.g.) procedural convergence and divergence, parallel execution, and path-theoretic equivalence, the logic of PDL will mischaracterize these
notions or only partially characterize them (by codifying how they interact with transitional
properties only). This is easy to see: given the notion encoded in π & π 0 , PDL will have no
way of showing that π & π 0 doesn’t follow from Rπ = Rπ0 .

Now, the foregoing implicitly assumes a re-interpretation of PDL for the epistemic case,

but this reinterpretation does no work in the argument against PDL’s adequacy. PDL is a
logic of actions and programs, first and foremost, and has no native features for representing
epistemic states. However, let us generally assume that, along with propositional valuations,
the models of PDL associate to each state a structure that interprets epistemic operators
like belief b and knowledge k - content states as in PLEN would be fine, replacing each states
with an epistemic model as in DEL would do the trick, as well. There are numerous possible
ways to do this; see [162, 219, 229, 247, 30, 34, 36, 68, 65] for developments of PDL into
dynamic doxastic logics.
Additionally, PDL does well with respect to other theoretical tradeoffs. PDL makes
no commitment to actions that result exclusively in changes of epistemic state. That is,
there are actions, a, in PDL such that a may change the state of the world in addition
13

Formally, one norm dictates carrying out a transition in transition relation Rd - deducing for myself. The
other dictates carrying out a transition in Rt ∪ Rd - the union of the deduction and twin-asking transition
relations. Of course, if Rt = Rd , then Rt ∪ Rd = Rt = Rd . The two norms have the same requirements under
PDL, but they are distinct. One can comply with the latter norm by carrying out an action that doesn’t
comply with the other.
14
See the next section for some details
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to epistemic states. So, PDL nicely evades Special Case 3 of the failure of norm exogeny
and of the failure to model epistemic dynamics. PDL is also fully general, committing to
the analysis of no specific kinds or subsets of epistemic actions like public announcements,
subterfuge, expansions and contractions, or any other specific subset of epistemic actions.
Finally, there are, as far as I know, few, if any, standard paradoxes plaguing PDL that aren’t
merely artifacts of the propositional, epistemic, or deontic logic that one attaches to it.15
And these can be switched out while retaining the action and program logic.
As a final bit of comparison between PDL and PLEN, note that PLEN is more expressive
than PDL. Denote bisimulation with ∼. Formula A is bisimulation invariant iff for any
graphs, g and g 0 such that s ∈ S and s0 ∈ S 0 , if s ∼ s0 , then s

A iff s0

A; A is

bisimulation variant iff it’s not bisimulation invariant. It is well-known that the control
operators of PDL are bisimulation invariant. As a result, the language of PDL contains
no expressions that are bisimulation variant.16 However, PLEN contains a control operator
and several connectives out of which bisimulation variant expressions can be formed in the
object language. It also has plenty of room for ad hoc meta-language operators that are
bisimulation variant.
(EXP) LP LEN can distinguish between bisimilar EDGs; ∩, ≡t , &p ↔p , and ≡sG generate
bisimulation variant formulae.

Corollary LP LEN contains formulae that are not bisimulation invariant, but are isomorphism invariant.
Corollary Graph-theoretic Protocol Equivalence Relations are bisimulation variant
but isomorphism invariant. This accounts for the difference in strength among
graph-theoretic protocol equivalence and the rest.
15

To be clear, when applied to both the doxastic [158, 162, 224, 225, 229] or deontic [174, 228] cases, things
are different; there are well-known paradoxes in PDL-based doxastic [219] and deontic [10] theories, despite
how well the application of a PDL-based framework does at removing other paradoxes.
16
Both of these technical results are proved and explored in [29, 30].
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The foregoing arguments make no reference to how epistemic states are represented. All of
the foregoing complaints have to do with the program logic that PDL employs. Fundamentally, PDL is constructed by attaching a bit of relational algebra to a modal logic. Actions
are all interpreted with binary transition relations, and so are programs. It’s this feature
that generates the problems for PDL. This is an important point because many formalisms
that are plausible rivals of PLEN simply build the action and program logic of PDL on top
of some innovation at the level of states or logic or they offer mild modifications of the action
and program logic of PDL. This extends to dynamic epistemic logics as well.
5.3.1.1

Modifying PDL

It might be thought that the main problems of PDL can be removed by giving a semantics of program expressions in terms of computation sequences [113]. Let a computation
sequence be a sequence of atomic action symbols, e.g., ha1 , ..., an i. Then, letting CS(π)
be the set of computation sequences of π, an elementary result of PDL is that CS(π)
is syntactically determined. For atomic, a, CS(a) = {a}. Letting pi be an arbitrary
computation sequence, and pi pj be a concatenated computation sequence: CS(π1 ; π2 ) =
{pi pj | pi ∈ CS(π1 ), pj ∈ CS(π2 )}, CS(π1 ∪ π2 ) = {pi | pi ∈ CS(π1 ) ∪ CS(π2 )}, and CS(π∗)
is the reflexive, transitive closure of CS(π). These can be associated, via the basic execution
rules, with transition relations.
The solution of some of PDL’s problems (with respect to modeling epistemic dynamics)
might lie in analyzing epistemic norms in terms of computation sequences. One way to do
this would be to either interpret the propositional language of PDL with the computation
sequences. First, note the sets of computation sequences mapped to each program, and let
the execution sets of programs be the computation sequences. Then let a function (relativized
to LTS, g), fπ : CS(π) −→ Rπ ⊆ W × W , associate each computation sequence of π with
a transition relation so that, basically, the execution rules of PDL are approximated. For
atomics, CS(a) = {a}. Let fa (a) = Ra with Ra defined as in PDL or the transitional
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fragment of PLEN. Then, for example, define fπ for complex protocols so that (inter alia):
if p1 p2 ∈ CS(π1 ; π2 ), then t ∈ fπ1;π2 (p1 p2 ) iff t = hf irst(fπ1 (p1 )), last(fπ1 (p2 ))i. Then, the
semantics of the operator [π]A can be defined like so:
(1) w |= [π]A iff for all p ∈ CS(π), if t ∈ (fπ (p)) and w = f irst(t), then last(t) |= A.
(2) w |= hπi A iff there is some p ∈ CS(π) such that t ∈ (fπ (p)) and w = f irst(t), then
last(t) |= A.
For example, let π = a; b where a and b are atomics. Then CS(π) = {ab}. Consider an
LTS g such that Pg is defined in g as it is in PLEN. Consider a state s such that hπi >
at w. Then there is some t such that t = hw, xi ∈ fa;b (ab). But then there must be some
t0 = hw, x0 i ∈ fa (a) and t00 = hx0 , xi ∈ f (b). The steps just go further with more complex
protocols.
Now, with this kind of semantics, PDL might be capable of distinguishing processes
from transitions. Simply put, computation sequences represent processes and transitions
are simply correlated with them. Two distinct computation sequences (i.e., processes), p
and q, that execute π can be bookended by the same transitions via fπ . So, it’s possible
that Rπ = Rπ , hπi > and hπ 0 i > at w, but that p ∈ CS(π) and p ∈
/ CS(π 0 ). For example,
CS(a; b) 6= CS(c; d), but, in g, let fa (a) = {t}, fb (b) = {t0 }, fc (c) = {t}, fd (d) = {t0 },
fa;b (ab) = tt0 = fc;d (cd). In this case, Ra = Rc , Rb = Rd , Ra;b = Rc;d , and ha; bi > and
hc; di > at f irst(t). Thus, two distinct sets of processes might nevertheless define, via fπ ,
identical transition relations. Now, with this amendment, PDL would be capable of supporting formulae, A(π), about π’s methodological inclusion, procedural features, and normative
status that distinguish programs π1 and π2 such that Rπ1 = Rπ2 . For instance, if we take
programs to encode the requirements of epistemic norms, then process (computation sequence) p may be in the execution set of π without being in the execution set of π 0 , even if
for all p in CS(π), fπ (p) = fπ0 (p0 ) for some p0 in CS(π 0 ) and the converse also holds. Hence,
if there are formulae A(π) with semantics defined in terms of computation sequences, these
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will distinguish programs with identical transition relations and non-identical computation
sequences. Or, in other words, A(π) ≡ A(π 0 ) will not follow from Rπ = Rπ0 if the truth
conditions of A(π) and A(π 0 ) are defined in terms of computation sequences rather than
transition relations. Thus, modifying PDL so that programs assertions are interpreted over
computation sequences is a marked improvement.
Unfortunately, this modification of PDL accomplishes - at best - no more than what is
accomplished by the procedural fragment of PLEN without machinery for encoding epistemic
and doxastic assertions (e.g., content states that interpret b(A)). Really, this modification
accomplishes less. Correlating protocols/programs with computation sequences and pairing
these with relation functions, fπ , delivers no more information than associating each program
with procedural paths.
First, in PLEN, it can be shown that Pπ = Pπ0 for all structures, g, iff CS(π) = CS(π 0 ).17
All there is to know about equivalence defined via computation sequences can be gotten from
procedural paths because procedural paths minus states are computation sequences. The
set of computation sequences can be read off of the set of paths. Anything we need to
know about computation sequences can thus be derived from some facts about procedural
paths. More, computation sequences do not give us the same information about protocols
that procedural paths do. For instance, the computation sequences of each protocol π are
determined exclusively by its syntax. Thus, the extension of CS(π) is not relative to any
semantic structures. However, the procedural paths of π are determined partially by the
syntax and partially by the graph-theoretic structure of each EDG. What this means is
that, taking the structure of a model of epistemic dynamics to encodes (e.g.) constraints
of capacity and feasibility, different conditions of feasibility and capacity with respect to
epistemic actions can change what it means to comply with a norm. Pπ in g may be distinct
from Pπ in g 0 . The paths in one set of executions may be structurally distinct from those in
the other, and this means that, in one graph, different computation sequences will be enacted
17

See section 5.4.2 of [135].
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than in the other. But computation sequences alone don’t tell us this - they can’t tell us
that two agents with different capacities will have to comply with the same norm differently.
We need to exploit the function fπ in order to get information about what computation
sequences are enacted in a particular graph. PLEN gives us this information for free via the
same constructions that give us computation sequences.
Second, there is no obvious way of using this kind of semantics to define graph-theoretic
relations among programs/protocols, and this will result in a blindspot in the equivalence
0

relations in modified PDL. Let π ≡G π 0 iff Gπ = Gπ (as defined in GTP1). Then π ≡G π 0
implies CS(π) = CS(π 0 ) while the converse fails. Thus, computation sequence identity
between protocols can’t establish “graph-theoretic equivalence”. Unless the modified form of
PDL, ultimately, just defines the procedural execution rules and implementations of PLEN,
even a version of PDL defined over computation sequences is without any clear means of
defining the sets of graphs exploited in defining ≡G . As a result, all of the useful results about
graph-theoretic equivalence disappear in the modified system. These results are explicitly
developed in the technical document [135].
Finally, if Rπ is the set of transitions composed of f irst(p) and last(p) for each p ∈ Pπ ,
then fπ (p) = Rπ , and the converse holds, as can be easily shown. So computation sequences
tell us no more about the transitions specified by protocols/programs than can be gotten
from procedural paths.18 And all of this ignores parallel execution or, in the PDL literature,
concurrency, which at least is given an analysis in PLEN that is theoretically adequate in
certain ways: e.g., parallel execution in PLEN delivers unique sequences of states for complex
protocols - especially sequentially composed protocols - that are executed concurrently.19 The
failure of this property implies that the total epistemic states of agents can simultaneously
evolve along two distinct paths, which is absurd.
Consequently, this modification of PDL is simply a step toward building PLEN that still
18

All pf these results only hold if fπ (π) = Rπ for all atomics, where Rπ is defined as in PLEN or PDL.
Else, fπ might be a completely arbitrary transition relation.
19
A well known and difficult problem. See chapter 10 of [113] as well as [247].
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omits some information about protocols, rather than a genuine rival.20 For the remaining
PDL based theories, this sort of modification is available, and, in each case, it improves the
performance of the formalism with respect to the desiderata at stake. However, in each case,
the underlying model of epistemic dynamics is just a step towards PLEN, and the additional
machinery in each theory can easily be approximated or added to PLEN. Thus, in none of
the following cases does the formalism, even modified as above, amount to a step forward
from PLEN with respect to solving the Processes, Constraints, and First-Class Citizenship
problems or formalization of D1-D3.

5.3.2

Process Logic (PL)

Process Logic (PL) [114] reinterprets the logic of PDL over path-models. The path-models
of PL are essentially ETL models. The innovations involve (a) the interpretations of actions
and programs by assigning them sets of paths, and (b) the machinery defined on top of the
path-models for analyzing features of processes like what states are reached over the course
of the process. The path-theoretic execution conditions of PLEN are directly inspired by
PL, as were many of the basic formal contrivances.21
There is much innovative treatment of these basic models, but the details can, without
loss, be overlooked for my purposes, here. Accordingly, I omit detailed exposition of PL
for the sake of brevity. However, the problems that plagued PDL as a model of epistemic
dynamics and epistemic rationality norms apply just as well to PL. The key problem is that
paths in PL are countable sequences of states. While this enables PL to analyze a number of
interesting properties of processes [114], it ultimately implies that PL suffers the Processes
problem. Actions, and sequence thereof, that correspond to identical sequences of states are
indistinguishable in PL, and so the Honest Twin case and Bad Reasoning throw up barriers
20

There are quite a few steps between this amendment to PDL and PLEN, however, among which lies
semantic decisions about how to execute parallel execution. This is taken up in the document [135].
21
The f irst(p), last(p) notation, the definition of execution conditions for sequential compositions over
concatenated paths, and the general thought that programs ought to be interpreted by assigning them sets
of paths rather than binary relations are all innovations of PL.
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to the adequate formalization of D2 and D3 in PL. As a result, cannot handle methodological
inclusion or epistemic distinctions in cases like the Honest Twin. Thus, PL fails to formalize
D2 and mischaracterizes D3, while failing to match PLEN’s norm exogeny just as PDL did.

5.3.3

Epistemic Protocol Logic (EPL)

EPL played a significant role in the design of PLEN. EPL protocols themselves have more
than a passing resemblance to the restrictions on an EDG’s paths that the execution rules
assign to each protocol in PLEN. EPL’s protocol expressions are are constructed from a very
similar syntax. More, the protocols of EPL [184] were the initial inspiration for the “protocol
graphs” used extensively in [135], though these constructions play little role in this thesis.
EPL protocols have the benefit of providing useful models of rules for selecting action
that captures certain intuitive features of what commitment to a protocol requires.22 More
important, EPL builds these protocols into a model of dynamics that explicitly displays
the actual courses of action according to a protocol (the protocol itself) as distinct from
the entire set of possible courses of action (the arena) and distinct from those courses of
action the agent thinks accord with a protocol (the subjectively enabled paths in the arena).
Essentially, every protocol in EPL is a restriction on paths through arenas that is assigned
to each protocol expression by the EPL semantics.
Unfortunately, EPL, being based fundamentally on PDL, interprets atomic actions with
binary transition relations, and basic protocols are simply trees. This reinstates a form of the
Processes and Constraints problems and, along with them, versions of the same failures that
befell PDL. First, any two atomics correlated with the same binary relations are interchangeable in all EPL contexts. This follows from the fact that the transition relations in protocols
are binary. Second, basic protocols with identical accessibility relations are interchangeable
in all EPL contexts. Consider EPL protocols t and t0 , such that the basic action sets are,
22

For instance, EPL’s protocols provide means of distinguishing between different sequences of decision
problems that PDL programs can’t make sense of. The aforementioned [184] demonstrates this well. (pp.
4-6)
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respectively, Σ and Σ0 , for every a ∈ Σ, there is an a0 ∈ Σ0 such that ⇒a =⇒a0 and vice versa.
Then, at any state in any arena, t is enabled iff t0 is enabled.23 Any equivalence relation
among protocols in EPL defined in terms of enabling or embedding, then, will hold between
t and t0 because they have equivalent transition or reachability relations. Finally, because
complex protocols are generated by composition functions on trees, these interchangeabilities extend to complex protocols (the protocols in EPL that correspond to complex protocol
expressions in EPL). Thus, there simply can’t be EPL protocols that represent the kind
of restriction on procedures that is required by epistemic rationality with respect to norms
that distinguish transition-equivalent actions. This implies that some of the problems of
PDL transfer directly over to each basic protocol of EPL.
Let t = hS, {Ra | a ∈ Act} , s0 i be a basic protocol. Let t0 = hS 0 , {Ra | a ∈ Act} , s00 i be
another basic protocol. Let b and c be atomic actions that are associated, for all basic
protocols, with identical binary transition relations, Rb = Rc , but, as in the Honest Twin
case, have distinct methodological, procedural, and normative properties. Then, every edge
labeled in t with b is also labeled with c and the same holds for t0 . Thus, at every state at
which t dictates doing b, t also dictates doing c. Same for t0 . This extends to every basic
protocol. From this, a number of troubles follow. Insofar as basic protocol expressions are
to be deployed to capture the content of norms, they fail. There can be no basic protocols
that represent restrictions on action that distinguish b from c; this just gets restrictions on
action wrong in cases like the Honest Twin. More, it follows that every basic protocol in
one’s methodology that dictates doing b also dictates doing c. This gets methodological
inclusion wrong. Finally, this feature of protocols in EPL also obscures procedural facts,
as a procedure that requires doing b needn’t, intuitively, require doing c, and yet any basic
protocol that requires doing one also requires doing the other.24 Because complex protocols
23

I am using Pacuit and Simon’s notation for protocols rather than the PLEN notation; in their system,
protocols are trees rather than syntactic items, so t is a convenient term for naming them. Keep in mind
that t may but does not always denote a transition in EPL as it does in the PLEN notation. What I call
protocols would be protocol expressions in EPL.
24
Certain kinds of procedural facts will be fine. For instance, a protocol t that is bisimilar to a t0 that
requires a sequencing of atomics a; b will also require the sequencing. This because every ordered pair is
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are built by various composition functions out of basic protocols, these results extend to
complex protocols; any pair of complex protocols will conflate b and c just as badly as any
pair of basic protocols. The foregoing arguments merely assumed that atomic actions were
interchangeable. These problems are exacerbated by the extension of interchangeability to
basic and complex protocols.
All of the foregoing implies several failings of EPL with respect to D1-D3. First, EPL
gets D2 wrong and D3 at least partially wrong by conflating actions with transitions (and
protocols with trees rather than multi-graphs). As for norm exogeny, there are explicit
protocol expressions in EPL and operators encoding the dynamic properties of protocols.
Taking protocols to be the analysans of epistemic norms, EPL is narrowly norm exogenous
and its deductive systems encode valid reasoning about the dynamic properties of epistemic
norms. Given the general strategy of interpreting deontics and verdicts in terms of dynamic
properties, these features of norms can be explicitly reasoned about in EPL. However, as
with PDL, there are philosophically important kinds of arguments concerning the properties of epistemic rationality norms that cannot be analyzed correctly in EPL due to the
interchangeability of transition-equivalent actions.

5.3.4

Epistemic Logic for Rule-based Agents (ELRA)

ELRA [134] was explicated in Chapter 1. The key insight of ELRA is that one can apply a
dynamic logic to the analysis of the actual process of deductive reasoning rather than simply
closing belief sets or knowledge under deduction. ELRA also shows us how to use dynamic
logic to characterize the inferential features of actions as represented by transition relations.
The fundamental problem with ELRA is generality; ELRA is restricted to the analysis of
also a tree, as is every unconnected node, so there will be a basic protocol that interprets every action label
in every basic protocol. So, many basic protocols are analyzable into more basic protocols, down to the
atomic actions. Thus, if a basic protocol t contains a subtree t0 , and if t0 is related to another subtree t00
in a way that forms t by means of one of the composition relations in EPL [184], then t0 is a “more basic”
protocol contained in t, and there will be a complex protocol expression corresponding to t that contains
one corresponding to t0 . Thus, if procedural facts like those at hand are encoded by some formulae of EPL,
these procedural facts can, at least, be represented.
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particular kinds of rule-based epistemic change, and these rule-based changes are all defined
by specific content state changes. While ELRA can distinguish the processes in Bad Reasoning, for example, it has no machinery for representing epistemic actions in general or the
Honest Twin case in particular. ELRA doesn’t suffer from the Processes problem as severely
as other formalisms, but it cannot handle methodological inclusion, procedural information,
or epistemic distinctions in cases like the Honest Twin. Thus, ELRA mischaracterizes D3.
Finally, because ELRA is restricted to reasoning about the specific rule-based processes it
is designed for, it cannot provide machinery for analyzing reasoning about the properties of
epistemic norms generally.

5.3.5

KARO Logics (KARO)

KARO logics, or logics of Knowledge, Action, and Opportunity (among many other things),
are a complication of the logical analysis of agency based roughly on the combination of
propositional dynamic logic and epistemic logic [128, 124]. The innovation of KARO is in
the representation of much more than merely the structure of epistemic states and the structure of procedures, plans, or actions; KARO is a more robust logic for practical reasoning,
including reasoning about motivational states, opportunities, and commitments (whether
due to plans or norms) to action. A KARO model is a set of states over which several
transition relations and equivalence relations are defined along with a function from states
to actions. The transition relations interpret actions, the equivalence relations interpret
knowledge, belief, and desire, and the function from states to actions functions as an agent’s
agenda - the set of actions per state that an agent is committed to.
The main failure of theoretical adequacy for KARO is a result of the incorporation of
the action and program logics of PDL. Accordingly, I omit detailed exposition of PL for the
sake of brevity. The same problems inherent in the action and program logics there transmit
directly to KARO. In fact, the problems are multiplied because the language of KARO
enable the interpretation of new assertions about programs and actions, and this increase
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in expressive power increases the possible errors that conflating processes with transitions
result in.

5.4

Dynamic Epistemic Logics

The general form of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) [65] emerged out of the study of Plaza’s
Public Announcement Logic (PAL) [193], which itself was a natural, dynamic extension of
Hintikka’s classic framework for Epistemic Logic (EL) [129]. PAL took the multi-agent epistemic models of EL and added a dynamic action of public announcement, which, intuitively,
has less to do with verbal announcements as it has to do with hard information updates for
entire groups of epistemic agents. PAL defines a public announcement as an action that takes
epistemic models to new epistemic models. The basic idea being that the transition relations
in an epistemic model encodes the properties of knowledge for each agent, and the transition
from one model to the next via public announcement updates these transition relations, and
so encodes changes in what’s known by each agent. DEL generalizes this picture by adding
a general class of product updates, one for each event and/or action model, which encodes
what agents know about events/actions.
The underlying model of dynamics is defined in terms of product updates. As such, DEL
is an input assimilating model of dynamics, and so suffers the standard problems with these
(e.g., inability to model constraints [131]). DEL can be upgraded by incorporating Epistemic
Action Logics (EAL) and Logics of Epistemic Programs (LEP) [18] to overcome some of these
limitations. It can alternately be combined with Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL), resulting
in a branching time model of epistemic dynamics, and a Temporal Dynamic Epistemic Logic
(TDEL) [131]. Epistemic Planning Logics (EPPL) apply DEL to the analysis of deliberate
action or the “reasoning” phase of action [41].
The foregoing are the rival systems I will focus on in this section.

CHAPTER 5. PLEN VS. RIVAL FORMALISMS

5.4.1

285

DEL, Epistemic Action Logic (EAL), and Logics of Epistemic
Programs (LEP)

Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) has the best chances of being a logic of epistemic norms
out of the rival formalisms of PLEN. Basic forms of DEL can be modified to incorporate
action logics and even programs in addition to their well known and fruitful structural
representations of epistemic states and the dynamics thereof. As such, such modifications of
DEL seem plausible as formalisms with structures for representing both epistemic dynamics
and epistemic norms.
Epistemic models represent epistemic uncertainty relations (per agent), and these are
used to read off properties and contents of epistemic states. That is, for agent i, Ri in
model M tells us everything we need to know about what i knows (or, in a doxastic logic,
what i believes), e.g., what’s true at the worlds connected by Ri in M gives a snapshot of
the contents of i’s knowledge and beliefs. Event models add to the content of an agent’s
epistemic state by representing uncertainty relations among events as well as some “external”
information about the preconditions of events.
Product updates represent transitions from one set of uncertainty relations to another
that are effected by particular events. Formally, product updates are just functions from
pairs, (M, E), of epistemic and event models to epistemic models that combine the uncertainty relations among states in M and events in E while preserving valuations for atomics
at all states. That is, epistemic dynamics are conceptualized in terms of transitions among
epistemic states associated with events. The properties of epistemic dynamics can be read
off of these updates.
Call a dynamic epistemic logic with structures analyzing actions an Epistemic Action
Logic (EAL).25 To analyze the epistemic features of actions, DEL deploys pointed models.
First, we consider pointed epistemic models (M, w) where w is one of the worlds in M .
Second, we consider pointed action models, (E, e), where E is an event model and e is a
25

See [65] for technical details.
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particular event in the set of events in E. Product update generates a pointed epistemic
model (M 0 , (w, e)) in a straightforward way that restricts or, in more fully generalized versions (re: [18, 65]), expands the uncertainty relation. “In this way, agent [i]’s uncertainty
in the resultant model [...] comes from two sources: her initial uncertainty in M [...] as to
which is the actual world and her uncertainty in E [...] as to which is the actual event.” [19]
The thought is that action is a species of event, and to see the epistemic effects of an action,
one must see how the action updates the uncertainty relations at the current world.
An action algebra can be added to DEL with EAL to generate a Logic of Epistemic
Programs (LEP) [18]. Here are two ways to do this. First, simply take the foregoing
machinery and add program control operators to the language so that the basic actions can
be combined via procedural operations. At a minimum, consider choice ∪ and sequential
composition ;. Then define functions on product updates in order to assign product updates
to epistemic programs. For an action a, we know that there is an action model (E, e) and
a product update function that identifies all transitions among epistemic models for a. The
same, mutatis mutandis, works for b. For the program a; b, the product update of the
program is just the composition of the product updates of a and b. The choice is the union
of them. A second way to do this is to assign to each program a program model, (E, π),
which is an action model such that π is a designated set of actions in E. Then the update for
(E, π) is the update for E restricted to the designated actions, i.e., we update any (M, s) to
(M 0 , (s, e)) where e ∈ π. In either case, there is a way in which complex procedures built out
of epistemic actions can be analyzed, and the underlying model of epistemic dynamics moves
beyond input assimilation to tree-like representations of possible unfoldings of a system.
LEP is a dynamic epistemic logic with a program logic on top. As such, it provides a
prima facie plausible underlying model of epistemic dynamics and a plausible looking model
of epistemic normativity in just the same way that PDL or PLEN do. Let the programs
in LEP represent procedural epistemic norms that dictate operations on epistemic actions.
The product updates represent the transitions that result from executing the instructions of
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these programs and so represent the rational courses of action according to the norms the
programs represent.
The fundamental problems of DEL (generalized with EAL) are three-fold, and they apply
equally well to the base form of DEL as to EAL and LEP. First, there are the problems of
DEL raised by Hoshi [131]. I quote him at length:
[...] DEL does not provide a machinery that is suitable for representing protocol information. There are two senses in which it does not. First, in DEL, there
is no restriction on which event models can be applied to given epistemic models. Any event model can be applied to any epistemic model, and the epistemic
model obtained by the process can be described by using corresponding event
operators. As we saw above, the informational state after I peep into the card on
the desk can be represented (in Figure 1.4) by an epistemic model. No matter
what communication constraints we think of for the situation after my peeping,
e.g. I put the card into the deck after peeping and leave the office, DEL does not
forbid us from applying the public announcement of !p (The card is the ace of
Diamonds), which will yield the truth of hϕ!i [2]p (p can be publicly announced
after which you know p).
Second, one may try to adjust the precondition functions of event models to
represent communication constraints. One component of event models is a precondition function pre. The function is interpreted in such a way that an event
e can happen iff pre(e) = ϕ. Thus, in the above example, we may introduce a
new propositional letter, say d, to represent whatever communicational or observational constraints there will be after my peeping, and say that the public
announcement of p is in fact the public announcement of p ∧ d, since the public
announcement of p can happen only if p is true and the condition d is satisfied.
For instance, we may interpret d here as “the card is still on the desk in the office
in front of us", and make d false to represent the situation after I put the card
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back into the deck of cards and leave the office. h!(p ∧ d)i [2]p then become false,
since p ∧ d is false in that case. Thus, after I put the card into the deck and leave
the office, you cannot know what the card is by turning the card over or asking
me what the card was.
Even though such an adjustment of precondition functions may yield satisfactory representations for certain cases of intelligent interaction, the strategy
cannot be applied generally to represent protocol information. The main obstacle
is that the informational events that can happen may change over time. In many
interaction scenarios, the information about what can happen at a given moment
depends on the information about what has happened earlier. For instance, our
conversation may obey implicit rules such as “Do not repeat yourself", “Say p
after q", etc. Protocol information of this kind cannot be captured by the above
maneuver, since the preconditions of events are encoded by propositional letters,
whose truth values are constant in DEL at a given world. A given world can
evolve in various possible ways, depending on what event happens, and propositional letters cannot do the job of tracking how the world has evolved. For this
reason, DEL is not suitable for capturing the temporality in protocol information.
(pp. 24-25)
What Hoshi calls protocol information, I call information about the constraints of capacity
and feasibility. In sum, DEL is inadequate to accurately representing the properties of
constraints discussed in Chapter 1. DEL thus suffers the Constraints problem.
Second, the use of Kripke models as the basis for structures that represent epistemic
states generates the well-known problem of logical omniscience and closure of knowledge
[134, 148]. This is a result of defining the semantics of knowledge and belief operators in
terms of transition relations among worlds. I won’t comment on this more, except to note
that syntactic epistemic logics do not have this bug; one can stipulate whatever conditions
on belief and knowledge one wants. Hence, PLEN is free of logical omniscience and closure -
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so long as one wants to be free of them. They can easily be reinstated by imposing conditions
of closure under validity relations on the acceptance set.
Third, and most serious from the perspective of comparing DEL to PLEN, DEL suffers the
Processes problem. In contrast to PDL, however, DEL conflates processes and transitions not
by omitting machinery for representing processes, but by omitting machinery for representing
transitions. No two actions represented in DEL can be transition equivalent. The epistemic
features of actions in DEL are represented by event models, but the dynamic features of
actions are defined by product updates. Consider actions a and b. It’s tempting to take the
phrase “action model” on its face, and think that a can be represented with pointed event
models. But this is a mistake; actions are encoded syntactically, as in PLEN, by means
of the symbols in action models, and their dynamic features are modeled indirectly by the
mapping provided by product updates. Recall that product update is a function from pairs
of pointed epistemic models and pointed action models, ((M, w), (E, e)), to pointed epistemic
models, (M 0 , w0 ), where the states in the resulting epistemic model are pairs, w0 ∈ W × E.
The transition relations that define execution of actions in DEL, then, are defined like so:
(M, w) 7→(E,a) (M 0 , w0 ) iff the preconditions of a are all satisfied at w, M 0 is the update
product of ((M, w), (E, a)), and w0 = (w, a).
This rules out transition equivalent yet distinct actions. Consider the following action
models. (E, a) = hE, →i , prei where a ∈ E, and (E 0 , b) = hE 0 , →0i , pre0 i where b ∈ E 0 .
Suppose that a and b define identical product updates. Thus, for any pointed epistemic
model (M, w) = hS, R, V, wi, the product update from ((M, w), (E, a)) = (M 0 , (w, a)) =
((M, w), (E, b)). But this just means that a = b, that −→i =−→0i , and that pre = pre0 .
Thus, (E, a) = (E, b). Thus, two distinct actions, a and b, cannot be transition equivalent;
the terminal states in transitions assigned to actions via the product update carry a “record”
of which action brought about the change, and so no two actions, DEL, can possibly be
associated with equivalent transition relations.
The foregoing property is a serious failure to accurately model epistemic dynamics as
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well as the content of epistemic rationality norms. First, as argued in Chapters 1 and 2,
it’s plausible that there really are transition equivalent epistemic actions. This means that
DEL straightforwardly mischaracterizes epistemic actions by ruling out an entire class of
potentially - and, if Chapters 1 and 2 are right - epistemologically important actions by
technical fiat. Second, the argument above shows that there cannot even be transition
convergent actions in DEL. For no pair of actions, a and b, is it possible for there to be
any (M, w) such that (E, a) and (E, b) to lead to the same terminal state from (M, w) while
a 6= b. Explicitly, the execution rules of DEL rule this out. (M, w) 7→(E,a) (M 0 , w0 ) iff the
preconditions of a are all satisfied at w, M 0 is the update product of ((M, w), (E, a)), and
w0 = (w, a), and (M, w) 7→(E,b) (M 0 , w0 ) iff the preconditions of b are all satisfied at w, M 0
is the update product of ((M, w), (E, b)), and w0 = (w, b). If a and b converged, for even
one transition, ((M, w), (M 0 , w0 ), then w0 = (w, a) = (w, b), and so a = b. But, again, it’s
quite clear that there are distinct epistemic actions and complex epistemic processes that
are transition convergent. Thus, DEL gets epistemic dynamics wrong.
All of this adds up to DEL failing to adequately formalize D2 because epistemic rationality can distinguish transition equivalent and transition convergent actions and processes,
and nothing in DEL can approximate such rational distinctions because DEL cannot even
recognize these categories of actions. As a result, the restrictions on epistemic dynamics
defined by procedural norms cannot be accurately represented (though dynamic restrictions
might be well represented).
The problem is that the distinction between processes is built directly into the machinery
for representing transitions. What is necessary is machinery that can represent transitions
and processes separately while also capturing their relations. By building machinery that
distinguishes processes at a fine grain (the syntactic level) into the terminal states of transitions, this assimilates all of the properties of transitions to those of processes rather than, as
PDL does, the other way around. Consequently, D3 can’t be formalized in DEL (extended to
LEP). Given Hoshi’s point above, D3(d) isn’t going to come out right, either. The absence
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of machinery for representing constraints of capacity and feasibility results in the failure to
distinguish them from normative restrictions. Now, even if that can be resolved by some
maneuver with preconditions, D3(b) and D3(c) cannot be accurately formalized due to the
failure to even recognize restrictions on transitions.
Finally, DEL (extended with EAL and LEP) supports logics that govern the expressions
that encode the dynamic properties of epistemic programs. Taking epistemic programs
to be the analysans for epistemic norms as we have above, these logics explicitly encode
valid reasoning about (the dynamic properties of) epistemic norms. The logics are thus
narrowly exogenous. However, just like PDL, its exogeny is lacking. As argued in [135],
there are specific kinds of arguments concerning the equivalence and dependence relations
among norms (as spelled out in terms of relations between restrictions on epistemic dynamics
and normative verdicts). LEP cannot adequately formalize these forms of argument for the
simple reason that LEP fails D2 and partially fails D3. LEP cannot analyze restrictions on
processes and actions in a way that distinguishes them from transitions, and so the forms
of reasoning that LEP can formalize are limited to arguments about properties that can
be analyzed in terms of transitions only. LEP cannot, for instance, formalize an argument
establishing that that a norm that prohibits asking my honest twin and dictates constructing
proofs myself is inequivalent with a norm that dictates either asking my honest twin or doing
the proofs myself. More, LEP cannot analyze any equivalence relations among epistemic
norms stricter than transitional equivalence. Thus, it follows that if LEP’s languages are
extended to contain expressions that encode statements about (e.g.) procedural convergence
and divergence, parallel execution, and path-theoretic equivalence, the logic of LEP will
mischaracterize these notions or only partially characterize them (by codifying how they
interact with transitional properties only). This is easy to see: given the notion encoded in
π & π 0 , LEP will have no way of showing that π & π 0 doesn’t follow from Rπ = Rπ0 .

These final problems apply across the board to all variants of DEL for the same reason

that the arguments against PDL applied to all variants. The problems just articulated
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depend only on the underlying model of dynamics in DEL that analyzes actions in terms of
transitions only. The resulting model of dynamics fails to distinguish actions from transitions,
and so a cascade of failures of desiderata ensues.

5.4.2

Epistemic Planning Logics (EPLL)

Epistemic Planning Logics (EPLL) [41] extend DEL to consider epistemic planning problems.
Explicitly, the idea is that we have a language of planning constructions:
π ::= E|skip|if Kϕ, then π else π|π; π 0

with

E

a

set

of

events

or

elementary

actions,

and

if Kϕ, then π, else π 0 and π; π 0 being complex constructions out of action. Essentially, the
former is conditional choice and the latter is sequential composition. Take a set of epistemic
models, (S,

, V ), and define an equivalence class over them with respect to bisimulation.

Call such classes information cells, and label them with M0 . Then, define an action library,
A, which is a finite set of event models (E, ∼⊆ E × E, P re, P ost). Intuitively, plan constructions combine elements of the action library. To what end? The end defined by the goal
state, φ, which is a propositional parameter in the language of EPLL. These propositions,
of course, define sets of worlds in epistemic models. Finally, a planning problem is a triple:
(M0 , A, φ). A planning problem is, intuitively, the problem of figuring out how to get from
the initial state M0 to a state that satisfies the goal state via plan constructions over the
action library, A.
Solutions to planning problems are planning trees or trees with nodes labeled with epistemic models and edges labeled with event models, such that the root node is labeled with
the initial state and the leaf nodes are such that the goal state is satisfied at all worlds in
the epistemic model that labels the leaf node. Define the tree expansion function intuitively
so that it takes a node n, adds node m, and connects them with some ε ∈ A such that ε

CHAPTER 5. PLEN VS. RIVAL FORMALISMS

293

is applicable at M (n) and M (m) = M (n) ⊗ ε via product update. Intuitively, the idea is
just this: you start at an initial state, have a state you want to reach, and search the action
library for actions that you can put together to take you from the initial state to the goal
state.
The basic tree-like model of dynamics that underlies planning trees have a natural interpretation as models of epistemic dynamics. Epistemic models model epistemic states,
actions in the action library are epistemic actions, and the goal state is defined by epistemic
norms. For instance, given one’s initial state, one might have the normatively informed goal
of coming to accept the element of a set of theories that maximizes some set of desiderata or
coming to a consistent belief state, etc.. One then tries to figure out what plans of epistemic
action would achieve this goal. Ideally, then, one can characterize restrictions on actions,
processes, and even plans that achieve one’s normative goals. First, restrictions on states
are straightforwardly defined by all goal states - only the states that satisfy one’s goal state
are to be reached. Second, only transitions that are mapped to the actions in a plan that
succeeds at achieving the goal state are acceptable. Third, only processes that instantiate
a plan that succeeds in achieving the goal state are acceptable. Finally, only actions that
are parts of a plan that succeeds in achieving the goal state are acceptable. That is, the
features of the planning problem determine which states, transitions, processes, and actions
are in and which are out. Taking the requirements of epistemic rationality to specify our goal
states, these requirements define restrictions on states, transitions, processes, and actions.
The main problems of EPLL are that (i) it fails norm exogeny, and (ii) actions are
analyzed in terms of product update. Concerning the first, the norms that define epistemic
goal states are entirely left out of the picture. No structure in EPLL represents them, and
nothing in EPLL will formalize reasoning about norms directly. The key problem is that
plans, which might plausibly encode norms, are constructed in EPLL in order to arrive
at goal states, which are themselves defined by some underlying norms. The norms that
determine the set of goal states are left implicit. Even if one can interpret deontics over
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EPLL and so interpret translations of norm-kernels (e.g., if one can only reach φ by plan
π, then it’s obligatory to carry out π), it’s clear that the properties of these norm kernels
do not analyze the properties of epistemic norms. Rather they would be derived from some
assumptions about what epistemic rationality requires that are encoded in the goal states
that define a given planning problem.
The second problem is simply that the problems with DEL carry over to EPLL. There
are no transition equivalent actions at all, and so the Processes problem appears in an
interesting form, in which, rather than ignoring processes and actions, it is transitions that
are neglected. As a result D2 and D3 - at the least - cannot be adequately formalized.

5.4.3

Temporal Dynamic Epistemic Logic (TDEL)

Hoshi [131] and van Benthem et al [37] develop Temporal Dynamic Epistemic Logic by
combining ETL and DEL to construct Temporal Dynamic Epistemic Logic (TDEL). The
fundamental goal of this project is to improve upon DEL’s ability to represent constraints on
epistemic dynamics in a manner similar to that of ETL. To that end, things like propositional
stability (V (w0 , e0 ) = V (w0 )) may be dropped from the definition of product update, and
devices are given that relate histories in ETL to sequences of action models to sequences of
product updates.26 The result is a set of DEL generated ETL models, (M, E∗) where M is
an initial epistemic model and E∗ is a protocol or set of sequences of pointed action models.
Call these TDEL models, for short. TDEL models are, intuitively, trees that represent all of
the possible evolutions of M (sequences of updated epistemic models) that can be generated
by applying any sequence of actions in E∗.
I omit the interesting and innovative technical details, but do see the foregoing references
26

Though, in the basic logic that Hoshi devises, it’s left in, which gives the implausible theorem: for
arbitrary action e and a proposition, A, hei A ↔ hei > ∧ A. Which is to say, if you can apply e at the current
state of the current model, then e can be applied (it’s executable), and A is already true. This rules out
the possibility that one can perform an action that brings it about that A, or, in von Wright’s transition
calculus, the theorem rules out the possibility of e being the sort of action that results in a transition like
¬AT A. That is a terrible expressive limitation for any model of epistemic dynamics that countenances a
capacious notion of epistemic actions.
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for them. As is implicit in the intuitive description of TDEL models, the primary objection
to TDEL is simple: the exact problem that plagued the basic model of dynamics in PDL and
DEL persists. While there are protocols in TDEL, and these nicely represent constraints
on action, and, suitably interpreted, perhaps also epistemic norms, the resulting model
of dynamics conflates sequences of transitions for processes. The protocols in TDEL are
analogous to the computation sequences of PDL. These are extremely interesting structures
in their own right, and they encode instructions for the performance of action. But the pieces
of dynamics with which they are associated are not complex enough to carry information
that allows the distinction of (e.g.) the actions in the Honest Twin case. To be a bit more
explicit, the foundation being essentially that of DEL, the execution conditions of actions
and processes make it impossible for there to be transition equivalent or convergent actions
and processes, and so there cannot be machinery that represents epistemic rationality norms
that distinguish these kinds of actions and processes. D2 and D3 are thus not formalized
adequately.
I close consideration of TDEL with a conjecture. The fundamental representation theorem of the formalism establishes that the models generated by combining TDEL are isomorphic to a subset of ETL models that meets certain specified conditions. But, it’s plausible
that if one sets up a correspondence between pointed event models or pointed action models
and elementary actions in PLEN, then each ETL model is isomorphic to a set of computation
sequences in PLEN. From there, one can map these computation sequences to sets of sequences of states in a way that generates PLEN’s state sequences. If one can map epistemic
models and product updates on epistemic models to nodes in EDGs, then EDGs isomorphic
to TDEL models can be generated. If all of that works, then TDEL can be embedded in
PLEN by just redefining the truth rules.

CHAPTER 5. PLEN VS. RIVAL FORMALISMS

5.5

296

Deontic Logics

The development of deontic logics has unfolded in a number of different, occasionally intersecting directions.27 However, only some of the directions in deontic logic are relevant to
the general project for which a formalism might rival PLEN. Standard Deontic Logic, for
instance, despite having a model-theory that is built on Kripke frames just like PDL (and,
ultimately, a lot like PLEN), is miles away from an analysis of epistemic norms that meets
the desiderata in Chapters 1 and 2. SDL is not oriented toward action in the first place,
and its model-theory uses Kripke frames not to model any form of dynamics but to capture
the modality-ish behavior of deontic operators. As such, there is no clear way to apply
SDL as a logic of epistemic norms that solves any of the problems with modeling epistemic
dynamics, even if it’s a nice theory of the logical behavior of deontic expressions. As such,
I’ll be ignoring most of the field of deontic logic in order to zero in on a number of formal
frameworks that are plausible rivals of PLEN with respect to the project at hand.
The rival formalisms I will focus on are those that build deontic logics on top of an
underlying dynamic model of action. These systems tend to be independent, but broadly
parallel in many of their insights. First, I consider von Wright’s analysis of norms and actions
(VWNA), which provides a deep and insightful analysis of, predictably, norms and actions
[261]. I then move on to the STIT paradigm for action and deontic logic (STIT) [27, 130].
Third, I consider Deontic Interpreted Systems (DIS) [166], which are built on top of the
classic Interpreted Systems paradigm from [74] (RAKIS). The Interpreted Systems approach
is, essentially, an alternative approach to dynamic epistemic logic that takes a somewhat
simplified approach to epistemic dynamics as compared to DEL, building both actions and
protocols for controlling the development of an epistemic system. DIS then builds a deontic
logic on top of this underlying model of dynamics. Finally, I consider the application of PDL
to deontic logic [174] that generates Propositional Dynamic Deontic Logic (PDeL). Finally, I
turn to Deontic Update Logics (DUL), that builds a deontic logic on top of a logic of updates
27

See [89] for an overview.
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[246].

5.5.1

Norm and Action

The seminal [261] is credited by many with the establishing the foundations of deontic logic
[89]. There, von Wright develops a transition relation based theory of actions and then
imposes a deontic logic of action over this basic theory of world dynamics. Call the system
VWNA.
Actions in VWNA are represented by transitions in von Wright’s system. The basic piece
of the puzzle is the idea that each proposition, p, describes a set of possible situations or
states of the world. Actions are, fundamentally, things that can effect changes in the state of
the world. Any such change can be represented by some proposition changing from true to
false or vice versa. A change in the state of the world can thus be represented by a transition,
(...)T (− − −), where ... and − − − are replaced by some proposition, p, and its negation
in some order. For every proposition p, then, there are four basic possible transitions: pT p,
¬pT p, pT ¬p, and ¬pT ¬p. Transition expressions can be conjoined by truth functions.
Actions stand in a 1 − 1 relation to transitions [261], on von Wright’s pre-formal assumptions. Thus, the basic action expression schemata with respect to a proposition, p, are
d(pT p), d(¬pT p), d(pT ¬p), and d(¬pT ¬p). The actions d(¬pT p) and d(pT ¬p) are actions
that effect a change in the world, transforming it from one where p fails to one where p holds
or vice versa. The actions d(pT p) and d(¬pT ¬p) are preservative actions, where the world
would have transitioned from a state where p holds to one where it fails, d(pT p) prevents
the world from changing in this way. Mutatis mutandis for d(¬pT ¬p). Forbearing f (d(...))
is an operator encoding the omission of action. One can forbear to preserve p just as much
as one can forbear changing the state of the world so that p fails or forbear to bring p about.
Complex actions are formed in two ways. First, by applying the truth functions to the
transition expressions within a d−expression. Thus, d(pT p ∨ qT ¬q) is the complex action
expression of either preserving p or bringing it about that q fails. Second, by applying truth
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functions to d−expressions and f −expressions: d(pT p) ∨ f (qT ¬q). The operators d and f
are conjunctively and disjunctively distributive over perfect normal form complex transition
expressions.28
Norm expressions are applications of deontic operators O and P to action expressions.
Norm-kernels are directly formalized by introducing a novel conditional operator: / that
takes action expressions to the left and transition expressions to the right. In von Wright’s
terms, norm-kernels break into conditions of application, contents, and characters. The
content of a norm-kernel is the object, and the character is the valence. The conditional
operator / is introduced to formalize norm-kernels directly: D(d(...))/C where d(...) is an
action expression, D is a deontic operator, and C is the condition of application. Thus,
O(d(pT ¬p ∧ f (qT ¬q))/rT s is a norm-kernel informing us that, if the world is about to
transition from an r world to an s world, it’s obligatory to bring it about that p fails while
also forbearing to bring it about that q fails. The formalism makes room for both wide scope
and narrow scope norms.
In examining VWNA, the most natural adaptation to the epistemic case is to treat the
propositional language as one that contains epistemic or doxastic expressions and to interpret
the deontic operators as epistemic deontic operators - O(...) means that it is rationally
obligatory that ..., etc.. That is, a norm-kernel, O(d(pT p)), may say that it is rationally
obligatory that one maintain the fact p, where p encodes a fact about belief. Thus, the
T-calculus is a calculus of epistemic transitions, the df −calculus is a calculus of epistemic
actions, and the OP −calculus is a calculus of epistemic norm-kernels. Keep this adaptation
of VWNA in mind in what follows.
VWNA does somewhat well with respect to capacity and feasibility. A key feature of
the analysis is the fragment devoted to the analysis of agent abilities. Many of von Wright’s
motivating observations are direct parallels with the features of constraints on action identified in Chapter 1. For instance, von Wright’s “can-do of success” corresponds to feasibility,
28

I omit most of the detail of VWNA. Much of it won’t be relevant to the forthcoming objections. There
are very many subtleties of the system that are worth studying, but they won’t be material in what follows.
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and his “can-do of ability” corresponds to capacity. The only complaint to be made about
von Wright’s analysis of constraints is that the formalism doesn’t account for changes -over
time or due to action - in the preconditions of actions. This is due to a key limitation of the
formalism.
VWNA is demonstrably norm exogenous given that norm-kernels have direct formal
counterparts. These objects can thus be reasoned about straightforwardly; one can establish
a number of dependence, independence, and equivalence relations among them easily because
they are embedded in a truth functional logic.29 For a quick instance, von Wright contends
that, given the principles articulated in his system, that P d(¬pT p) ∧ O(d(¬pT p) ∧ d(¬qT q) ∨
f (¬pT p) ∧ d(¬qT q) ∨ f (¬pT p) ∧ f (¬qT q)) → P (d(¬qT q)/¬pT ¬p) is a tautology. That is,
“If one is unconditionally permitted to produce a certain state of affairs but unconditionally
forbidden to produce this state and forbear to produce a certain other state, then one is also
permitted to produce this second state under circumstances which constitute an opportunity
for producing the first state.” (p. 182)
The main problems with VWNA are straightforward and threefold: von Wright identifies
acts with transitions and gives essentially an input assimilating model of dynamics. Thus,
the system falls afoul of the Processes problem in two dimensions. First, the system conflates
actions with transitions and so can not distinguish between the actions a and b in the Honest
Twin case with respect to any of the properties identified. This, of course, results in a failure
to accurately represent procedural norms - von Wright’s norm-kernels cannot require that
one carry out an action or process a rather than b where a and b result in identical token
transitions. The df −calculus that expresses the contents of norms simply cannot distinguish
such actions. Explicitly, consider a transition expression in von Wright’s T-calculus, AT B,
where A is a complex propositional expression capturing the complete state description of
the world prior to a change and B is a complete state description after. Let two actions a
and b result in identical token changes of the world described by A0 T B 0 (such that A implies
29
See for instance the various principles that von Wright defends concerning preconditions of action,
conditions of application, categorical and hypothetical norms.
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A0 and B implies B 0 ). Explicitly, for every p in A0 , if a results in pT p (mutatis mutandis
all other basic action expressions), then so does b and the converse also holds. Then the
df −calculus analyzes the tokens of both a and b with d(A0 T B 0 ). Thus, given von Wright’s
OP −calculus, every norm N assigns a and b the same valence. This is a syntactic result: no
OP expression can assign the token of a resulting in A0 T B 0 a deontic D without also assigning
D to the token of b resulting in A0 T B 0 because the language can only assign deontics to df
expressions like A0 T B 0 . The same problem results if A is logically equivalent to A0 and B is
logically equivalent to B 0 .
Thus, VWNA (suitably modified to the epistemic case) fundamentally fails to adequately
represent epistemic dynamics. VWNA suffers the Processes problem. As a result, it fundamentally mischaracterizes the content of epistemic norms by misconstruing the extensions of
restrictions on epistemic dynamics. From there, despite its other logical successes, VWNA
cannot give a fully adequate logic for epistemic norms simply because it omits so many of
their essential properties. For instance, only transitional forms of norm equivalence, dependence, or sufficiency can be recognized in VWNA. If N and N 0 are procedurally inequivalent,
VWNA has no way of capturing this or the kind of reasoning that can be used to establish
it. So, VWNA’s adequacy as a logic of norms is lower than a rival that can capture such
distinctions.
Second, VWNA does not recognize the program-like aspects of procedural norms. There
are no explicit procedural operations in VWNA, and such operations would ill fit the system.
The logic is a logic of single opportunities; it has no temporal or dynamic dimension beyond
the basic notion of transition. The underlying “T-calculus” or calculus of transitions has no
mechanisms at all for iterated changes or extended processes of change. As such, there is no
clear sense in which VWNA represents processes at all, and so, a fortiori, no way in which
VWNA represents the program-like features of norms and their restrictions on dynamics.
Finally, VWNA does not contain direct epistemic operators, and, in its classical presentation, doesn’t have a model theory that suggests a way to represent knowing or deliberate
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execution. It’s not clear whether anything stands in the way of adding this machinery.

5.5.2

STIT Theory

The STIT theory analyzes action over a multi-agent, branching time model of dynamics
[27, 130]. A STIT frame is a triple, hT, <, V, C, Ii where T is a set of moments with a
tree ordering < over them, maximal sequences of moments in a frame are histories, V is a
valuation function mapping pairs of histories and moments to propositions of the language
of STIT, and I is a set of agents. The unique bit is C: a set of choice functions per agent i
i
i
. A choice cell, Cm
, is a sets of paths
that partitions paths of moments into choice cells, Cm
i
through a moment m in the tree ordering. The choice cell Cm
(h) is the choice cell that

contains h. Say that h, m |= φ iff (h, m) ⊆ V (φ). Intuitively, the idea is that each agent’s
choices at any given moment, m, restricts the set of histories that can extend forward in
time from m.
The basic form of action in STIT is iST IT φ, which means, roughly, that i sees to it
that φ. Doing so, at any given moment, brings it about that φ is true and also restricts
the future. Omitting quite a lot of detail, STIT focuses on the notion of Deliberative STIT:
i
(h) ⊆ V (φ) and there is at least one history that is not in V (φ).
h, m |= iST IT φ iff Cm

In examining STIT, the most natural adaptation to the epistemic case is to treat the
propositional language as one that contains epistemic or doxastic expressions, to interpret
the STIT operators as epistemic actions, and to trade moments out for epistemic states.
Doing so leaves STIT with much in common with ETL. STIT by itself is a logic of action.
Building in action modals, one can encode postconditions with formulae like [iST IT φ]ψ. One
can build deontic operators over STIT that function in rather obvious ways (like temporal or
dynamic operators) in order to build a normative language. One can then construct normkernel like formulae like C → O(iST IT φ). An easy example is the epistemic consequentialist
norm: [iST IT bM (A)]b(A) ∧ T r(A) → P (iST IT bM (A)). If i’s seeing to it that she believes
A by method M always results in a state where A is believed and true, then it’s rationally

CHAPTER 5. PLEN VS. RIVAL FORMALISMS

302

permissible for her to see to it that she believes A by method M .
The major problem with STIT should be obvious given that STIT explicitly analyzes
actions in terms of what effects they bring about: histories are merely series of states, and
the actions in STIT are mere transitions. As such, they cannot distinguish transitions from
actions.30 If iST IT φ and iST IT ψ correspond to identical transitions (e.g., if φ is logically
equivalent to ψ), then D(iST IT φ) iff D(iST IT ψ), where D is a deontic operator. As such,
“extensionally equivalent” actions like those in the Honest Twin case will be normatively
equivalent under all conditions, and this is, of course, false. Thus, D3 is inadequately formalized, as is norm equivalence; the restrictions on epistemic dynamics of procedural norms
are ignored and STIT validates incorrect reasoning about norm verdicts. If the propositional language STIT encodes methodological or procedural statements, the Processes problem implies that STIT will fail to adequately represent dynamics by suffering the problems
articulated in Chapter 1.

5.5.3

Propositional Dynamic Deontic Logic (PDeL)

Meyer [174] combines PDL and deontic logics with a unique semantics to generate a dynamic
deontic logic in the same mold as von Wright’s system. Which is to say, Meyer builds a
deontic logic on top of a (dynamic) logic of action. He defines a set of actions Act and
assertions A. Over Act, he deploys the sequential composition ;, choice ∪, parallel execution
∩, and negated action (or complement) −, which map onto the same intuitive procedural
operations that they do in PLEN. Meyer adds a special control operator for conditional
choice A → a1 /a2 , which intuitively maps onto the instruction “If φ, then a1 ; else a2 ”.
The semantics of actions are defined in terms of (the finite prefixes of) s-traces, which are
30

I omit detailed consideration, here, but Xu [262] combines STIT with an action theory in a way that is
quite interesting, and gets at many of the same philosophical judgments about action that PLEN does. For
instance, actions in the combined STIT and Action theory (call it ASTIT) are sets of transitions such that,
in every history, each transition in an action occurs only once. This enables ASTIT to distinguish act tokens
from act types in much the same way that PLEN and PDL do. However, the dynamics are still histories as
in STIT, and there is seemingly no recognition in ASTIT that actions might be procedurally or normatively
distinct even if they define identical sets of transitions.
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sequences of elementary action symbols. These sequences of elementary action symbols are
then associated with state transition relations, and the semantics of assertions is then built
on top of this action logic. I omit the details, here, but do see the appendix of [174].
Unlike PLEN, PDeL does not represent epistemic norms via constructions in the action
logic. Rather, norms are implicitly characterized via the propositional language and the
deontic operators. In PDeL, A is a straightforward propositional language with a special
violation constant V , which indicates that one has violated the requirements of whatever
norms define the deontic notions being analyzed via PDeL. The violation constant is randomly assigned to states in the models of PDeL. The assertion [a]A is central to PDeL, as
the semantics of normative forbiddance or prohibition is defined in terms of the violation
constant and this construction: letting s be a state, s |= F a iff s |= [a]V . The rest of the
deontic operators are defined in terms of F a.
PDeL can be appropriated for epistemic normativity by straightforward means. Think
of the states as epistemic states. Suppose that A contains expressions encoding assertions
about (e.g.) epistemic states. The facts about the deontics characterize the requirements
of epistemic rationality. That is, where [a]V is true, epistemic rationality tells us that
execution of a is forbidden; the execution of a results in violation of the requirements of
epistemic rationality. Then, by encoding normative assertions involving deontic operators,
and conditionals with deontic assertions in their consequences translate norm-kernels.
The action logic of PDeL is superior to that of the base form of PDL because, essentially, s-traces are computation sequences. The action logic of PDeL can distinguish between
processes and transitions, in principle, because it associates each program to a set of computation sequences which are then associated with transition relations. Then, all of the benefits
of the modified form of PDL above accrue for PDeL. So, when applying PDeL to the epistemic case, the underlying model of epistemic dynamics is as adequate to the Constraints
and Processes problems as PLEN. However, PDeL falls short of some of D1-D3.
D1 is as well taken care of in PDeL as it is in PLEN. As argued above, the basic program
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logic in PDeL gives a model of epistemic dynamics equivalent to that in a fragment of the
path-theoretic fragment of PLEN. The programs that are associated with identical transition
relations are not associated with identical s-traces. Taking s-traces to encode epistemic
processes, this solves the Processes problem. Given that different s-traces are associated
with different starting states, this handles the Constraints problem.
As for D2 and D3, the template for argument in this chapter tends to move from failure of
Processes to failure of D2 and D3. PDeL bucks this trend by failing to formalize D2 and D3
without suffering the Processes problem. Now, on the one hand, given that s-traces can be
rational or irrational, the restrictions on epistemic dynamics representable in PDeL include
restrictions on processes, putting PDeL a step ahead of many other formalisms. Interpreting the violation constant as the violation of the requirements of epistemic rationality, the
semantics of F π for all programs enables the definition restrictions on processes by assigning
the s-traces of forbidden programs to the irrational sets. So, it seems that the restrictions
on dynamics that epistemic rationality specifies can be represented as well in PDeL as they
can be in PLEN.31 But this is too fast.
By deriving restrictions on s-traces from the violation constant, and associating the violation constant only with states, we have failed to properly represent restrictions on procedures
and on processes. Consider a pair of programs, π1 and π2 such that the set of state transition relations associated with π1 ’s s-straces is identical to the set of state transition relations
associated with π2 ’s s-traces. Then F π1 iff F π2 because the final states of those transition
relations are identical despite the non-identity of the s-traces of π1 and π2 . Thus, PDeL will
mischaracterize the restrictions on procedures, actions, and processes that norm-kernels define because all normative verdicts will be equivalent for any transition equivalent programs.
This directly fails to correctly represent restrictions on processes correctly because PDeL will
obscure the restrictions that norms like Bad Reasoning from Ch.2 specify. Thus, PDeL will
fail to adequately characterize restrictions on dynamics for the reason that it runs together
31

This isn’t to say that either PDeL or PLEN characterize the extensions of these restrictions accurately,
but only that both formalisms can characterize restrictions on procedures.
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the restrictions on processes where the processes map to the same transitions. As shown in
Chapter 2, there will be states at which reasoning by modus ponens and by affirming the
consequent will both be forbidden or both be permitted because one of them is, and they
converge on a terminal state that does (or doesn’t) satisfy the violation constant. This is a
result of a more central problem with PDeL.
The primary failure of PDeL, even deployed to the epistemic case, is that it fails norm
exogeny. Programs in PDeL are simply procedures or plans, and their place relative to
the restrictions on dynamics that epistemic rationality determine is given, ultimately, by
the violation constant. But the violation constant encodes a single, unchanging protocol
underlying each model of PDeL. While one can draw inferences to or from specific normkernels, these are all defined with respect to the violation constant. This conflicts with a
prima facie plausible conceptual principle: the definition of violation of the requirements of
epistemic rationality should flow, in an account of epistemic rationality, from the norms that
specify those requirements.32 PDeL gets this exactly backwards, and this is what generates
the failure of P2 and P3 above.
In PLEN, restrictions on states and transitions are derived from the restrictions on procedures (defined by execution sets of protocols), which encode the instructions of procedural
norms, mirroring the conceptual priorities argued for in Chapter 2. In PDeL, restrictions
on procedures are derived from restrictions on states formulated via the violation constant,
reversing the order argued for in Chapter 2. The violation constant is assigned to states
randomly, thereby characterizing a kind of ur-requirement of epistemic rationality that then
determines what norm-kernels hold at what states. Then, assigning restrictions on processes
on the basis of restrictions on actions defined by appeal to the violation constant gives us
restrictions on processes that have to be linked extensionally to the verdicts of the normkernels - and these are dependent on a restriction on states defined by the satisfaction of the
32

This can be seen as a consequence of the asymmetric “generation facts” argued for in Chapter 2. Every
restriction on states or transitions can be read off of some restriction on procedures, but not the other way
around.
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violation constant.
From there, however, PDeL can formalize arguments to and from the dependence and
equivalence relations among norm-kernel translations. However, there is no machinery in
PDeL that can formalize reasoning about what it is that defines the violation constant.
Which is to say that PDeL can formalize no epistemic norms nor reasoning about them.
Norm-kernels then, do not have the conceptual primacy that epistemic norms have, so the
formalization of reasoning about norm-kernels isn’t a formalization of reasoning about epistemic norms. This, I think, suffices for a direct failure of narrow exogeny, and, without
norm exogeny to embed norms in assertions about what agents know about various norms,
a direct failure to formalize arguments about norms. Worse, as above, we derive equivalence
of restrictions on processes from equivalence of restrictions on actions from equivalence of
restrictions on states, and this mischaracterizes the equivalence relations among these kinds
of restrictions by imposing a connection that was argued, intuitively, to not hold in Chapter
2: transitionally equivalent processes needn’t be normatively equivalent! Just see the Honest
Twin case.
Another pressing problem with the epistemic take on PDeL is that, as with the modified
version of PDL, the program logic is just an alternative way of pursuing the basic underlying
model of epistemic dynamics as in PLEN’s path-theoretic fragment. From there, some machinery is added to account for epistemic normativity via the violation constant and deontic
operators. All of this can just be added to PLEN without loss. Or, from another angle, one
could replace the underlying action logic in PDeL with that of PLEN, and the formalism
would come cheaper, in that PLEN has simpler and more diagrammatically intuitive structures. As such, PDeL represents an extension or modification of a fragment of PLEN with
an alternative take on the primacy of requirements on states, transitions, and processes as
and a suitably alternative account of deontic notions. Thus, even if none of the problems
above are compelling, PLEN can assimilate PDeL’s virtues as it could with the modified
PDL.
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Deontic Interpreted Systems (DIS)

Interpreted systems model dynamics in a straightforward way. First, given a set of agents
A = {1, ..., n, e}, one of which is the environment, we define a set of local states for each agent
S1 , ..., Sn , Se . Then, we define a global state as a tuple of local states, g ∈ S1 × ... × Sn × Se .
So, the set of global states is G ⊆ S1 × ... × Sn × Se . Define runs over G as sequences of
global states or, alternately, maps from sequences of natural numbers into G. An interpreted
system is a set of runs over G.
For each i ∈ A, there is a set of actions, Acti = {a1 , ..., am }. Each action is associated
with a transition among global states meeting certain constraints that I omit, here [166].
The essential thought being that actions change the states of agents, some actions change
an agent’s own states, other actions change the states of other agents. Protocols, then, are
defined as rules that map local states to actions. Thus, protocols define sets of runs over G.
Thus, each protocol determines an interpreted system.
A deontic logic can be built on top of interpreted systems in a straightforward way.
Partition the sets of local states, Li , for each agent into green states Gri (and, by complementation, red states Rdi ), including the environment. A deontic system of global states is
any system of global states defined over the Gri ; that is, each global state is defined as a
tuple of green states and a deontic system of global states is a set of runs over this set of
global states. A deontic interpreted system is simply a pair (DS, v) where DS is a deontic
system of global states and v is a valuation function assigning the atoms of a logical language
to sets of global states.
Define generated deontic frames as multi-model Kripke frames hW, R1 , ..., Rk i for each
DS such that: W = DS and for any i ∈ A, hle , l1 , ..., ln i Ri hle0 , l10 , ..., ln0 i if li0 ∈ Gri . Deontic
operators are interpreted over generated deontic frames:
(Obligation) A global state, g, in DS satisfies Oi φ iff, for all g 0 such that gRi g 0 , g 0 satisfies
φ.
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The thought is that, because each protocol defines a set of runs over G, there is a set of
protocols that defines each DS. Thus, each g in every DS is a world that accords with such
a protocol - it describes what happens if the protocol is perfectly followed by all parties (and
the complement of the sets of runs over G in which global states are not green describes what
happens in the worlds where the protocol isn’t followed by all parties). Obligations, then,
are defined in terms of what complies with the underlying protocols that define the green
runs. Derivatively, the permissible actions are those that correspond to the Ri in generated
deontic frames.
An alternative approach is to directly consider green runs and transitions: “In applications
to specific examples it is often useful to classify as red the states that result from the failure
of an agent to follow its functioning protocol. In these cases one can consider a finergrained notion of interpreted systems in which the concepts of protocols and transitions are
introduced. Moreover, a rather different and interesting approach is to label runs of the
system as ‘red’ or ‘green’ instead of states, enabling us to reason about allowed/acceptable
as opposed to disallowed/unacceptable/faulty runs.” [74, 166] (p. 6)
The problems for DIS with respect to the project of modeling epistemic dynamics and
epistemic norms should be obvious, now. Let interpreted systems encode epistemic states
in any of a number of ways - by simply verifying doxastic and epistemic expressions added
to the language, by replacing them with epistemic models, etc.. Epistemic norms are then
the protocols that define the green runs defined over the green states. The problem is
similar to that which plagued PDeL. There, the problem was that the violation constant
essentially defined a restriction on states first, and then restrictions on transitions, actions,
and processes was derived from that. In either version of DIS, the green states or green runs
define a restriction on states or a restriction on runs. This, in turn, can be used to define
a restriction on transitions, actions, and processes. But these are just extensional notions.
So, however restrictions on transitions, actions, and processes are derived from green states
or green runs, they will be limited in ways that get D2 and D3 wrong. It won’t be possible
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for there to be restrictions on (e.g.) actions and processes that distinguish actions/processes
with identical transition relations or identical runs.
Let’s go with green states, first. Consider a pair of agent i’s potential actions, ai and bi .
Let ai and bi be associated with identical transition relations on global states. Say that P ai
holds at g iff ai is executable at g or at some green run that extends from g in a green run.
It follows that P ai iff P bi . But this just gets the Honest Twin case wrong; let ai be asking
my twin and bi be carrying out the deduction myself. These will not be permissible at all of
the same states. Just so for reasoning by modus ponens and reasoning by modus morons,
and so DIS can’t formalize procedural norms like Bad Reasoning. This means that DIS fails
D2 and D3.
Now, lets consider green runs. The set of green runs defines a set of green protocols exactly those protocols that result in green runs. First, taking protocols to analyze norms,
this gets norms wrong. Let π1 and π2 be such that the set of runs associated with π1 is
identical to the set of runs associated with π2 . Then every property of π1 that holds strictly
in virtue of π1 ’s runs holds of π2 and vice versa. But, as was argued in Chapter 2, two
norms might generate the same restriction on transitions and even sequences of transitions
without specifying the same restrictions on actions. A protocol N that always requires
asking my Honest Twin and always forbids deducing things for myself will always converge
on runs with the protocol N 0 that always requires deducing for myself and forbids asking my
twin. To conclude that these protocols (hence, norms) are equivalent would be to simply
mischaracterize them. They ought to have different execution or compliance conditions,
supply different verdicts about actions, and specify distinct restrictions on action.
Second, if distinct actions (by distinct agents!) may be assigned to the same transitions,
then protocols π1 and π2 may be rather distinct, assigning different actions to at least some
states, while defining the same runs. Let P ai at g iff a green protocol π maps ai to g or a
successor state of g. Then, let π and π 0 be protocols with distinct action to state mappings
that are both green because their actions converge on a run. Thus, let a1 be asking my
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honest twin and b1 be deducing for myself. It follows that P a1 iff P b1 . But this is false in
the Honest Twin case.

5.6

PLEN as a Supersystem

It might be objected that, while PLEN satisfies the desiderata defended here, it fails the
desiderata that animate its rivals. If this is right, then despite the foregoing arguments, it
doesn’t follow that PLEN is (ceteris paribus) rationally preferable to its rivals. For instance,
PLEN might be argued to fail to provide plausible models of the classes of epistemic actions that effect expansion, contraction, or revision because it offers no rules or laws that
correspond to or analyze the epistemic commitment functions that represent these things or
the rationality postulates governing them. For another, PLEN contains no structures that
represent credence and so, from the perspective of Bayesians that don’t countenance full acceptance or rejection, fundamentally assumes a misbegotten model of epistemic states. More,
there is no way to characterize (e.g.) conditionalization in PLEN - so how can it possibly
provide a model of rational belief change? For yet another, PLEN’s syntactic account of the
content of epistemic states lacks the structure to ground the truths about epistemic states
that epistemic models provide via their graph-theoretic properties; the analysis of knowledge
in PLEN must thus be mistaken or ungrounded in the features of the formalism. Given that,
PLEN’s model of dynamics can’t properly analyze the relations of dynamics to changes in
knowledge.
This objection can be answered straightforwardly: the benefits of the other formalisms
can, without loss, be retained in PLEN because PLEN is abstract enough to act as a supersystem for all of them. The core of the thought is just that the model of dynamics at
the core of PLEN is so abstract that one can replace the model of states with just about
anything while retaining the important features of the dynamics and the logic of protocols.
PLEN would be a “supersystem” for all of these other systems of dynamics insofar as the
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features of dynamics represented by any model in the other theories would be represented
by some subset of models of PLEN. PLEN would thus be a system in which other theories
of dynamics appear as fragments. If this is right, it wouldn’t entail that none of the foregoing systems are actually rivals to PLEN by the definition of rivalry in section 5.1. Rather,
the fragments of a PLEN-based supersystem would not be formally identical to these other
systems; they would just provide logical resources equivalent to them.
The procedure for embedding the foregoing systems in PLEN is this: First, modify
PLEN’s content states to mirror whatever epistemic structures one likes. Replace content
states with belief sets, credence functions, or epistemic models. Second, introduce axioms
governing them (e.g., deductive closure, exhaustion and exclusion of membership in belief
set with respect to a propositional language, probabilistic coherence, arbitrary structural
conditions on epistemic models, etc.). From there, we can characterize the protocols that
correspond to the axioms as those such that all executions are bookended with transitions
that meet the conditions on transition relations in the other formalisms. For instance,
we can treat X in PLEN’s content states as belief states in AGM and then reason from
the stipulation that π+A always results in the expansion of the X at the root state of its
executions with A. That is, expansion can be characterized by axioms that govern protocols
in PLEN. Just the same, the content states can be replaced with credence functions, and we
can reason from the stipulation that π effects coherent conditionalizations. Or again, replace
the content states of PLEN with pairs of epistemic models and arbitrary (possibly empty)
sequences of protocols, associate each protocol to action models per graph, and stipulate
that π’s executions are bookended by the inputs and outputs of a product update.
Given these kinds of modifications, the properties of epistemic commitment functions,
updating procedures, and DEL style informational events can be embedded in PLEN as
properties of protocols or their executions. For instance, let π+A and π−A encode expanding
with A and contracting A, respectively, and let X be treated like a belief state (X = Cn(X)),
and let b(A) mean that A is in X (w

b(A) iff a ∈ X). The Recovery postulate of AGM can
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be encoded with the schema: b(A) → [π−A ; π+A ]b(A).33 Now, this is one case, and it’s far
from clear that this is an adequate approximation of Recovery or the rest of the analysis of
commitment functions in PLEN, but (a) it’s fairly well known that AGM can be embedded
in dynamic and epistemic logics, and (b) there isn’t space to fully carry out this embedding
of the other formalisms in PLEN; establishing this is itself an interesting and fairly major
project. The point is that the claim stands as a plausible conjecture for now.
Now, the important feature of this conjecture is that all of the good modeling work done
by these alternative formalisms can be done in PLEN while retaining the features of PLEN;
we don’t lose any of the structures that made PLEN so useful at solving the Processes or
First-Class Citizenship problems. All of the characterizations of (e.g.) the epistemic commitment functions can be done without conflating processes for transitions and while analyzing
epistemic norms as protocols in such a way that all of the results of PLEN hold. This is
because the foregoing embedding procedure just requires the modification of the epistemic
states and perhaps accompanying revisions of the epistemic part of the language and not the
protocol-theoretic part. None of the primary results of PLEN (the analysis of equivalence,
the distinction of processes from transitions, the analysis of restrictions on epistemic dynamics, etc..) depends on these features of PLEN. Thus, we can zero in on (e.g.) the AGM-like
fragment of PLEN focusing on the atomic (or complex) protocols (or classes of protocols),
π+A and π−A , which are characterized by axioms encoding the rationality postulates without the loss of the structural features of the formalism that (e.g.) distinguished processes
from transitions. One could, after all, just think of all protocols that abide by the rationality
postulates in a given EDG and still distinguish between the protocols themselves - as well
as the paths that execute them - while not obscuring anything about the transitions that
AGM wants to focus on. Two protocols, π+A and π 0 +A might be inequivalent, have different
executability conditions, or different methodological inclusion conditions even if they both
33

For Bayesianism, replace X with credence functions and introduce (a very large) expansion to the
language that encodes credences on formulae, Cr(A) = n, and conditional credences Cr(A | B) = m.
Then one can characterize conditionalization protocols, πC , by means of formulae like: Cr(A | B) = n →
[πC ](Cr(E) = 1 → Cr(A) = n).
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basically achieve expansions with A.
If PLEN truly is a supersystem in which all of the rival formalisms can be embedded
as some variant of one fragment or another, then the theory preference argument is truly
powerful. Accepting PLEN as a formal framework in which to represent and reasoning
about epistemic dynamics and epistemic rationality is both a theoretical step forward, in
that the Framework Problem is solved, and comes at no theoretical loss because all of the
rival formalisms can be preserved as fragments or variants of fragments of PLEN. Rational
theory preference thus dictates acceptance of PLEN over any rival assessed here.34

5.7

Conclusion

This chapter completes the primary argument for the protocol-theoretic account of epistemic
rationality norms. PLEN formalizes the protocol-theoretic account by building its main
theses directly into the semantic and syntactic features of PLEN. The primary argument
consists of showing that PLEN is theoretically preferable to other formal frameworks for
thinking about epistemic dynamics and epistemic rationality norms.
Chapter 4 showed that PLEN (i) solves the Processes, Constraints, and First-Class Citizenship problems, and (ii) formalizes D1-D3. More, PLEN has these properties, is narrowly
exogenous, and it doesn’t have any comparable theoretical tradeoffs. PLEN is completely
general with respect to action, it’s a formalism with relatively few moving parts that demands a minimum of mathematical sophistication, and it is at worst unclear whether PLEN
contains any other theoretical tradeoffs like paradox.
Where Chapter 4 showed how PLEN satisfied the foregoing desiderata, this chapter
34

Notably absent from the foregoing remarks are deontic logics. This is for rhetorical reasons. First, I
attack the problem of formalizing epistemic deontics in the main text at some length. Second, it’s difficult
to see how there are any desiderata on deontic logics as applied to the analysis of epistemic rationality
that aren’t countenanced in the various problems and desiderata PLEN is shown to handle. Any further
desiderata will really be a matter of adjusting the logic to account for the intuitive validities and invalidities
concerning deontic reasoning, and the logic of PLEN is also fully adjustable without sacrificing (e.g.) the
process-transition distinction: just add new operators or change the semantics of the operators or truth
functions as one sees fit. This can be done safely within the general framework of PLEN, even if this changes
the exact logic of PLEN.
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showed how PLEN’s rivals failed to satisfy those same desiderata. The recurring discovery
was that rival systems almost ubiquitously built their underlying models of dynamics on the
thought that actions are best represented by transitions or transition relations. This feature
of dynamics results in the Processes problem and the failure to formalize D2 and D3. Given
that the tools available for reasoning about epistemic norms in a system are dependent on
the underlying model of dynamics, this also generates a general failure to provide adequate
logics of epistemic norms. The addition of formal machinery in rival systems sometimes
added to this underlying model, but the additions either did little to alleviate the main
problems or just made the system more like PLEN.
The results of the primary argument are summarized in the following tables:
(Key) Systems in this family are generally:
• + :: Adequate
• - :: Somewhat Adequate, Some Systems Adequate, or Unclear
• X :: Inadequate

Norm Exogeny:
Broad or Narrow

Belief Revision
Systems
Dynamic Logics
Dynamic
Epistemic Logics
Deontic Logics
PLEN

Desiderata:
D1-D3

Paradoxes and
Other Tradeoffs:
Paradox,
Generality,
Simplicity, ...

X

Modeling
Epistemic
Dynamics:
Constraints
Problem, ProcessTransition
Distinction,
Restrictions
X

X

X

+
+

X
X

-

-

+
+

X
+

X
+

X
-
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D1

D2

D3

Belief Revision Systems

+

X

X

Dynamic Logics

+

X

X

Dynamic Epistemic Logics

+

X

X

Deontic Logics

-

X

-

PLEN

+

+

+

Even allowing that PLEN has general theoretical weaknesses that are as yet undetected,
every rival framework does worse, especially with respect to modeling epistemic dynamics.
As a result, PLEN’s informal rationality index is (ceteris paribus) higher than that of any
rival formalism.
Finally, I conjectured that PLEN has the interesting property of being able to embed
approximations of the other formalisms thereby retaining the theoretical benefits of these
systems without sacrificing anything that would cause a desideratum to fail. If this is correct,
the theory preference argument need not be qualified as carefully as it has been.The argument
contained in Chapters 3-5 shows that PLEN is demonstrably superior to its rivals with respect
to the problems and desiderata focused on, here. The conjecture shows, if correct, that PLEN
is already at least as good as its rivals at whatever they do. In other words, PLEN does
better with respect to these desiderata and ceteris is paribus! So PLEN is flat out rationally
preferable to its rivals as an account of epistemic dynamics and epistemic rationality.

Chapter 6
Recapitulation and The Road Ahead
6.0.1

The Entire Project in Focus

Epistemic norms are implicated in all of the most important epistemological projects. It’s
epistemic norms that define the contours of epistemic rationality and epistemic justification.
These things feed epistemic norms into the rest of epistemology in some way or another.
Traditional epistemology either builds assumptions about epistemic norms into accounts of
knowledge and justification or builds them into the derivation of norms for action, assertion,
and belief built on accounts of knowledge. Formal epistemology essentially builds models
of what different kinds of reasoning or cognition look like according to assumed systems of
epistemic norms. On procedural approaches to epistemology or the ethics of belief, epistemic
norms transparently take central importance. Epistemic norms thus lie at the conceptual
foundations of epistemology. In all cases, errors and oversights about the basic properties
of norms may introduce barriers to getting things right in the end. The central focus of
this project has been developing and defending a dynamic framework for thinking about
epistemic norms that resolves some of the central errors and oversights in thinking about
epistemic norms.
In this dissertation, I have defended a “protocol-theoretic” account of epistemic norms.
The main idea of the account is that epistemic norms ought to be thought of as protocols or
316
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instructions that map epistemic actions and combinations of epistemic actions to conditions
under which they can correctly be carried out. In order to study norms from this perspective,
norms should also be correlated with the effects they would have on (among other things)
an agent’s belief states if followed. Thus, the account requires an underlying model of
epistemic dynamics – a model of how things like beliefs and commitments change as a result
of actions and processes. To make the account precise, and to defend it as a fruitful theory,
I developed, explored, and applied a “protocol-theoretic” logical framework for analyzing
epistemic rationality norms. I called it PLEN. Formally, PLEN is built out of pieces of
propositional dynamic logic, epistemic dynamic logic, and formal belief revision theories like
AGM.
The basic insights of dynamic logic are that they have formal languages that encode
the structure of instructions that are given by programs, and semantics that – with some
modifications - are excellent models of epistemic dynamics. The basic insights of epistemic
logics and belief revision theories is that doxastic states or other contentful epistemic states
can be represented by set-theoretic structures (in the simplest case, sets of sentences), and
reasoning can be represented by transition relations among the models of epistemic states.
Combining these parts - along with minor innovations in the technical machinery - we get
PLEN, which basically provides a model of how normative instructions guide the behaviors
of epistemic agents and result in evolutions of contentful states of epistemic agents.
The main results of the dissertation show that, though still in the early stages of its
development, PLEN not only analyzes and justifies theoretical features of epistemic normativity that are frequently ignored or denied (desiderata D1-D3), but also overcomes some
of the major drawbacks of the existing approaches to epistemic dynamics and belief revision. As I argued in Chapters 1 and 2, there are deep problems with any formal account
of epistemic dynamics that doesn’t distinguish epistemic actions, processes, and procedures
from the transitions among epistemic states that they bring about. These problems result in
fundamental failures to analyze the properties, especially logical properties like equivalence
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and complete accounting of normative verdicts, of any account of epistemic norms built on
top of this underlying model of dynamics.
The innovation of PLEN, as defined in Chapter 3 and applied in Chapter 4, is the simple
modification of the structures of PDL into EDGs and the accompanying redefinition of
the execution conditions of protocols. This lead to a reconceptualization of restrictions on
epistemic dynamics that enabled the idea to account for restrictions on processes as well
as restrictions on procedural construction. More precisely, I showed that the protocols of
PLEN are structures from which all of the theoretically important features of restrictions
on dynamics can be derived by means of several technical results. These moving parts
together made for the success of the analysis of epistemic rationality norms with protocols;
the Framework Problem was solved. Chapter 5 showed that PLEN is unique in solving the
problems raised in Chapters 1 and 2. None of the rival theories of PLEN can solve the
Framework Problem as currently formulated, and it’s plausible that their theoretical fruits
can be assimilated into PLEN.
This project is intended to form the kernel of a “hard core” style research program. In
future work, I want to take the protocol-theoretic account of norms and the PLEN framework
and explore what can be done with them. Let me comment on some possible applications.
First, the problem of the epistemic role of logic is arguably the core problem in the
intersection of epistemology and philosophy of logic. Reasoning is one of our primary sources
of rational belief and knowledge. Logic is often conceptualized as the study of reasoning,
but this can’t be the case. Logic, as a field, focuses on the construction and exploration of
logics, which are formal systems of not indeterminate but also not uncontroversial form [88].
Logics are not generally formal systems with special utility in analyzing reasoning, and what
they do analyze - logical consequence or validity or proof rules - isn’t indisputably related
to the dynamic process of reasoning in any special way. Harman [121, 119, 122] showed us
this, and thereby inaugurated the debate about the epistemic role of logic.
PLEN can be used to formalize parts of the dispute about the epistemic role of logic
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[23, 79, 80, 121, 241] that are helpful for resolving it. Explicitly, PLEN can formalize the
different accounts of the epistemic role of logic. More precisely, PLEN provides a formalization of epistemic rationality norms, and, as a result, it can formalize different possible
bridge principles between logical validity and epistemic rationality. PLEN can also formalize
desiderata on such accounts of logic’s epistemic role. Thus, theoretical preferences among
bridge principles may be clearly articulated and rigorously defended in the logical platform
offered by PLEN. But this formalization is partly revisionary; it reconceives epistemic norms
from a dynamic and procedural perspective. The application of PLEN might thus result
in a reconceptualization of the debate about the epistemic role of logic, and may have surprising results. While theoretically interesting in its own right, such a reconceptualization
attains added interest given that different accounts of the epistemic role of logic interact
with other disputes in philosophy of logic, such as those about logical theory preference
[8, 110, 202, 206, 22] and revision of logic [38, 56, 138].
Second, PLEN can almost certainly - in virtue of both its similarities to and differences
from existing multi-agent settings [65, 74] - be extended fruitfully to the logical formalization
of the EMIL-A model of norm immergence and compliance [59]. More work can also be one
with respect to Chapter 2’s gestures concerning how normative alternatives are supplied in
default interventionist accounts of cognition, and it may be able to supply a model of the
content that is taken on by individual agents in the development and adoption of norms.
Beyond that, there is room to develop connections to the broader study of normativity
and action, as the formalism can be used as a basis for deontic logic and the semantics of
imperatives [89, 250, 251].
Of course, there is always room for further development of the underlying philosophy
of the model as well as further technical development of the basic formalism. While I’ve
argued fairly extensively for the philosophical account of norms to which the formalism
is anchored, it’s a wide-ranging discussion, launching criticisms of timeslice epistemology,
devising arguments from robustness analysis, proposing accounts of the purpose of epistemic
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norms, and so on. Each of these lines can be further developed and defended. On the
technical side, and I have only proven soundness results and a number of other results that
were especially useful for the philosophical purposes of the dissertation. Considerations
of completeness, decidability, alternative kinds of proof system, and extensions with new
devices are all in the offing. Let me close with a superficial glance at potential future
technical extensions of PLEN.

6.1

Extensions of PLEN for Future Work

PLEN is a modular framework. There are many points at which one can impose restrictions
on the constructions in PLEN in order to generate distinct logics for distinct purposes; modifications practically suggest themselves for various purposes. First, and foremost, there is
much room for the rigorous exploration of the modifications of PLEN that were briefly developed in Chapters 4 and 6. Here, I restrict myself to some potential avenues of modification
that have heretofore gone unremarked upon.

6.1.1

Alternative Parallel Executions

There are several ways in which parallel executions are unsatisfactory. One way is that
they require parallel executions to be composed of actions that decompose in to the same
number of steps. A better way to analyze parallel executions would be to build in machinery
that represents the temporal durations of actions, and defines parallel execution in terms of
durations. One could read π1 ∩ π2 as instructing the execution of π1 while executing π2 (and
vice versa). One way to do this would be to treat states as temporal indices and to define
the executions of parallel executions as those paths p such that f irst(p) is either f irst(q)
for some execution of π1 or f irst(r) for some execution of π2 and last(p) is either last(q) or
last(r) and the processes are interleaved in some way. A version of this is carried out in the
technical appendix of Meyer’s PDeL [174]. The analysis of concurrency is a well-developed
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subfield of dynamic logic [113], and a full analysis of the options for revising parallel execution
is reserved to future work.

6.1.2

Alternative Tests

In modeling epistemic dynamics, there are a number of interesting ways to think of tests. One
question to answer about tests is, independent of what epistemic action they are to represent,
whether to think of them as atomic actions or processes that might have durations that vary.
In the procedural fragment of PLEN, tests are treated in the latter way:





 V f irst(p) = last(p) 


((-)?) P(A)? = p | 





last(p) A
This definition allows tests to be executed in parallel or to be process or transition equivalent
with complex processes. This allows them to be executed in parallel with other protocols.
The treatment of tests in the ternary fragment gives us “basic tests”:
Basic Test P(A)? = R(A)? = {hs, (A)?, si | s

A}

While this form of tests doesn’t work as well with the considerations about parallel execution,
it has the feature that the replacement theorems apply in an unrestricted fashion to them.
With the conception of tests as processes of indeterminate length, tests end up having
some counterintuitive features. For one, in a test that takes one across many different states,
we get what we might think of as “Gettierized” tests. It might be the case that A holds at
f irst(p) = last(p) but that it fails to hold at some or all of the intermediate states. One
might want to think of tests as useful for detecting invariances:
Invariance Test





 V ∀si≤n ∈ w(p)(w(p) = hs1 , ..., sn i → A ∈ (v(si ) ∩ v(si+1 )) 


P(A)? = p | 





last(p) A
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Invariance tests require A to hold at the first state of the process and to carry through to all
other states in the process. Now, invariance tests might have a number of features we don’t
want them to have. We might think that tests should change as little as possible about the
world while revealing whether A holds:
Minimal Test




 V ∀si≤n−1 ∈ w(p)(w(p) = hs1 , ..., sn i → (v(si ) = v(si+1 )) 



Pm(A)? = p | 





v(last(p)) = v(f irst(p)) ∪ {A}
Minimal tests are minimally mutilating to the world; the test procedure uncovers A without
changing anything else in the world, but might mislead by bringing it about that A. A better
minimal test:
Minimal Invariance Test





 V ∀si≤n ∈ w(p)(w(p) = hs1 , ..., sn i → (v(si ) = v(si+1 )) 


Pmi(A)? = p | 





v(last(p)) = v(f irst(p))
An alternative way to think of tests is as processes (whether basic actions or not) of introspection. Where an EDG represents the dynamics of an agent, this suggests that, rather
than thinking of tests as reflexive transitions that always result in (and begin with) states
where A holds, they might be restricted to those where doxastic or epistemic propositions
hold:
Doxastic Test Pe(A)?





 V f irst(p) = last(p) 



= p| 





last(p) b(A)

Epistemic Test Pe(A)?







V  f irst(p) = last(p) 
= p| 





last(p) K(A)


The key differences between the two being those due to the semantics (in Chapter 4) for K;
doxastic test does not require that one’s beliefs end up true, where the Epistemic test does.
Again, these tests might differ from intuition in the ways in which tests always do, so we
might want to combine the forgoing pieces into more complex tests:
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Minimal Doxastic and Epistemic Tests
(Doxastic)




∀si≤n−1 ∈ w(p)(w(p) = hs1 , ..., sn i → (v(si ) = v(si+1 ))


 V

Pmd(A)? = p | 
 c(f irst(p)) = [X : Y : ΠM ] → c(last(p)) = [X ∪ {A} : Y : ΠM ]






v(last(p)) = v(f irst(p)) ∪ {b(A)}














(Epistemic)




∀si≤n−1 ∈ w(p)(w(p) = hs1 , ..., sn i → (v(si ) = v(si+1 ))


 V

Pme(A)? = p | 
 c(f irst(p)) = [X : Y : ΠM ] → c(last(p)) = [X ∪ {A} : Y : ΠM ]






v(last(p)) = v(f irst(p)) ∪ {K(A)}














Of course, epistemic actions - even those that are aimed at merely detecting things - are
often not minimal, resulting in all sorts of changes to the world:
Non-minimal Doxastic and Epistemic Tests
(Doxastic)




∀si≤n ∈ w(p)(w(p) = hs1 , ..., sn i → (v(si , A) = v(si+1 , A))


 V

Ppd(A)? = p | 
 c(f irst(p)) = [X1 : Y1 : ΠM 1 ] → c(last(p)) = [X1 ∪ {A} ⊆ X : Yn : ΠM n ]






v(last(p)) = v(sn−1 ) ∪ {b(A)}














(Epistemic)




∀si≤n ∈ w(p)(w(p) = hs1 , ..., sn i → (v(si , A) = v(si+1 , A))


 V

Ppe(A)? = p | 
 c(f irst(p)) = [X1 : Y1 : ΠM 1 ] → c(last(p)) = [X1 ∪ {A} ⊆ X : Yn : ΠM n ]






v(last(p)) = v(sn−1 ) ∪ {K(A)}














All of the foregoing tests are invariance tests. The minimal epistemic test is mutilating
to the world; the test procedure uncovers invariant A and pushes it into the acceptance
set without changing anything else in the world. The non-minimal epistemic test is not
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minimally mutilating to the world; the test procedure uncovers invariant A and pushes it
into acceptance set while allowing changes in the world. The addition of these forms of
test into PLEN might increase the utility for representing epistemic instructions that require
introspection or awareness.

6.1.3

Weighted Paths

In chapter 2, restrictions on epistemic dynamics were discussed in a somewhat limited way.
I introduced a construction that plausibly (or so I argued) modeled the categorical and
deontic content of norms as well as a kind of ranking or ordering on components of epistemic
dynamics. In Chapter 4, it was shown that protocols, in virtue of the execution rules, can
all be mapped to restrictions on epistemic dynamics, and that each restriction on epistemic
dynamics defined by any norm-kernel (whose elements are representable in PLEN) correlates
to those defined by some protocol. But this correlation was defined in terms of agreement
between the rational and irrational subsets and the thresholds of irrationality. PLEN couldn’t
represent the actual ordering of the elements of dynamics in the restrictions.
One way to overcome this limitation is by modifying the execution rules so that they
define not only sets of executions but ordering relations on all paths in each graph. For each
protocol π, define a function, P refπ , that, for each graph, g, arbitrarily maps each path in
g to a value in [0, 1]. Then, letting t ∈ [0, 1], for the regular operators, define the execution
sets of π, Pπt , for each threshold, t:
t
(;) Pπ1;π2
= {p | p = qr ∧ q ∈ Pπ1 ∧ r ∈ Pπ2 ∧ P refπ1;π2 (p) > t}









 ∃n≥ 1

















∃
hx
...x
i
1
n









 V V





t

(∗) Pπ∗
= p|  

∀
(x
∈
W
),
f
irst(p)
=
x
,
last(p)
=
x
,
V  i≤n i
1
n
  

 

 
  




0
0
0
0




∀p
,
∀
[(x
=
f
irst(p
),
x
=
last(p
))
→
p
∈
P
]


i≤n−1
i
i+1
π
















P refπ∗ (p) > t

CHAPTER 6. RECAPITULATION AND THE ROAD AHEAD
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t
= {p | (p ∈ Pπ1 ∨ p ∈ Pπ2 ) ∧ P refπ1∪π2 (p) > t}
(∪) Pπ1∪π2

I conjecture that this will enable us to map every restriction on epistemic dynamics defined
over the set of EDGs to some protocol in PP LEN in such a way that not only corresponds
to the rational and irrational subsets of elements, but also to the orderings they define
over paths. Adding preference functions on the basis of states and transitions should be
straightforward. Perhaps a function P refπ for transitions would work by requiring that:
P refπ (t) > P refπ (t0 ) iff t = hf irst(p), last(p)i, and t0 = hf irst(p0 ), last(p0 )i, and P refπ (p) >
P refπ (p0 ) would work.
Of course, there are now infinitely many sets of executions of each protocol, and this will
make proving anything meaningful about the formalism more difficult as a result. There
are infinitely many sets of executions of each protocol - one for each t ∈ [0, 1]. Protocol
graphs [135], for instance, seem apt to become massively more complex. For instance, if
every subprotocol and implementation of π must be executed in a protocol graph of π, there
will be infinitely many executions of each subprotocol and implementation.

6.2

PLEN and Nonclassical Logics

There are two very interesting ways of combining PLEN with non-classical logics. The first
- and more straightforward way - is to make the underlying logic of PLEN non-classical.
PLEN makes much room for non-classical modifications. After all, the truth functions in
PLEN were interpreted in strictly classical ways; one could always (for instance) replace the

CHAPTER 6. RECAPITULATION AND THE ROAD AHEAD

326

conditional of PLEN by giving the PLEN conditional a different truth table or by replacing it
with or adding an intensional conditional or a non-classical negation. It would be interesting
to see what follows from a non-classical PLEN.
The second way is actually more interesting. It would be worthwhile to explore PLEN
as theoretical basis for analyzing logical consequence relations. One way of doing this is to
think about the dynamic consequence relations analyzable via PDL: test-to-test consequence,
update-to-test consequence, update-to-update consequence, and so on.1 These notions have
already been deployed to analyze logical consequence [39, 258]. Another way of doing this
would be to try to build a relevant logic with PLEN as its semantics, following [208] or [243].
The basic idea being that some set of constraints on epistemic dynamics might provide a
natural basis for the semantics of relevant logic in much the same way that information
dynamics [208] or function application do [201]. This is also similar to Gardenfors’ basing
logical consequence on rational belief dynamics [91].

6.2.1

Alternative Epistemic Logics in PLEN

PLEN built its representation of epistemic dynamics on a syntactic epistemic logic [148] that
was inspired by Restall’s “states” [210] and Jago’s ELRA [134]. This enabled PLEN to simply
bypass any of the usual paradoxes or counterintuitive features of other epistemic logics, i.e.,
logical omniscience. This made PLEN suitable to representing epistemic dynamics at a
lower level of idealization. But this also left the properties of knowledge in PLEN relatively
incomplete and unsettled.
Probability and Credence in PLEN First, credence had no place in PLEN. This can
remedied easily enough by by amending content states with credence functions. Respecting
the threshold view of partial belief, let Cr(A) ∈ [0, 1] such that, for some threshold t, A ∈ X
iff Cr(A) > t and A ∈ Y iff Cr(A) < t. Then throw credence statements into the language
1

See Chapter 7 of [30] for an outline of these “dynamic styles of inference”.
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of LP LEN and protocols can be characterized in terms of their effects on credences. This
seems to be a way of injecting subjective probabilities into PLEN; I didn’t specify that Cr
had to obey any probability axioms, but it would be simple enough to require it at either
the meta-level or to characterize protocols that satisfy this or that set of axioms.
Epistemic Models Second, we could follow the central thought of research on DEL and
replace the states in EDGs with epistemic models, thereby moving from a syntactic representation of epistemic states to an epistemic models based representation. From there, we can
identify those pairs of states that essentially result in the same changes of transition relation
that would result from a product update, and associate them with the atomic protocols to
which they’re mapped. This gives us a way of embedding DEL into PLEN.
Norm Revision plus Conceptual Innovation

Finally, we could extend PLEN to not

only represent changes of epistemic state and changes of methodology, but even more radical
epistemic changes like conceptual innovation. One can combine Multiple Language Architectures (MLAs) and dynamic logics to create Descriptive Dynamic Logics [231], in which
protocols connect “units” over which distinct languages with distinct logics are interpreted.2
Each unit is itself a graph, and the protocols pair states in one graph with states in another.
To treat this in PLEN, think of hyper-EDGs, in which the nodes are themselves EDGs.
Then, after adding a meta-protocol language to PLEN, one could assign these new protocols
transitions (or even paths) among EDGs within hyper-EDGs. This could represent transitioning to an entirely new way of thinking. The language of one unit could be strictly
truth-functional while another has intensional connectives.
What would this technical modification represent? Well, to take one example, suppose
that in one unit, the logical language contains modals and in another unit, the language
doesn’t. Then there are contents for doxastic states in one unit with contents inexpressible
in the other. The expression b(A) is in one language and not in the other. The transition
2

See also graph modifier logics [15].
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from the modal-free unit to the modal unit looks like acquiring the concept of modality.
Alternately, in one unit, there may be no protocol expressions, and in another there may be
all of the protocol expressions of LP LEN . The transition from the first to the second unit
represents the acquisition of protocol-theoretic concepts.
With that, I end my brief excursion into additions and extensions of PLEN. And with
that, I end my initial articulation, defense, and case for the continued development of the
protocol-theoretic account of epistemic norms. Hopefully, it has added something to the
project of doing better epistemically.
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